National identity and social cohesion: theory and evidence for British social policy by Richards, Benjamin
1 
 
THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 
National identity and social cohesion:   
theory and evidence for British social policy 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Social Policy of the London School of Economics for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, September 2013 
 
Benjamin Richards 
 
 
 
 
  
 
2 
 
Declaration 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the 
London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I 
have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried 
out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that 
full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written 
consent. 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any 
third party. 
I declare that my thesis consists of 95,324 words. 
  
3 
 
Abstract 
Arguments that a national identity could create a sense of social unity, solidarity and cohesion 
in a national group have a long tradition in social and political theory. J. S. Mill, for instance, 
argued that “the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of 
nationalities” because a state with several nationalities is one in which members are 
“artificially tied together” (2001, 288). In Britain in the 2000s these arguments resurfaced in 
public and political discourse through a distancing from multiculturalism, which was 
increasingly seen as divisive, and a new emphasis on national unity and social cohesion 
through the promotion of British identity. There is, however, a lack of empirical research in 
Britain on what the relationship between national identity and social cohesion might actually 
be, and the strength of the relationship as compared with other issues that might also be 
important for social cohesion. This mixed-methods thesis attempts to address the research gap 
both through analysis of the Citizenship Survey covering England and Wales, and through semi-
structured interviews with respondents of Black-African and Black-Caribbean ethnicity in an 
area of London. I argue first that the type of national identity in question is of crucial 
importance; a distinction between constitutional patriotism, civic national identity, and ethnic 
national identity is helpful, and evidence suggests the latter form may in fact be detrimental to 
some aspects of social cohesion. Second, I argue that social cohesion might be better broken 
up into two separate concepts – one referring to a commitment to certain of the state’s 
institutions (termed ‘institutional cohesion’), and the other to associational types of behaviour 
(termed ‘associational cohesion’) – since the correlates of each of the two concepts are rather 
different and their separation would resolve many of the confusions in academic and public 
discussions of social cohesion. Third, I find evidence to suggest that British identity may be of 
more relevance for the associational type of cohesion than the institutional type, but overall 
both British and English identity are of marginal relevance for social cohesion as compared to 
education, deprivation, and perceptions of discrimination. This suggests that attempts to use 
British identity as a tool to create unity and cohesion in the context of increasing diversity may 
not work or even be counterproductive; issues of inequality and discrimination may be much 
more important to address. Fourth, I reflect on the extent to which issues of unity and 
cohesion at the level of the nation-state are still relevant in the context of identity politics on 
the one hand, and processes of globalisation on the other. I argue that nation-states, for the 
time being, remain important sites of redistribution and reference points for perceptions of 
equality; to the extent that these issues are important for social cohesion, nation-states are 
therefore important too.  
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Arguments for the importance of national identities for national unity, cohesion and solidarity 
have a long history in social and political theory. J.S. Mill, for instance, argued that “the 
boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities” because a 
state with several nationalities is one in which members are “artificially tied together” (Mill 
2001, 288). Jean-Jacques Rousseau also wrote of the importance of patriotism for national 
unity, claiming “that the greatest miracles of virtue have been produced by patriotism” 
(Rousseau 1973, 130), and that “a careful and well-intentioned government, vigilant 
incessantly to maintain or restore patriotism … provides beforehand against the evils which 
sooner or later result from the indifference of the citizens to the fate of the Republic” (ibid., 
137). In the 20th and early 21st centuries such arguments were adopted by other political 
philosophers, who have argued that national identities can be important for national unity and 
solidarity for a variety of reasons. These include: a liberal concern with “the creation and 
maintenance of the conditions under which liberal democratic institutions will survive” (Barry 
2001, 79); a socialist or social democratic concern with the implementation of policies 
designed to ensure redistribution or social justice (e.g. Miller 1995); a communitarian concern 
with supporting a national culture that provides the necessary cultural conditions for human 
flourishing (Luban 1980); and a conservative concern with the maintenance of national 
customs or traditions, which is seen as an important end in itself (e.g. Scruton 2006). What this 
diverse set of arguments has in common is, for varying reasons, an emphasis on the 
importance of national identities for a sense of national unity, solidarity and cohesion. 
Since the early 2000s government policy and public discourse in the UK has emphasised the 
importance of national unity and cohesion, and arguments about the importance of national 
identity for national unity and cohesion have found their way into this policy and public 
discourse. ‘Race relations’ policy has seen a shift away from multiculturalism – the favoured 
policy prior to 2001 – and towards an emphasis on ‘community cohesion’ (Worley 2005). In the 
wake of the 2001 disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham, a view was expressed in 
government reports of ‘communities’ excluding themselves from the ‘mainstream’ by living 
‘parallel lives’ (Cantle 2001), and “in national policy, respect for diversity has been de-
emphasised or de-prioritised in favour of emphasising shared values and promoting cohesion” 
(Lewis & Craig 2013, 2). There was a new perception that multiculturalism could be divisive 
and detrimental to national unity, and a focus emerged of immigrants (and possibly their 
descendants) integrating into a ‘mainstream’ British culture.  
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This shift in government policy towards a new focus on community cohesion, with its emphasis 
on the important of national identity, has taken place despite a lack of academic research into 
what the nature of the relationship between national identity and social cohesion might 
actually be in Britain, and despite a lack of conceptual clarity on how the relationship might be 
dependent on the precise meaning given to both ‘national identity’ and ‘social’ or ‘community’ 
cohesion. The research that does exist highlights a number of things of importance. On the one 
hand, evidence from the US in particular suggests that ethnic diversity may be associated with 
negative outcomes for some types of cohesion: lower interpersonal trust, social capital and 
support for redistributive policies (Putnam 2007; Alesina & Glaeser 2004). Other evidence 
suggests belonging and attachment to Britain may be associated with “social trust, civic duty … 
and by increased support for the political order” (Heath & Roberts 2008, 2). On the other 
hand, different research suggests that, at least in contexts outside the US, “immigration, 
multiculturalism policies and redistribution can represent a stable political equilibrium” 
(Banting 2005, 98); and that there may be crucial differences in the roles of ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ 
national identities for cohesion, since ‘ethnic’ identities may exclude certain groups (Heath & 
Roberts 2008). In addition it may be the case that, contrary to suggestions that minority 
communities should feel a greater sense of ‘Britishness’ to bring themselves into the British 
‘mainstream’, many members of ethnic minority groups already feel British, and instead a 
bigger issue may be to do with the non-acceptance of their identity claims by the white 
majority (Modood et al. 1994). 
This study investigates, therefore, whether or not national identity in Britain can be important 
for increased social cohesion outcomes. If so, it asks in what contexts: what type of national 
identity; and what precisely is meant by the social cohesion it might be important for? If not, 
then what else might be important instead: as Banting (2005) and Letki (2008) suggest, are 
structural issues more important? Does the relationship vary by ethnic group? And what are 
the roles of non-acceptance and discrimination? 
This thesis investigates these questions by using a mixed methods approach. The reasons for 
using mixed methods to investigate the research question were primarily based on what 
Bryman refers to as completeness – that is because “a more complete answer to a research 
question or set of research questions can be achieved by including both quantitative and 
qualitative methods” (2012, 637) – and also explanation, in the sense of using the qualitative 
component to “explain relationships between variables” found in the quantitative component 
(2012, 641). The quantitative component of the thesis analyses the Home Office’s Citizenship 
Survey covering England and Wales. It first uses Principal Components Analysis to produce 
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measures of social cohesion, second constructs regression models to investigate whether 
there are associations between British and English identities and the measures of social 
cohesion and whether these associations vary by ethnic group, and third asks whether any of 
the control variables included in the model – measuring, for instance, ‘structural’ issues such 
as deprivation, socio-economic group, and educational qualifications – might also be important 
for social cohesion. The qualitative component consists of semi-structured interviews with 
twenty two respondents of Black African and Black Caribbean ethnicity living in an ethnically 
diverse area of London. Respondents expressed their feelings of their national and ethnic 
identities, and any links they might see between these identities and aspects of social 
cohesion. The objective of the qualitative component was to identify a range of narratives 
surrounding national and ethnic identities and possible links, or otherwise, to social cohesion. 
The thesis makes four main arguments. First, it suggests that the relationship between national 
identity and social cohesion in Britain depends crucially on the nature of the concept of 
national identity in question. It is argued that the distinction between constitutional 
patriotism, civic national identity and ethnic national identity (e.g. Kymlicka 1995) is helpful, 
and that British identity – which is at least to some extent a civic national identity – may be 
more relevant for social cohesion than English national identity, which is largely an ethnic 
national identity. Indeed, English identity may, in some cases, be associated with decreased 
social cohesion, perhaps because of its exclusive nature, with its links to being ‘Anglo-Saxon’. 
Second, the thesis argues that the vague, ambiguous and contested concept of social cohesion 
might be better broken up into two different types of cohesion, since its relationship with 
national identity differs depending on the type in question. These types are given the working 
titles of ‘institutional cohesion’ and ‘associational cohesion’: the former refers to the ability to 
influence and access public institutions, such as public services; and the latter refers to 
associational relationships between individuals – such as social and civic activities – and to 
feelings of spatial belonging. It is suggested that British identity may have some importance for 
associational cohesion, but may have little relevance for institutional cohesion. Third, the 
thesis argues that certain types of equality may have much more important relationships with 
social cohesion that does national identity. For associational cohesion, structural equality – 
with a particular focus on area-level deprivation and educational qualifications – may be much 
more important than national identity; and for institutional cohesion, perceptions of 
discrimination – particularly with regard to equal access to public services – may be especially 
important. Fourth, the thesis reflects on the role of the nation-state as the appropriate ‘level’ 
at which to focus on issues of social cohesion and suggests that, to the extent that states are 
important for implementing progressive social policies, and are important frames of reference 
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for perceptions of equality, the fact that equality was found to be important for social 
cohesion means that states are, for the time being, important too. 
Why is all this important for British social policy? To answer this question, the next section 
introduces the policy context in Britain, particularly since the early 2000s; it discusses the shift 
in race relations policy from multiculturalism to ‘community cohesion’; and it illustrates the 
importance of evidence on the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in 
this policy context.  
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1.1 National identity and social cohesion in British public discourse 
and policy 
 
Since the disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001, UK ‘race relations’ policy has 
seen a shift from previous policies focusing on multiculturalism, to a new policy focus on social 
cohesion (Worley 2005). After the 2001 disturbances several reports were published. The 
Cantle Report (Cantle 2001) used the definition of social cohesion given by Forrest & Kearns 
(2001), a definition that will also provide the starting point of this thesis, but simply replaced 
the word ‘social’ with ‘community’ in order to discuss ‘community cohesion’. The Cantle 
Report built partly on Parekh’s (2000) idea of Britain being a ‘community of communities’, but 
claimed that different communities were living ‘parallel lives’; the task of community cohesion 
was then to bring together, in some sense, this diverse set of communities, but the discourse 
around community cohesion had “a strong assimilationist tendency” (Platt 2007a, 2), 
particularly in that there was an implication of ethnic minority communities, rather than 
communities in general, being the problem. 
The new focus on social and community cohesion implied a move away from multiculturalism, 
which was increasingly seen as detrimental to national unity (O'Donnell 2007). 
Multiculturalism had been criticised prior to the advent of the social cohesion discourse, 
including on the grounds that concerns for preserving cultural differences could lead to the 
overlooking of discrimination within groups (Okin 1998); that institutionalising difference 
‘freezes’ cultural differences, making them less available to reform (A. Phillips 2007); and that 
multiculturalism trivialises difference by providing only a superficial ‘celebration’ of it (Gilroy 
1992). What was different about the new critique of multiculturalism that accompanied the 
social cohesion discourse, however, was its emphasis on the former’s alleged role in 
undermining national unity. The new critique included accusations that multiculturalism had a 
role to play in “licensing ethnically based ‘ghetto mentalities’ and disunity” (McLaughlin 2010, 
97), and sustaining ‘difference’ rather than promoting integration (Percival 2007). 
There are many examples of this shift, including in speeches and statements of politicians, the 
media, and policy. A perception that “diversity threatens national stability” (Burnett 2007, 353) 
has appeared in statements such as Gordon Brown’s assertion that: 
“Continually failing to emphasise what bound us together as a country, 
multiculturalism became an excuse for justifying separateness and then separateness 
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became a tolerance of – and all too often a defence of – even greater exclusivity” 
(Telegraph 2007). 
As leader of the opposition, David Cameron expressed similar views, stating that: 
“[t]he doctrine of multiculturalism has undermined our nation’s sense of cohesiveness 
because it emphasises what divides us rather than what brings us together” (Burnett 
2007, 353). 
The Denham Report (Denham 2001, 11) – another influential report published after the 2001 
disturbances – argued for a civic national identity as a key component in the community 
cohesion strategy: 
“We have drawn on the detailed descriptions and analysis contained in the reports of 
Cantle, Clarke, Ouseley and Ritchie … in setting out the following brief overview of the 
key issues. There is a large measure of agreement on the following being the most 
important factors; 
- the lack of a strong civic identity or shared social values to unite diverse 
communities”. 
This idea of using a civic notion of Britishness as a unifying tool has been a key theme in the 
social cohesion agenda since 2001: “The issue of Britishness and what it represents, whether it 
is an identity that can continue to act as social glue, is resonant in all discussions about 
cohesion in the UK” (Hickman et al. 2012, 49). This has been a major part of the agenda 
despite Parkeh’s (2000, 38) warning just a year earlier that “Britishness as much as Englishness, 
has systematic, largely unspoken racial connotations”. Measures to promote the new social 
cohesion agenda included the introduction of new Citizenship Test requirements for 
immigrants wishing to gain citizenship (Burnett 2007) and citizenship became more prominent 
in policy with, for example, its link with access to benefits, such as the differential treatment of 
asylum seekers in providing welfare in the form of vouchers (Alexander, Edwards et al. 2007). 
There has been extensive academic criticism of the social cohesion discourse. One of the main 
strands has focused on the relative emphasis placed on social and cultural explanations, in 
particular of the 2001 disturbances, in preference to socio-economic explanations. For 
example, McGhee (2003, 392) criticises government reports following the 2001 disturbances 
for their “overwhelming emphasis on the failure of inter-community communication [which] 
de-emphasises contributory factors such as poverty, exclusion from the workforce, exclusion 
from consumption”. Similarly, Amin (2003, 460) criticises the “culture of unashamed 
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questioning of the cultural practices and national allegiances of British Muslims”, instead citing 
the long history of deprivation as a key factor in the 2001 disturbances. 
More recently government reports, such as the Home Office’s (2005a) Improving Opportunity, 
Strengthening Society, have addressed this criticism to a certain extent, showing greater 
emphasis on inequality between ethnic groups alongside the perceived importance of British 
identity (C. Phillips 2009). Nevertheless, much media discourse still focuses on relations 
between communities, in contrast to most academic literature which emphasises the need to 
tackle both issues: “We need to consider how people relate to each other as well as addressing 
fundamental issues of deprivation, disadvantage and discrimination. Discussing how people 
get on together without dealing with inequalities will not work” (Hickman, Crowley et al. 
2008). 
In this policy context, therefore, providing evidence on the nature of any relationship between 
national identity and social cohesion, and other issues that may influence this relationship, is 
of fundamental importance, especially given the strong emphasis placed on the potential 
benefits of a civic notion of Britishness for community cohesion. It is hoped that this thesis can, 
in however small a way, contribute to the current policy debate in Britain. 
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1.2 Structure of the thesis 
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature relevant 
to a discussion of national identity and social cohesion. It discusses the meaning of the 
contested and ambiguous concept of social cohesion, and presents the most rigorous 
definition of the concept to date – that of Forrest and Kearns (2001). It then discusses the 
concept of national identity, including presenting a brief history of nationalism, and goes on to 
discuss race and ethnicity. Links to the concepts of nationalism and national identity are 
highlighted and, following this, theoretical arguments regarding the importance of national 
identity for social cohesion are outlined. Chapter 2 next goes on to review existing research 
that is relevant for an investigation into the relationship between national identity and social 
cohesion. In particular, there is a substantial body of research into links between ethnic 
heterogeneity and some indicators of social cohesion such as social capital, interpersonal trust, 
and support for redistributive policies; and there is a limited amount of research investigating 
the relationship between national identity and social cohesion directly. Chapter 2 finishes by 
drawing out the specific research questions arising from this review of the literature, and 
provides a theoretical framework that will guide the methodology used in the empirical part of 
the thesis. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the methodology for the empirical investigation of this 
thesis, although greater details of more specific aspects of the methodology are provided in 
Chapters 4 and 5, which report on the results of the quantitative and qualitative components 
respectively. Chapter 3 shows the reasoning behind the choice of the Citizenship Survey for 
quantitative analysis, presents the relevant questions available, and outlines the way in which 
the theoretical framework will guide the analysis. It then goes on to outline the approach to 
the qualitative component, which comprises a set of semi-structured interviews with people of 
Black African and Black Caribbean ethnicity in an ethnically diverse area of London. Purposive 
sampling was used to recruit interviewees, which ensured a range of different people were 
interviewed across three potentially important categories: employment status, gender, and 
age. 
Chapter 4 gives a detailed report on the quantitative component of the thesis. Its first task is to 
use Principal Components Analysis to produce measures of the multifaceted concept of social 
cohesion, and it shows that, using the variables available in the Citizenship Survey, social 
cohesion can be broken down into ten different ‘elements’. Second, it produces regression 
models to look for associations between measures of national identity and social cohesion. The 
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main focus is on British national identity, but a measure of English identity is also created. 
Results are broken down by ethnic group, and comparisons are drawn between the 
magnitudes of the effects of British and English identity with the magnitudes of the effects of 
key control variables. 
Chapter 5 gives a detailed report of the qualitative component of the thesis. The data 
presented are drawn from twenty two semi-structured interviews with respondents of Black 
African and Black Caribbean ethnicity residing in an area of London. Chapter 5 presents a range 
of narratives around four issues: first, respondents’ expressions of their national identities; 
second, respondents’ expressions of their ethnic identities and any links they may see between 
their ethnic and national identities; third, the ways in which respondents described the links 
they may or may not see between their national identities and social cohesion; and fourth, 
groups of narratives that were commonly expressed together. The aim is to establish as wide a 
range of narratives as possible regarding ways in which respondents expressed their feelings of 
identity, and in terms of links between their identities and social cohesion. 
Chapter 6 draws together the findings of Chapters 4 and 5 with some theoretical 
considerations on the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain 
since, in addition to the empirical analysis, this study also involves some important theoretical 
work. Chapter 6 introduces some new theoretical material, and provides a synthesis of this 
theoretical material together with the insights found from Chapters 4 and 5. It identifies four 
different theoretical arguments about the ways in which national identity might be important 
for social cohesion that correspond to four different political positions. In the light of the 
findings from Chapters 4 and 5, the nature of the concepts of national identity and social 
cohesion are each explored, and links are drawn between different conceptions of each, and 
the four theoretical arguments regarding the importance of national identity for social 
cohesion. Reflections are then given upon the importance of national identity for national 
social cohesion in the context of arguments for multicultural solidarities on the one hand, and 
global solidarities on the other. 
Chapter 7 concludes. After summarising the thesis, including the argument of each chapter 
and key findings, it presents the four main arguments of the thesis. These are first that the 
relationship between national identity and social cohesion depends crucially on the nature of 
the concept of national identity in question; and second that social cohesion might be better 
broken into two different concepts corresponding to two different types of cohesion, since the 
relationship with national identity depends on the concept in question. Third, it is argued that 
indicators of equality – in particular area-level deprivation, education and perceptions of 
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discrimination – may have a much more important relationship with social cohesion than 
national identity. Fourth, reflections are given on the role of the nation-state as the 
appropriate ‘level’ at which cohesion should be maintained, and it is suggested that, given the 
importance of states for redistribution and as a frame of reference for perceptions of equality, 
together with the finding that equality may be of particular importance for social cohesion, 
then nation-states remain for the time being an important ‘level’ for cohesion. Last, Chapter 7 
draws on the government policy context in Britain to outline some policy implications and 
areas for future research. 
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Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter first explores the central concepts under investigation by discussing the meaning 
of social cohesion, and exploring literature on national identity. Issues of ‘race’, ethnicity and 
religion are also relevant to the discussion of national identity and social cohesion, so they are 
explored next. The chapter goes on to discuss existing research on national identity and social 
cohesion, with a particular focus on the evidence that exists on possible links between ethnic 
diversity and indicators of social cohesion such as trust and support for redistributive policies. 
The chapter finishes by stating the research questions in detail, and providing a theoretical 
framework that will guide the way in which the questions are investigated in this thesis. 
 
2.1 Meanings of social cohesion 
 
Although in much public and policy discourse the meaning of ‘social cohesion’ is taken to be 
relatively unproblematic, it has been used in multiple, often contradictory ways, and remains 
very much a vague and contested concept. As Kearns & Forrest (2000, 966) put it: 
“What is meant by the term ‘social cohesion’? Typically, it is used in such a way that its 
meaning is nebulous but at the same time the impression is given that everyone knows 
what is being referred to. The usual premise is that social cohesion is a good thing, so 
it is conveniently assumed that further elaboration is unnecessary.” 
Pahl (1991, 350) hints that excessive social cohesion in certain situations may create negative 
outcomes: “Excessive local or personal loyalty or cohesion may be the essential basis for 
certain types of crime”. In addition, there may be conflicts between the levels at which social 
cohesion is supposed to occur such that, for instance, the cohesiveness of a small region, with 
desires such as self-governance, may create problems for the cohesiveness of the country as a 
whole. Despite these conceptual issues, “politicians, Eurocrats and atheoretical specialists in 
social policy argue for social cohesion and social consensus as if these were self-evidently 
good” (Pahl 1991, 358). 
Following criticisms of the vague nature of the concept, there have been academic attempts to 
define it more precisely. Definitions vary, but often reference is made to ‘social glue’ (Rajulton, 
Ravanera et al. 2007), or “the need to find unifying common ground which will inspire assent 
across the board” (Wetherell 2007, 5). 
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The most rigorous attempt at an academic definition is provided by Forrest & Kearns (2001) 
(see Table 1), whereby social cohesion is broken down into the following five dimensions: 
common values and a civic culture; social order and social control; social solidarity and 
reductions in wealth disparities; social networks and social capital; and place attachment and 
identity. In public and policy discourse, the Cantle Report (Cantle 2001) used these five 
dimensions, although replaced the term ‘social cohesion’ with ‘community cohesion’, the 
reasoning behind which was that, as noted above, it is possible for internally ‘socially cohesive’ 
communities to exhibit tensions externally with other communities. The Cantle Report 
therefore distinguished between ‘social cohesion’ as referring to the presence of cohesion in 
an unspecified (but potentially very small) area, including for example a cohesive community 
within a divided city; and ‘community cohesion’ as referring to cohesion within and between 
different communities (Robinson 2005). 
As already hinted at, the concept is multi-level in the sense that an individual’s identification 
with, and relationships within, a group can be at, for example, the national level, the 
community level, or the neighbourhood level. Although a property of a group, indicators of 
social cohesion can be found at the individual level, as will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
Given the fact that the definition provided by Forrest & Kearns (2001) is the most rigorous 
attempt to date at defining social cohesion, this formulation seems a reasonable starting point 
to use in investigating the role of national identity for social cohesion. However, the concept 
will be used critically and its contested nature will be kept in mind. 
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Table 1: The dimensions of social cohesion 
Domain  Description 
Common values and 
a civic culture  
Common aims and objectives; 
common moral principles and codes of behaviour; 
support for political institutions and participation in politics 
Social order and 
social control 
Absence of general conflict and threats to the existing order; 
absence of incivility; 
effective informal social control; 
tolerance; 
respect for difference; 
intergroup co-operation 
Social solidarity and 
reductions in wealth 
disparities 
Harmonious economic and social development and common 
standards; 
redistribution of public finances and of opportunities; 
equal access to services and welfare benefits; 
ready acknowledgement of social obligations and willingness to assist 
others 
Social networks and 
social capital 
High degree of social interaction within communities and families; 
civic engagement and associational activity; 
easy resolution of collective action problems 
Place attachment 
and identity 
Strong attachment to place; 
intertwining of personal and place identity 
 
Source: Forrest and Kearns (2001, 2129)  
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2.2 National identity 
 
There have been academic arguments for the importance of national identity for social 
solidarity and cohesion. One such argument asserts the importance of national identity and 
nation-building in liberal democracies (e.g. Tamir 1993; Miller 1995). Miller (1995, 10) argues 
that “it may properly be part of someone’s identity that they belong to this or that national 
grouping”, and that national identity can be important for replicating at the national level the 
solidarities found in small communities. This can in turn be important for sustaining support at 
the national level for such things as the political order and the welfare state. Miller (1995) also 
argues that national identity has more significance in advanced liberal societies than many 
would admit. Although people may be “repelled by the raucous form that nationalism often 
takes in countries that are less developed and less liberal”, there are moments when people 
“see their own well-being as closely bound up with that of the [national] community” (ibid., 
15). Canovan (1996) also sees national identity as important, and uses the metaphor of 
national identity as a ‘battery’ that makes states operate, with citizens motivated to work for 
common goals. 
There have, in addition, been arguments about the potential benefits of national identity at 
the local level. Putnam (2007, 164), for example, argues that the benefits of immigration are 
often felt at the national level, whilst the short-term costs are “often concentrated at the local 
level”, and it may be possible to reduce the impact of these costs by encouraging shared 
identities. Hirschman (2005) also emphasises what he sees as the long-term benefits to local-
level American society and culture of fostering a national identity and allowing immigrants to 
become more ‘American’. 
In the context of these arguments for the potential benefits of national identity for solidarity 
and cohesion, this section will explore the concept of national identity, and its implications for 
an analysis of the role of national identity for social cohesion. 
History of nationalism and national identity 
Miles & Brown (2003) argue that the 19th century saw nationalism become much more 
widespread in Europe, whereby a sense of ‘imagined community’ that was seen as necessary 
to sustain a capitalist economy was created to consolidate the system. There were significant 
links between racism and nationalism, with proponents of the latter drawing upon ‘scientific’ 
racism in an attempt to demonstrate the distinctness of each nation, and contend that there 
was a “historical inevitability” to the separateness of the nation (Miles and Brown 2003, 145). 
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The idea that there were biological differences between national ‘races’ was a particularly 
useful argument in creating and sustaining national myths. 
Towards the end of the 19th century and during the start of the 20th century, nationalism also 
influenced policy in Britain. Faced with a challenge to Britain’s industrial supremacy, a 
declining birth rate, evidence of the poor health of British soldiers during the Boer War, and a 
new activism amongst the working class, the ruling classes sought to “subordinate class 
interests to those of nation and empire” by arguing that social reforms were the fruits of 
imperialism, and justifying this on the grounds of the supremacy of the British race (Williams 
1989, 156). Williams argues that the state created an impression of an interdependence 
between welfare reform and imperialism, such that trade unions came to believe that welfare 
reforms were necessary for ‘national efficiency’, upon which imperialist power depended, 
which created “an apparent material as well as ideological basis for the working class to 
believe in imperialism and racial supremacy” (ibid.). 
Since the advent of genetics, ‘scientific’ racism has become thoroughly discredited (Pilkington 
2003). In particular, the idea that features such as skin colour are necessarily congruent with 
other characteristics, such as intellectual capacity, has been shown to be incorrect (Ballard 
2002). In addition, the political and economic climate altered significantly in the 20th century 
such that “the relationship between the capitalist mode of production and the nation state is 
becoming increasingly contradictory” (Miles and Brown 2003, 147). Economic and political 
interdependence between nations, accompanied by increased migration across borders, have 
challenged traditional national identities and led to a “fragmentation and erosion of collective 
social identity” (Hall 2000, 146). 
Nevertheless, national identities remain widespread: in England, Scotland and Wales the 
majority of residents identify with Britain, at least as part of their identity (Heath and Roberts 
2008). However, many meanings can be attached to national identity, and it is important to be 
clear about precisely what type one is discussing. Although nationalism can be linked to racist 
ideology, this is not necessarily the case: “Nationalism is a broad-spectrum ideology ranging 
from fascism to a moderate identification with a given country with no necessary negative 
assumptions about other nations” (O'Donnell 2007, 250). Despite its widespread racist use in 
the 19th century, there can be a wide range of meanings attached to national identities. Some 
key distinctions will be explored in the following section. 
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Civic belonging and national identity 
Castles & Miller (2009) make an important distinction between civic belonging and national 
identity in their comparison of state development and national identity in, amongst other 
countries, Britain, France and Germany. In Germany, which was unified relatively late in 1871, 
an idea of nation and corresponding national identity existed before the formation of the 
state; this was an ethnic, racially-based identity. In Britain and France, by contrast, the state 
was created without a corresponding pre-existing national identity: in France such an identity 
was created after the French Revolution; whilst in Britain it was accepted that citizens could 
identify with England, Wales or Scotland as long as they showed political allegiance to Britain. 
This comparison demonstrates the differing nature of national identity in Britain, France and 
Germany in the 19th century, with France requiring its citizens to abandon group identities in 
favour of a unitary French identity, Britain permitting citizens to maintain group identities as 
long as they showed political allegiance, and Germany requiring having (and being accepted by 
others to have) German national identity as “a precondition for belonging as a citizen” (Castles 
and Miller 2009, 146). This comparison highlights the important distinction between civic 
belonging and national identity, with national identity and civic belonging being tied together 
in France and Germany, but allowed to remain separate in Britain.1 
These distinctions between types of national identities, some with the accompaniment of a 
racist ideology but some without, highlight just how important it is to be clear about the sort 
of national identity one is talking about, especially if it is something one is looking to promote. 
It may also have important implications for how national identity may relate to social cohesion 
and solidarity. A civic conception of national identity is seen as ‘thinner’ and more abstract 
than an ethnic conception; this makes civic identity more inclusive to other ethnic groups than 
an ethnic conception, but has raised questions about the ability of ‘thinner’ identities to 
sustain solidarities between citizens in the same way that a ‘thicker’ conception could 
(Kymlicka 2008). 
  
                                                          
1
 In addition, Mirel (2002) describes the way in which immigrants to the US in the early 20th century 
were initially required to give up their ethnic identities entirely in order to assimilate. By 1950, however, 
this policy had changed considerably, with American identity being redefined in terms of civic ideals 
such as respecting diversity. In this way, immigrants were able to simultaneously keep elements of their 
ethnic identity whilst also adopting elements of an American civic identity. This distinction has 
similarities to that between civic and ethnic conceptions of British national identity in a recent UK-based 
study (Heath and Roberts 2008). Ethnic conceptions of national identity place emphasis on “ancestry 
and ascribed characteristics that are more or less fixed at birth”; whilst civic conceptions place emphasis 
on acquired characteristics, such as support for a particular type of politics (Heath and Roberts 2008, 
24). 
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2.3 Race, ethnicity and religion 
 
Of central importance to arguments that national identity is important for solidarity and 
cohesion are issues of race, ethnicity and religion. Academic literature emphasises the 
importance of ethnic identity in the understanding of national identity (Maxwell 2006; Castles 
and Miller 2009) and of aspects of social cohesion (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Putnam 2007); 
and ethnicity is also “a possible source of new national identities” (Miller 1995, 20). Religious 
identities may also be important since some religious groups may “give religion rather than 
national origins a greater saliency in self-concepts” (Modood and Ahmad 2007, 187). It is 
possible that the relationships between national identity and social cohesion may differ 
depending on ethnic or religious identity, and so these key concepts will be explored in this 
section. 
Ethnic and racial identity 
Two points of particular relevance for how national identity may relate to social cohesion 
come out of this literature. The first is the importance of identity claims being accepted by 
others; and the second is the changing, complex and often hybrid nature of identities that 
defies reduction into specific categories. Each of these issues will now be discussed in turn. 
After the period of significant immigration to Britain following the Second World War, a 
politics of identity emerged in response to the racism directed at recent immigrants. This 
politics of identity constructed a notion of ‘Black’; one that highlighted the commonalities in 
experience of those discriminated against due to their country of origin. “Blocked out of any 
access to an English or British identity”, people could simultaneously use ‘Black’ identity as an 
alternative identity source, whilst also showing their solidarity with people who, despite often 
having a different skin colour and heritage, shared their plight (Hall 2000, 148). Political 
‘Blackness’ became an identity one could learn from experience, not something that 
necessarily described one’s heritage or culture. Hall (2000) highlights his experience of 
adopting a new identity as a ‘Black’ person, something that happened only after leaving 
Jamaica and living in the UK. 
It is interesting to note the way in which Hall describes ‘Black’ identity as compensating for 
being excluded from English or British identity. This is consistent with the emphasis placed by 
several commentators, for example McCrone & Bechhofer (2008), on the importance of 
identity claims being accepted by others, and it highlights the need for examination of the role 
identity supposedly plays in the choice, or otherwise, of members of ethnic minority 
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communities to exclude themselves. For example, a study by Modood et al. (1994) highlights 
the willingness of many of the participants of Caribbean heritage to identify with Britain, but 
also their feeling of exclusion from this identity by the (white) majority, because of their skin 
colour. The political identity of ‘Black’ may be particularly important to the qualitative 
component of this study since it is of particular relevance to those of Black African and Black 
Caribbean heritage – the groups that were targeted for interview. 
Although it had advantages for uniting otherwise diverse groups of people to fight against the 
common experience of racism, there were problems inherent in the political identity ‘Black’, 
such as that it suggested non-white groups had something in common other than how others 
treated them (Modood 1994), and it was rejected by some Asian groups in order to highlight 
the distinct nature of discrimination against them. This contributed towards the creation of 
what many commentators have termed ‘new ethnicities’, in which people took new, complex 
and sometimes hybrid identities. According to Solomos (2003, 211), “[p]erhaps the most 
important symbol of this change was the assertion that it was possible to be both black and 
British”. This led to a desire, for example, for third generation Black people to identify 
simultaneously with their Caribbean heritage, a ‘Black’ identity, and a British identity: “They 
want to speak from all three identities” (Hall 2000, 152). This point is echoed by Amin’s (2003, 
462) reading of the 2001 disturbances in northern England, in which those involved were 
“young people who have grown up routinely mixing ‘eastern’ and ‘western’ markers of 
identity, through language, bodily expression, music and consumer habits, and who are not 
confused about their identities and values as cultural ‘hybrids’”.2 
These issues highlight first the importance of identity claims being accepted by others, 
whereby the identity of ‘Black’ can be seen partly as a response to exclusion from British 
identity, suggesting care will need to be taken in interpreting the national identities of minority 
ethnic groups: it may be that a lack of British identity does not indicate an unwillingness to 
adopt such an identity, but instead a feeling of exclusion from it. Second, the description of 
emerging ‘new ethnicities’ illustrates the complexity, fluidity and hybridity of identities, 
                                                          
2
 There are many disadvantages to how the political identity of ‘Black’ came to be used. First, by 
emphasising the common experiences of racism of recent immigrants, it hid other differences, such as 
class and gender, which could potentially highlight important similarities such as the economic position 
of working class whites and some migrants; and also suggested a “false essentialism, namely, that all 
non-white groups have something in common other than how others treat them” (Modood 1994, 866). 
Second, it silenced the specific experiences, cultural pride, and identity of Asian people. As Modood 
(1994) argues, ‘Blackness’ had become a symbol of the discrimination against African and Caribbean 
people, one that focused in particular on skin colour, and also became associated with African and 
Caribbean heritage and cultural pride. Whilst many people of African and Caribbean heritage would also 
object to being categorised as ‘Black’, this problem applied in particular to Asian people, many of whom 
viewed the discrimination against them as based around culture and religion rather than skin colour. 
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demonstrating that it is difficult to place them firmly in fixed categories. The analysis of 
relationships between national identity and social cohesion will need to demonstrate 
awareness of this complex and multiple aspect of people’s identities; for example there will 
need to be awareness of the possibility that people identify strongly with both their heritage 
and host countries simultaneously.3 
This last point is particularly important with regard to the way in which ethnicity is categorised 
in census or survey questions, since fixed categories are used with which respondents are 
asked to self-identify, but these fixed categories may not respond to the way in which 
respondents understand their own identities, which may be complex, hybrid, and dependent 
on context: 
“Expressed or chosen identity is often not captured in sources of information about 
minority ethnic groups: questions are not left open and the options offered indicate 
that in seeking information on ethnic origin surveys and censuses are attempting to 
capture something about the ‘non-White’ population of the UK aggregated to reflect a 
number of common aspects of ‘identity’ such as immigration history, forebears’ 
nationality, region of origin, religion and so on”. 
(Platt 2007a, 18)  
The ethnic categories that are used in censuses and surveys attempt to combine the aim of 
producing categories which are seen as useful for the purposes of analysis of different groups 
with the aim of producing categories that people able to meaningfully self-identify with. For 
instance, Howard (2006, 120) highlights the way in which categories are decided upon on a 
politicised basis rather than reflecting an understanding of “sociological reality”. The extent to 
which the ethnic categories used in this study correspond to the actual ethnic groups with 
which people identify, therefore, is clearly a crucial issue with regard to the conclusions that 
can be drawn from the way in which relationships between national identity and social 
cohesion might differ by ethnic group. 
                                                          
3
 A related and important distinction is that between identity as a ‘mode of oppression’, and identity as 
a ‘mode of being’ (Modood 1994). An identity as a ‘mode of oppression’ is an identity based on the 
characteristics of a group that are the focus of discrimination; the original form of ‘Black’ identity falls 
into this category. Such an identity is negative since it is determined by the oppressing group and does 
not necessarily correspond to how the oppressed group would wish to define their own identities. 
Identity as a ‘mode of being’, by contrast, has much more to do with positive aspects of a person’s 
identity, such as pride in their heritage, which Modood sees as necessary for active participation in 
society. There is a danger that by imposing identity categories upon minorities, this creates “group 
identities exclusively from the point of view of the dominant whites”, and fails to recognise minorities’ 
“mode of being … which defies such reduction” (Modood 1994, 869). 
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Religious identity 
Religious identity may also be an important source of identity, particularly for some ethnic 
groups – indeed for some commentators it may be the most important source of personal 
identity (Platt 2007a) – and there may also be overlaps between religious and ethnic identity. 
Modood (1994) highlights the importance of the struggle against cultural and religious 
discrimination for some Asian groups, whilst these issues have become even more prominent 
in the last decade, with Amin (2003, 460) describing a “culture of unashamed questioning of 
the cultural practices and national allegiances of British Muslims”. Modood & Ahmad (2007, 
187) argue that “South Asians, especially Muslims, give religion rather than national origins a 
greater saliency in self-concepts”. 
There may also be relationships between religious identity and various socio-economic issues. 
Lindley (2002, 427) finds that religious identities reveal important differences in earnings and 
employment within conventional ethnic categories: for example, “notable differences exist 
between Indian Sikhs and Hindus”. There is, in addition, evidence of a “pure Islamic penalty”, 
after controlling for other characteristics, for employment and earnings. Despite such findings, 
Maxwell (2006) finds Muslims to be almost as likely as those of a White British ethnicity to 
identify with Britain. Such research highlights first that ethnic and religious identities may 
overlap, and second that religious identity, in addition to ethnic identity, may be related to 
aspects of social cohesion. Including religious identity in the analysis of the role of national 
identity for social cohesion is thus essential, since the relationship may be different for 
different religious groups. This will be particularly important in the quantitative component of 
this study (see Chapter 4) since the analysis will cover all religious groups. Religion may, 
perhaps, play less of a role in the qualitative component since the ethnic groups under 
investigation are those of Black African and Black Caribbean heritage. Religion may be more 
important for Muslims and South Asians than for these groups (Modood and Ahmad 2007). 
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2.4 Existing research 
 
2.41: Ethnic diversity and social cohesion 
 
Before focusing directly on existing research on national identity and social cohesion, it is 
informative to discuss the large literature that exists on the relationships between ethnic 
diversity and aspects of social cohesion. This related research will help provide a background 
for a discussion of the research on national identity and social cohesion, since part of the 
argument for the importance of national identity is that it is needed to overcome potentially 
divisive identities, such as those based on ethnicity. 
There is a body of evidence, much of it from the US, that ethnic heterogeneity is associated 
with lower levels of interpersonal trust, social capital, and support for redistributive policies. 
For example, Putnam (2007) provides evidence that, in the US, ethnic diversity is associated 
with a reduction in generalised trust, towards those both outside and within one’s own ethnic 
group. Alesina & Ferrara (2002) find, again using data from the US, that living in a 
heterogeneous area and being a member of a historically subjugated group both decrease 
trust at the individual level. 
There is, in addition, some cross-national evidence to support the finding that heterogeneity 
decreases trust outside the US: for example Delhey & Newton (2005) find the same pattern 
across 55 countries, although it is most marked amongst the Nordic nations. Alesina & Glaeser 
(2004, 218) conclude that the “importance of ethnic fractionalization cannot be over-
emphasized” in their explanation of the more generous social spending found in Europe in 
comparison with the US, suggesting that support for redistribution, too, is related to ethnic 
homogeneity. Noting the lower levels of ethnic diversity in Europe, the overall picture from 
much of this US-based research predicts a decline in trust, social capital, and support for social 
spending as Europe becomes more diverse. This creates a pessimistic picture for policymakers 
in Europe, suggesting that the adoption of progressive social policies will become increasingly 
difficult and social problems, such as a lack of trust, will increase alongside an increase in 
ethnic diversity. 
There is, however, also a significant body of contradictory evidence. Banting (2005) fails to find 
cross-national evidence of systematically lower social spending in countries with large foreign-
born populations. Moreover, Canada exhibits quite different patterns as compared with the 
US: “immigration, multiculturalism policies and redistribution can represent a stable political 
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equilibrium” (ibid., 98). Letki (2008), in a study of ethnic diversity in British neighbourhoods, 
finds low socio-economic status to be more important than heterogeneity for explaining social 
capital. Hooghe et al. (2009, 218) find that “the full-blown negative relationship between 
ethnic diversity and generalised trust does not hold across Europe”. Gesthuizen et al. (2009) 
find that economic inequality and a national history of continuous democracy are more 
important for explaining cross-national differences in social capital in Europe. Evans (2006, 
152) studies British evidence for the argument that there is a “trade-off between the extension 
of multiculturalist policies and public commitment to a universalistic welfare state”, but finds 
little or no evidence for such predictions. In sum, the pessimistic predictions made based on 
mostly US-focused research do not seem to consistently hold in Europe; there may be “no 
necessary tension between diversity and solidarity” (Burchardt & Craig 2008, 11). 
What explains these contradictory findings? It seems clear that a systematic negative 
relationship between ethnic diversity and aspects of social cohesion does not hold. As 
Pilkington (2008, 4.8) puts it: “[the] claim that there may be a tension between diversity and 
solidarity is incontrovertible. [The] further claim, however, that these principles are in fact in 
conflict is more debatable”. But what mediates the potential tensions between diversity and 
solidarity? 
One suggestion put forward by many authors, including Miller (1995), Tamir (1993), Canovan 
(1996), Goodhart (2007), Putnam (2007) and Hirschman (2005), and one that features 
prominently in the social cohesion public discourse, is national identity. However, more 
research is needed to establish whether, across a range of different cases, there are 
relationships between national identity and solidarity, since “[this] can help identify the 
potential room for creating new approaches that generate solidarity while accommodating 
diversity” (Kymlicka 2008, 73). Wetherell (2007, 13) argues that “we need more empirical work 
on who is grabbed by these new identity possibilities, in what contexts, and with what effects”. 
Stone & Muir (2007, 26) argue that “Britain’s ongoing national identity crisis looks set to 
continue and the implications for community cohesion remain unclear”. 
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2.42: National identity and social cohesion 
 
There are two questions of particular importance for an analysis of the relationship between 
national identity and social cohesion. First, what is already known about British identification 
for minority ethnic groups? Second, what direct evidence is there that national identity 
influences social cohesion? These questions will be discussed in turn. 
British and minority ethnic identification 
Heath & Roberts (2008) find that the majority of British residents have dual identities, 
including ethnic minority residents. This finding is consistent with the arguments of Hall (2000) 
and Modood et al. (1994) that young Black men and women ‘speak’ from several identities 
simultaneously. In addition, Heath & Rothon (2010) fail to find evidence of an inverse 
correlation between attachment to one’s community and wider society, and find that in fact 
most members of minority groups do identify strongly both with their group and with Britain. 
The common presence of dual identities among ethnic minority groups suggests that if ethnic 
identities accompanied by a lack of British identity are problematic for social cohesion, this 
phenomenon is not likely to be systematic or widespread amongst minority groups, but may 
be more isolated.  
Generation may also be important for the national identities of minority groups, since 
“[a]cross groups we can observe a generational shift towards more majority-orientated 
identities” (Platt 2013, 26). When referring to minority ethnic groups, however, ‘generation’ 
can mean at least two different things: it can refer to whether or not someone is a first, second 
or third generation immigrant; or it can refer more broadly to the generation of a family a 
person belongs to. The two meanings overlap to a certain extent when one is discussing, for 
instance, a family that has three generations currently living in the UK, whereby the 
grandparents are foreign-born but came to settle in the UK, and their children and 
grandchildren are UK-born. For recent immigrants – those having no UK-born children – the 
term mainly has relevance with regard to the generation of their family they belong to. 
Generational differences – in the sense of whether a member of a family belongings to an 
older or younger generation – may be important to this study in terms of looking at how 
identities change over time. However, it is the sense of the term that refers to generation of 
immigrant – that is whether a person is foreign-born themselves, or the child or grandchild of 
someone foreign-born – that may be the most important distinction for the meanings attached 
33 
 
to ethnic and national identities. The main focus of generational issues in this study, therefore, 
refers to generation as understood as ‘generation of immigrant’. 
There is some evidence of factors that may influence a feeling of belonging to Britain. Maxwell 
(2006) finds perceived discrimination against members of ethnic minority groups to make 
them less likely to identify with Britain. This finding is consistent with that of Modood et al. 
(1994), who find that some members of ethnic minority groups feel they are not accepted as 
British. In addition, the distinction already discussed between civic and ethnic conceptions of 
national identity is important here, since a civic conception may be considerably more open to 
members of ethnic minority groups than an ethnic conception. The predominant conception 
amongst members of the British public, however, includes an ethnic component (Heath & 
Roberts 2008). 
Identity and ‘social cohesion’ 
As already shown, there are several theoretical arguments about the importance of national 
identity for solidarity and the legitimacy of the state. Such arguments support the contention 
that increasing British identity may be beneficial for solidarity and social cohesion. But what 
empirical evidence is there to support such a contention in the British context? 
There is limited evidence in the British context, but a study that does analyse some of these 
links is authored by Heath & Roberts (2008, 2), who find belonging and attachment to Britain 
to be associated with “social trust, civic duty ... and by increased support for the political 
order”. However, Heath & Roberts (2008) do not analyse whether the links between British 
identity and outcomes such as trust and support for the political order differ depending on the 
ethnic or religious identity of the respondent, or whether neighbourhood-level characteristics 
such as socio-economic deprivation and ethnic diversity are important for social cohesion. 
Also, there has been no research on whether perceived discrimination which, as discussed 
above, has been shown to be important for British identification (Maxwell 2006), influences 
the relationships between British identity and social cohesion. Overall, there is relatively little 
evidence of relationships between national identities and social cohesion, despite the 
theoretical arguments for the importance of national identity for solidarity and cohesion in the 
academic literature, and the importance of such relationships to the arguments of the social 
cohesion public discourse.4 
                                                          
4
 Qualitative evidence on identity and social cohesion highlights the importance of perceived fairness in 
resource allocation for reducing racial tensions (Dench et al. 2006; Hudson et al. 2007). In addition, 
Hickman et al. (2008) ask respondents about their understandings of the meanings of social cohesion, 
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Despite the lack of evidence in a British context there is, however, some evidence elsewhere. 
Putnam (2007) argues that one is more likely to trust another person if there is a shared 
element of identity such that the other person is not perceived as ‘socially distant’. There is 
evidence from the social psychology literature that when group identification is made along 
ethnic lines, “ethnic identity is related to out-group prejudice” (Smith et al. 2003), and that 
super-ordinate identities such as national identity may be beneficial to intergroup relations by 
creating a ‘thin’ identity transcending previously differentiated groups, and thus creating a 
new sense of ‘we’ (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000).5 
These findings point to several areas in need of further research. The perception that 
strengthening British identity may lead to increased social cohesion appears to be over-
simplistic, since many members of ethnic minority groups already identify strongly with 
Britain. Given this, which factors influence this relationship? Are discrimination and socio-
economic deprivation and inequality important for this relationship? Is the predominant 
conception of Britain – one that includes an ethnic component – problematic for social 
cohesion, or would encouraging a civic conception make no difference? Would the ‘thinning’ 
of British identity to be as inclusive as possible to ethnic minority groups influence its potential 
for increasing social cohesion or, as Kymlicka (2008, 72) argues, are ‘thinner’ “national 
identities still capable of sustaining ... solidarity”? In addition, little is known about the 
perceptions of minority groups of the way in which national identification is developed, and 
how this may relate to “racial community conflict” (Percival 2007, 164). 
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
and about their understandings of belonging to Britain, and identify two narratives with regard to how 
recent immigrants are perceived when moving to a local area. ‘From here’ is a narrative in which the 
local area is seen as being comprised of settled residents who are ‘like us’. Where this narrative is 
dominant, new immigrants are seen negatively, and are seen to be responsible for restoring the ‘social 
cohesion’ they have disturbed. By contrast, ‘from here and elsewhere’ is a narrative whereby the 
diversity of the area and history of immigration are acknowledged, and responsibility for maintaining 
‘social cohesion’ is seen as shared between existing residents and new immigrants. These studies do 
not, however, ask respondents about the relationships they see between identity and social cohesion. 
5
 In addition, Crisp & Hewstone (1999) find evidence that identities based on one main cleavage, such as 
ethnicity, may lead to intergroup conflict. Miguel (2004) argues that the success of Tanzania relative to 
Kenya in bridging social divisions and producing effective local public services is due to nation-building 
policies in Tanzania. 
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2.5 Research questions and theoretical framework 
 
There is a tension in the academic literature between arguments suggesting that national 
identity can be beneficial for aspects of social cohesion (Miller 1995; Goodhart 2007; Putnam 
2007), or that it may “lead ultimately to social inclusion or exclusion” (McCrone and Bechhofer 
2008, 1245); and arguments suggesting that national identity may have a more complex 
relationship with social cohesion, and one that differs depending on various other factors such 
as ethnic identity, religious identity, and socio-economic variables (Maxwell 2006; Hickman, 
Crowley et al. 2008). Although there are theoretical arguments for the importance of national 
identity for solidarity and cohesion, and large literatures both on ethnic and religious identities 
and on relationships between diversity and aspects of social cohesion, there is limited 
empirical evidence directly focusing on a relationship between national identity and social 
cohesion in the British context, and no research that investigates the relationship 
systematically. 
Main Research Question: What is the relationship between national identity and social 
cohesion in Britain? 
There is a sense in which the main research question of this study occupies a middle ground 
between, on the one hand, the academic literature and, on the other, the public and policy 
discourse. In the academic literature there are arguments for national identity being broadly 
important for social solidarity, and also arguments that national identities can be important for 
aspects of social cohesion, such as trust and support for redistribution. Perhaps since the 
concept of social cohesion itself is vague and contested, there have been no attempts to 
explore systematically the influence national identity may have on it. Yet in public and policy 
discourse the term is used, as highlighted previously, as if it were relatively unproblematic and 
as if there were a consensus both over its meaning and also over the effect that national 
identity is argued to have upon it. 
The relationship of this study to the academic literature is thus complicated, but the 
connections can be seen in two ways. First, the investigation of the role of national identity for 
social cohesion can be seen as a search for empirical evidence for a specific aspect of the 
broader arguments for national identity being important for solidarity at the national level 
(e.g. Miller 1995), and for national identity being important for specific indicators of social 
cohesion, such as trust and social capital (e.g. Putnam 2007). Second, this study can be seen as 
the filling of an academic research gap for a question posed partly by public and policy 
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discourse. The public and policy discourse makes claims for which, at present, there is little or 
no academic evidence. There is academic research, however, into related issues, such as the 
nature of ethnic identities and their relationship with national identities, and on other issues 
which may influence aspects of social cohesion, and the insights from this literature are used 
to provide a theoretical framework for the present study. 
Based on the key themes identified in the literature, Figure 1 represents a summary of the 
issues that may, potentially, affect the relationship between national identity and social 
cohesion. These relationships may be very complex, and it is accepted that Figure 1 is likely to 
be an oversimplification. However, since it is based on the key themes currently in the 
literature, it should provide a reasonable conceptual tool. The objective of the theoretical 
framework is to specify precisely how the main research question of this study will be 
investigated. In what follows, each relationship in Figure 1 is briefly described. 
First, however, it is necessary to discuss what is clearly an important issue with regard to the 
fact that social cohesion is an area-level concept, and the other concepts in Figure 1 can be 
treated as individual-level. There is a conceptual difficulty with the research question itself, 
since national identity is something belonging to individuals (clearly ‘nation’ is an area-level 
concept but it is individuals that identify with the nation), whereas social cohesion is the 
property of an area. Arguments for the importance of national identities for social cohesion 
are similarly about individuals identifying more strongly with the nation, but about this 
implying that an area might become more socially cohesive. 
An approach to investigating the relationship between national identity and social cohesion, 
therefore, could either try to investigate both concepts, in some sense, at the area level, or 
investigate both concepts at the individual level. Investigating both at the area level might 
involve taking aggregate measures of national identity, and seeing if there was a relationship 
between the aggregate national identity and social cohesion of different areas. Investigating 
both at the individual level could involve looking at individuals’ national identity, and for 
individual-level indicators of an area’s social cohesiveness.  
It was decided to investigate the relationship between both concepts at the individual level, 
because treating national identity in terms of an aggregate would not allow for the 
complexities and nuances that may shape people’s national identities to be revealed – 
something that may be very important in fully answering the research question, and which is a 
particular focus of the qualitative component. Investigating ‘social cohesion’ at the individual 
level, therefore, implies a particular understanding of the concept. Under investigation are 
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both indicators of individuals’ perceptions of area-level cohesion, and indicators of the 
likelihood an individual might contribute to social cohesion. The latter type of indicator would 
suggest that if many people adopted a particular trait then an area could be considered to be 
socially cohesive. If one is, for instance, interested to know whether an area might be 
considered as socially cohesive in the sense of having a high level of civic engagement, then 
one might look for a large number of individuals engaging civically as an individual-level 
indicator of social cohesion in this sense. It is important, however, to flag this conceptual 
difficulty with the way in which I am treating social cohesion.  
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Figure 1: Theoretical framework 
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R1. The relationship between national identity and social cohesion 
This is the key relationship under investigation. The literature predominantly focuses on the 
way in which national identity may influence social solidarity and cohesion (e.g. Canovan 
1996); therefore the direction of this relationship points from national identity towards social 
cohesion. Possibilities that the relationship may be two-way are explored in the qualitative 
component, however. The concept of national identity can be broken down into various types, 
including ethnic or civic (Heath and Roberts 2008), British or non-British, and also of different 
strengths. National identity itself may be directly affected by various factors (R2), which in turn 
may indirectly affect social cohesion. Social cohesion itself may be directly affected by factors 
other than national identity (R3). In addition, there may be factors that affect the relationship 
between national identity and social cohesion itself (R4, R5 and R6). These factors affecting the 
relationship itself are operationalised as interaction effects (for example between national 
identity and ethnic identity) in the quantitative component of this study. 
R2. Which issues directly affect national identity? 
This relationship describes factors that directly affect national identity and which may, in turn, 
indirectly affect social cohesion. The literature identifies several salient factors that may affect 
national identity: perceived discrimination, which may reduce the likelihood that a member of 
an ethnic minority group identifies with Britain (Maxwell 2006); acceptance of identity claims 
by others, such that members of minority groups may attempt to identify with Britain but 
never be fully accepted by the majority (Modood et al. 1994; Hall 2000); ethnic identity, in that 
there may be a difficultly in simultaneously identifying with one’s ethnic heritage and the 
national identity of the host country (Alba and Nee 2003); and socio-economic attainment, 
which may affect the likelihood of strong national identification (ibid.). 
R3. Issues affecting social cohesion directly 
There may be factors other than national identity that affect social cohesion directly. Hickman 
et al. (2008) identify both structural and relational issues that may affect social cohesion. 
Structural issues include individual-level factors - quality of housing, level of poverty, and 
employment status (ibid.); and also area-level factors - ethnic diversity, and area-level 
deprivation (Putnam 2007; Letki 2008; Dench et al. 2006). 
In terms of relational issues that may affect social cohesion, Hickman et al. (2008) identify two 
key narratives that may directly influence social cohesion, particularly with regard to how new 
immigrants to an area may be perceived: ‘from here’ and ‘from elsewhere’. ‘From here’ is a 
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narrative in which the local area is seen as being comprised of settled residents who are ‘like 
us’. Where this narrative is dominant, new immigrants are seen negatively, and are seen to be 
responsible for restoring the social cohesion they have disturbed. By contrast, ‘from here and 
elsewhere’ is a narrative whereby the diversity of the area and history of immigration are 
acknowledged, and responsibility for maintaining social cohesion is seen as shared between 
existing residents and new immigrants. 
R4. The way in which ethnic identity affects the relationship between national identity and 
social cohesion 
The literature emphasises the importance of ethnic identity in the understanding of national 
identity (Maxwell 2006; Castles and Miller 2009) and aspects of social cohesion (Alesina and 
Glaeser 2004; Putnam 2007). The academic literature suggests that the relationship between 
ethnic identity and national identity may be varied, with some people having both a strong 
ethnic and national identity, but others not. It is therefore important to include it as an 
interaction effect in the quantitative component since the relationship between national 
identity and social cohesion may be different for people with different ethnic identities. For 
example, there is evidence that suggests people identifying with a Black Caribbean ethnicity 
may be, in some cases, considerably less likely to identify themselves as British (Heath and 
Roberts 2008); whilst people identifying with a South Asian identity may be almost as likely as 
those of a White British origin to identify themselves as British (Maxwell 2006). In addition, the 
generation an immigrant belongs to may also be important (Modood et al. 1994). The 
relationship between national identity and social cohesion may therefore be different for 
people of a different immigrant generation, so this factor is included in R4a, and 
operationalised in the quantitative component as an interaction effect. 
R5. The way in which religious identity affects the relationship between national identity and 
social cohesion 
In addition to ethnic identity, religious identity may affect the relationship between national 
identity and social cohesion. Modood & Ahmad (2007, 187) argue that “South Asians, 
especially Muslims, give religion rather than national origins a greater saliency in self-
concepts”. There may also be relationships between religious identity and employment and 
earnings (Lindley 2002), and religious differences in national identification: Maxwell (2006) 
finds Muslims to be almost as likely as those of a White British ethnicity to identify with Britain. 
Such research highlights that religious identity, in addition to ethnic identity, may influence the 
relationship between national identity and social cohesion. 
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Religious and ethnic identity may also overlap, so this relationship is represented by R5a. 
Lindley (2002, 427) finds that religious identities reveal important differences in earnings and 
employment within conventional ethnic categories: for example, “notable differences exist 
between Indian Sikhs and Hindus”. 
R6. Other issues affecting the relationship between national identity and social cohesion 
There is evidence to suggest that feelings of belonging to Britain are strongly influenced by age 
(Heath and Roberts 2008), and also level of education (McCrone and Bechhofer 2010) and 
employment status (Maxwell 2006). There is also evidence to suggest that access to education 
and paid employment for some ethnic minority groups differ markedly depending on gender 
(Dale 2002). There is also evidence that social cohesion is influenced by education and 
employment (Hickman, Crowley et al. 2008), and that indicators of social cohesion such as 
trust and political participation are associated with age. Since both national identity and social 
cohesion may be associated with education, employment, and age, it is therefore plausible 
that these characteristics could influence the relationship between national identity and social 
cohesion. Heath & Roberts (2008) find that age and socio-economic status do in fact explain a 
portion of the association they find between strength of belonging to Britain and trust and 
political participation. The characteristics that form R6, therefore, are: age, gender, 
employment status, and education level. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
 
The academic literature features arguments that national identities can be beneficial for 
national solidarity and cohesion (Tamir 1993; Miller 1995; Canovan 1996), and for local-level 
aspects of social cohesion such as trust and social capital, whereby national identity is seen as 
important for mitigating problems perceived to stem from ethnic diversity or tensions 
(Hirschman 2005; Putnam 2007). There is, however, little evidence to support such arguments 
in the British context, and contradictory evidence internationally. These issues are highly 
relevant to public and policy discourses, where an association has been made between strong 
British identities and social cohesion without a corresponding body of academic evidence. It is 
also not clear that the concept of social cohesion itself is appropriate for dealing with these 
issues. 
This research therefore critically investigates, in the British context, the relationship between 
national identity and social cohesion, and with a particular focus on the implications of ethnic 
differences for this relationship. There are large literatures exploring the nature of national 
identities, of ethnic and religious identities, and also other factors that may directly influence 
aspects of social cohesion. It is possible to draw upon these literatures to construct a 
theoretical framework of the potential issues that may influence the role of national identity 
for social cohesion; these relationships are shown in Figure 1 above. 
These issues are of great importance for policymakers. The emphasis in policy discourse on the 
importance of social cohesion has not been accompanied by research showing a clear 
understanding of what is meant by the concept, or whether this is the best way to resolve 
ethnic tensions. In addition, the implication that increasing British identity amongst members 
of minority ethnic groups will be beneficial for social cohesion contradicts research suggesting 
that members of such groups already identify strongly with Britain (e.g. Heath and Roberts 
2008); that discrimination greatly reduces the likelihood of British identification for minority 
groups (e.g. Maxwell 2006); and that members of minority groups are able to make sense of 
their hybrid ethnic and British identities (Modood et al. 1994; Hall 2000). Greater 
understanding of the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain, and 
the salience of any factors influencing the relationship, such as ethnic identities, would greatly 
enhance the ability of politicians to make appropriate policy decisions. 
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Chapter 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
Although it remains a contested distinction, many researchers differentiate between 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. One difference relates to epistemology, 
whereby quantitative methods are often linked with positivist principles and qualitative 
methods are often linked with interpretivist principles (Bryman 2008). Another relates to 
ontology, whereby quantitative methods are linked to a view of the world in which researchers 
can go out and investigate an independent and ‘objective’ reality; whereas qualitative 
methods are linked to a view of the world as socially constructed, and to which the researcher 
cannot be independent (ibid.). Viewing national identity and social cohesion, and the 
relationship between them, as existing in an ‘objective’ reality to which the researcher is 
independent would therefore be more consistent with a quantitative approach to answering 
the research question; whereas viewing the concepts and the relationship between them as 
entirely socially constructed, as dependent on the interpretations of different social actors, 
and as objects of study to which the researcher can never be independent, would therefore be 
more consistent with a qualitative approach to answering the research question. 
The choice of research strategy in this study was influenced both by the nature of the research 
question and by the extent to which there already exists a body of theory and evidence with 
regard to the question. Quantitative research is often linked with the testing of theories, in 
contrast to qualitative research being linked with the generation of theories (Bryman 2012), so 
clearly the extent to which there is a well-defined theoretical model to test is a crucial 
consideration. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are clear arguments suggesting that national 
identity may be beneficial for social cohesion; Forrest & Kearns (2001) provide a detailed 
theoretical definition of social cohesion; and there are substantial literatures on other 
concepts that might influence the relationship. Given that the research question is about the 
relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain, it may therefore be 
informative to use the theory that does exist to investigate the question in Britain as a whole, 
which suggests using a nationally-representative dataset – that is using quantitative methods – 
may be a good strategy. 
On the other hand, the concepts of national identity and social cohesion are contested and 
problematic. Pahl (1991, 359) warns of the dangers for those that “refer to social cohesion 
unproblematically”. National identity in Britain may have extremely complex interactions with 
generation, ethnicity and religion: “groups are moving at different rates; and the patterns for 
religious identity, British identity and minority ethnic identity do not all assume consistent 
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trajectories” (Platt 2013, 26). The concept of ethnic identity is also problematic in terms of the 
way it is operationalised in survey research, particularly given the way in which a predefined 
list is presented to respondents “with relatively crude fixed categories” (Burton et al. 2010, 
1332). Indeed, several of the interviewees in this study did in fact refer to their selections for 
ethnic identity in survey categories as being determined by their perceptions of what ‘society’ 
viewed them to be, rather than their own perceptions of their identities. It may, therefore, be 
important to follow a research strategy that gives opportunities for theory generation, and is 
able to understand the social constructions of national and ethnic identity and social cohesion 
and the ways in which the concepts are interpreted differently by different social actors – that 
is to follow a qualitative strategy. 
In sum, then, given the desire to answer the research question by focusing on Britain as a 
whole – that is by understanding broad patterns of association between concepts at the 
national level – it was felt that a quantitative component to the study was appropriate. 
However, given the contested nature of the concept of social cohesion, and the complexities 
inherent in the concepts of national identity and ethnic identity, it was felt that including a 
qualitative component in the study was also appropriate. For these reasons, a mixed methods 
approach to answering the research question is followed, in which nationally representative 
patterns in relationships between national identity and social cohesion can be investigated in 
the quantitative component, and different understandings of each of the key concepts and 
their relation to ethnicity can be investigated in the qualitative component. In addition, 
because of the contested nature of the concept of social cohesion in particular, Chapter 6 
delves into some theoretical considerations about the relationship between national identity 
and social cohesion in more detail and, in the light of the empirical findings of Chapters 4 and 
5, presents a synthesis of theory together with insights from both the quantitative and 
qualitative components. 
Based on the distinctions made by Bryman (2012) between different rationales for conducting 
mixed methods research, the two approaches that were drawn upon in particular were those 
of completeness and of explanation. According to Bryman (2012, 637): “Completeness 
indicates that a more complete answer to a research question or set of research questions can 
be achieved by including both quantitative and qualitative methods”. As already mentioned, 
given the research question is about the relationship between national identity and social 
cohesion in Britain, clearly some data that can be taken to be representative of Britain as a 
whole would be advantageous (or, in the case of the Citizenship Survey, England and Wales, 
which contain a large proportion of the population of Britain), so quantitative analysis of a 
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national dataset is informative. However, the contested nature of social cohesion in particular, 
and the relevance of ethnicity to the research combined with the challenges involved with 
constructing or using ethnic categories in survey research (Burton et al. 2010), mean that 
something more nuanced might be said about the research question by using a more open-
ended method. In addition, finding a dataset with satisfactory questions on respondents’ 
identity was difficult. In the case of the Citizenship Survey, it was not possible to ‘get at’ 
several aspects of national identification deemed important by other studies and significant 
bodies of literature, not least the idea of ‘non-acceptance’ of the national identities of 
members of minority groups by the majority, and its potential impact on the national 
identifications of members of minority groups (Hall 2000). In addition, with regard to the 
contested concept of social cohesion, the quantitative component follows the definition 
provided by Forrest & Kearns (2001), but the qualitative component is able to explore the 
concept more freely by allowing respondents to describe things in their own terms. In sum, 
qualitative data alone would be insufficient to capture broad nationally representative 
patterns regarding the relationship between national identity and social cohesion (and 
possible important ethnic differences), and quantitative data alone would be insufficient to 
capture fully the complex nature of the concepts of national identity, social cohesion and 
ethnic identity, so a more complete understanding of the research question can potentially be 
achieved by combining qualitative and quantitative methods. In this way, it is possible that 
“complex objects of social scientific analysis like this require a variety of research tools to 
arrive at a comprehensive understanding” (Bryman 2012, 637). 
The other key rationale for using mixed methods in this study relates to what Bryman refers to 
as explanation: “One of the problems that frequently confronts quantitative researchers is 
how to explain relationships between variables” (2012, 641). The quantitative component can 
look for broad patterns of association between variables, and one knows that they are 
nationally representative, but not why these associations might have been found. Adding a 
qualitative component allows for different understandings of the ways in which associated 
variables might be related to be expanded upon in detail, and potential mechanisms explaining 
the relationships can be uncovered. As will be seen later, there are clear instances of the 
quantitative and qualitative component in fact combining in this way. For example, the 
quantitative component found that whether or not a respondent was born in the UK crucially 
affected associations between British identity and social cohesion. A potential explanation for 
this finding was given by the qualitative component, in terms of the very different accounts of 
what British identity meant to first- and later-generation immigrants, and in terms of how 
these different meanings might affect the relationship to social cohesion. There are also key 
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differences in the findings of the quantitative component depending on whether the national 
identity under investigation was English or British identity, and these findings were explained 
by the ‘fleshing out’ of the concepts in the qualitative component through an exploration of 
the different meanings English and British identity had to respondents. 
In addition, uncovering descriptions of possible mechanisms underlying the associations 
between variables found in the quantitative component can perhaps give suggestions as to the 
causality at work. Causality is notoriously difficult to establish, but Pawson & Tilley (1997) 
identify two perspectives that can be contrasted in terms of strategies to attempt to identify it. 
A ‘successionist’ theory of causation broadly follows a Humean approach to causality, whereby 
causality is inferred when two events are seen to be ‘constantly conjoined’; if one can isolate 
all possible confounding factors then it is possible to conclude that one event is (probably) 
causing the other. This approach informs quantitative strategies for establishing causation, and 
in particular experimental designs, in which an experimental group and a control group differ 
only in their exposure “to the information, experience or event whose impact is to be tested” 
(Hakim 1987, 101). The disadvantage to this strategy, however, is that it does not say much 
about why the causal relationship might have been found. Pawson & Tilley (1997) contrast this 
approach with a ‘generative’ theory of causation, in which the strategy is to search for the 
underlying mechanism and to understand the contexts in which it may or may not have 
effects. The qualitative component can, perhaps, shed some light on potential mechanisms – 
the aim is not to establish causality conclusively, but simply to uncover some potential 
mechanisms that might explain the associations found in the quantitative component and to 
guide future research. 
In the following two sections, an overview of the methodology used in both the quantitative 
and qualitative components to this study is outlined, although further details about more 
specific aspects of the methodologies are given in Chapters 4 and 5. The quantitative 
component consists of secondary analysis of the Citizenship Survey to investigate the 
relationship between national identity and social cohesion; whilst the qualitative component 
explores narratives of national and ethnic identity and social cohesion as expressed by 
interviewees in an ethnically diverse ward. Both components are guided by the theoretical 
framework outlined in Figure 1. 
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3.1 Quantitative component 
 
The quantitative component investigates the relationship between national identity and social 
cohesion, with a particular focus on ethnic differences, by first using Principal Components 
Analysis to create measures of the multifaceted concept of social cohesion, and second by 
constructing regression models based on the theoretical framework in Figure 1. The concept of 
social cohesion was operationalised according to the five dimensions as defined by Forrest & 
Kearns (2001), although alternative meanings are explored in the qualitative component; 
variables were selected from the Citizenship Survey that could potentially represent each 
dimension of social cohesion (see Table 3 below), and Principal Components Analysis (PCA) 
was used as a data reduction technique to break the large number of variables down into a 
smaller number of components. Composite variables were created from each of the 
components, representing measures of each of the ‘elements’ of social cohesion. 
Regression models were then created based on the theoretical framework shown in Figure 1. 
Each of the composite variables from the PCA was used as a dependent variable in a separate 
regression model. The relationship R1 (see Figure 1), therefore, represents the main 
relationship under investigation, but variables representing R3 to R6 were also included in the 
regression models in order to ascertain whether these relationships also have an influence on 
the relationship R1. It is accepted that the regression models do not incorporate relationship 
R2 – which refers to things that may affect national identity directly – since national identity 
itself is taken as a given. Separate regression analysis could explore factors that affect national 
identity (R2), but this is not the focus of the quantitative component; instead issues directly 
influencing national identity are investigated by the qualitative component, since the methods 
are better placed to uncover the detail and nuance of respondents’ feelings about their 
national identities, and is an important reason for using mixed methods. It is also accepted 
that the regression models will not be able to establish whether the relationships are causal, 
since they only show associations. However, the qualitative component seeks to uncover 
potential mechanisms that could give clues about causality. 
In choosing the methods for the quantitative component, consideration was given to the 
potential advantages of using Structural Equation Modelling (SEM). Given the complexity of 
the relationships illustrated in Figure 1, including the possibility of two-way relationships and 
many interactions between variables, the way in which SEM allows for the testing of 
interactions between variables may have been useful, as would the ability to treat certain 
variables as dependent and independent simultaneously. However, given that SEM is a 
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confirmatory method, and given the contested nature of the ambiguous and multifaceted 
concept of social cohesion, it was felt that there was not a sufficiently well-defined theoretical 
model to employ SEM to test the relationship between national identity and social cohesion, 
since “it is crucial for researchers using SEM to test models that have strong theoretical or 
empirical foundations” (Bowen & Guo 2012, 7). Instead, an exploratory method was needed to 
measure social cohesion, and so PCA was used (see Chapter 4 for a discussion of the choice of 
PCA over exploratory factor analysis). Also, cross sectional rather than longitudinal data was 
used because the research question does not refer to changes in social cohesion or national 
identity over time, although an analysis of the relationships over time would certainly make an 
interesting topic of future research.  
Choice of dataset 
The Home Office’s Citizenship Survey was chosen as the most appropriate dataset to use for 
this study. In choosing an appropriate dataset, two key criteria were considered: first, richness 
of questions on identity, due to an absence of such questions in many datasets; and second, 
given the potential for ethnic identity to play an important role in the relationship under 
investigation, the presence of a sample suitable for investigating ethnic differences, such as an 
ethnic minority boost sample, which would increase the likelihood of finding statistically 
significant results and reduce the size of the standard errors. 
The following table shows a summary of the strengths and weaknesses of several UK surveys 
that were considered based on the two key criteria for this research; a more detailed analysis 
and references are shown in the Appendix, Part A. 
 
Table 2: Summary of potentially useful datasets 
 Sampling Questions on identity 
BHPS No boost sample Limited 
Labour Force Survey No boost, but larger sample of 
60,000 used 
Limited 
BSA No boost sample Good 
Citizenship Survey Ethnic minority boost sample Good 
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The table shows the Citizenship Survey to be the most appropriate for the purposes of this 
research, since it has several advantages over other UK-based surveys. It is relatively rich in 
questions on identity, and provides both attitudinal and behavioural measures of social 
cohesion on several dimensions. Just as importantly, however, it includes an ethnic minority 
boost sample (Agur et al. 2010). The boost sample features an over-representation of minority 
ethnic respondents, which potentially makes it possible to reveal statistically significant 
differences between ethnic groups in the relationships between national identity and social 
cohesion that would not be revealed without the boost sample. This will be particularly 
important for establishing whether R4 and R4a (see Figure 1) are important for the central 
research question. 
The fact that the Citizenship Survey provides data on individuals, whereas the concept of social 
cohesion is an area-level concept, is an important issue. The Citizenship Survey can provide 
individual-level indicators of social cohesion. However, as shown in Table 3 below, there are 
aspects of the concept of social cohesion on which it will not, in principle, be possible to create 
an analysis at the individual level. Table 3 shows the aspects that can or cannot in principle be 
properties of an individual. For example, it is not possible that an individual exhibits ‘common 
aims and objectives’ since this property is a property of a group. By contrast, an individual can 
exhibit ‘support for political institutions and participation in politics’. This will mean that only 
part of each dimension of social cohesion can be analysed using the Citizenship Survey and is, 
unfortunately, a limitation of this study. 
Table 4 below shows the structure of the initial regression models used, including control 
variables corresponding to the concepts identified in Figure 1. Figure 1 identifies a number of 
issues that could potentially interact with each other in their relationship with social cohesion, 
so these were operationalised as interaction effects in the regression models. However, as will 
become clear in Chapter 4, not all the interaction effects were used in the final models due to 
the fact that some of them consistently did not produce statistically significant results, and so 
were dropped from the model to aid parsimony. 
Initially, analysis was conducted using the 2008-9 Citizenship Survey – the most recent dataset 
available when the analysis took place. However, after the initial analysis was finished it was 
felt that in order to check the robustness of the results, and also to have the benefit of a larger 
sample size, the 2007-8 survey could be combined with the 2008-9 survey. Encouragingly, the 
results using the combined sample were very similar to the initial results. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, the way in which ethnicity is categorised in survey questions is 
problematic (Burton et al. 2010). There have been extensive debates about the nature of a 
question asking respondents’ ethnic group that was originally included in the 1991 census. It is 
important to be aware of the difference between the way the categorisation is set out in 
survey questions, as compared with the way in which respondents may wish to express their 
own ethnicity. Commentators have emphasised the way in which the construction of ethnic 
categories is likely to be politicised, and there are important power differences between those 
deciding upon the categories and the respondents choosing the category in a survey question. 
It is, therefore, important to be aware that the way in which the quantitative component of 
this study ‘captures’ ethnic difference is likely not to correspond neatly to the way in which 
individuals may personally express their ethnicity. Whilst this is certainly a limitation of the 
quantitative component, investigating ethnic differences may, nevertheless, reveal something 
important about group differences relating to immigration history, place of origin, and perhaps 
the nature of disadvantage or discrimination faced by different groups: “there are still many 
who would maintain that the existence of inequalities across subgroups of the population is 
worthy of attention, even if those concerned do not directly identify with the categories to 
which they are being allocated” (Platt 2011, 18). 
As will be seen below the distinction between survey categorisation and self-identification is 
also, to an extent, an issue with the qualitative component, in that the qualitative component 
specifically targets those who categorise themselves as ‘Black African’ or ‘Black Caribbean’ 
when asked to identify their ethnicity from a list of ethnic groups taken from the Citizenship 
Survey. However, since the qualitative component allows respondents to freely express their 
ethnicity as part of the interview, it is also possible to gain further insights into respondents’ 
genuine self-identification, and this is one of the reasons for using mixed methods in this 
study. 
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Table 3: Social cohesion variables available in Citizenship Survey 
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Table 4: Regression equation and explanatory variables available 
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3.2 Qualitative component 
 
Three key criteria were considered in choosing an area in which to conduct the interviews for 
the qualitative component. The first criterion was the demographic make-up of the area. 
Particular minority ethnic groups were targeted for interview – for reasons discussed below – 
so an area with a high concentration of people from those ethnic groups was an important 
consideration, in order to facilitate easier access to interviewees. Clearly this criterion narrows 
down the number of areas that could be targeted for interviewees, but there are a large 
number of areas in Britain with a high concentration of particular minority ethnic groups. The 
second criterion was personal familiarity with the local area. This was considered important in 
particular because it makes the recruitment of interviewees much easier than in an area about 
which the researcher knows very little. Following on from this, the third criterion was the 
presence of a number of contacts in the area that could facilitate access to different types of 
interviewees, both to increase the size of the sample, and to ensure that the sample was as 
diverse as possible. As explained below, recruiting interviewees through a variety of sources 
increases the likelihood that the sample will be diverse, and reduces the risk of biases in the 
selection of participants. 
Minority ethnic groups rather than members of the majority group were chosen to target for 
interview for several reasons. First, as mentioned in the literature review, the ways in which 
minority groups understand identity and its links in particular with “racial community conflict” 
are under-researched (Percival 2007, 164). Second, there are likely to be more complex links 
between ethnic and national identities than for members of the majority group. Third, as 
already discussed, the focus of the social cohesion discourse has primarily been on the 
identities of ethnic minority groups rather than the majority group, and so it is hoped that 
targeting minority groups for interview will make the study more relevant to current public 
and policy debates. This does not imply, however, that interviewing the majority group would 
not produce informative and interesting data, but it is beyond the scope of this study. A focus 
on Black African, Black Caribbean or South Asian ethnic groups was considered most 
appropriate to the research question since a substantial part of the post-war immigration to 
the UK was from the Caribbean, Africa and South Asia (Craig 2012). As discussed in more detail 
below, members of these ethnic groups are relatively likely to have been settled in Britain for 
some time, and also may contain first, second and third generation immigrants, allowing for 
the possibility to investigate whether these differences have a relationship with differences in 
feelings of national identity. 
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Based on these considerations, two local areas were shortlisted. One – in London – has a high 
proportion of Black Caribbean and Black African residents, and is familiar to the researcher. 
The researcher also has a number of contacts in this area that can make recruitment easier. 
The second – in Birmingham – has a high proportion of South Asian residents, particularly of 
Bangladeshi ethnicity. Again, the presence of contacts in the area was considered an important 
advantage.  
At the Major Review stage of the thesis, the candidate proposed to include both shortlisted 
local areas in the qualitative component of the research which, in addition to ensuring that 
Black Caribbean, Black African and South Asian ethnic groups were represented in the study, 
would have had the advantage of enabling a comparison between the two areas. 
Unfortunately the Major Review examiners deemed the inclusion of two areas too ambitious, 
particularly bearing in mind the strict deadlines in place for the submission of the thesis. It was 
a requirement of passing Major Review that the candidate restricted the qualitative 
component to one local area only. For this reason, and also the fact that the researcher’s 
familiarity with and contacts within the area in London were significantly better than for the 
local area in Birmingham, it was decided at the Major Review stage to include the London local 
area only. If time had allowed, however, including two areas would have been desirable, and 
could be an important focus of future research into national identity and social cohesion. 
The objective of the qualitative component is to identify key narratives about national identity 
and social cohesion from the perspective of the interviewees, to explore the understandings 
they have of these concepts, and understand the nature of any links they see between them. 
The data derived from the interviews are not representative, but the objective of the 
interviews is to identify as many different narratives as possible. 
Since the qualitative component involves what could be considered to be vulnerable groups, 
research ethics approval was sought and received before fieldwork was undertaken. In 
addition, full informed consent was sought from participants prior to starting the interview, 
including permission to use audio recording, and a commitment was given to strict 
confidentiality and anonymity. Data protection, in the form of security of interview recordings 
and transcripts, was ensured by either keeping data in a locked cupboard or on a password-
protected computer. No record of any identifying information was kept: names were not 
included in the transcripts, and after transcription each interviewee was given a pseudonym to 
aid analysis. 
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Demographics of the local area 
Although the local area in question had boundaries that did not fit exactly with an 
administrative area, a large proportion of the local area studied was in one particular ward. In 
a relatively central area of London, this ward is very ethnically diverse, with only 37% of the 
population being categorised as ‘White British’, in comparison to the London average of 
approximately 45%, and the average for England of around 80% (ONS 2011). Around 8% of the 
population is categorised as Asian, which is similar to the average for England, although 
unusually (compared to the English average) most of Asian origin are categorised as Chinese or 
‘Other Asian’. Around 30% of the population is ethnically Black, more than twice the London 
average and nearly 9 times the English average, with around 14% of the population 
categorised as Black African, 11% Black Caribbean, and 5% ‘Other Black’. A further 8% are of 
mixed ethnicity, and 11% are categorised as ‘Other White’ (ibid.). 
In terms of socio-economic characteristics, the ward has a relatively similar proportion of 
economically active people compared to the average for England, but has a relatively low 
proportion of retired people (less than 6%, compared to over 13% for England on average), 
and a slightly higher proportion of unemployed people (6% compared to 4.4% for England). Its 
population is relatively young, with a median age of 31, compared to 33 for London and 39 for 
England (ibid.). 
There is also evidence of active local community and political activity. The ward’s society 
recently campaigned for the renovation of a local park; there are several local arts festivals; 
and a local farmers’ market. In addition, schooling is an important local issue: a recent 
campaign against the closure of a secondary school failed; whilst another local secondary 
school is the most over-subscribed state school in the country. It is, however, unclear whether 
there are ethnic differences in community participation. The area is interesting for its relatively 
high levels of ethnic diversity, particularly those of Black African and Black Caribbean origin, 
accompanied by an active local community. 
Methods 
There were three stages to the methodology: first, snowball sampling was conducted to access 
appropriate interviewees; second semi-structured interviews were conducted; and third data 
were collated and analysed using thematic analysis (Robson 2002). A summary of the methods 
is shown in the table below. 
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Table 5: Summary of qualitative methods 
Sampling method Snowball 
Interview method Semi-structured 
Target number of interviews 20 - 24 
Data analysis Thematic analysis 
 
Sampling design 
The construction of the sample for the qualitative component of the study followed a 
purposive sampling approach, based on three key categories that were considered to be of 
particular importance: gender, age and employment status. These categories were considered 
to be particularly important because of findings in the literature that age can be very 
important for both national identity and social cohesion (Heath and Roberts 2008); and that 
gender (Dale 2002) and employment status (Hickman, Crowley et al. 2008) may also be very 
important. The way in which respondents expressed narratives about their identities and social 
cohesion, therefore, may vary depending on these three key categories. Clearly, in an ideal 
world it would be possible to include many more categories, but due to practical limitations 
such as time constraints it was felt that three would have to suffice. Individuals of a Black 
African or Black Caribbean ethnicity were targeted for interview, and there was a target of 
between 20 and 24 interviews, meaning the intention was to have one or two interviewees in 
each category. 
There are many different ethnic groups that would be interesting to target for interview in a 
way that is relevant to the research question. However, it was felt that the interviews should 
be restricted in some way because people with different histories and experiences may have 
markedly different understandings of their national and ethnic identities, which may be 
influenced by very different experiences of disadvantage and discrimination. For instance, 
Modood (1994) highlights the way in which some Asian groups rejected the identity of ‘Black’ 
to emphasise the distinct discrimination they faced, based more on religion and culture than 
skin colour. The experiences that different groups may have faced in terms of the non-
acceptance of their national identities by the white majority may similarly be quite different 
and related to the nature of discrimination against them. In addition, because of the policy 
debate over community cohesion in Britain being focused not only on recent immigrants, “but 
also longstanding minority ethnic groups” (Platt 2007a, 2), and because of the possibilities for 
insights to be found looking at generational differences in national and ethnic identification 
(Hall 2000), it was felt that focusing on interviewees that could potentially be from a settled 
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community (potentially including different generations) would be especially informative for 
the research question. 
In terms of the history of immigration into the UK, there was a substantial post-war period of 
“immigration from the Caribbean, Africa and South Asia [that] was stimulated most of all by 
the need for labour” (Craig 2012, 54). During this period, immigration was largely from India, 
Pakistan, the ‘West Indies’, the ‘Far East’, and West Africa, as shown by substantial increases in 
the estimates of the populations of each of these groups in the UK between 1951 and 1961 
(ibid., 55). Given the personal familiarity with several contacts in an area of London with a 
substantial Black African and Black Caribbean population; given that the nature of 
discrimination for these two groups was likely to be relatively similar, being focused on skin 
colour rather than culture or religion; and given that these two groups may include people that 
are relatively settled in Britain, opening possibilities for interviewing people from several 
generations, it was felt that it would be reasonable to target these two groups for interview. 
It is, however, important to note first that there are some key differences between these two 
groups, particularly the much higher levels of educational qualifications found in the Black 
African group (Platt 2011); and second to reiterate the importance of the problematic nature 
of identifying respondents based on a pre-defined list of ethnic categories. It is also worth 
noting at this point the procedure used to establish the ethnic group of interviewees. 
Interviewees were asked to fill in a preliminary short questionnaire, which included standard 
survey categories on ethnic groupings (taken from the Citizenship Survey). Interviewees were 
asked to indicate which category they felt most applied to them, although they could also give 
their own description of their ethnic group. Respondents were, therefore, purposively sampled 
based on their self-identification as Black-African or Black-Caribbean. Interestingly, following 
the purposive sampling, two of the interviewees in fact described their ethnic identities as 
mixed when asked to elaborate further as part of the interview, which highlights the 
importance of the distinction between self-identification and identification from a pre-defined 
list (although admittedly a ‘mixed’ category was present on the list). 
As mentioned, based on the academic literature it is anticipated that issues of religious identity 
may not be as salient for individuals of a Black African or Black Caribbean ethnicity as they 
might be for Muslims or individuals of a South Asian origin (Modood and Ahmad 2007). 
Nevertheless, questions on religious identity are included in the Interview Schedule, but may 
not be as important as they would have been for Muslims or South Asian groups. By contrast, 
the identity of ‘Black’ may be important for these groups, and it may also be related to 
national identity. For example, Hall (2000) describes the way in which ‘Black’ identity may 
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partially be a response to exclusion from British identity. The interview schedule contains 
open-ended questions on ethnic and national identity such that it should be possible for the 
identity of ‘Black’ to be explored. 
The sample construction utilised several methods of recruiting interviewees. Several contacts 
in the area were used, as was door-to-door leafleting, spending time at a local market, talking 
to people in local betting shops, and making announcements in several local churches. All of 
these methods resulted in the recruitment of interviewees. One of the contacts in the local 
area also kindly assisted in conducting some of the interviews. It is accepted that this, to some 
extent, may increase inconsistency in the results of the qualitative component, particularly 
given that the interviews were semi-structured and so were somewhat open-ended, but two 
interviews were conducted jointly, in part to check for consistency. Also, given the author of 
this study is a white male, having a second interviewer – and the interviewees were often 
asked if they had a preference as to their interviewer – had the potential to reduce issues of 
‘respondent bias’ (Lincoln & Guba 1985), whereby a respondent may feel the researcher is a 
threat and could withhold information or simply say what they feel would be socially desirable. 
Given that the second interviewer was female, albeit also white, this could potentially be 
especially beneficial when interviewing women. 
Twenty-two interviews were conducted. Table 6 below shows the composition of the 
qualitative sample in terms of the number of interviews conducted with respondents falling 
into each group. Although the target was to have between one and two interviewees in each 
group, there were two groups that unfortunately were not represented – these were females 
aged 35 to 50, out of employment; and males aged over 50, out of employment. The aim of 
the purposive sample was to generate a reasonable spread of interviewees across the three 
categories, and it was felt that this was achieved, although it is accepted that it would have 
been advantageous to conduct more interviews to ensure that all categories were fully 
represented. In total, ten interviews were conducted by the second interviewer, ten by the 
author, and two were conducted jointly. For the avoidance of doubt, the second interviewer 
did not have a role in transcription, analysis, or indeed any other part of this study. The second 
interviewer was also given ethics clearance and gave formal assurances of strict confidentiality 
before the start of fieldwork. 
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Table 6: Composition of the qualitative sample (numbers of interviewees) 
 Age: < 35 Age: 35 - 50 Age: > 50 
In employment; Female 4 3 2 
In employment; Male 3 1 2 
Out of employment; Female 1 0 1 
Out of employment; Male 2 3 0 
 
 
Interview methodology 
The interview schedule (see the Appendix, Part B) was intended to ask respondents what they 
consider their national, ethnic, and religious identities to be, and to ask them whether or not 
they consider there to be any links between national identity and social cohesion. In this way, 
it was intended that narratives surrounding the relationships between identity and social 
cohesion could be uncovered. The open-ended nature of the questions could also, perhaps, 
reveal whether or not respondents see the concept of social cohesion to be appropriate for 
describing these relationships. Semi-structured, face-to-face interviews were undertaken for 
several reasons. As compared to structured interviews, they offer the flexibility to discuss 
delicate issues surrounding identity whilst importantly also placing emphasis on the 
interviewee’s point of view rather than the interviewer’s specific concerns (Bryman 2001, 313). 
Interviews of about an hour were aimed for, but in practice the interviews varied a fair amount 
in length, often depending on how much time the interviewee could spare. The shortest was 
around 15 minutes, with the longest being around two and a half hours, although the majority 
were between 45 minutes and an hour. 
A further problem that was anticipated was the presence of language barriers, although it was 
thought this may be less of an issue for the Black Caribbean group in particular, and also to an 
extent the Black African group, as compared with some Asian groups, for instance, and was 
one of the reasons for the choice of these groups to interview. Nevertheless, to overcome 
potential problems, it was decided to focus only upon those with a reasonably good level of 
English; the reasoning behind this is as follows. Two approaches to the problem of language 
barriers are possible: the first is to use translators such that interviewees can speak in their 
preferred language; and the second is to limit the sample to those with reasonably good levels 
of English. The first approach involves many difficulties, including finding appropriate 
translators with fluency in both English and the interviewee’s preferred language, and creates 
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additional biases in the data through translation. For reasons such as these, it was felt that the 
second approach is more appropriate, although it does have the disadvantage that it was not 
possible to discover whether the discourse around national identity and social cohesion, and 
links between these concepts, are different for those with limited or no English. Nevertheless, 
it was felt that the discourses that do emerge will still be of interest, in particular since the 
focus of much of the social cohesion agenda has tended to be on relatively young British-born 
people belonging to ethnic minority groups. It may even be the case that second-generation 
members of minority groups may be more conscious of and sensitive to issues surrounding 
identity, as is evidenced by Modood et al.’s (1994, 100) observation that the second-
generation participants in their study were, “much more than the first generation, conscious of 
the difficulties” of retaining identity based on their heritage in addition to their British identity. 
It is, however, necessary to note this as a limitation of the study. 
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Chapter 4: QUANTITATIVE COMPONENT 
 
This chapter gives a detailed report of the results of the quantitative component of this study. 
The chapter is designed in particular to give an answer to the questions: what is the 
relationship between British identity and social cohesion; and does this relationship vary by 
ethnic group? In order to answer these questions, data from the Citizenship Survey were used 
to first produce measures of social cohesion, and second to investigate the relationship 
between British identity and each measure of social cohesion. Close attention was given to 
ethnic differences in social cohesion, and to whether the relationship between British identity 
and social cohesion differs by ethnic group. 
The broad findings discussed in this chapter can be summarised as follows. First, the 
multifaceted concept of social cohesion, as measured using variables available in the 
Citizenship Survey, can be considered to break down into ten different ‘elements’ which are as 
follows: equal treatment by public service providers (general); equal treatment by health 
service providers; trust in and equal treatment by the police; satisfaction with one’s place of 
residence; belonging to neighbourhood and local area; belonging to Britain; social interaction 
with people of different backgrounds; civic engagement and volunteering; ability to influence 
decisions of public institutions; and being treated with respect in public. 
Second, these ten elements can be broken down into three broad groups in terms of the 
extent to which each regression model provides a satisfactory explanation of the social 
cohesion measure. The first group has a high level of explanatory power; the second group a 
moderate level; and the third a poor level of explanatory power. For those elements that were 
poorly explained, further exploration was undertaken to find control variables that were 
relevant and increased the R squared values; this further exploration produced some success 
for some of the elements, but only limited success for others. 
Third, the relationship between British identity and social cohesion differs depending on the 
element of social cohesion in question: it appears to be associated with moderately increased 
social cohesion for some elements, but have no impact on others. In addition, these 
associations differ markedly depending on the ethnic group in question. 
Fourth, some variables used as control variables appear to be strongly associated with the 
measures of social cohesion, and the effect is significantly stronger than that of British identity 
for some of the elements. High levels of education and reduced area deprivation, in particular, 
are associated with positive social cohesion measures. A discussion is given towards the end of 
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the chapter, relating these findings to debates over whether identity, or ‘objective conditions’ 
such as deprivation and levels of education, are most relevant for social cohesion. 
An additional striking finding is that, for non-White ethnic groups, generation – in the sense of 
being UK- or foreign-born – appears to be of fundamental importance to whether or not 
British identity is associated with social cohesion. Nearly all of the positive associations 
between British identity and social cohesion that were found for non-White groups only apply 
to those not born in the UK. 
Parts of the chapter contain detailed technical explanations of the statistical techniques used. 
However, in order to allow the narrative to flow more freely and in a manner that can be more 
easily read, much of the technical information is given in separate boxes and tables, in 
footnotes, and in some cases in the Appendix. 
Summary of methods 
The methodology of the quantitative component of this study can be split into two parts. The 
first part considers each of the variables in the Home Office’s Citizenship Survey that were 
taken to be theoretically plausible measures of social cohesion, as detailed in Chapter 3. As 
detailed in the literature review, social cohesion is a complex and multifaceted concept, and 
there are a large number of variables that could be considered to represent it. Because of this, 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was used as a ‘data reduction’ technique in order to 
break the large number of variables down into a smaller number of components, with each 
representing a separate element of social cohesion. Care was taken to check that each 
component has a substantive meaning, and those variables that did not ‘fit’ either statistically 
or substantively were eventually dropped, after all possible combinations of variables were 
considered. Following this, PCA was again used to create composite variables for each 
‘element’ of social cohesion. PCA, rather than factor analysis, is preferable for the creation of 
composite variables (Blunch 2008, 71), which is why this technique was preferred for this 
purpose. Part 4.1 of this chapter details this part of the methodology and corresponding 
results. 
The second part of the methodology used each composite variable as the dependent variable 
in a linear regression model. A measure of the strength of a respondent’s British identity was 
created and used as a key explanatory variable. Control variables included each of the issues 
identified theoretically as potentially affecting social cohesion, as detailed in the literature 
review, and as illustrated in the ‘theoretical framework’ (Figure 1). Particular attention was 
given to ethnic differences in social cohesion, and to differences in the relationship between 
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British identities and social cohesion for different ethnic groups; variables representing 
differences in ethnic groups were therefore used as key interaction effects with the identity 
variables. The regression models thus enable one to ask: holding other factors constant, what 
is the relationship between British identity and each of the social cohesion measures, and how 
does this impact vary by ethnic group? Part 4.2 of this chapter gives a description of the 
methodology used when constructing the regression models; and Part 4.3 shows the results of 
each of the models. Part 4.4 gives some analysis of the results, and Part 4.5 concludes. Table 7 
below shows the structure of the methodology used in this chapter, and the corresponding 
results. 
Before going any further, it is important to outline briefly some details of the design of the 
Citizenship Survey. The survey “is designed to contribute to the evidence base across a range 
of important policy areas including cohesion, community empowerment, race equality, 
volunteering and charitable giving”, and uses a representative sample of around 10,000 adults 
(the ‘core’ sample), and in addition an ethnic minority (defined as non-white ethnic groups) 
‘boost sample’ of around 5,000 adults (Agur et al. 2010, 1). The survey covers England and 
Wales. Data from the 2007-08 and 2008-09 surveys are used in this study, the combination of 
which was not hugely problematic because the “sample design for 2008-09 is effectively that 
of the 2007-08 survey, with some minor changes to the number of issued wards” (ibid., 3). The 
sample design uses two phases, in which wards6 were randomly selected in the first phase, and 
households randomly selected in the second phase, which has the practical advantage of 
geographically concentrating the households to be targeted for interview, but the 
disadvantage of reducing statistical efficiency (compared to sampling all households 
nationally). Households were sampled, but one eligible adult was selected at random from 
each household, where eligible adult means being aged 16 or over for the core sample, or 
“being 16 or over and from an ethnic minority group for the boost sample” (ibid., 10).  
For the core sample, there was a response rate of 56% for the 2008-9 survey and 57% for the 
2007-8 survey. The actual number of interviews conducted for the core sample for both the 
2007-8 and 2008-9 surveys was 9335 in each year (Agur et al. 2010; Agur et al. 2009). 
The design of the ethnic minority boost sample is complex. Two techniques were used to 
target ethnic minority interviewees: direct screening and focused enumeration screening. 
Direct screening was used for wards in which 18% or more of the population were categorised 
                                                          
6
 Primary sampling units (PSUs) were in fact sampled, which are identical to wards aside from the fact 
that if a ward has fewer than 500 addresses it is grouped with a neighbouring ward to create a PSU 
(Agur et al. 2010). 
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as belonging to an ethnic minority group (defined as a non-white ethnic group according to the 
2001 census). This means that a random sample of these wards (with 18% or more ethnic 
minority population) was taken, and a random sample of households was taken within each 
selected ward. It was established whether or not each selected household had an ethnic 
minority (i.e. non-white ethnic group) resident, and if so, they were asked to be interviewed. 
63% (2008-9 survey) and 62% (2007-8 survey) of such addresses were ineligible since they did 
not contain anyone from an ethnic minority group. For the remainder of households, the 
response rate was 55% for the 2008-9 survey and 49% for the 2007-8 survey (Agur et al. 2010; 
Agur et al. 2009). 
Focused enumeration screening was used for wards in which 1% or more, but less than 18%, of 
the population was from an ethnic minority group. Focused enumeration is a technique in 
which respondents from the core sample (residing in these wards) were asked whether the 
four addresses adjacent to them (‘adjacent’ defined as the two addresses preceding and the 
two following the interviewee’s address on the Postcode Address File) had anyone belonging 
to an ethnic minority group living there. In 97% of such cases in both years of the survey, it was 
thought no-one belonging to an ethnic minority group lived there (or the address was 
classified as ‘deadwood’, such as a commercial property). The remaining 3% were then 
targeted for direct screening, in which 67% (2008-9 survey) and 63% (2007-8 survey) were in 
fact found to have at least one eligible adult (i.e. an adult categorised as belonging to a non-
white ethnic group). Of these people, the response rate was 55% for the 2008-9 survey and 
59% for the 2007-8 survey (Agur et al. 2010; Agur et al. 2009). 
In total (in terms of a combination of the direct screening and focused enumeration methods) 
the boost sample led to 5582 interviews in 2008-9 and 4762 Interviews in 2007-8 (Agur et al. 
2009). For both the Principal Components Analysis and the regression analysis, it was 
necessary to use weights to “correct for biases caused by unequal selection probabilities and 
non-response” (Agur et al. 2010, 33). The weight variable used was ‘WtFInds’, which is the 
appropriate weight for using the combined core and boost sample. The boost sample, as was 
discussed, was used because of the importance of ‘capturing’ ethnic differences in results. The 
statistical software package Stata was used for analysis, and for the regression analysis, Stata 
provides additional functions allowing for the adjustment of standard errors due to the survey 
design. This was not necessary for the Principal Components Analysis because it is a descriptive 
technique and therefore does not provide statistical significance tests. Section 4.22 details 
additional information about these additional functions for the regression analysis.  
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Table 7: Quantitative Component – Structure 
 
1. Measuring Social Cohesion 
A Identification of theoretically plausible variables in Citizenship Survey 
B PCA Stage 1: Inclusion and exclusion of variables identified in (A) 
C PCA Stage 2: Creating composite variables for each group 
D Presentation of each measure of social cohesion 
 
2. Relationship between British Identity and Social Cohesion 
A Construction of the regression model 
B Results of regression models with a high level of explanatory power 
C Results of regression models with a moderate level of explanatory power 
D Results of regression models with a poor level of explanatory power 
E Analysis 
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4.1 Measuring social cohesion 
 
The first stage in the measurement of social cohesion was to establish which variables in the 
Citizenship Survey could be considered to be potential indicators of social cohesion. The 
multifaceted and often vague nature of the concept make this a particularly difficult task, but 
initial guidance can be found from the definition of social cohesion provided by Forrest & 
Kearns (2001). All questions that were in the Home Office's Citizenship Survey, for the years 
2007-8 and 2008-9 (NatCen 2010) were considered, and those deemed to potentially be able 
to represent a particular aspect of social cohesion were listed, as described in Chapter 3. Table 
3 (in Chapter 3) shows the definition of social cohesion given by Forrest & Kearns (2001) 
together with those questions that could theoretically be considered to measure each part of 
the concept. 
 
4.11: Methodology 
 
The overall objective in the measurement of social cohesion using data from the Citizenship 
Survey was to be able to use the large number of variables identified theoretically as being 
potential indicators of social cohesion, and create from them a much smaller number of 
composite variables that could be considered as representing a particular element of social 
cohesion. Since the list of variables identified that could potentially measure social cohesion is 
large, it is necessary to employ a data reduction technique to make the measures of social 
cohesion less unwieldy. Additionally, data reduction techniques offer the possibility of 
analysing the structure of the relationships between variables, such that it is possible to gain 
an insight into how many different elements of social cohesion might be represented by the 
variables in the Citizenship Survey. It is then possible to use the Citizenship Survey variables to 
create one or more composite variables that can be considered to measure a particular aspect 
of the concept. 
There are two main data reduction techniques that could both analyse the structure of the 
relationships between variables and create a more parsimonious set of composite variables 
based on the number of components identified. The first is Principal Components Analysis 
(PCA), which explains a proportion of the variance in a set of variables in terms of a smaller 
number of 'principal components' (Bartholomew 2008). It is a descriptive technique, and 
therefore does not provide information such as statistical significance tests. The second 
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technique is factor analysis, which assumes that a proportion of the variance in the set of 
variables to be analysed can be explained in terms of a number of latent variables, or factors. It 
is a model-based technique, and therefore provides information such as significance tests, and 
tests of model fit. The two techniques become very similar when the variance of the error 
terms in factor analysis can be assumed to be equal. However, Principal Components Analysis 
was chosen for the purposes of this study, since the objective is to create a set of composite 
variables, and PCA is more reliable than factor analysis at generating scores for the creation of 
composite variables (Blunch 2008, 71). 
PCA is a technique that transforms a set of variables into a smaller number of uncorrelated 
components, whilst retaining as much of the variance in the variables as possible. The variance 
of a variable can be considered as equating to the amount of information contained in that 
variable (Blunch 2008). So, if a variable has a variance of zero – that is if all of its values are the 
same – then it is of no interest since it contains no information. For example, if a test is devised 
such that the only results are either to pass or to fail, but every person taking the test passes, 
then this tells one nothing  that could be used to discriminate between those taking the test. 
By contrast, a test with marks ranging between 1 and 100, and where those taking the test had 
a wide range of scores across the entire scale, could be used to give one a lot of information 
about the relative abilities of those taking the test. 
PCA is useful in determining how to measure social cohesion because it can reduce the large 
and unwieldy number of variables identified as potential indicators of social cohesion into a 
smaller and more manageable number of components, and this can be done in such a way that 
as much of the information as possible in the original variables is retained. 
A second key consideration in the measurement of social cohesion centred on whether the 
variables to be used were continuous, binary, ordinal or categorical. Nearly all the variables 
identified as potential indicators of social cohesion (as shown in Table 3) are either binary or 
ordinal variables. In order to conduct the PCA it is necessary to adopt a technique that is 
appropriate for the analysis of binary and ordinal variables, since standard PCA assumes that 
all variables are continuous (Bartholomew 2008). 
At this point it is necessary to note a few technical issues with using the Citizenship Survey 
data. First, some of the questions in the Citizenship Survey were changed in quarter 4 of 2008-
9 in order to make space in the survey for questions on, amongst other things, violent 
extremism (NatCen 2011, personal communication). This affects several questions on 
treatment by public service providers, along with some questions on respect, mixing and 
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values. Including quarter 4 in the analysis therefore resulted in a very large number of missing 
values for some of the variables identified as potentially measuring social cohesion, so it was 
decided it was necessary to exclude quarter 4 from the analysis and concentrate only on 
quarters 1, 2 and 3. Doing this drastically reduced the number of missing values. 
Second, although the initial analysis was conducted using only quarters 1, 2 and 3 from the 
2008-9 survey, it was decided a second analysis would be undertaken that combined these 
three quarters with all four quarters from the 2007-8 survey. The reasons for this were to 
increase the sample size, in order to check both whether any statistically insignificant findings 
became significant when the sample size increased, and also to increase the possibilities for 
searching for interaction effects. The sample was thereby increased from 11251 to 25346. The 
second reason was as a robustness check: the findings produced using only the sample from 
2008-9 were replicated using the expanded dataset to check whether or not they changed. 
Most findings did in fact stay very similar to those produced only using the 2008-9 dataset: the 
ten components uncovered using the PCA had very similar loadings and almost identical 
interpretations; and nearly all the statistically significant associations found using the 
regression analysis held with the larger sample, with some additional significant associations 
uncovered. 
Third, the number of respondents answering ‘don’t know’ to some of the questions created a 
separate issue with respect to missing values. Due in part to the fact that questions were 
drawn from many different parts of the survey questionnaire for inclusion in the PCA, there 
were many different people answering ‘don’t know’ to at least one question. If ‘don’t know’ 
answers are excluded listwise from the PCA, this results in almost 40% of the sample being 
excluded – an unacceptably large proportion. It was decided to include the ‘don’t know’ 
answers in the analysis to reduce the missing values drastically, but in order to do this it was 
necessary to recode the ordinal variables as binary, which unfortunately involves losing some 
information. On balance it was felt that losing this information was better than having missing 
values of around 40%.7  
                                                          
7
 If one decides not to exclude the ‘don’t know’ answers from the analysis, it is not at all clear how to code them 
when the variable in question is ordinal. If, for instance, the possible answers are ‘strongly agree’, ‘tend to agree’, 
‘tend to disagree’, and ‘strongly disagree’, it does not seem justifiable that a ‘don’t know’ answer would indicate the 
respondent disagrees even more strongly than had they answered ‘strongly disagree’. One might perhaps make an 
argument that a ‘don’t know’ answer might indicate ambivalence or a lack of opinion, so ‘don’t know’ could be 
coded in the middle – that is in between ‘tend to agree’ and ‘tend to disagree’, but it was felt that this is a rather 
strong assumption as a ‘don’t know’ answer does not really fit on the ordinal scale at all. 
If one considers a ‘don’t know’ answer in the context of binary variables, the situation is slightly different. Consider, 
for instance, a question whereby a respondent is asked whether or not they feel they belong to their local area, and 
71 
 
Following the recoding of variables into the binary format, the technique that was chosen for 
the PCA is to compute polychoric correlations between the variables, and to run a standard 
PCA on the resultant correlation matrix. Polychoric correlations are specifically designed for 
binary and ordinal variables and so are appropriate for this task, and although tetrachoric 
correlations are also designed for binary variables, they do not support sampling weights, 
which are needed for this analysis; more detailed technical information can be found in Figure 
2. 
The use of PCA to create composite variables followed two stages. First, all of the variables 
identified as potential indicators of social cohesion (see Table 3 above) were included in an 
initial PCA. Statistical and substantive criteria were used to decide upon those variables that 
should be kept for a subsequent PCA, and those that should be dropped. All combinations of 
variables were tried systematically. Second, a final PCA was run using the remaining variables 
in order to generate composite variables representing each aspect of social cohesion. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
they can either answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’, but instead they answer ‘don’t know’. Whilst answering ‘don’t know’ is not 
equivalent to answering ‘no’, it nevertheless seems a reasonable assumption that we should consider a respondent 
answering ‘yes’ to belong more strongly to their local area than a respondent answering ‘don’t know’. One can then 
keep the don’t know responses in the analysis, instead of excluding them, by coding all ‘yes’ responses as 1 and all 
‘no’ and ‘don’t know’ responses as 0 in a binary variable. Whilst this solution is not ideal, it does at least seem more 
justifiable than coding ‘don’t know’ arbitrarily in an ordinal variable. 
For this reason it was decided to recode all ordinal variables as binary variables such that all ‘don’t know’ responses 
could be included in the analysis. This drastically reduces the number of missing values, although it does have the 
significant disadvantage of losing some of the information contained in the ordinal variables. A four category ordinal 
variable (e.g. ‘strongly disagree’; ‘tend to agree’; ‘tend to disagree’; ‘strongly disagree’) therefore, was recoded such 
that ‘strongly agree’ and ‘tend to agree’ were set as value 1, and ‘tend to disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’, together 
with any ‘don’t know’ answers, were coded as 0. Although doing this does involve loss of information, it was in fact 
found that the interpretation of the PCA components generated in this way was very similar to a PCA utilising the 
full ordinal variables. 
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As is common in social scientific survey data, nearly all the Citizenship Survey variables 
considered as measures of social cohesion are either binary or ordinal. Many are measured 
on a scale whereby the respondent answers 'strongly agree', 'tend to agree', 'tend to 
disagree', or 'strongly disagree'. Standard principal components analysis (PCA) and factor 
analysis techniques assume variables to be continuous, and so these standard techniques 
are inappropriate for this study. Some authors using PCA or factor analysis simply use 
ordinal variables as if they were continuous, despite the fact that this violates the 
assumptions. Whilst this approach is somewhat more justifiable when the number of 
ordinal categories is large (more than ten, for instance), with a smaller number of 
categories (many of the Citizenship Survey variables have four or five) the possibility of 
obtaining inaccurate results is substantial (Bartholomew 2008).  
An approach used to achieve data reduction for a set of binary variables is termed the 
‘underlying variable’ approach (Bartholomew 2008). Purely out of convenience, it assumes 
that ordinal variables are an incomplete representation of a continuous latent variable. So, 
for instance, a variable with four possible responses ranging from 'strongly agree' to 
'strongly disagree' is assumed to be an incomplete representation of a continuous latent 
variable that captures precisely how much a respondent agrees with the question. This 
incorporates the fact that all that is known from the ordinal variable is that if a person 
answers 'strongly agree' to one question and 'tend to agree' to a second, one would 
presume they agree more strongly with the first question than the second; but one would 
not, however, know how much more strongly they agree. The underlying variable approach, 
therefore, assumes the distinction between 'strongly agree' and 'tend to agree' to 
represent some point on the underlying continuous variable, but one does not know 
precisely where this point is, only in what order the four categories are. 
Standard PCA and factor analysis techniques essentially analyse correlations between 
continuous variables. Using the underlying variable approach, it is possible to analyse the 
correlations between binary and ordinal variables by creating types of correlation 
specifically designed for these types of variables. One such type of correlation is the 
polychoric correlation (Uebersax 2011). Polychoric correlations can be computed in Stata, 
and this makes it possible, when analysing binary and ordinal variables, to use standard PCA 
and factor analysis on the correlation matrices computed based on polychoric correlations. 
The variables analysed in the measurement of social cohesion are all binary. The 
quantitative component of this study, therefore, uses Stata to run standard principal 
components analyses on the correlation matrices of polychoric correlations. This ensures 
that the assumptions of standard PCA and factor analysis are not violated. 
Figure 2: PCA and Factor Analysis with Binary and Ordinal Variables 
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Each of the variables potentially measuring social cohesion, as listed in Table 3, were included 
in an initial PCA. Variables were then considered for inclusion or exclusion in a further PCA. 
Several criteria were considered when deciding whether to retain a particular variable: the first 
set of criteria was based on statistical guidelines; and the second on substantive and 
theoretical guidelines. 
The objective of a PCA is to explain as much of the variance in a set of variables as is possible in 
a (preferably much) smaller number of principal components. One of the statistical criteria was 
therefore to account for as much of the variance as possible; a conventional rule of thumb is to 
aim for around 70% of variance (Bartholomew 2008). This should be attained whilst ensuring 
that eigenvalues are generally over 1, and by identifying an ‘elbow’ in the scree plot showing 
where the proportion of variance explained by each further component begins to decrease 
dramatically. Variables with a large proportion of variance that remains unexplained by the 
PCA, therefore, are good candidates for exclusion. 
Substantive and theoretical criteria for deciding whether or not to exclude a particular variable 
focused around whether a particular component had an intuitive interpretation. Each 
component can be interpreted based on those variables for which it has high loadings. If a 
component exhibited high loadings on five variables, for instance, and one of the variables 
appeared intuitively to correspond to a different concept, then this indicates that one may 
need to investigate whether there may be a spurious correlation due to, perhaps, the wording 
of the survey question or a bias in missing values. In considering whether a set of variables 
might represent a particular element of social cohesion, therefore, not only is it important that 
each variable has a high loading on the same component, but also that each variable has 
something substantive in common with the other variables. 
An additional objective of the PCA was to attain a solution approaching 'simple structure'. 
Simple structure is a property of a solution that is relatively easy to interpret since the loading 
of each variable is near zero on all of the components but one. The component can then be 
interpreted as being a representation of a particular set of variables. Each component, 
therefore, can be interpreted in terms of something that is common to those corresponding 
variables with high loadings on that component and loadings near zero on each of the other 
components. Another criterion when deciding upon those variables to exclude from the PCA, 
then, was whether or not that variable had a high loading on only one component and loadings 
of near zero on each of the others. Variables not exhibiting this property were good candidates 
for exclusion. 
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Based on both these statistical and substantive criteria, Figure 3 gives a summary of the 
methodology used to decide upon which variables to exclude from the PCA and which to 
retain. 
  
 
The methodology for deciding upon which variables to exclude from the PCA and which 
variables to keep was as follows: 
1. Run a PCA with an unlimited number of components, on the correlation 
matrix of all variables 
2. Establish where the ‘elbow’ in the scree chart might be, and how many 
components have eigenvalues of over 1, in order to decide the number 
of components to keep 
3. Run the PCA again, this time only keeping the specified number of 
components 
4. Note the proportion of the variance that has been explained; if it is less 
than around 70% it may be beneficial to drop at least one variable 
5. Those variables with a large proportion of variance left unexplained by 
the PCA are good candidates for exclusion 
6. Identify which variables have high loadings on which of the 
components; each component can be interpreted in terms of the 
variables with high loadings on that component. For each component, 
any variable with a substantively different interpretation from the 
others with high loadings is a good candidate for exclusion 
7. Identify those variables exhibiting ‘simple structure’ and those that 
have high loadings on more than one component. Variables not 
exhibiting ‘simple structure’ are good candidates for exclusion 
8. Exclude variables systematically based on the criteria in (5), (6) and (7) 
above. Run the PCA again – if the proportion of variance explained (as 
described in step (4)) increases, it may be advisable to permanently 
drop this variable 
 
Figure 3: Excluding variables from PCA 
75 
 
4.12: Results 
 
All variables identified as potential indicators of social cohesion were included in an initial PCA. 
The results of the PCA are shown in Figures 4 and 5 below. Based on the statistical guideline of 
retaining components with eigenvalues of over 1, one would retain eleven components. Eleven 
components explain 67.03% of the variance in the data, which is a little short of the 70% 
target, so it would be beneficial to attempt to increase the proportion of variance explained by 
considering those variables that could be dropped from the PCA. 
Figure 4: PCA on all variables 
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Figure 5: Component loadings of 11-component PCA with varimax rotation 
 
 
Based on the statistical and substantive criteria outlined, it was then necessary to decide which 
variables to exclude from further analysis. Four of the variables (sfriends, reldis13, sinc and 
zcivpar) have a particularly high unexplained variance - of over 50% - and so are good 
candidates for exclusion. Several more of the variables have relatively high loadings on several 
components and so, given the target of attaining simple structure and achieving an intuitive 
interpretation, these are also good candidates for exclusion. In addition, ptrust has an 
interpretation that does not fit comfortably with the other variables that have high loadings on 
component 4. Ptrust asks a respondent about generalised trust, whereas all the other variables 
refer to place – either the respondent’s local area or neighbourhood – which makes this 
variable a candidate for exclusion. Table 8 shows a table of those variables considered for 
exclusion. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                
       sfriendsc    -0.0206   -0.0445    0.0616   -0.0333    0.0253    0.0280    0.3664   -0.1281   -0.0177    0.2810   -0.0024 
       reldis13c     0.0356    0.2777   -0.1637    0.1516   -0.0826   -0.1337   -0.1339    0.0173    0.0629    0.0291    0.0960 
         ptrustc    -0.0138   -0.0447    0.0148    0.4319   -0.2394   -0.0129    0.0912   -0.0614    0.0427    0.1310    0.0232 
         ptparlc    -0.0307   -0.1547    0.1665    0.0358   -0.1493    0.1197   -0.0575    0.1736    0.1536    0.3150    0.0624 
         ptcnclc    -0.0048   -0.0741    0.0889    0.0593   -0.0716    0.0684   -0.0390    0.2030    0.0521    0.3345    0.0950 
           sincc     0.0732   -0.0421   -0.0877    0.1097   -0.1326    0.1577    0.0389    0.0457    0.1440   -0.4621    0.1526 
         svaluec     0.0013    0.0132    0.0107    0.3375    0.2382   -0.0041   -0.0256    0.0392   -0.0523    0.0067   -0.0584 
       srespectc    -0.0161    0.0497    0.0053    0.0791    0.0384    0.5578   -0.0762   -0.1080   -0.0241    0.1254   -0.0857 
         rehealc     0.0111    0.1494   -0.0939    0.0059    0.0122   -0.0454    0.0050   -0.0374    0.0326    0.0019    0.6051 
          repubc    -0.0182   -0.0813    0.0769   -0.0015    0.0380    0.0098    0.0030   -0.0215   -0.0517   -0.0088    0.7136 
         senjoyc     0.0074   -0.0198   -0.0398    0.2609    0.3345   -0.0243   -0.0353    0.0251   -0.0243    0.0228    0.0193 
          ssafec     0.0099   -0.0295    0.0229    0.5062   -0.0533    0.0486   -0.0437    0.0279   -0.0510   -0.1565    0.0125 
        stogethc    -0.0173    0.0331    0.0345    0.1936    0.1541    0.3633   -0.0853   -0.0721    0.0048    0.1222   -0.0486 
         strustc    -0.0146    0.0535   -0.0478    0.4359    0.0947   -0.0229    0.0374   -0.0132   -0.0380    0.0468   -0.0067 
         rdis16c     0.3510   -0.0776    0.1295    0.0884   -0.0394   -0.0425    0.0232    0.0163   -0.0012   -0.1311   -0.0276 
         rdis15c     0.3711   -0.0760    0.1044    0.0595   -0.0138   -0.0314   -0.0067    0.0079   -0.0263   -0.1010   -0.0235 
         rdis14c     0.3169   -0.0961    0.1185   -0.0216    0.0424   -0.0098   -0.0651    0.0430   -0.0414   -0.0394    0.0628 
         rdis13c     0.3915    0.1018   -0.1622   -0.1181    0.0694    0.0587   -0.0095   -0.0411   -0.0418    0.2202   -0.0220 
         rdis12c     0.3987    0.0958   -0.1516   -0.1130    0.0650    0.0426   -0.0253   -0.0291   -0.0604    0.1968   -0.0006 
         rdis10c     0.3721   -0.0004    0.0202    0.0735   -0.0534   -0.0461    0.0425    0.0036    0.0909   -0.0885   -0.0210 
         rdis09c     0.3594    0.0168    0.0171    0.0642   -0.0531   -0.0412    0.0461    0.0063    0.0917   -0.0783   -0.0252 
         rdis08c     0.1704   -0.0808    0.2811   -0.0853    0.0658    0.0684   -0.0685   -0.0207   -0.1339   -0.0052    0.0133 
         rdis07c     0.0130    0.0568    0.3943    0.0253   -0.0417   -0.0370    0.0277    0.0001   -0.0289    0.1373    0.0317 
         rdis06c    -0.0253   -0.0134    0.4811   -0.0090   -0.0318   -0.0561   -0.0480    0.0278   -0.0475    0.1025    0.1051 
         rdis05c    -0.0011    0.1254    0.3960   -0.0215    0.0479    0.0325    0.0191   -0.0456    0.0795   -0.0921   -0.0424 
         rdis04c    -0.0223    0.1301    0.3928    0.0392    0.0327    0.0272    0.0670   -0.0666    0.0916   -0.1223   -0.0611 
         rdis03c    -0.0089    0.4771    0.0836   -0.0416   -0.0182    0.0157   -0.0086    0.0453    0.0027    0.0361    0.0112 
         rdis02c     0.0111    0.5117    0.0309    0.0003   -0.0338    0.0269   -0.0002    0.0260    0.0074   -0.0335    0.0188 
         rdis01c     0.0056    0.5201    0.0220   -0.0028    0.0071    0.0309    0.0283    0.0193   -0.0304   -0.0063   -0.0252 
        zcivparc    -0.0025    0.0224   -0.0325    0.0568    0.0205   -0.0748    0.4634    0.0710   -0.1138   -0.0075   -0.0228 
        zforvolc    -0.0031    0.0143   -0.0034    0.0245   -0.0050   -0.0024    0.5388    0.0036    0.0865   -0.0240    0.0370 
        zinfvolc     0.0185   -0.0086    0.0061   -0.0410    0.0289    0.0366    0.5072    0.0164   -0.0265   -0.0332   -0.0071 
         xmxoftc     0.0029    0.0144   -0.0250   -0.0563   -0.0816    0.4913    0.1308    0.0641    0.0002   -0.1043   -0.0113 
          sracec     0.0191   -0.0486   -0.0313   -0.1376   -0.0244    0.4502    0.0094    0.1024   -0.0268   -0.2150    0.1424 
         febritc     0.0122    0.0208   -0.0154    0.0041    0.0116    0.0362    0.0181   -0.0340    0.6392   -0.0019   -0.0360 
          sbegbc    -0.0147   -0.0254    0.0176   -0.0364    0.0624   -0.0599   -0.0254    0.0133    0.6455    0.0004   -0.0087 
         sbelocc    -0.0079   -0.0314    0.0349   -0.0707    0.5443    0.0286    0.0284    0.0035    0.1002    0.0133    0.0518 
       sbeneighc     0.0160   -0.0109   -0.0225   -0.0021    0.5738   -0.0137    0.0243    0.0450    0.0317   -0.0100    0.0459 
         ptpolcc     0.1310   -0.0002   -0.1505    0.0657   -0.1146    0.0801    0.0578    0.0042    0.1150    0.4193    0.0924 
         paffgbc    -0.0004   -0.0004    0.0059   -0.0363    0.0046   -0.0058   -0.0455    0.6598    0.0217   -0.0037   -0.0457 
        pafflocc    -0.0046    0.0454   -0.0228    0.0344    0.0398   -0.0154    0.0680    0.6403   -0.0461    0.0057   -0.0138 
                                                                                                                                
        Variable      Comp1     Comp2     Comp3     Comp4     Comp5     Comp6     Comp7     Comp8     Comp9    Comp10    Comp11 
                                                                                                                                
Rotated components 
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Table 8: Variables considered for exclusion from PCA 
Variable Question Reason considered for exclusion 
Ptcncl To what extent do you trust your local 
council? 
Fairly high loadings on several 
components, and no particularly 
high loading on any 
Ptparl To what extent do you trust 
parliament? 
Fairly high loadings on several 
components, and no particularly 
high loading on any 
Ptrust Would you say that most people can 
be trusted, or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people? 
Interpretation does not fit with 
the other variables with high 
loadings for that component 
Sfriends How many close friends do you have? Has a large proportion of 
unexplained variance 
Sinc How many of your friends have similar 
incomes to you? 
Has a large proportion of 
unexplained variance 
Reldis13 Have you experienced religious 
discrimination by any public services? 
Fairly high loadings on several 
components, and no particularly 
high loading on any; also has a 
relatively high proportion of 
unexplained variance 
Zcivpar Have you taken part in any civic 
engagement in the last year? 
Has a large proportion of 
unexplained variance 
Source: UKDA (2007) 
Each of the above variables were systematically excluded from the PCA in turn, such that all 
possible combinations were explored, whereby one or all of the 7 variables were dropped. The 
outcome of the analysis was that all variables aside from Zcivpar were dropped. When these 
variables were dropped from the PCA, the proportion of variance explained improved and the 
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interpretation of the components became much more intuitive. Without the other six 
variables, the proportion of unexplained variance for zcivpar fell, so it was possible to keep it.  
Table 9 shows the 35 variables that were retained for the final PCA, along with their meanings 
and possible answers. Also shown in brackets are the values that each variable was given when 
recoded into a binary variable: it is intended that values of 1 represent higher levels of social 
cohesion, and values of 0 lower levels. 
Table 9: List of variables chosen as indicators of social cohesion 
Variable name Survey Question Possible Answers 
Paffloc Do you agree or disagree that you can 
influence decisions affecting your local 
area? (15-20 minutes walk) 
1. Definitely agree (1) 
2. Tend to agree (1) 
3. Tend to disagree (0) 
4. Definitely disagree (0) 
5. Don’t know (0) 
Paffgb Do you agree or disagree that you can 
influence decisions affecting Britain? 
1. Definitely agree (1) 
2. Tend to agree (1) 
3. Tend to disagree (0) 
4. Definitely disagree (0) 
5. Don’t know (0) 
Ptpolc To what extent do you trust the police? 1. A lot (1) 
2. A fair amount (1) 
3. Not very much (0) 
4. Not at all (0) 
5. Don’t know (0) 
Sbeneigh How strongly do you feel you belong to 
your immediate neighbourhood? 
1. Very strongly (1) 
2. Fairly strongly (1) 
3. Not very strongly (0) 
4. Not at all strongly (0) 
5. Don’t know (0) 
Sbeloc How strongly do you feel you belong to 
your local area? (15-20 minute walk) 
1. Very strongly (1) 
2. Fairly strongly (1) 
3. Not very strongly (0) 
4. Not at all strongly (0) 
5. Don’t know (0) 
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Sbegb How strongly do you feel you belong to 
Britain? 
1. Very strongly (1) 
2. Fairly strongly (1) 
3. Not very strongly (0) 
4. Not at all strongly (0) 
5. Don’t know (0) 
Febrit To what extent do you agree or disagree 
that you personally feel a part of British 
society? 
1. Very strongly (1) 
2. Fairly strongly (1) 
3. Not very strongly (0) 
4. Not at all strongly (0) 
5. Don’t know (0) 
Srace What proportion of your friends are of the 
same ethnic group as you? 
1. All the same (0) 
2. More than a half (0) 
3. About a half (1) 
4. Less than a half (1) 
5. Don’t know (0) 
Xmxoft In the last year, have you mixed [in some 
way] with people from a different ethnic 
group at least once a month?* [derived 
variable] 
0. No (0) 
1. Yes (1) 
(derived variable: don’t 
know coded as 0) 
Zcivpar In the last year, have you taken part in [any 
listed] civic engagement activities?** 
[derived variable] 
0. No (0) 
1. Yes (1) 
(derived variable: don’t 
know coded as 0) 
Zinfvol Have you given any informal voluntary help 
in the last 12 months? [derived variable] 
0. No (0) 
1. Yes (1) 
(derived variable: don’t 
know coded as 0) 
Zforvol Have you given any formal voluntary help in 
the last 12 months? [derived variable] 
0. No (0) 
1. Yes (1) 
(derived variable: don’t 
know coded as 0) 
 Compared to people of other races, how 
would ...  treat you? 
1. I would be treated worse 
than other races (0) 
2. I would be treated better 
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than other races (0) 
3. I would be treated the 
same as other races (1)  
4. Don’t know/no opinion 
(0) 
Rdis01 Your local doctors’ surgery  
Rdis02 Your local hospital  
Rdis03 The health service generally  
Rdis04 A local school  
Rdis05 The education system generally  
Rdis06 A council housing department or housing 
association 
 
Rdis07 A local council (apart from a housing 
department) 
 
Rdis08 A private landlord  
Rdis09 The courts – that is, Magistrates and Crown 
Courts 
 
Rdis10 The Crown Prosecution Service  
Rdis12 Your local police  
Rdis13 The police in general  
Rdis14 The immigration authorities  
Rdis15 The Prison Service  
Rdis16 The Probation Service  
Srespect Would you agree or disagree that this local 
area (15-20 minutes walking distance) is a 
place where residents respect ethnic 
differences between people? 
1. Definitely agree (1) 
2. Tend to agree (1) 
3. Tend to disagree (0) 
4. Definitely disagree (0) 
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5. Don’t know (0) 
Strust In your neighbourhood, to what extent can 
people be trusted? 
1. Many of the people can 
be trusted (1) 
2. Some can be trusted (1) 
3. A few can be trusted (0) 
4. None can be trusted (0) 
5. Don’t know (0) 
Svalue To what extent do you agree or disagree 
that people in this neighbourhood share the 
same values? 
1. Strongly agree (1) 
2. Agree (1) 
3. Disagree (0) 
4. Strongly disagree (0) 
5. Don’t know (0) 
Stogeth To what extent do you agree or disagree 
that this local area (within 15-20 minutes 
walking distance), is a place where people 
from different backgrounds get on well 
together? 
1. Definitely agree (1) 
2. Tend to agree (1) 
3. Tend to disagree (0) 
4. Definitely disagree (0) 
5. Don’t know (0) 
Ssafe How safe would you feel walking alone in 
this neighbourhood after dark? 
1. Very safe (1) 
2. Fairly safe (1) 
3. A bit unsafe (0) 
4. Very unsafe (0) 
5. Never walks alone after 
dark (0) 
6. Don’t know (0) 
Senjoy Would you say that this is a neighbourhood 
you enjoy living in? 
1. Yes, definitely (1) 
2. Yes, to some extent (0) 
3. No (0) 
4. Don’t know (0) 
Repub Would you say you are treated with respect 
when using public transport? 
1. All of the time (1) 
2. Most of the time (1) 
3. Some of the time (0) 
4. Rarely (0) 
5. Never (0) 
6. Don’t know (0) 
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Reheal Would you say you are treated with respect 
when using health services? 
1. All of the time (1) 
2. Most of the time (1) 
3. Some of the time (0) 
4. Rarely (0) 
5. Never (0) 
6. Don’t know (0) 
Source: UKDA (2007) 
The next objective of the PCA was to use the final set of variables and run a PCA in order to 
establish composite variables for each component, with each component representing a 
separate element of social cohesion. 
Figures 6 and 7 show the results of a PCA on the final set of variables retained. Ten 
components have eigenvalues of at least one, so these ten components are included, and 
together the PCA explains 70.67% of the variance in the variables, which just exceeds the 
target of 70%. As shown in the right-hand column of Figure 7, the PCA explains at least half of 
the variance in each variable. 
Each of the ten components can be interpreted in terms of those variables for which it has 
high loadings, since component loadings are the correlations between a component and a 
particular variable (Blunch 2008). Each component can then be interpreted as being a 
representation of a particular set of variables. The black boxes around some of the loadings 
shown in Figure 7 highlight those variables with relatively high loadings on that component; 
most other variables have loadings relatively close to zero. As one can see, the PCA does not 
exhibit perfect ‘simple structure’, since some of the variables outside the black boxes have 
loadings closer to zero than others. Nonetheless, the black boxes capture to a reasonable 
extent those variables that have high loadings. Each of the ten components, therefore, can be 
interpreted in terms of something that is common to those corresponding variables inside 
each of the black boxes. 
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Figure 6: Final PCA for the measurement of social cohesion 
 
 
Figure 7: Final PCA with varimax rotation 
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In order to interpret Figures 6 and 7 substantively, it is necessary to consult Table 10 below, 
which shows a list of each of the variables, together with the questions the variables 
correspond to in the Citizenship Survey. The task in the interpretation of each component, 
then, is to understand what might be common to each of the variables exhibiting high loadings 
on that component. Table 10 shows a list of each of the ten components together with the 
variables for which the component has high loadings, and the interpretations of the variables. 
Table 10: Groupings of variables by component 
COMPONENT HIGHEST 
LOADINGS ON 
MEANING 
1  
Rdis04 
Rdis05 
Rdis06 
Rdis07 
Rdis08 
Rdis09 
Rdis10 
Rdis14 
Rdis15 
Rdis16 
Compared to people of other races, how would …  treat 
you? 
Your local school 
The education system generally 
A council housing department / housing association 
Your local council 
A private landlord 
The courts 
The crown prosecution service 
The immigration authorities 
The prison service 
The probation service 
2  
Rdis01 
Rdis02 
Rdis03 
Compared to people of other races, how would …  treat 
you? 
Your local doctor 
Your local hospital 
The health service generally 
3 Ptpolc 
Rdis12 
Rdis13 
 
Do you trust the police? 
How would your local police treat you compared to other 
races? 
How would the police in general treat you compared to 
other races? 
4 Strust 
Svalue 
Ssafe 
How much can people be trusted in your local area? 
Do people in your neighbourhood share the same values? 
How safe do you feel after dark in your local area? 
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Senjoy Do you enjoy living in your neighbourhood? 
5 Sbeneigh 
Sbeloc 
How strongly do you belong to your neighbourhood? 
How strongly do you belong to your local area? 
6 Sbegb 
Febrit 
How strongly do you belong to Britain? 
To what extent do you agree or disagree that you 
personally feel a part of British society? 
7 Srace 
 
Xmxoft 
 
Stogeth 
 
Srespect 
What proportion of your friends are of the same ethnic 
group as you? 
Have you mixed [in some way] with people from a 
different ethnic group at least once a month? 
Do people from different backgrounds get on well in your 
local area? 
Do people respect ethnic differences in your local area? 
8 Zinfvol 
Zforvol 
Zcivpar 
Have you done any informal volunteering in the last 12 
mnths? 
Have you done any formal volunteering in the last 12 
mnths? 
Have you taken part in any civic engagement in the last 12 
mnths? 
9 Paffloc 
Paffgb 
Can you influence decisions affecting local area? 
Can you influence decisions affecting Britain? 
10 Repub 
Reheal 
Are you treated with respect when using public 
transport? 
Are you treated with respect when using health services? 
Source: UKDA (2007) 
Based on the meanings of each of the questions in the right hand column, it is possible to get a 
sense of the themes common to each component. Each component could be interpreted as 
follows: 
1. Equal treatment by public service providers, compared to other races (but NOT health 
services or the police) 
2. Equal treatment by health services, as compared to other races 
3. Trust in and equal treatment by the police 
4. Satisfaction with, and harmony of, neighbourhood and local area 
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5. Belonging to neighbourhood / local area 
6. Belonging to Britain 
7. Social interaction and getting on with people of different backgrounds 
8. Civic engagement and volunteering 
9. Ability to influence decisions of public institutions 
10. Being treated with respect when in public / using public services 
Figure 8 below represents graphically the ways in which the variables split into components 
according to the results of the PCA, and composite variables were created based on these PCA 
results such that each of the ten composite variables can be considered to represent a 
different element of social cohesion. The text in the coloured area explains the interpretation 
of each element, whilst the labels outside the circle identify the key themes and concepts 
exemplified by the element, some of which are common to more than one element. 
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Figure 8: Elements of social cohesion 
 
It is worth reflecting briefly on the ways in which the variables in the PCA ‘group’ together. It 
may be the case, for instance, that certain variables are correlated with one another because 
the questions are worded in a similar manner, or perhaps that they are taken from the same 
part of the survey (and so a respondent may, perhaps, have answered the question in a 
particular way because he or she gave the same answer to the question that preceded it). The 
components relating to ‘access to public services’ and ‘belonging to place’, however, show that 
the PCA is revealing more about the structure of the data that simply ‘picking up’ on the 
question wordings. Despite coming from similar parts of the survey, the PCA shows that 
belonging to Britain and to one’s local area are markedly different from one another; as are 
attitudes to the police and health services, and compared with one another and with attitudes 
towards public services in general. 
There are some similarities between the way in which the elements of social cohesion divide 
up and some of the concepts in the sociological literature. Scholz (2008, 21), for instance, 
identifies three types of solidarity. Social solidarity measures “the interdependence among 
individuals within a group” and “the cohesion of a small community” and is probably most 
similar to satisfaction with one’s place of residence, since this element focuses on sharing of 
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values, trust, pulling together to improve the neighbourhood, on so on in a (spatially defined) 
community.  A similar concept is Crow’s (2001) idea of ‘community solidarity’ in which a 
common interest allows solidarity to cut across other lines of differentiation. The element of 
satisfaction with one’s place of residence, therefore, fits under the theme of social/community 
solidarity. 
The second type of solidarity identified by Scholz (2008) is civic solidarity, which describes the 
obligations of the state to its citizens, particularly in redistributing wealth. To the extent that 
equal access to public services can be seen as a form of wealth redistribution, the elements of 
social cohesion that refer to access to services have most in common with this form of 
solidarity. Being treated with respect when using public services is also included here. The 
third type of solidarity identified by Scholz (2008) is political solidarity, in which people with 
common interests support each other in a battle for common goals and are able to have 
political influence to obtain those goals. This form of solidarity has most in common with the 
ability to influence public institutions. 
Amongst the ten elements of social cohesion there is also a strong spatial theme, both in terms 
of belonging to one’s local area and Britain, but also in the element of satisfaction with one’s 
place of residence, which refers strongly to neighbourhood and local area. 
The elements under civic activity and social activity have similarities to ideas of civil society: 
the ideas of association with people of different spheres (i.e. meaningful interaction with those 
of different backgrounds) has similarities with Aristotle’s idea of civil society as “founded on 
respect for different spheres and multiple associations in which life is lived” (Ehrenberg 1999). 
Figure 9 shows a modified version of the diagram representing the elements of social 
cohesion, together with the theory relevant to each of the elements. 
 
  
89 
 
Figure 9: Elements of social cohesion with theoretical categories 
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4.2 Construction of regression models 
 
Part 4.1 of this chapter showed how Principal Components Analysis can break the large 
number of variables potentially measuring social cohesion into a smaller number of 
components, whereby each component represents an ‘element’ of social cohesion. Composite 
variables were created from each component, so that ten composite variables are able to 
represent the ten elements. This section – part 4.2 – explains how each of the composite 
variables was used as a dependent variable in a regression model, such that it is possible to 
search for associations between measures of British identity and each of the elements of social 
cohesion, controlling for other potential confounding variables. A discussion is given of how 
the regression model is constructed, including the measurement of British identity and the 
inclusion of control variables, and second it is shown how the ten elements of social cohesion 
divide into three groups. The first group is relatively well-explained by the model, the second 
moderately well-explained, whilst the elements in the third group are not well-explained. 
 
4.21: Building the model 
 
The main measure of national identity used in the regression models in this chapter is of a 
respondent's British identity. This is derived from the variables natid5 and impnat. Natid asks 
the respondent to list any national identities they may have, and natid5 is coded as 1 if they 
mentioned British identity, whilst impnat asks the respondent about the importance of their 
national identity to their sense of who they are. The derived measure of British identity is a 
binary variable with a score of 1 when a respondent mentions British identity as their national 
identity, and also considers their national identity to be either ‘very important’ or ‘quite 
important’ to their sense of who they are. Sensitivity analysis will also be conducted at 
appropriate points in the analysis to consider whether changing this measure of British identity 
– by focusing only on those considering their national identity to be very important, or looking 
at English as opposed to British identity, for instance – has an impact on the results. 
Once the key independent variable – British identity – has been constructed, it is necessary to 
include control variables in the model. The literature review identifies several factors that 
could potentially affect both British identity and social cohesion, so it is necessary to include 
variables representing these factors in the model to prevent, as much as is possible, reporting 
spurious associations between British identity and social cohesion that are in fact driven by a 
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third factor. By including control variables in the mode it is possible to establish whether or not 
associations remain between British identity and each of the measures of social cohesion 
whilst holding these third factors constant. 
In addition, the literature review identifies several factors that could influence the relationship 
between British identity and social cohesion itself. These factors will need to be included as 
interaction effects with British identity. Last of all, several variables will be included that are 
hypothesised in the literature to have an impact on social cohesion but not British identity in 
order to compare the relative magnitudes of the associations between each of the 
independent variables and the measures of social cohesion. 
There are many factors identified in the literature that may affect social cohesion, or both 
social cohesion and British identity. The theoretical framework illustrated in Figure 1 (see 
Chapter 2) provides a guide to the construction of the regression models, including those 
variables that are to be used as interaction effects. Variables – and interaction effects – that 
were consistently found to be statistically insignificant were dropped from the final model. 
Table 11 shows the concepts identified in the literature review as being particularly salient, 
and the variables in the Citizenship Survey that are available for measuring each of these 
concepts. 
Table 11: Control variables available in Citizenship Survey 
Concept Variable Description 
Quality of housing Hhhldr Rents/owns accommodation – a somewhat 
crude indicator for quality of housing 
Level of poverty Pincome Respondent’s income 
Employment status Rnssec7 Socio-economic group, split into 7 categories, 
including whether or not in work 
Ethnic diversity of area Pethdec The proportion of minority ethnic residents in 
the respondent’s ward 
Area deprivation Dimd7 Index of area deprivation 
Religion Relprac Whether practicing a religion 
Age Dvage The respondent’s age, in years 
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Education Zquals The respondent’s highest qualification 
Ethnicity Ethnic5 The respondent’s ethnic group, split into 5 
categories 
Gender Sexmale Binary coding of the respondent’s gender 
Generation of immigrant Rcob2 Whether respondent born in UK 
Length of time in place of 
residence 
Slive5 The number of years the respondent has lived 
in their local area 
 
The following issues are good candidates for being included in the model as interaction effects 
with British identity: 
 Ethnicity 
 Generation of immigrant / length of time in UK 
 Religion 
Some of the variables did not work well in the model and so had to be removed. For instance, 
the Citizenship Survey does not measure income very well – a respondent’s personal level of 
income turned out not to have a significant effect in many of the models – so this variable was 
removed. It is still possible to measure poverty indirectly, however, via socio-economic 
classification and area deprivation. Additionally, the indicator for quality of housing (rent/own 
accommodation) turned out not to be significant, so was also removed. An additional control 
variable that was included was a dummy variable representing the year of the survey – either 
2007-8 or 2008-9 – to pick up whether or not there are systematic differences in results 
depending on the survey year. This variable was not significant at the 5% level for all models 
except two: the models for ability to influence decisions, and being treated with respect. The 
explanatory variables included in the regression model were also analysed to check for 
multicollinearity – see the Appendix, Part C for a discussion of this. 
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4.22: Differences between regression models 
 
Each of the ten composite indicators of social cohesion was used as the dependent variable in 
a linear regression model. Linear regression is appropriate since the ten indicators of social 
cohesion are derived from 35 binary variables; when the number of variables from which a 
variable is derived is as large as this, it can be interpreted as continuous; and linear regression 
is appropriate when the dependent variable can be interpreted as continuous (Bartholomew 
2008). 
There are a few technical issues to note at this point, relating to the complex design of the 
Citizenship Survey, which contains a core and boost sample, and a multi-stage stratified 
random sample design. The regression models were computed using Stata, which contains a 
set of commands that can be used to take account of the sampling design in the calculation of 
output. The following code was used in order for Stata to modify the standard errors to 
compensate for the complex design: 
Svyset psu_scr [pweight=wtfindtot], strata(strata_scr) vce(linearized) singleunit(certainty) 
The psu_scr part of the command specifies the sampling unit variable used in the Citizenship 
Survey, whilst the strata(strata_scr) part specifies the sampling unit variable. The 
pweight=wtfindtot part specifies the weights used. The wtfindtot variable is derived from a 
weight for the combined sample for quarters 1, 2 and 3 of the 2008-9 survey (NatCen 2011, 
personal communication), and the wtfinds variable from the 2007-8 survey, which is the 
weight for the combined sample for all four quarters. 
There are two options that could appropriately be used for the calculation of variance 
estimation in the Citizenship Survey – variance estimation is specified by the command ‘vce’ – 
and these are ‘linearized’ and ‘jackknife’. Linearized variance estimation is most commonly 
used, but can have poor results when the number of sampling units is small (Stata 2009). An 
alternative is to use a jackknife method. The results in this chapter use a linearized method as 
the default, but sensitivity analysis is conducted on key analyses with the results briefly 
reported in the main text, and details in the Appendix. 
Broadly speaking, the ten models can be split into three groups. The first group has relatively 
high R squared values, and clear patterns that indicate the model can provide a meaningful 
insight into the social cohesion indicators. The second group has moderately satisfactory R 
squared values and patterns emerging that can be meaningfully interpreted. The third group, 
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by contrast, has low R squared values, indicating the model to be a poor predictor of the social 
cohesion variables. Although some patterns can be ascertained from the regression results, 
care should be taken in reading too much into them, since there may be important 
confounding factors not included in the model. Table 12 shows a summary of the R squared 
values for each of the ten elements of social cohesion. 
Table 12: Summary of R squared values for each of the 10 models 
Element R squared value Explanatory power of model 
Satisfaction with place of 
residence 
0.193 High 
Civic engagement & volunteering 0.158 High 
Socialising with people of different 
backgrounds 
0.189 High 
Belonging to local area 0.106 Moderate 
Belonging to Britain 0.055 Moderate 
Equal treatment by service 
providers (general) 
0.031 Poor 
Equal treatment by health services 0.018 Poor 
Equal treatment by police services 0.021 Poor 
Ability to influence & confidence 
in public institutions 
0.039 Poor 
Respectful treatment 0.022 Poor 
 
As can be seen from Table 12, the ten indicators of social cohesion can be split roughly into 
three groups. The models for satisfaction with one’s place of residence, civic engagement and 
volunteering, and socialising with people of different backgrounds, have relatively high R 
squared values, indicating that the models explain the variation in the social cohesion 
indicators relatively well. The models for the second group, consisting of belonging to one’s 
local area and to Britain, have moderate R squared values, indicating that the models do 
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explain the composite variables reasonably well (less so in the case of belonging to Britain), but 
that a fair amount of the variation in the social cohesion indicators remains unexplained, so 
one should be careful in making overly bold assertions based on these two models. The third 
group, consisting of the three service provision indicators along with one’s perceived ability to 
influence public institutions, and whether or not one is treated with respect in public, have low 
R squared values indicating that the models do not explain the variation in the social cohesion 
variables very well. For this last group, further exploration will be undertaken to search for 
other variables that may be important. Figure 10 shows an updated version of the diagram of 
the ten elements of social cohesion, but this time splitting the elements into three groups 
according to the explanatory power of their corresponding regression model. 
Figure 10: The elements of social cohesion by group 
 
 
In addition, and before directly discussing any of the regression models, it is informative to 
present summary statistics of each of the ten measures of social cohesion. Table 13 presents 
the number of observations, the means, standard deviations, and the maximum and minimum 
for each of the ten cohesion measures. Statistics are shown first for the overall sample, and 
then for each of the ethnic groups considered separately. 
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Table 13: Summary statistics of each measure of social cohesion 
Social cohesion measure Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
1: Equal treatment by 
public service 
providers 
Overall 25287 1.688 0.965 -0.411 3.266 
White UK born 13970 1.700 0.946 -0.398 3.229 
White non UK 924 1.690 0.961 -0.316 3.216 
Asian 5181 1.682 0.997 -0.411 3.260 
Black 3081 1.607 0.978 -0.377 3.266 
Mixed 922 1.825 0.969 -0.308 3.208 
Other 1196 1.665 0.991 -0.312 3.191 
2: Equal treatment by 
health service 
providers 
Overall 25287 1.767 0.434 -0.363 2.480 
White UK born 13970 1.780 0.408 -0.282 2.431 
White non UK 924 1.719 0.482 -0.285 2.422 
Asian 5181 1.782 0.447 -0.363 2.480 
Black 3081 1.723 0.479 -0.256 2.439 
Mixed 922 1.747 0.449 -0.281 2.428 
Other 1196 1.724 0.471 -0.260 2.438 
3: Equal treatment and 
trust in the police 
Overall 25287 1.177 0.691 -0.810 2.593 
White UK born 13970 1.261 0.642 -0.647 2.593 
White non UK 924 1.231 0.669 -0.629 2.486 
Asian 5181 1.125 0.703 -0.810 2.572 
Black 3081 0.918 0.774 -0.785 2.549 
Mixed 922 1.022 0.770 -0.721 2.435 
Other 1196 1.173 0.699 -0.676 2.497 
4: Satisfaction with 
place of residence 
Overall 25287 1.389 0.634 -0.570 2.585 
White UK born 13970 1.520 0.594 -0.480 2.585 
White non UK 924 1.371 0.634 -0.424 2.410 
Asian 5181 1.298 0.633 -0.568 2.450 
Black 3081 1.138 0.637 -0.520 2.376 
Mixed 922 1.071 0.663 -0.561 2.337 
Other 1196 1.157 0.651 -0.570 2.300 
5: Belonging to one’s 
local area 
Overall 25287 1.121 0.585 -0.553 2.147 
White UK born 13970 1.125 0.580 -0.553 2.060 
White non UK 924 1.000 0.644 -0.392 1.997 
Asian 5181 1.205 0.545 -0.453 2.147 
Black 3081 1.058 0.602 -0.459 2.092 
Mixed 922 1.063 0.602 -0.429 1.985 
Other 1196 1.002 0.632 -0.414 2.124 
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Social cohesion measure Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
6: Belonging to Britain Overall 25287 1.312 0.422 -0.552 2.039 
White UK born 13970 1.330 0.425 -0.418 2.039 
White non UK 924 1.277 0.437 -0.552 1.884 
Asian 5181 1.354 0.367 -0.332 1.994 
Black 3081 1.248 0.443 -0.403 2.026 
Mixed 922 1.250 0.424 -0.287 1.950 
Other 1196 1.169 0.471 -0.383 2.011 
7: Social interaction 
with people from 
different backgrounds 
Overall 25287 1.152 0.543 -0.374 2.245 
White UK born 13970 0.940 0.520 -0.374 2.190 
White non UK 924 1.218 0.500 -0.300 2.226 
Asian 5181 1.414 0.426 -0.205 2.245 
Black 3081 1.433 0.441 -0.215 2.235 
Mixed 922 1.501 0.457 -0.035 2.208 
Other 1196 1.440 0.478 -0.293 2.201 
8: Civic engagement 
and volunteering 
Overall 25287 0.826 0.607 -0.452 2.265 
White UK born 13970 0.921 0.602 -0.452 2.261 
White non UK 924 0.813 0.608 -0.321 2.233 
Asian 5181 0.643 0.587 -0.450 2.249 
Black 3081 0.757 0.589 -0.388 2.265 
Mixed 922 0.877 0.589 -0.391 2.120 
Other 1196 0.659 0.581 -0.452 2.120 
9: Influencing the 
decisions of public 
institutions 
Overall 25287 0.494 0.560 -0.370 1.836 
White UK born 13970 0.423 0.527 -0.370 1.795 
White non UK 924 0.473 0.533 -0.307 1.738 
Asian 5181 0.587 0.593 -0.278 1.788 
Black 3081 0.621 0.594 -0.323 1.836 
Mixed 922 0.597 0.580 -0.313 1.732 
Other 1196 0.520 0.568 -0.277 1.769 
10: Being treated with 
respect when in public 
Overall 25287 1.206 0.445 -0.391 1.897 
White UK born 13970 1.175 0.442 -0.391 1.863 
White non UK 924 1.250 0.429 -0.289 1.877 
Asian 5181 1.279 0.418 -0.296 1.897 
Black 3081 1.190 0.485 -0.292 1.870 
Mixed 922 1.198 0.470 -0.267 1.858 
Other 1196 1.259 0.441 -0.257 1.888 
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4.3 What is the relationship between British identity and social 
cohesion? 
 
According to several commentators (e.g. Goodhart 2007), British identity is important for 
positive social cohesion outcomes. Based on these arguments, one should expect to find 
British identity to be positively associated with at least some elements of social cohesion. Is 
this argument supported by the findings of this chapter? The answer to this question depends 
on the element of social cohesion one is discussing.  
First, one needs to establish whether British identity is associated with the composite variable 
representing the element of social cohesion in question, since if British identity has an impact 
on social cohesion one should at least find an association between the two. Second, as 
discussed above, ethnicity may be important. An interaction effect between British identity 
and ethnicity will therefore be included in order to determine whether any association 
between British identity and social cohesion differs by ethnic group. Third, the length of time a 
respondent has been in the UK may be important, so a variable representing this will also be 
included as an interaction effect. Last, if there are associations, it is necessary to consider how 
strong the magnitude is as compared with other variables in the model in order to place the 
effect of British identity in context. Comparisons of the magnitude of the effects of British 
identity as compared with control variables will therefore be given. 
Part 4.31 below focuses on the models producing a high level of explanatory power, and 
makes several arguments. First, there are associations between British identity and two of the 
three measures of social cohesion – satisfaction with one’s place of residence, and civic 
engagement and volunteering – even after controlling for all other factors, but not for 
socialising with people of different backgrounds. When broken down by ethnic group, British 
identity is associated with civic engagement and volunteering for all three of the White, Asian, 
and Black groups, but only with satisfaction with one’s place of residence for the White group. 
When broken down in such a way, a positive association between British identity and 
socialising with people of other backgrounds is also found for the Asian group. 
Second, although there do appear to be positive associations between British identity and 
social cohesion outcomes, at least for satisfaction with one’s place of residence and civic 
engagement and volunteering, these associations are relatively modest when compared with 
some of the control variables. When compared with the effect of qualifications and area 
deprivation, the magnitude of the effects of British identity look rather small indeed: it is 
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argued that ‘structural’ variables have a larger effect on social cohesion than British identity 
for these elements. 
Part 4.32 looks at the two models with a moderate level of explanatory power: belonging to 
Britain and belonging to one’s local area. For the model for belonging to Britain, British identity 
is (perhaps unsurprisingly) more strongly associated with social cohesion as compared with the 
control variables, although for belonging to one’s local area area-level deprivation is 
particularly important. 
Parts 4.31 and 4.32 make an additional argument. When one takes into account whether or 
not the respondent was born in the UK, for the non-White ethnic groups, nearly all 
associations between British identity and social cohesion are no longer found for those born in 
the UK, but are found for those not born in the UK. This suggests that the generation a 
member of an ethnic minority group belongs to may be of fundamental importance with 
regard to whether British identity has an impact on social cohesion. 
Part 4.33 looks at the group of measures that are poorly explained by the model, and 
investigates whether adding further independent variables can increase the R squared values. 
Some success (albeit limited for some of the models) is attained by doing so, although one 
must be careful in interpreting the results of these models, since the R squared values are still 
not particularly large and there may be other variables, perhaps not included in the survey, 
that might be more strongly associated with these elements of social cohesion than British 
identity, education, or deprivation. It may also be the case that broad national-level indicators 
such as level of qualifications, socio-economic group, and so on, are good predictors of some 
of the elements of social cohesion but not others or, perhaps, that these composite variables 
are not particularly good measures of the concepts they are intended to represent. 
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4.31: Models with a high level of explanatory power 
 
Turning first to the group of models with a high level of explanatory power, Tables 14, 15 and 
16 below show the full results of the regression output for the dependent variables 
representing ‘satisfaction with one’s place of residence’, ‘civic engagement and volunteering’, 
and ‘socialising with people of different backgrounds’. 
Table 14: Regression output for 'Satisfaction with Place of Residence' 
Summary statistics:  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
compm4 25287 1.388678 0.6341965 -0.5704478 2.585028 
      Survey: Linear regression 
 
Number of obs = 20400 
    
 
Population size = 
20631.56
3 
Number of strata   
= 623 
 
Design df = 1580 
Number of PSUs     
= 2203 
 
F(  42,   1539) = 78.31 
   
Prob > F = 0 
   
R-squared = 0.1929 
   
Linearized     
 
compm4 Coef. 
Std. 
Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
  
     
  
Important British ID 0.043 0.010 4.11 0.000 0.022 0.063 
  
     
  
Ethnic group (ref=white) 
    
  
2: Asian 0.027 0.027 0.98 0.327 -0.027 0.080 
3: Black -0.063 0.028 -2.29 0.022 -0.118 -0.009 
4: Mixed -0.180 0.031 -5.9 0.000 -0.240 -0.120 
5: Chinese / Other -0.117 0.032 -3.69 0.000 -0.179 -0.055 
  
     
  
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions) 
   
  
2: Intermediate occup. -0.028 0.016 -1.74 0.083 -0.059 0.004 
3: Lower supervisory -0.056 0.017 -3.35 0.001 -0.089 -0.023 
4: Routine -0.080 0.021 -3.75 0.000 -0.121 -0.038 
5: Never 
worked/unemp. -0.061 0.032 -1.93 0.054 -0.123 0.001 
6: Students 0.007 0.032 0.22 0.827 -0.056 0.070 
7: Not stated 0.039 0.059 0.66 0.512 -0.077 0.155 
  
     
  
Age (years) 0.002 0.000 3.7 0.000 0.001 0.003 
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Sex: female -0.127 0.011 -11.77 0.000 -0.149 -0.106 
  
     
  
Highest qualification (ref=higher education) 
  
  
2: A levels or equiv. -0.061 0.017 -3.54 0.000 -0.095 -0.027 
3: GCSEs or equiv. -0.089 0.015 -5.84 0.000 -0.119 -0.059 
4: Foreign or other -0.177 0.040 -4.42 0.000 -0.256 -0.099 
5: No quals -0.142 0.018 -7.78 0.000 -0.178 -0.106 
  
     
  
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived) 
 
  
2 -0.060 0.021 -2.8 0.005 -0.102 -0.018 
3 -0.065 0.021 -3.03 0.002 -0.107 -0.023 
4 -0.111 0.022 -5.06 0.000 -0.154 -0.068 
5 -0.156 0.023 -6.82 0.000 -0.201 -0.111 
6 -0.178 0.024 -7.32 0.000 -0.225 -0.130 
7 -0.278 0.025 -11.15 0.000 -0.327 -0.229 
8 -0.376 0.026 -14.47 0.000 -0.427 -0.325 
9 -0.455 0.026 -17.79 0.000 -0.505 -0.405 
10 -0.558 0.027 -20.98 0.000 -0.610 -0.506 
  
     
  
Born in UK 0.009 0.021 0.44 0.659 -0.032 0.051 
  
     
  
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year) 
 
  
2: 1-4 years 0.129 0.025 5.08 0.000 0.079 0.179 
3: 5-9 years 0.188 0.026 7.16 0.000 0.137 0.239 
4: 10-29 years 0.201 0.025 8.04 0.000 0.152 0.250 
5: 30 or more years 0.229 0.028 8.26 0.000 0.175 0.283 
  
     
  
Practising a religion 0.018 0.013 1.4 0.160 -0.007 0.043 
  
     
  
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)   
2 -0.016 0.025 -0.65 0.519 -0.064 0.032 
3 -0.035 0.025 -1.39 0.166 -0.085 0.015 
4 -0.072 0.025 -2.88 0.004 -0.121 -0.023 
5 -0.086 0.024 -3.59 0.000 -0.133 -0.039 
6 -0.152 0.025 -5.98 0.000 -0.202 -0.102 
7 -0.119 0.027 -4.33 0.000 -0.173 -0.065 
8 -0.183 0.030 -6.14 0.000 -0.241 -0.124 
9 -0.210 0.028 -7.43 0.000 -0.265 -0.154 
10 -0.247 0.033 -7.51 0.000 -0.311 -0.182 
  
     
  
Survey is year 2008-9 0.007 0.012 0.57 0.567 -0.016 0.030 
_cons 1.734 0.043 39.94 0.000 1.649 1.819 
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Table 15: Regression output for 'Civic Engagement and Volunteering' 
Summary statistics:           
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
compm8 25287 0.8263267 0.607474 -0.4521634 2.264861 
      Survey: Linear regression 
 
Number of obs = 20400 
    
 
Population size = 20631.563 
Number of strata   
= 623 
 
Design df = 1580 
Number of PSUs     
= 2203 
 
F(  42,   1539) = 64.49 
   
Prob > F = 0 
   
R-squared = 0.1577 
   
Linearized     
 
compm8 Coef. 
Std. 
Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
  
     
  
Important British ID 0.038 0.011 3.42 0.001 0.016 0.059 
  
     
  
Ethnic group (ref=white) 
    
  
2: Asian -0.157 0.022 -7.08 0.000 -0.200 -0.113 
3: Black -0.050 0.022 -2.29 0.022 -0.093 -0.007 
4: Mixed 0.052 0.026 2.02 0.043 0.002 0.103 
5: Chinese / Other -0.118 0.028 -4.18 0.000 -0.174 -0.063 
  
     
  
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions) 
   
  
2: Intermediate occup. -0.062 0.016 -3.92 0.000 -0.092 -0.031 
3: Lower supervisory -0.120 0.015 -7.78 0.000 -0.150 -0.090 
4: Routine -0.177 0.020 -8.63 0.000 -0.217 -0.136 
5: Never 
worked/unemp. -0.196 0.031 -6.42 0.000 -0.256 -0.136 
6: Students -0.032 0.033 -0.98 0.327 -0.096 0.032 
7: Not stated -0.061 0.060 -1.02 0.307 -0.178 0.056 
  
     
  
Age (years) 0.001 0.000 2.6 0.009 0.000 0.002 
Sex: female 0.056 0.011 5.1 0.000 0.035 0.078 
  
     
  
Highest qualification (ref=higher education) 
  
  
2: A levels or equiv. -0.068 0.017 -3.89 0.000 -0.102 -0.033 
3: GCSEs or equiv. -0.208 0.015 -13.83 0.000 -0.237 -0.178 
4: Foreign or other -0.233 0.033 -7.12 0.000 -0.297 -0.169 
5: No quals -0.403 0.018 -22.41 0.000 -0.439 -0.368 
  
     
  
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived) 
 
  
2 0.044 0.025 1.78 0.076 -0.005 0.093 
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3 0.019 0.024 0.8 0.425 -0.028 0.066 
4 0.005 0.025 0.2 0.841 -0.044 0.054 
5 0.017 0.026 0.68 0.497 -0.033 0.068 
6 0.004 0.025 0.18 0.861 -0.044 0.053 
7 -0.009 0.026 -0.36 0.716 -0.060 0.041 
8 -0.020 0.025 -0.8 0.421 -0.070 0.029 
9 -0.035 0.025 -1.39 0.164 -0.085 0.014 
10 -0.063 0.025 -2.51 0.012 -0.112 -0.014 
  
     
  
Born in UK 0.152 0.019 8.06 0.000 0.115 0.189 
  
     
  
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year) 
 
  
2: 1-4 years 0.069 0.023 3.03 0.003 0.024 0.114 
3: 5-9 years 0.149 0.024 6.3 0.000 0.103 0.195 
4: 10-29 years 0.134 0.022 5.99 0.000 0.090 0.178 
5: 30 or more years 0.128 0.026 4.99 0.000 0.078 0.178 
  
     
  
Practising a religion 0.158 0.012 12.96 0.000 0.134 0.182 
  
     
  
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)   
2 0.016 0.027 0.6 0.546 -0.036 0.069 
3 -0.013 0.028 -0.46 0.646 -0.068 0.042 
4 -0.004 0.028 -0.16 0.873 -0.059 0.050 
5 0.001 0.027 0.02 0.981 -0.053 0.054 
6 -0.025 0.027 -0.91 0.361 -0.077 0.028 
7 -0.011 0.028 -0.38 0.702 -0.065 0.044 
8 -0.034 0.029 -1.19 0.232 -0.090 0.022 
9 -0.038 0.029 -1.33 0.185 -0.095 0.018 
10 -0.098 0.029 -3.31 0.001 -0.155 -0.040 
  
     
  
Survey is year 2008-9 -0.020 0.012 -1.71 0.087 -0.043 0.003 
_cons 0.839 0.041 20.69 0.000 0.759 0.918 
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Table 16: Regression output for 'Socialising with People of Different Backgrounds' 
Summary statistics:           
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
compm7 25287 1.151939 0.5428537 -0.3744145 2.244632 
      Survey: Linear regression 
 
Number of obs = 20400 
    
 
Population size = 20631.563 
Number of strata   
= 623 
 
Design df = 1580 
Number of PSUs     
= 2203 
 
F(  42,   1539) = 95.53 
   
Prob > F = 0 
   
R-squared = 0.1885 
   
Linearized     
 
compm7 Coef. 
Std. 
Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
  
     
  
Important British ID 0.014 0.009 1.58 0.115 -0.003 0.032 
  
     
  
Ethnic group (ref=white) 
    
  
2: Asian 0.111 0.017 6.5 0.000 0.078 0.145 
3: Black 0.163 0.017 9.57 0.000 0.130 0.196 
4: Mixed 0.257 0.024 10.82 0.000 0.210 0.304 
5: Chinese / Other 0.176 0.022 7.99 0.000 0.133 0.219 
  
     
  
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions) 
   
  
2: Intermediate occup. -0.030 0.013 -2.33 0.020 -0.055 -0.005 
3: Lower supervisory -0.028 0.013 -2.15 0.032 -0.053 -0.002 
4: Routine -0.017 0.018 -0.97 0.335 -0.053 0.018 
5: Never 
worked/unemp. -0.080 0.024 -3.32 0.001 -0.128 -0.033 
6: Students 0.009 0.026 0.34 0.731 -0.041 0.059 
7: Not stated -0.012 0.051 -0.24 0.807 -0.112 0.087 
  
     
  
Age (years) -0.006 0.000 -15.15 0.000 -0.007 -0.005 
Sex: female -0.034 0.009 -3.7 0.000 -0.051 -0.016 
  
     
  
Highest qualification (ref=higher education) 
  
  
2: A levels or equiv. -0.025 0.014 -1.72 0.085 -0.053 0.003 
3: GCSEs or equiv. -0.036 0.013 -2.88 0.004 -0.061 -0.012 
4: Foreign or other -0.054 0.028 -1.95 0.051 -0.108 0.000 
5: No quals -0.105 0.015 -6.82 0.000 -0.135 -0.075 
  
     
  
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived) 
 
  
2 -0.012 0.022 -0.55 0.582 -0.055 0.031 
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3 -0.036 0.021 -1.7 0.090 -0.077 0.006 
4 -0.028 0.022 -1.3 0.193 -0.071 0.014 
5 -0.018 0.022 -0.81 0.415 -0.061 0.025 
6 -0.045 0.022 -2.07 0.039 -0.087 -0.002 
7 -0.048 0.021 -2.26 0.024 -0.090 -0.006 
8 -0.095 0.022 -4.33 0.000 -0.137 -0.052 
9 -0.099 0.022 -4.51 0.000 -0.142 -0.056 
10 -0.155 0.023 -6.66 0.000 -0.200 -0.109 
  
     
  
Born in UK -0.113 0.015 -7.38 0.000 -0.143 -0.083 
  
     
  
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year) 
 
  
2: 1-4 years 0.003 0.017 0.19 0.853 -0.031 0.037 
3: 5-9 years -0.002 0.018 -0.09 0.930 -0.036 0.033 
4: 10-29 years 0.031 0.017 1.82 0.069 -0.002 0.065 
5: 30 or more years 0.025 0.020 1.22 0.224 -0.015 0.065 
  
     
  
Practising a religion 0.024 0.011 2.19 0.029 0.002 0.045 
  
     
  
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)   
2 0.118 0.028 4.28 0.000 0.064 0.172 
3 0.143 0.027 5.29 0.000 0.090 0.196 
4 0.167 0.027 6.28 0.000 0.115 0.219 
5 0.245 0.027 9.11 0.000 0.192 0.297 
6 0.257 0.026 9.84 0.000 0.206 0.309 
7 0.355 0.027 13.24 0.000 0.302 0.407 
8 0.398 0.026 15.5 0.000 0.347 0.448 
9 0.460 0.026 17.63 0.000 0.409 0.511 
10 0.483 0.026 18.81 0.000 0.433 0.533 
  
     
  
Survey is year 2008-9 0.003 0.011 0.28 0.777 -0.018 0.024 
_cons 1.249 0.037 33.67 0.000 1.176 1.321 
 
Table 17 below summarises the results of these models in terms of the effects of British 
identity. Having a British identity is associated with an increased satisfaction with one's place 
of residence, and with increased civic engagement and volunteering, but there is no significant 
effect on socialising with people of different backgrounds, at the 5% level. Alternative 
calculations using jackknife variance estimation yielded almost exactly the same results, with 
the only difference being that the p value for socialising with people of different backgrounds 
was modified to 0.116 - full details of the alternative jackknife variance estimations are shown 
in the ‘Sensitivity Analysis’ section of the Appendix (Part D). 
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Table 17: Associations between British identity and social cohesion 
(positive values = increased social cohesion) 
 Satisfaction with 
place of residence 
Civic engagement and 
volunteering 
Socialising with 
people of different 
backgrounds 
Effect of British identity 
P value 
0.043 
0.000 
0.038 
0.001 
0.014 
0.115 
R squared 0.193 0.158 0.189 
 
It is possible that the associations between British identity and social cohesion differ by ethnic 
group. To determine whether this is the case, additional regression models were run for each 
ethnic group separately, by restricting the sample in each case to the ethnic group under 
consideration. This allows for the possibility of determining whether or not British identity has 
an association with the social cohesion measures for each ethnic group separately. Six ethnic 
categories were used: White UK born, White non-UK born, Asian, Black, Mixed, and 
Chinese/Other. The question one is asking, therefore, is: compared to a Black person with no 
British identity, what is the effect of being Black and having a British identity? Similarly for a 
different ethnic group: compared to an Asian person with no British identity, what is the effect 
of being Asian and having a British identity? The same question can be asked of all six ethnic 
groups. Tables 18 to 23 below show the results. Results that are significant at the 5% level are 
shown in bold.  
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Table 18: Regression output for the White UK-born group 
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Table 18 shows the regression output for the White UK-born group. The results are quite 
similar to the results for the sample as a whole – although this is perhaps unsurprising, given 
the fact that this group makes up a large proportion of the overall sample. The R squared 
values are all fairly similar. British identity is significantly and positively associated with the 
social cohesion measures for the ‘satisfaction with place of residence’ and ‘civic engagement 
and volunteering’ models. For ‘socialising with people of different backgrounds’ the coefficient 
is positive and is now almost significant at the 5% level, with a P value of 0.06.  
The control variables also exhibit a similar pattern to the models for the whole sample, with 
higher educational qualifications being associated with increased cohesion, particularly for the 
‘satisfaction’ and ‘civic engagement’ models, and lower scores on the Index of Multiple 
Deprivation being associated with much lower scores for ‘satisfaction with place of residence’. 
The percentage of minority ethnic residents in the ward has a negative association with 
‘satisfaction’, but a very strong positive association with ‘socialising with people of other 
backgrounds’. 
Table 19 below shows the regression results for the White non-UK born group. The R squared 
values are a little higher than for the other ethnic groups, aside for the ‘socialising’ model, for 
which the R squared value is a little lower. The most striking differences, however, relate to 
the effect of British identity for this group. The positive associations for the ‘satisfaction’ and 
‘civic engagement’ models – found for the White group born in the UK – are lost and, for the 
‘socialising’ model, rather than there being a positive effect that is only just insignificant, 
British identity is negatively associated with socialising with people of different backgrounds. 
This suggests that British identity may have a more negative relationship with these social 
cohesion measures for the White non-UK born group. 
For the ‘satisfaction’ model, the control variables exhibit patterns that are similar to the UK-
born model, although the negative effects of deprivation and the percentage of minority 
ethnic residents are concentrated towards the most deprived and most diverse areas, rather 
than there being a general pattern across all areas. For the ‘socialising’ model, the negative 
association with area deprivation is lost, although much of the positive association with the 
percentage of minority ethnic residents is retained. 
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Table 19: Regression output for the White non-UK born group 
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Table 20: Regression output for the Asian group 
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Table 20 above shows the regression output for the Asian ethnic group. The R squared value 
for the ‘civic engagement’ model is fairly similar to that of the model for the full sample, but 
for the ‘satisfaction’ and ‘socialising’ models the R squared values are lower. The positive 
association between British identity and ‘civic engagement’ that was found in the model for 
the full sample is retained, but there are no associations between British identity and both the 
‘satisfaction’ and ‘socialising’ cohesion measures. 
The patterns exhibited by the control variables are fairly similar to the model for the full 
sample. However, for the ‘satisfaction’ model, for the Asian group being older is associated 
with lower satisfaction with one’s place of residence – as opposed to higher scores for the full 
model.  In addition, a respondent’s qualifications, and the percentage of minority ethnic 
residents, are no longer significant for the Asian group as compared to the full sample. For the 
‘civic engagement’ model, the control variables of the Asian model are fairly similar to those 
for the full sample, with the main difference being that having a higher density of minority 
ethnic residents is associated with a lower score. For the ‘socialising’ model, the main 
difference as compared with the full sample is that having a greater density of minority ethnic 
residents in one’s area is no longer significantly associated. 
Table 21 below shows the regression output for the Black group. The R squared values are 
again lower than for the models using the full sample. There are no associations between 
British identity and both ‘satisfaction with place of residence’ and ‘socialising with people of 
different backgrounds’, but there is a positive and significant association between British 
identity and ‘civic engagement and volunteering’. 
The control variables exhibit similar patterns to the models for the full sample. For the 
‘satisfaction’ model, lower educational qualifications and living in a deprived area are 
negatively associated, whilst living for a long time in the neighbourhood is positively 
associated. The main difference for this model is that living in an area with a higher percentage 
of minority ethnic residents is positively associated. For both the ‘civic engagement’ and 
‘socialising’ models, the patterns are again similar, except that living in an area with a high 
percentage of minority ethnic residents is negatively associated with both civic engagement 
and socialising with people of different backgrounds for the Black group, whereas for the 
overall sample the results are broadly insignificant, and broadly positive, respectively. 
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Table 21: Regression output for the Black group
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Table 22: Regression output for the Mixed group 
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Table 22 above shows the results of the regression output for the Mixed ethnic group. The R 
squared values are a little higher than for the models using the overall sample for ‘satisfaction’ 
and ‘civic engagement’, but a little lower for ‘socialising with people of different backgrounds’. 
British identity is not significantly associated with any of the three models.  
The control variables for each of the three models are fairly similar to the models for the 
overall sample, except the negative association for the percentage of minority ethnic residents 
in ward for the ‘satisfaction’ model, found for the overall sample, is not found consistently for 
the Mixed group. 
Table 23 below shows the results of the regression output for the Chinese or Other group. The 
R squared value is a little lower for the ‘satisfaction’ model, a little higher for the ‘civic 
engagement’ model, and about the same for the ‘socialising model’, as compared with those 
for the overall sample. There are no significant associations between British identity and any of 
the social cohesion measures.  
For the ‘satisfaction’ model, educational qualifications are not as clearly negatively associated 
– aside from the effect of foreign qualifications – as compared to the overall sample; living 
longer in one’s neighbourhood is not as consistently positively associated; and practising a 
religion becomes positively and significantly associated for the Other group. The control 
variables for the ‘civic engagement’ and ‘socialising’ models exhibit fairly similar patterns to 
those for the overall sample. 
These findings are, of course, only associations, and it is not clear in which direction any 
causation may go. It may be the case, for instance, that for some ethnic groups, civic 
engagement and volunteering cause increased British identification, rather than British 
identification causing increased civic engagement and volunteering. It may also be the case 
that there is some element of two-way causation, whereby to some extent British identity is 
causing civic engagement and volunteering, but also civic engagement and volunteering is 
causing increased British identity. It is unfortunately not possible to determine which is the 
case from this analysis on its own; more work into potential mechanisms underlying these 
associations is needed. Last of all, it may be the case that both British identification and one or 
more of the social cohesion outcomes are being caused by a third concept that is not 
controlled for in the model. Care has been taken to control for as many of the concepts that 
could theoretically be relevant for both British identity and social cohesion as is possible but, 
unfortunately, this last possibility cannot be ruled out entirely. 
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Table 23: Regression output for the Other group 
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Another important factor hypothesised in the literature as potentially affecting the 
relationship between British identity and social cohesion is the generation a member of a 
minority groups belongs to. For ethnic minority groups, whether or not the respondent was 
born in the UK may be of particular importance. A binary variable representing whether the 
respondent was born in the UK (with a value of 1 when born in the UK, and 0 when not) was 
therefore included as an interaction effect with British identity for each of the models for the 
different ethnic groups. 
The main coefficient of interest is the main effect of British identity in each interaction model, 
as this allows one to ask, for instance: is an Asian person born in the UK and with a British 
identity more likely to have positive social cohesion outcomes as compared with an Asian 
person born in the UK but without a British identity?  
The same question can then be asked for an Asian person not born in the UK, by changing the 
reference category of the interaction model, such that one is comparing to an Asian person 
born outside the UK but without a British identity, with an Asian person born outside the UK 
with a British identity. The same process can then be followed for each of the ethnic groups, 
except for the White groups, which are already split between those born and not born in the 
UK. 
In addition, the interaction effect between British identity and being born in the UK shows 
whether there is an additional effect of being both born in the UK and having a British identity, 
as compared to being born outside the UK with no British identity. When the reference 
category is changed, this effect becomes the additional effect of being both born outside the 
UK and having a British identity. 
Table 24 shows the results of the regression models with interaction effects for the Asian 
group. P values are not shown, but associations that are significant at the 5 per cent level are 
shown in bold. If one looks at the main effect of British identity, it is clear that British identity is 
only positively associated with the social cohesion measures for those not born in the UK. 
Indeed, there is a negative association between British identity and ‘satisfaction with place of 
residence’ for Asian respondents born in the UK. This pattern is also captured in the 
interaction effects for the ‘satisfaction’ model: there is an additional positive effect of being 
both born outside the UK and having a British identity. No significant effects were found for 
the ‘socialising’ interaction model, however. 
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Table 24: Interaction models for the Asian group 
 
 
Table 25 below shows the results of the regression models with interaction effects for the 
Black group. If one looks at the main effect of British identity, it is again clear that the positive 
association between British identity and ‘civic engagement’ only holds for those respondents 
not born in the UK. For those born in the UK there is no such association for British identity, 
and for the ‘satisfaction’ and ‘socialising’ models, no significant effects were found.  
 
Table 25: Interaction models for the Black group 
 
 
R squared
Reference = no British identity, not born in the UK
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Main: British ID 0.074 0.023 0.070 0.023 0.011 0.017
Main: Born in UK 0.012 0.043 0.203 0.041 -0.026 0.029
Int: Born in UK * Br ID -0.158 0.047 -0.061 0.047 0.015 0.034
Reference = no British identity, born in the UK
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Main: British ID -0.084 0.042 0.009 0.043 0.026 0.029
Main: Not born in UK -0.012 0.043 -0.203 0.041 0.026 0.029
Int: Not born in UK * Br ID 0.158 0.047 0.061 0.047 -0.015 0.034
Satisfaction with 
place of residence
Civic engagement 
and volunteering
Socialising with 
people of different 
backgrounds
0.076 0.179 0.080
R squared
Reference = no British identity, not born in the UK
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Main: British ID -0.028 0.034 0.157 0.034 -0.029 0.022
Main: Born in UK -0.017 0.042 0.129 0.042 -0.040 0.030
Int: Born in UK * Br ID -0.043 0.055 -0.100 0.054 0.002 0.042
Reference = no British identity, born in the UK
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Main: British ID -0.072 0.044 0.057 0.045 -0.027 0.034
Main: Not born in UK 0.017 0.042 -0.129 0.042 0.040 0.030
Int: Not born in UK * Br ID 0.043 0.055 0.100 0.054 -0.002 0.042
Satisfaction with 
place of residence
Civic engagement 
and volunteering
Socialising with 
people of different 
backgrounds
0.099 0.129 0.076
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Table 26, however, shows that the pattern for the Mixed group is a little different. In contrast 
to the Asian and Black groups, where British identity was associated with positive social 
cohesion outcomes, but only for those not born in the UK, for the Mixed group it is associated 
with decreased social cohesion for those not born in the UK for both the ‘satisfaction’ and 
‘socialising’ models. This suggests that the relationship between British identity and social 
cohesion may differ for those of Mixed ethnicity, as compared to those of Asian or Black 
ethnicity. Finally, Table 27 shows the results of the interaction models for the Chinese or Other 
group, for which there were no significant associations for British identity. 
Table 26: Interaction models for the Mixed group 
 
 
Table 27: Interaction models for the Other group 
  
R squared
Reference = no British identity, not born in the UK
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Main: British ID -0.163 0.072 -0.028 0.058 -0.124 0.042
Main: Born in UK -0.030 0.059 0.185 0.051 -0.052 0.041
Int: Born in UK * Br ID 0.191 0.085 0.083 0.071 0.201 0.063
Reference = no British identity, born in the UK
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Main: British ID 0.028 0.051 0.055 0.043 0.077 0.045
Main: Not born in UK 0.030 0.059 -0.185 0.051 0.052 0.041
Int: Not born in UK * Br ID -0.191 0.085 -0.083 0.071 -0.201 0.063
Satisfaction with 
place of residence
Civic engagement 
and volunteering
Socialising with 
people of different 
backgrounds
0.215 0.209 0.140
R squared
Reference = no British identity, not born in the UK
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Main: British ID -0.021 0.048 0.065 0.053 0.002 0.026
Main: Born in UK -0.113 0.069 0.168 0.054 -0.109 0.054
Int: Born in UK * Br ID 0.152 0.090 -0.093 0.086 0.088 0.069
Reference = no British identity, born in the UK
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Main: British ID 0.131 0.076 -0.028 0.070 0.091 0.061
Main: Not born in UK 0.113 0.069 -0.168 0.054 0.109 0.054
Int: Not born in UK * Br ID -0.152 0.090 0.093 0.086 -0.088 0.069
Satisfaction with 
place of residence
Civic engagement 
and volunteering
Socialising with 
people of different 
backgrounds
0.133 0.177 0.182
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Alternative measures of national identity 
It is worth asking at this point whether the results presented above remain the same when one 
makes small adjustments to the key variables – that is, do the results hold consistently, or are 
they the product of a specific calculation of each of the key variables? For instance, it is worth 
looking more closely at the variable representing British identity. The existing measure is a 
binary variable coded as 1 when a respondent mentions British identity as their national 
identity and also considers their national identity to either be ‘very important’ or ‘quite 
important’ to their sense of who they are. One could equally plausibly change the variable 
such that it is only coded as 1 when a respondent considers their national identity to be ‘very 
important’. The results above (such as in Table 17) show that British identity is associated with 
increased satisfaction with one’s place of residence, and with increased civic engagement and 
volunteering. It is worth asking whether these results hold when different measures of British 
identity are used. 
First, one might ask if the results hold when simply comparing those that mention British 
identity as their national identity with those that do not (rather than including a measure of 
the strength of national identity). The pattern is in fact very similar, as shown by Table 28 
below, as compared with Table 17 above. 
Table 28: Associations for alternative measure of British identity 
(positive values = increased social cohesion) 
 Satisfaction with 
place of residence 
Civic engagement and 
volunteering 
Socialising with 
people of different 
backgrounds 
Effect of British identity 
P value 
0.028 
0.008 
0.061 
0.000 
0.013 
0.151 
R squared 0.193 0.158 0.189 
 
Second, one might ask whether looking at the importance of respondents’ national identity to 
their sense of who they are exhibits similar patterns when broken down further. For those 
people mentioning British identity as their national identity, and compared to those 
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considering their national identity to be ‘not at all important’ to them, the following 
associations can be found: 
Table 29: Different strengths of British identity 
(positive values = increased social cohesion; reference = ‘not at all important’) 
 Satisfaction with 
place of residence 
Civic engagement and 
volunteering 
Socialising with 
people of different 
backgrounds 
‘Not very important’ 
P value 
0.106 
0.010 
0.050 
0.274 
0.044  
0.234 
‘Quite important’ 
P value 
0.156 
0.000 
-0.088 
0.035 
0.061 
0.069 
‘Very important’ 
P value 
0.132 
0.000 
-0.072 
0.089 
0.025 
0.466 
R squared 0.195 0.161 0.190 
 
The pattern shown by Table 29 is interesting: for satisfaction with one’s place of residence, a 
stronger British identity on the whole increases satisfaction; whereas for civic engagement and 
volunteering strength of identity seems to make little difference (and in fact possibly decreases 
the association); and for socialising with people of different backgrounds, British identity 
appears to have no association at all. 
Third, one might ask whether British identity has markedly different relationships to these 
three elements of social cohesion compared to identification with the nations that make up 
Britain. When one looks at respondents mentioning English identity as the national identity, 
the results are striking, as shown in Table 30: 
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Table 30: Associations between English identity and social cohesion 
(positive values = increased social cohesion) 
 Satisfaction with 
place of residence 
Civic engagement 
and volunteering 
Socialising with 
people of different 
backgrounds 
Effect of English identity 
P value 
-0.003 
0.751 
-0.016 
0.168 
-0.033 
0.001 
R squared 0.192 0.157 0.189 
 
When British identity is replaced by English identity, the positive effects on satisfaction with 
one’s place of residence and civic engagement and volunteering disappear. What is more, 
having an English identity is associated with decreased socialising with people of different 
backgrounds. Such results are consistent with other research that considers English identity to 
be an ethnically-based, non-inclusive identity, as compared to British identity which can be 
‘civic’ and more inclusive (e.g. Heath & Roberts 2008). To investigate this further, Tables 31 to 
36 show associations between English identity and each of the three elements when broken 
down by ethnic group. These associations were found in the same way as before, by restricting 
the sample to each ethnic group in turn. To save space only the coefficients and standard 
errors are shown; any associations that are significant at the 5 per cent level are shown in 
bold. 
As can be seen from Table 31, the pattern for the overall sample – whereby English identity is 
not significantly associated with ‘satisfaction’ and ‘civic engagement’, yet there is a negative 
association between English identity and ‘socialising with people of different backgrounds’ – is 
retained for the White UK-born group. The R squared values for this group are also fairly 
similar, albeit with a somewhat lower R squared value for the ‘socialising’ model.  
From Table 32 one can see that, for the White non-UK born group, there is a positive 
association between English identity and ‘satisfaction’. However, as with the UK-born group, 
there is again a negative association for ‘socialising with people of different backgrounds, and 
for this group the association is quite strong – it is greater in magnitude than any of the other 
variables in the model, aside from those measuring the percentage of minority ethnic 
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residents in the ward. The R squared values for this group are higher than for the overall 
sample, with the exception of the ‘socialising’ model, for which they are slightly lower. 
Table 33 shows that, for the Asian group, English identity is significantly and positively related 
to ‘civic engagement and volunteering’, but not significantly associated with the other two 
indicators of cohesion. The R squared values are substantially lower than those for the overall 
sample for the ‘satisfaction’ and ‘socialising’ models, but slightly higher for the ‘civic 
engagement’ model.  
From Table 34 one can see that, for the Black group, there are positive associations between 
English identity and ‘satisfaction’ and ‘civic engagement’, but no significant associations for the 
‘socialising’ measure. The R squared values for the Black group are all somewhat lower than 
those for the overall sample. 
Table 35 shows the results for the Mixed group. One can see that, for the ‘civic engagement’ 
model, there is a significant and negative association with English identity. For the other two 
models the results are not significant. The R squared values are a little higher for the 
‘satisfaction’ and ‘civic engagement’ models, but a little lower for the ‘socialising’ model, as 
compared to the full sample. 
Last of all, Table 36 shows the results for the Chinese or Other group. There are no significant 
associations between English identity and the ‘satisfaction’ and ‘socialising’ measures of 
cohesion, but a positive association between English identity and the ‘civic engagement’ 
measure. The R squared values are fairly similar as compared to the full sample, although the R 
squared value for the ‘satisfaction’ model is slightly lower. 
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Table 31. English identity: regression output for the White UK-born group 
 
 
R squared
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Important English ID 0.013 0.012 -0.016 0.012 -0.025 0.010
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)
2: Intermediate occup. -0.025 0.017 -0.050 0.017 -0.021 0.014
3: Lower supervisory -0.054 0.018 -0.108 0.017 -0.023 0.014
4: Routine -0.083 0.023 -0.155 0.022 -0.017 0.019
5: Never worked/unemp. -0.109 0.041 -0.197 0.039 -0.062 0.032
6: Students 0.013 0.041 -0.042 0.042 0.025 0.033
7: Not stated 0.052 0.069 -0.080 0.069 -0.001 0.059
Age (years) 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.006 0.000
Sex: female -0.120 0.012 0.064 0.013 -0.035 0.010
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)
2: A levels or equiv. -0.063 0.019 -0.075 0.019 -0.019 0.016
3: GCSEs or equiv. -0.102 0.017 -0.223 0.017 -0.027 0.014
4: Foreign or other -0.207 0.058 -0.218 0.050 -0.013 0.045
5: No quals -0.165 0.021 -0.417 0.020 -0.097 0.017
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)
2 -0.060 0.021 0.043 0.025 -0.014 0.024
3 -0.078 0.022 0.018 0.025 -0.039 0.022
4 -0.123 0.023 0.013 0.026 -0.021 0.023
5 -0.159 0.024 0.023 0.028 -0.021 0.024
6 -0.179 0.026 0.012 0.027 -0.053 0.024
7 -0.276 0.027 -0.012 0.028 -0.058 0.023
8 -0.403 0.029 -0.013 0.028 -0.100 0.024
9 -0.465 0.030 -0.047 0.029 -0.104 0.024
10 -0.599 0.031 -0.069 0.029 -0.163 0.026
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)
2: 1-4 years 0.130 0.030 0.037 0.027 0.001 0.021
3: 5-9 years 0.184 0.032 0.115 0.028 -0.003 0.021
4: 10-29 years 0.193 0.030 0.095 0.026 0.028 0.021
5: 30 or more years 0.222 0.032 0.095 0.030 0.023 0.023
Practising a religion 0.014 0.014 0.176 0.014 0.037 0.013
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)
2 -0.011 0.025 0.021 0.027 0.119 0.028
3 -0.035 0.026 -0.017 0.029 0.141 0.027
4 -0.073 0.026 -0.009 0.028 0.177 0.026
5 -0.079 0.024 0.002 0.028 0.251 0.027
6 -0.151 0.026 -0.028 0.028 0.248 0.026
7 -0.109 0.028 -0.008 0.030 0.357 0.027
8 -0.174 0.030 -0.037 0.030 0.404 0.026
9 -0.212 0.031 -0.012 0.032 0.475 0.027
10 -0.250 0.043 -0.083 0.037 0.534 0.029
Survey is year 2008-9 0.005 0.013 -0.018 0.013 0.003 0.012
_cons 1.770 0.045 1.042 0.042 1.143 0.037
Satisfaction with 
place of residence
Civic engagement 
and volunteering
Socialising with 
people of different 
backgrounds
0.186 0.144 0.142
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Table 32. English identity: regression output for the White non-UK born group 
 
 
R squared
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Important English ID 0.113 0.057 0.061 0.053 -0.164 0.039
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)
2: Intermediate occup. -0.019 0.047 -0.076 0.046 -0.076 0.042
3: Lower supervisory -0.134 0.062 -0.145 0.057 -0.044 0.050
4: Routine -0.021 0.075 -0.270 0.061 0.085 0.063
5: Never worked/unemp. -0.030 0.137 -0.245 0.125 -0.084 0.082
6: Students 0.069 0.125 0.038 0.116 -0.077 0.077
7: Not stated 0.113 0.060 0.039 0.159 -0.146 0.130
Age (years) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.007 0.002
Sex: female -0.129 0.040 0.044 0.040 -0.055 0.032
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)
2: A levels or equiv. -0.184 0.091 -0.050 0.067 -0.121 0.053
3: GCSEs or equiv. -0.156 0.054 -0.197 0.062 -0.066 0.052
4: Foreign or other -0.248 0.077 -0.155 0.065 -0.158 0.047
5: No quals -0.125 0.068 -0.362 0.070 -0.096 0.057
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)
2 -0.065 0.098 0.167 0.079 0.026 0.066
3 0.095 0.069 0.077 0.084 0.084 0.052
4 0.067 0.072 -0.011 0.082 -0.111 0.070
5 -0.017 0.084 -0.072 0.090 0.069 0.072
6 -0.056 0.080 -0.014 0.073 0.067 0.071
7 -0.181 0.089 0.079 0.082 0.060 0.065
8 -0.061 0.082 -0.074 0.079 0.022 0.071
9 -0.420 0.090 0.009 0.089 0.018 0.077
10 -0.429 0.091 -0.068 0.079 -0.080 0.072
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)
2: 1-4 years 0.048 0.065 0.202 0.048 -0.002 0.044
3: 5-9 years 0.144 0.060 0.281 0.059 -0.011 0.046
4: 10-29 years 0.207 0.072 0.382 0.063 0.036 0.056
5: 30 or more years 0.251 0.093 0.221 0.089 0.060 0.085
Practising a religion -0.030 0.047 0.115 0.038 0.027 0.035
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)
2 -0.155 0.086 0.012 0.101 0.085 0.087
3 0.032 0.089 0.081 0.106 0.030 0.086
4 0.074 0.073 0.079 0.100 -0.047 0.086
5 -0.087 0.091 0.104 0.088 0.016 0.104
6 -0.170 0.090 0.097 0.095 0.296 0.095
7 -0.129 0.104 -0.075 0.088 0.206 0.085
8 -0.185 0.081 0.006 0.093 0.185 0.083
9 -0.270 0.086 -0.101 0.083 0.225 0.082
10 -0.362 0.092 -0.087 0.084 0.285 0.083
Survey is year 2008-9 -0.010 0.041 -0.012 0.039 0.013 0.031
_cons 1.720 0.116 0.687 0.115 1.454 0.107
Satisfaction with 
place of residence
Civic engagement 
and volunteering
Socialising with 
people of different 
backgrounds0.281 0.221 0.159
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Table 33. English identity: regression output for the Asian group 
 
 
R squared
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Important English ID 0.066 0.036 0.095 0.038 0.028 0.024
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)
2: Intermediate occup. -0.041 0.030 -0.153 0.030 -0.023 0.023
3: Lower supervisory -0.033 0.032 -0.198 0.029 -0.017 0.020
4: Routine -0.079 0.045 -0.263 0.035 -0.072 0.027
5: Never worked/unemp. 0.011 0.039 -0.212 0.034 -0.115 0.025
6: Students -0.070 0.046 -0.077 0.045 0.013 0.029
7: Not stated -0.243 0.093 -0.131 0.099 -0.189 0.059
Age (years) -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001
Sex: female -0.157 0.021 0.001 0.019 0.001 0.014
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)
2: A levels or equiv. 0.017 0.035 0.040 0.033 0.042 0.023
3: GCSEs or equiv. 0.035 0.029 -0.039 0.030 -0.051 0.021
4: Foreign or other 0.047 0.043 -0.197 0.040 -0.015 0.030
5: No quals 0.040 0.030 -0.270 0.027 -0.123 0.021
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)
2 -0.022 0.063 -0.150 0.074 -0.059 0.043
3 -0.021 0.065 -0.028 0.064 -0.077 0.048
4 -0.173 0.070 -0.060 0.061 -0.108 0.049
5 -0.164 0.061 -0.034 0.062 -0.098 0.042
6 -0.215 0.061 -0.144 0.057 -0.088 0.039
7 -0.224 0.058 -0.092 0.059 -0.077 0.039
8 -0.310 0.059 -0.126 0.055 -0.115 0.038
9 -0.329 0.060 -0.093 0.054 -0.153 0.038
10 -0.345 0.057 -0.102 0.055 -0.192 0.038
Born in UK -0.094 0.026 0.163 0.024 -0.015 0.018
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)
2: 1-4 years 0.245 0.046 0.079 0.036 0.052 0.025
3: 5-9 years 0.343 0.046 0.197 0.040 0.067 0.026
4: 10-29 years 0.339 0.045 0.181 0.039 0.083 0.026
5: 30 or more years 0.414 0.055 0.245 0.048 0.124 0.033
Practising a religion 0.050 0.025 0.020 0.022 -0.031 0.016
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)
2 0.049 0.326 -0.980 0.116 0.036 0.262
3 -0.084 0.310 -0.931 0.092 0.168 0.264
4 -0.623 0.327 -0.779 0.141 -0.081 0.277
5 -0.122 0.308 -0.882 0.086 0.010 0.271
6 -0.064 0.310 -1.003 0.084 0.121 0.263
7 -0.010 0.303 -0.787 0.099 0.047 0.261
8 -0.148 0.302 -0.925 0.080 0.033 0.260
9 -0.028 0.298 -0.984 0.068 0.105 0.260
10 -0.111 0.299 -1.039 0.066 0.067 0.259
Survey is year 2008-9 0.025 0.021 -0.021 0.022 0.005 0.015
_cons 1.554 0.310 1.765 0.103 1.596 0.264
0.074 0.178 0.080
Satisfaction with 
place of residence
Civic engagement 
and volunteering
Socialising with 
people of different 
backgrounds
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Table 34. English identity: regression output for the Black group 
 
 
R squared
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Important English ID 0.115 0.036 0.071 0.036 -0.005 0.026
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)
2: Intermediate occup. -0.040 0.045 -0.107 0.038 -0.032 0.027
3: Lower supervisory -0.035 0.039 -0.144 0.036 -0.046 0.027
4: Routine 0.012 0.057 -0.162 0.055 0.032 0.038
5: Never worked/unemp. 0.063 0.057 -0.178 0.052 -0.077 0.035
6: Students 0.018 0.052 -0.052 0.050 0.049 0.034
7: Not stated 0.008 0.131 -0.062 0.168 -0.173 0.087
Age (years) 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.001
Sex: female -0.214 0.029 0.045 0.025 -0.047 0.018
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)
2: A levels or equiv. -0.130 0.043 -0.079 0.039 0.071 0.029
3: GCSEs or equiv. -0.080 0.036 -0.108 0.038 -0.021 0.027
4: Foreign or other -0.048 0.075 -0.193 0.054 -0.015 0.044
5: No quals -0.193 0.043 -0.314 0.052 -0.067 0.027
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)
2 0.088 0.117 -0.044 0.128 -0.194 0.110
3 0.150 0.089 -0.089 0.098 0.013 0.070
4 -0.124 0.099 -0.147 0.089 0.025 0.079
5 -0.074 0.103 -0.076 0.095 -0.161 0.076
6 -0.105 0.094 -0.223 0.089 -0.079 0.072
7 -0.150 0.086 -0.195 0.087 -0.139 0.070
8 -0.236 0.087 -0.161 0.077 -0.172 0.066
9 -0.225 0.084 -0.134 0.073 -0.174 0.069
10 -0.259 0.084 -0.142 0.073 -0.204 0.068
Born in UK -0.066 0.031 0.083 0.031 -0.043 0.022
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)
2: 1-4 years 0.160 0.045 0.055 0.045 0.061 0.035
3: 5-9 years 0.202 0.050 0.144 0.053 0.054 0.040
4: 10-29 years 0.235 0.051 0.160 0.050 0.084 0.038
5: 30 or more years 0.368 0.070 0.138 0.066 0.137 0.049
Practising a religion 0.065 0.029 0.135 0.028 0.000 0.019
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)
2 0.803 0.064 -0.169 0.114 -0.298 0.039
3 0.548 0.090 -0.108 0.086 -0.554 0.101
4 0.661 0.162 -0.196 0.117 -0.797 0.101
5 0.527 0.108 -0.129 0.081 -0.744 0.066
6 0.717 0.096 -0.075 0.079 -0.767 0.076
7 0.685 0.095 -0.174 0.092 -0.591 0.050
8 0.598 0.077 -0.115 0.077 -0.727 0.059
9 0.744 0.070 -0.191 0.059 -0.648 0.044
10 0.654 0.068 -0.198 0.058 -0.649 0.045
Survey is year 2008-9 0.003 0.027 -0.052 0.025 0.018 0.018
_cons 0.596 0.132 1.162 0.112 2.414 0.096
Satisfaction with 
place of residence
Civic engagement 
and volunteering
Socialising with 
people of different 
backgrounds0.101 0.118 0.075
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Table 35. English identity: regression output for the Mixed group 
 
 
R squared
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Important English ID -0.034 0.045 -0.090 0.044 -0.023 0.042
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)
2: Intermediate occup. -0.013 0.056 -0.218 0.054 -0.142 0.043
3: Lower supervisory -0.119 0.051 -0.228 0.047 -0.049 0.043
4: Routine -0.152 0.082 -0.240 0.065 -0.014 0.055
5: Never worked/unemp. -0.082 0.093 -0.242 0.074 -0.082 0.061
6: Students -0.293 0.078 -0.112 0.072 -0.141 0.069
7: Not stated -0.338 0.149 0.223 0.193 -0.134 0.121
Age (years) 0.005 0.002 -0.002 0.002 -0.004 0.002
Sex: female -0.263 0.042 0.026 0.034 -0.054 0.033
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)
2: A levels or equiv. -0.112 0.059 -0.096 0.051 -0.070 0.047
3: GCSEs or equiv. -0.148 0.060 -0.162 0.047 -0.004 0.037
4: Foreign or other 0.285 0.112 -0.238 0.115 -0.085 0.102
5: No quals -0.015 0.070 -0.321 0.056 -0.214 0.061
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)
2 0.244 0.096 0.082 0.112 -0.037 0.079
3 0.128 0.096 0.238 0.108 -0.133 0.120
4 -0.192 0.111 0.112 0.120 -0.126 0.081
5 -0.194 0.094 0.252 0.108 -0.073 0.087
6 -0.208 0.121 0.164 0.125 -0.123 0.090
7 -0.198 0.095 0.210 0.109 -0.151 0.070
8 -0.262 0.086 0.042 0.103 -0.204 0.083
9 -0.363 0.092 0.120 0.104 -0.215 0.074
10 -0.402 0.097 0.134 0.107 -0.257 0.075
Born in UK 0.041 0.052 0.243 0.040 0.027 0.037
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)
2: 1-4 years 0.228 0.075 -0.021 0.072 0.181 0.070
3: 5-9 years 0.196 0.077 0.192 0.071 0.180 0.070
4: 10-29 years 0.218 0.080 0.092 0.068 0.218 0.078
5: 30 or more years 0.157 0.101 0.173 0.096 0.102 0.079
Practising a religion 0.037 0.042 0.133 0.037 -0.010 0.034
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)
2 0.121 0.141 0.208 0.120 0.102 0.089
3 -0.006 0.164 -0.055 0.176 0.217 0.109
4 -0.069 0.120 0.212 0.124 0.014 0.151
5 -0.044 0.089 0.199 0.124 0.150 0.099
6 0.021 0.118 0.173 0.138 0.161 0.130
7 -0.397 0.104 0.221 0.118 0.068 0.088
8 0.033 0.090 0.116 0.114 0.293 0.082
9 -0.079 0.070 0.115 0.108 0.330 0.063
10 -0.079 0.075 0.001 0.102 0.270 0.063
Survey is year 2008-9 0.009 0.037 -0.076 0.036 0.036 0.032
_cons 1.324 0.134 0.826 0.171 1.510 0.121
Satisfaction with 
place of residence
Civic engagement 
and volunteering
Socialising with 
people of different 
backgrounds0.211 0.213 0.132
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Table 36. English identity: regression output for the Other group 
 
 
R squared
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Important English ID 0.055 0.059 0.226 0.059 -0.084 0.047
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)
2: Intermediate occup. -0.022 0.052 -0.099 0.048 -0.086 0.038
3: Lower supervisory -0.066 0.056 -0.099 0.049 -0.038 0.038
4: Routine -0.089 0.067 -0.131 0.057 -0.135 0.048
5: Never worked/unemp. 0.019 0.074 -0.120 0.070 -0.088 0.060
6: Students -0.076 0.066 -0.131 0.057 0.006 0.043
7: Not stated -0.297 0.140 0.034 0.116 -0.070 0.064
Age (years) 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.001
Sex: female -0.137 0.032 0.039 0.029 -0.076 0.024
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)
2: A levels or equiv. 0.001 0.062 0.001 0.058 0.023 0.043
3: GCSEs or equiv. 0.058 0.067 -0.123 0.055 -0.103 0.041
4: Foreign or other -0.174 0.050 -0.231 0.050 -0.052 0.038
5: No quals -0.087 0.049 -0.356 0.042 -0.105 0.042
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)
2 -0.049 0.075 0.214 0.095 -0.065 0.073
3 -0.067 0.075 -0.003 0.103 -0.241 0.063
4 -0.157 0.090 0.123 0.103 -0.092 0.068
5 -0.129 0.079 0.061 0.091 -0.260 0.072
6 -0.220 0.073 -0.023 0.073 -0.087 0.067
7 -0.277 0.086 -0.047 0.081 -0.078 0.069
8 -0.360 0.079 0.020 0.074 -0.219 0.063
9 -0.360 0.077 0.029 0.076 -0.210 0.060
10 -0.409 0.076 -0.003 0.073 -0.198 0.063
Born in UK -0.056 0.055 0.097 0.046 -0.048 0.034
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)
2: 1-4 years 0.112 0.050 0.068 0.054 0.137 0.037
3: 5-9 years 0.097 0.064 0.180 0.059 0.065 0.048
4: 10-29 years 0.093 0.064 0.051 0.063 0.148 0.045
5: 30 or more years -0.066 0.105 0.267 0.114 -0.167 0.084
Practising a religion 0.114 0.041 0.054 0.031 0.003 0.030
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)
2 0.080 0.147 -0.078 0.154 0.181 0.185
3 -0.350 0.133 -0.400 0.130 0.416 0.211
4 -0.314 0.138 -0.149 0.173 0.360 0.198
5 -0.451 0.147 -0.266 0.134 0.547 0.197
6 -0.188 0.133 -0.381 0.121 0.577 0.197
7 -0.244 0.130 -0.199 0.133 0.545 0.193
8 -0.117 0.126 -0.263 0.124 0.696 0.195
9 -0.233 0.128 -0.235 0.121 0.693 0.198
10 -0.352 0.126 -0.339 0.118 0.604 0.196
Survey is year 2008-9 -0.010 0.033 0.044 0.035 -0.016 0.025
_cons 1.642 0.149 0.949 0.147 1.155 0.212
Satisfaction with 
place of residence
Civic engagement 
and volunteering
Socialising with 
people of different 
backgrounds0.130 0.184 0.181
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Religion 
Religion was also identified as something that could potentially affect the relationship 
between national identity and social cohesion. A respondent’s religion was therefore included 
in the model to test whether this fundamentally changed the results. In addition, an 
interaction effect between British identity and religion was included, in order to investigate the 
main effect of British identity in each interaction model. This enables one to ask: compared to 
someone of a particular religion, and without a British identity, what is the effect of being of 
that religion and having a British identity? First of all, a simple interaction between whether or 
not a respondent actively practices a religion and whether or not the respondent had a British 
identity that was important to them was included. The results of the main effects of British 
identity from the interaction model is shown in Table 37 below, with the effects of both non-
practising and practising religious respondents being found by changing the reference category 
as appropriate. 
Table 37: Effect of British identity for those that are practising and non-practising 
(the effect of British identity; positive values = increased social cohesion) 
 Satisfaction with 
place of residence 
Civic engagement 
and volunteering 
Socialising with people of 
different backgrounds 
Non-practising 
P value 
0.047 
0.000 
0.036 
0.008 
0.009  
0.436 
Practising 
P value 
0.028 
0.133 
0.033 
0.072 
0.031 
0.049 
R squared 0.194 0.159 0.189 
 
 
Next, interaction models were produced between British identity and different religions. By 
changing the reference category and looking at the main effect of British identity, this allowed 
one to ask: compared to a practising Christian with no strong British identity, what is the effect 
of being a practising Christian and have a strong British identity? The same question can be 
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repeated for each of the other religions with categories available in the Citizenship Survey. 
Table 38 below shows the results, along with those for non-practising people and those who 
have no religion. 
Table 38: Effect of having a British identity for different religious groups 
  
Satisfaction with 
place of residence 
Civic engagement & 
volunteering  
Socialising with 
different backgrounds   
  Coeff. p Coeff. p Coeff. p n 
Christian 0.022 0.31 0.04 0.067 0.044 0.021 7383 
Buddhist -0.154 0.371 -0.248 0.089 -0.118 0.301 160 
Hindu -0.049 0.294 0.091 0.047 0.055 0.111 1214 
Jew -0.181 0.534 0.175 0.488 -0.056 0.748 53 
Muslim 0.075 0.055 0.08 0.026 -0.014 0.606 3196 
Sikh -0.039 0.631 -0.044 0.497 0.038 0.501 492 
Other relig. 0.131 0.22 -0.038 0.677 0.035 0.66 463 
Not practice 0.049 0.001 0.036 0.019 0.009 0.463 12401 
No religion -0.036 0.176 0.037 0.178 0.005 0.834 3553 
R squared 0.1967 0.1593 0.1894   
 
As one can see, there is no particularly clear pattern here. The most obvious finding is that for 
those that are not practicing, there is a positive association between British identity and social 
cohesion on two of the indicators. In addition, one positive effect is found for Christian, Hindu 
and Muslim groups.  
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Control variables 
For these three models many of the control variables are also statistically significant, so it is 
informative to analyse these control variables both in terms of other factors that may be 
associated with social cohesion, and by way of comparison with the magnitudes of the effects 
of British identity. 
Area deprivation 
By far the strongest and most consistent predictor of satisfaction with one's place of residence 
is the control variable representing area deprivation, derived from the ODPM Index of Multiple 
Deprivation (IMD) for England and IMD for Wales from the year 2005 for the 2007-8 dataset, 
and 2007 for the 2008-9 dataset (UKDA 2009).8 This variable is split into deciles, and compared 
to a respondent living in the decile representing an area of least deprivation, living in a more 
deprived area is consistently associated with lower social cohesion outcomes in terms of 
satisfaction with one's place of residence. What is more, the magnitude of this effect is 
stronger for each consecutive decile, and all effects bar one are significant at the 1% level, with 
the remaining effect being significant at the 5% level. These results make intuitive sense: 
respondents are more likely to be satisfied with their place of residence if it is less materially 
deprived. However, this measure of social cohesion also contains variables referring to trust, 
respect for difference, whether people pull together to improve the neighbourhood, and 
feeling safe after dark, indicating that material deprivation also has a strong association with 
these issues. In addition, the magnitude and consistency of the results is striking, despite the 
fact that one cannot say simply from these associations that material deprivation causes lower 
social cohesion on this measure.  
This association is not, however, found as consistently for the other two measures. Area 
deprivation is not significantly associated with civic engagement and volunteering, except for 
the most deprived decile, whilst for socialising with people of other backgrounds the pattern is 
stronger, but not as strong as for satisfaction with one’s place of residence.  
                                                          
8
 Care has been taken to check that there is no significant overlap between the IMD and other variables 
included in the model. The IMD is a weighted average of 7 domains of deprivation: income, 
employment, health & disability, education, skills & training, housing & services, living environment 
deprivation, and crime (DCLG 2008). There are 38 indicators ‘feeding into’ the 7 domains. There should 
be no problem with overlap with other variables in the model because the IMD variables are derived 
from area-level data – from Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs), which contain an average of 
around 1,500 people – whereas all other variables used in the model are individual-level. For instance, 
the education domain of the IMD is derived from indicators such as average GCSE scores at the LSOA 
level, and the proportion of people going into higher education. These indicators should not be 
correlated to a large degree with the variable in the model representing an individual respondent’s 
highest level of education. 
138 
 
Table 39 shows the associations between area deprivation and each of the measures of social 
cohesion, with the reference category being the least deprived decile. Negative values indicate 
decreased social cohesion outcomes. Alternative calculations using jackknife variance 
estimation yielded very similar results, with no substantive changes in terms of significant or 
insignificant effects – full details can be found in the Appendix Part D. 
Table 39: The effect of area deprivation, deciles 
(reference = least deprived; 10 = most deprived) 
 Satisfaction with one's 
place of residence 
Civic engagement and 
volunteering 
Socialising with people of 
different backgrounds 
 Coefficient P value Coefficient P value Coefficient P value 
2 -0.060 0.005  0.044 0.076 -0.012 0.582 
3 -0.065  0.002  0.019 0.425 -0.036 0.090 
4 -0.111  0.000 0.005 0.841 -0.028 0.193 
5 -0.156  0.000 0.017 0.497 -0.018 0.415 
6 -0.178  0.000 0.004 0.861 -0.045 0.039 
7 -0.278  0.000 -0.009 0.716 -0.048 0.024 
8 -0.376  0.000 -0.020 0.421 -0.095 0.000 
9 -0.455  0.000 -0.035 0.164 -0.099 0.000 
10 -0.558  0.000 -0.063 0.012 -0.155 0.000 
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Level of qualifications 
Another control variable with strong associations with some of the three measures is the 
variable representing the level of a respondent’s qualifications. The results are particularly 
striking for civic engagement and volunteering: for instance, compared to having a degree-
level qualification, having no qualifications is strongly associated with negative civic 
engagement and volunteering outcomes, and the qualification associations are the strongest 
of any of the variables in the model. Higher outcomes in terms of satisfaction with one’s place 
of residence, and socialising with people of other backgrounds, are also fairly consistently and 
strongly associated with a higher level of qualifications. 
Table 40 shows the associations between level of qualifications and each of the three 
measures of social cohesion. In each case it is asked: compared to a respondent with a degree 
or equivalent, what is the effect of having the stated (lower) level of qualifications? 
Table 40: The effect of level of qualifications on social cohesion 
(reference = higher education) 
 Satisfaction with one's 
place of residence 
Civic engagement and 
volunteering 
Socialising with people 
of different 
backgrounds 
 Coeff. P value Coeff. P value Coeff. P value 
A level or 
equivalent 
-0.061 
 
0.000 -0.068 
 
0.000 -0.025 
 
0.085 
 
GCSE or 
equivalent 
-0.089 
 
0.000 -0.208 
 
0.000 -0.036 
 
0.004 
 
Foreign or 
other 
qualifications 
-0.177 
 
0.000 -0.233 
 
0.000 -0.054 
 
0.051 
 
No 
qualifications 
-0.142 0.000 -0.403 
 
0.000 -0.105 
 
0.000 
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Comparison of magnitude of effects 
To understand the relative size of the associations between British identity and each of the 
three social cohesion measures it is informative to compare the magnitude of each effect with 
those of the control variables. What one finds is that the effect of at least one of qualifications 
or area deprivation dwarfs the effect of British identity. Figures 11 and 12 below show the 
effects of British identity, together with the effect of having a higher education qualification as 
compared to no qualifications, and living in one of the least deprived areas as compared to one 
of the most, for the ‘satisfaction’ and ‘civic engagement’ models for the whole sample (not 
broken down by ethnic group). Given that a significant effect of British identity was not found 
for the overall sample for the ‘socialising’ model, the White non-UK born model is shown for 
illustrative purposes. Positive values indicate positive social cohesion outcomes. 
It is clear from these charts that area deprivation is of great importance to whether or not 
someone is satisfied with their place of residence, qualifications of great importance to 
whether someone is involved with civic activities and volunteering, whilst both are of 
considerable importance to socialising with people of other backgrounds (for the White UK-
born group). For this last model, British identity is negatively associated with cohesion, but the 
positive effect of reduced deprivation is still twice as large in magnitude. 
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Figure 11: Size of effects – satisfaction with place of residence 
 
Figure 12: Size of effects - civic engagement & volunteering 
 
Figure 13: Size of effects - socialising with people of different backgrounds 
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4.32: Models with a moderate level of explanatory power 
 
Turning now to the group of models with a moderate level of explanatory power, Table 41 
below shows the results of regression models for ‘belonging to Britain’ and ‘belonging to one’s 
local area’. Having a British identity is associated with increased belonging to both Britain and 
one’s local area, and this effect is significant at both the 5% and 1% levels. Female respondents 
exhibit higher scores on each of the belonging measures; and both area deprivation and having 
a high percentage of minority ethnic respondents in one’s ward are in general negatively 
associated with belonging, particularly for belonging to one’s local area. 
 
Table 41: Regression output for belonging cohesion measures 
 
  
Coef Std Err P>t Coef Std Err P>t
Important British ID 0.104 0.008 0.000 0.047 0.012 0.000
Ethnic group (ref=White)
2: Asian 0.045 0.019 0.016 0.240 0.026 0.000
3: Black -0.033 0.019 0.087 0.141 0.028 0.000
4: Mixed -0.037 0.021 0.078 0.139 0.030 0.000
5: Chinese / Other -0.091 0.025 0.000 0.111 0.033 0.001
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)
2: Intermediate occup. -0.030 0.012 0.016 0.007 0.017 0.656
3: Lower supervisory -0.065 0.013 0.000 0.009 0.017 0.571
4: Routine -0.075 0.018 0.000 0.027 0.024 0.270
5: Never worked/unemp. -0.028 0.021 0.185 0.028 0.032 0.378
6: Students -0.001 0.025 0.977 0.001 0.037 0.978
7: Not stated -0.071 0.042 0.093 0.090 0.053 0.092
Age (years) 0.000 0.000 0.987 0.002 0.000 0.000
Sex: female 0.042 0.008 0.000 0.071 0.011 0.000
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)
2: A levels or equiv. -0.036 0.013 0.006 0.003 0.019 0.881
3: GCSEs or equiv. -0.071 0.012 0.000 0.020 0.017 0.230
4: Foreign or other -0.128 0.032 0.000 0.009 0.038 0.819
5: No quals -0.089 0.014 0.000 0.053 0.019 0.006
Belonging to Britain Belonging to Local Area
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If one again breaks the sample down by ethnic group, regression output can be shown for each 
group separately, as before.  The question one is asking is: compared to a member of the 
specified ethnic group without a British identity, is having a British identity associated with 
increased or decreased belonging for that ethnic group? Tables 42 to 47 show the regression 
output for each ethnic group separately, and significant associations (at the 5% level) are 
shown in bold. 
The tables below show that British identity is positively and significantly associated with both 
belonging to Britain and to one’s local area for the White UK-born group and the Asian group. 
For the White non-UK born, Black, Mixed, and Chinese or Other groups, British identity is 
significantly and positively associated with belonging to Britain, but not to one’s local area. The 
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)
2 -0.012 0.018 0.497 -0.014 0.024 0.549
3 -0.003 0.017 0.854 -0.009 0.024 0.704
4 -0.047 0.018 0.009 -0.028 0.024 0.246
5 -0.020 0.018 0.255 -0.056 0.025 0.024
6 -0.025 0.018 0.167 -0.079 0.026 0.003
7 -0.077 0.020 0.000 -0.116 0.026 0.000
8 -0.059 0.020 0.003 -0.171 0.026 0.000
9 -0.067 0.020 0.001 -0.206 0.026 0.000
10 -0.063 0.019 0.001 -0.208 0.028 0.000
Born in UK 0.045 0.016 0.004 -0.027 0.022 0.221
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)
2: 1-4 years 0.017 0.021 0.417 0.120 0.027 0.000
3: 5-9 years 0.034 0.022 0.122 0.249 0.027 0.000
4: 10-29 years 0.048 0.020 0.019 0.327 0.026 0.000
5: 30 or more years 0.061 0.022 0.006 0.440 0.028 0.000
Practising a religion 0.027 0.010 0.006 0.064 0.013 0.000
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)
2 -0.024 0.018 0.175 0.008 0.030 0.793
3 -0.031 0.017 0.076 -0.044 0.032 0.162
4 -0.060 0.018 0.001 -0.044 0.030 0.144
5 -0.029 0.017 0.088 -0.042 0.030 0.161
6 -0.057 0.017 0.001 -0.117 0.032 0.000
7 -0.069 0.019 0.000 -0.106 0.032 0.001
8 -0.095 0.018 0.000 -0.151 0.032 0.000
9 -0.074 0.020 0.000 -0.155 0.035 0.000
10 -0.057 0.022 0.009 -0.168 0.035 0.000
Survey is year 2008-9 -0.009 0.008 0.274 0.018 0.012 0.149
_cons 1.348 0.036 0.000 0.806 0.049 0.000
R squared 0.055 0.106
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R squared values for several of the belonging regression models are higher for certain ethnic 
groups: notably the White non-UK born, Mixed, and Chinese or Other groups. 
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Table 42: Regression output for belonging models - White UK born 
 
Coef Std Err P>t Coef Std Err P>t
Important British ID 0.091 0.009 0.000 0.042 0.013 0.001
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)
2: Intermediate occup. -0.036 0.014 0.010 0.012 0.018 0.523
3: Lower supervisory -0.064 0.014 0.000 0.008 0.018 0.657
4: Routine -0.067 0.019 0.001 0.037 0.025 0.149
5: Never worked/unemp. -0.045 0.027 0.100 0.009 0.041 0.831
6: Students 0.016 0.031 0.612 -0.009 0.046 0.845
7: Not stated -0.047 0.046 0.304 0.111 0.062 0.076
Age (years) 0.000 0.000 0.181 0.002 0.001 0.004
Sex: female 0.053 0.009 0.000 0.082 0.013 0.000
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)
2: A levels or equiv. -0.054 0.014 0.000 0.003 0.020 0.892
3: GCSEs or equiv. -0.088 0.013 0.000 0.017 0.018 0.360
4: Foreign or other -0.123 0.045 0.007 0.108 0.047 0.021
5: No quals -0.111 0.016 0.000 0.050 0.022 0.020
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)
2 -0.020 0.020 0.298 -0.026 0.025 0.298
3 -0.010 0.018 0.590 -0.023 0.025 0.362
4 -0.055 0.019 0.005 -0.044 0.025 0.080
5 -0.020 0.019 0.285 -0.050 0.027 0.058
6 -0.031 0.019 0.108 -0.086 0.028 0.002
7 -0.086 0.022 0.000 -0.128 0.028 0.000
8 -0.072 0.023 0.002 -0.195 0.029 0.000
9 -0.072 0.023 0.002 -0.213 0.029 0.000
10 -0.082 0.022 0.000 -0.223 0.032 0.000
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)
2: 1-4 years -0.019 0.023 0.411 0.115 0.033 0.000
3: 5-9 years -0.022 0.024 0.361 0.232 0.033 0.000
4: 10-29 years -0.005 0.022 0.836 0.308 0.031 0.000
5: 30 or more years 0.021 0.024 0.374 0.427 0.032 0.000
Practising a religion 0.028 0.011 0.008 0.058 0.015 0.000
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)
2 -0.029 0.018 0.119 0.008 0.031 0.802
3 -0.034 0.018 0.057 -0.046 0.032 0.145
4 -0.064 0.018 0.000 -0.044 0.031 0.152
5 -0.032 0.018 0.073 -0.043 0.030 0.156
6 -0.064 0.018 0.000 -0.120 0.032 0.000
7 -0.072 0.020 0.000 -0.106 0.032 0.001
8 -0.103 0.019 0.000 -0.139 0.033 0.000
9 -0.077 0.022 0.000 -0.167 0.039 0.000
10 -0.062 0.026 0.019 -0.189 0.044 0.000
Survey is year 2008-9 -0.014 0.009 0.124 0.019 0.013 0.165
_cons 1.484 0.036 0.000 0.809 0.050 0.000
R squared
Belonging to Britain Belonging to Local Area
0.054 0.101
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Table 43: Regression output for belonging models - White non UK born 
 
Coef Std Err P>t Coef Std Err P>t
Important British ID 0.145 0.029 0.000 0.050 0.054 0.357
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)
2: Intermediate occup. 0.034 0.041 0.405 -0.084 0.053 0.114
3: Lower supervisory -0.098 0.052 0.062 0.010 0.068 0.884
4: Routine -0.196 0.073 0.008 -0.115 0.092 0.213
5: Never worked/unemp. 0.088 0.078 0.262 0.244 0.101 0.016
6: Students -0.001 0.116 0.993 0.010 0.135 0.939
7: Not stated -0.313 0.094 0.001 0.225 0.154 0.146
Age (years) 0.003 0.001 0.015 0.002 0.002 0.226
Sex: female -0.019 0.036 0.594 0.052 0.045 0.250
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)
2: A levels or equiv. 0.038 0.067 0.569 -0.021 0.093 0.823
3: GCSEs or equiv. -0.033 0.063 0.602 0.013 0.078 0.873
4: Foreign or other -0.043 0.062 0.488 -0.080 0.066 0.226
5: No quals -0.024 0.051 0.634 0.108 0.072 0.138
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)
2 0.142 0.054 0.009 0.141 0.094 0.134
3 0.125 0.060 0.039 0.109 0.077 0.157
4 0.082 0.062 0.189 0.173 0.081 0.034
5 0.017 0.057 0.773 -0.076 0.088 0.386
6 0.055 0.056 0.325 -0.036 0.084 0.666
7 0.046 0.075 0.537 0.035 0.079 0.656
8 0.030 0.067 0.657 -0.067 0.090 0.459
9 -0.041 0.074 0.582 -0.234 0.094 0.014
10 0.138 0.071 0.052 -0.192 0.093 0.040
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)
2: 1-4 years 0.072 0.060 0.231 -0.056 0.068 0.412
3: 5-9 years 0.205 0.055 0.000 0.211 0.074 0.005
4: 10-29 years 0.223 0.057 0.000 0.319 0.073 0.000
5: 30 or more years 0.187 0.068 0.006 0.483 0.092 0.000
Practising a religion -0.006 0.038 0.876 0.087 0.049 0.079
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)
2 0.125 0.074 0.091 0.065 0.083 0.433
3 0.053 0.081 0.513 0.017 0.090 0.854
4 0.069 0.075 0.358 0.028 0.091 0.755
5 0.066 0.082 0.418 0.098 0.103 0.338
6 0.086 0.074 0.246 -0.021 0.098 0.828
7 0.024 0.081 0.766 -0.011 0.113 0.926
8 0.053 0.075 0.480 -0.206 0.096 0.033
9 0.008 0.071 0.907 -0.084 0.091 0.360
10 0.029 0.073 0.692 -0.126 0.087 0.148
Survey is year 2008-9 0.040 0.033 0.230 0.031 0.041 0.452
_cons 0.889 0.104 0.000 0.752 0.132 0.000
R squared
Belonging to Britain Belonging to Local Area
0.167 0.219
147 
 
Table 44: Regression output for belonging models - Asian 
 
Coef Std Err P>t Coef Std Err P>t
Important British ID 0.116 0.013 0.000 0.072 0.019 0.000
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)
2: Intermediate occup. 0.010 0.019 0.595 0.021 0.027 0.429
3: Lower supervisory -0.004 0.021 0.865 0.028 0.026 0.282
4: Routine 0.003 0.029 0.912 -0.021 0.036 0.561
5: Never worked/unemp. -0.042 0.024 0.086 0.033 0.033 0.317
6: Students -0.015 0.034 0.651 -0.002 0.041 0.964
7: Not stated -0.117 0.079 0.137 -0.266 0.130 0.041
Age (years) 0.002 0.001 0.009 -0.001 0.001 0.453
Sex: female 0.024 0.013 0.075 -0.021 0.019 0.281
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)
2: A levels or equiv. 0.061 0.022 0.006 0.049 0.029 0.098
3: GCSEs or equiv. 0.044 0.019 0.023 0.049 0.029 0.086
4: Foreign or other -0.047 0.035 0.183 0.055 0.042 0.192
5: No quals 0.027 0.022 0.215 0.061 0.027 0.023
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)
2 -0.043 0.048 0.365 -0.037 0.066 0.572
3 -0.037 0.039 0.348 0.043 0.070 0.543
4 -0.074 0.041 0.072 -0.027 0.078 0.728
5 -0.022 0.037 0.548 -0.072 0.068 0.290
6 -0.029 0.040 0.470 -0.063 0.063 0.319
7 -0.064 0.037 0.087 -0.080 0.063 0.202
8 -0.034 0.037 0.363 -0.033 0.060 0.589
9 -0.021 0.037 0.566 -0.086 0.061 0.158
10 -0.060 0.037 0.102 -0.074 0.061 0.224
Born in UK -0.015 0.016 0.344 -0.109 0.024 0.000
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)
2: 1-4 years 0.096 0.035 0.006 0.293 0.045 0.000
3: 5-9 years 0.176 0.032 0.000 0.421 0.046 0.000
4: 10-29 years 0.168 0.032 0.000 0.488 0.042 0.000
5: 30 or more years 0.143 0.039 0.000 0.505 0.048 0.000
Practising a religion -0.003 0.015 0.835 0.057 0.023 0.012
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)
2 -0.062 0.120 0.603 0.421 0.609 0.490
3 0.099 0.099 0.317 0.427 0.603 0.480
4 -0.039 0.135 0.776 0.299 0.610 0.624
5 0.083 0.112 0.458 0.420 0.605 0.488
6 0.198 0.084 0.019 0.570 0.602 0.344
7 0.147 0.090 0.103 0.487 0.600 0.417
8 0.112 0.083 0.180 0.499 0.599 0.405
9 0.179 0.079 0.024 0.547 0.597 0.360
10 0.156 0.079 0.047 0.516 0.598 0.388
Survey is year 2008-9 0.006 0.014 0.663 -0.018 0.018 0.321
_cons 0.956 0.097 0.000 0.295 0.603 0.625
R squared
Belonging to Britain Belonging to Local Area
0.084 0.099
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Table 45: Regression output for belonging models - Black 
 
Coef Std Err P>t Coef Std Err P>t
Important British ID 0.106 0.019 0.000 0.036 0.027 0.184
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)
2: Intermediate occup. -0.026 0.031 0.408 0.063 0.040 0.122
3: Lower supervisory -0.004 0.028 0.884 0.006 0.038 0.876
4: Routine 0.015 0.035 0.669 0.016 0.052 0.763
5: Never worked/unemp. -0.028 0.049 0.564 0.035 0.048 0.468
6: Students -0.063 0.043 0.140 0.004 0.052 0.943
7: Not stated 0.026 0.109 0.809 0.073 0.107 0.494
Age (years) 0.000 0.001 0.818 0.001 0.001 0.646
Sex: female -0.012 0.020 0.544 -0.037 0.027 0.162
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)
2: A levels or equiv. 0.013 0.033 0.700 -0.010 0.043 0.823
3: GCSEs or equiv. 0.042 0.027 0.114 0.025 0.042 0.554
4: Foreign or other 0.015 0.045 0.741 0.068 0.050 0.171
5: No quals 0.010 0.032 0.747 0.028 0.043 0.518
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)
2 -0.050 0.090 0.580 -0.095 0.126 0.451
3 0.049 0.078 0.533 0.384 0.085 0.000
4 0.119 0.066 0.073 0.033 0.118 0.778
5 -0.031 0.070 0.660 -0.072 0.113 0.526
6 0.030 0.052 0.557 0.067 0.097 0.490
7 0.003 0.053 0.959 -0.017 0.097 0.857
8 0.053 0.049 0.286 -0.001 0.092 0.992
9 0.031 0.050 0.542 -0.054 0.090 0.547
10 0.014 0.051 0.777 -0.029 0.088 0.738
Born in UK -0.055 0.022 0.015 -0.059 0.030 0.050
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)
2: 1-4 years -0.006 0.040 0.881 0.252 0.059 0.000
3: 5-9 years 0.064 0.042 0.129 0.340 0.057 0.000
4: 10-29 years 0.100 0.042 0.017 0.408 0.062 0.000
5: 30 or more years 0.120 0.050 0.016 0.542 0.072 0.000
Practising a religion 0.113 0.021 0.000 0.088 0.028 0.002
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)
2 -0.102 0.043 0.018 -0.447 0.159 0.005
3 -0.491 0.214 0.022 -0.098 0.112 0.383
4 -0.502 0.130 0.000 -0.635 0.138 0.000
5 -0.385 0.087 0.000 -0.652 0.154 0.000
6 -0.338 0.053 0.000 -0.500 0.097 0.000
7 -0.262 0.051 0.000 -0.545 0.100 0.000
8 -0.429 0.057 0.000 -0.625 0.085 0.000
9 -0.425 0.044 0.000 -0.526 0.057 0.000
10 -0.400 0.042 0.000 -0.515 0.057 0.000
Survey is year 2008-9 -0.026 0.017 0.143 0.016 0.029 0.574
_cons 1.494 0.086 0.000 1.175 0.123 0.000
R squared
Belonging to Britain Belonging to Local Area
0.060 0.076
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Table 46: Regression output for belonging models - Mixed 
 
Coef Std Err P>t Coef Std Err P>t
Important British ID 0.104 0.024 0.000 -0.001 0.034 0.986
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)
2: Intermediate occup. 0.025 0.038 0.513 0.015 0.046 0.740
3: Lower supervisory -0.041 0.035 0.238 -0.088 0.048 0.070
4: Routine 0.057 0.052 0.275 0.025 0.081 0.752
5: Never worked/unemp. 0.019 0.071 0.790 0.042 0.086 0.624
6: Students 0.025 0.048 0.602 -0.140 0.067 0.039
7: Not stated -0.354 0.103 0.001 -0.675 0.208 0.001
Age (years) 0.000 0.001 0.965 -0.001 0.002 0.396
Sex: female -0.037 0.026 0.165 -0.036 0.035 0.306
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)
2: A levels or equiv. 0.036 0.041 0.382 -0.064 0.051 0.206
3: GCSEs or equiv. 0.012 0.042 0.770 0.022 0.050 0.669
4: Foreign or other -0.037 0.091 0.687 0.117 0.133 0.381
5: No quals -0.039 0.055 0.478 0.104 0.064 0.106
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)
2 0.041 0.067 0.544 0.344 0.107 0.002
3 0.071 0.058 0.220 0.199 0.111 0.074
4 0.136 0.056 0.017 0.441 0.109 0.000
5 0.121 0.048 0.013 0.251 0.091 0.006
6 0.048 0.070 0.495 0.204 0.098 0.039
7 0.074 0.052 0.157 0.168 0.094 0.075
8 0.029 0.056 0.605 0.131 0.096 0.174
9 -0.036 0.059 0.547 0.055 0.100 0.581
10 0.053 0.054 0.323 -0.021 0.098 0.826
Born in UK -0.005 0.033 0.892 0.018 0.042 0.670
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)
2: 1-4 years 0.167 0.058 0.004 0.497 0.075 0.000
3: 5-9 years 0.165 0.058 0.005 0.536 0.072 0.000
4: 10-29 years 0.167 0.059 0.005 0.628 0.072 0.000
5: 30 or more years 0.144 0.069 0.038 0.854 0.093 0.000
Practising a religion 0.069 0.027 0.012 0.100 0.039 0.010
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)
2 0.404 0.067 0.000 0.321 0.216 0.138
3 0.349 0.099 0.001 0.266 0.226 0.241
4 0.408 0.081 0.000 0.178 0.224 0.428
5 0.474 0.064 0.000 0.203 0.218 0.354
6 0.544 0.076 0.000 0.316 0.219 0.151
7 0.361 0.076 0.000 -0.092 0.221 0.679
8 0.387 0.064 0.000 0.108 0.215 0.615
9 0.460 0.061 0.000 0.310 0.208 0.138
10 0.403 0.064 0.000 0.262 0.211 0.215
Survey is year 2008-9 0.017 0.023 0.444 -0.047 0.035 0.177
_cons 0.598 0.096 0.000 0.232 0.242 0.339
R squared
Belonging to Britain Belonging to Local Area
0.090 0.181
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Table 47: Regression output for belonging models - Chinese/Other 
 
Coef Std Err P>t Coef Std Err P>t
Important British ID 0.258 0.026 0.000 0.039 0.033 0.239
Socio-econ (ref=managerial/professions)
2: Intermediate occup. 0.046 0.037 0.215 0.029 0.054 0.595
3: Lower supervisory -0.004 0.045 0.927 0.032 0.054 0.546
4: Routine 0.045 0.047 0.339 0.103 0.069 0.132
5: Never worked/unemp. -0.012 0.056 0.833 -0.017 0.071 0.810
6: Students 0.040 0.050 0.418 0.063 0.068 0.352
7: Not stated -0.056 0.121 0.644 0.153 0.181 0.398
Age (years) 0.004 0.001 0.007 0.004 0.002 0.013
Sex: female -0.009 0.025 0.722 -0.057 0.036 0.115
Highest qualification (ref=higher education)
2: A levels or equiv. 0.032 0.046 0.489 0.026 0.064 0.690
3: GCSEs or equiv. -0.061 0.050 0.222 0.074 0.062 0.238
4: Foreign or other -0.020 0.044 0.654 -0.020 0.060 0.738
5: No quals 0.062 0.036 0.083 0.036 0.050 0.468
Index of Multiple Deprivation (deciles, ref=least deprived)
2 0.206 0.088 0.020 0.030 0.130 0.821
3 0.100 0.090 0.269 -0.118 0.126 0.351
4 0.218 0.098 0.027 -0.064 0.116 0.583
5 0.143 0.093 0.123 -0.197 0.130 0.131
6 0.168 0.092 0.070 -0.041 0.119 0.730
7 0.248 0.091 0.007 -0.097 0.120 0.421
8 0.160 0.089 0.073 0.000 0.118 1.000
9 0.128 0.091 0.158 -0.252 0.121 0.038
10 0.210 0.084 0.013 -0.183 0.112 0.102
Born in UK 0.042 0.033 0.212 -0.099 0.053 0.063
How long lived in neighbourhood (ref=less than a year)
2: 1-4 years 0.099 0.039 0.012 0.306 0.048 0.000
3: 5-9 years 0.095 0.047 0.046 0.291 0.069 0.000
4: 10-29 years 0.132 0.050 0.009 0.435 0.062 0.000
5: 30 or more years -0.200 0.117 0.087 0.363 0.110 0.001
Practising a religion 0.056 0.027 0.043 0.096 0.037 0.011
Percentage of minority ethnic residents in ward (ref=lowest density)
2 0.238 0.268 0.375 -0.198 0.139 0.158
3 0.114 0.253 0.652 -0.109 0.120 0.367
4 0.007 0.246 0.978 -0.397 0.110 0.000
5 0.214 0.246 0.386 -0.295 0.131 0.025
6 0.140 0.250 0.577 -0.403 0.104 0.000
7 0.180 0.244 0.460 -0.459 0.105 0.000
8 0.211 0.245 0.391 -0.221 0.092 0.017
9 0.195 0.242 0.422 -0.206 0.082 0.013
10 0.107 0.241 0.658 -0.336 0.083 0.000
Survey is year 2008-9 -0.023 0.026 0.386 0.057 0.031 0.067
_cons 0.525 0.258 0.043 0.880 0.176 0.000
R squared
Belonging to Britain Belonging to Local Area
0.136 0.135
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For the ethnic groups not already split between those born in or outside the UK, it is again 
informative to include an interaction effect between British identity and being born in the UK, 
to investigate whether the patterns seen for the other measures of cohesion – whereby for the 
Black and Asian groups, positive associations were found between British identity and 
cohesion for those not born in the UK, but for the Mixed group this association was negative – 
are also found for the two ‘belonging’ measures of cohesion. 
 
Table 48: Belonging interaction models for the Asian group 
 
 
Table 48 shows the results of the interaction models for the Asian group. One can see from the 
main effect of British identity that the pattern found before is again found for the two 
belonging models – British identity is positively associated with social cohesion, but only for 
those not born in the UK. The interaction effect between being not born in the UK and having a 
British identity also highlights this pattern: there is an additional positive effect of being both 
born outside the UK and having a British identity for both belonging models. 
Table 49 shows the results of the interaction models for the Black group. The pattern seen for 
the Asian group is not found – instead whether or not a respondent is born in the UK appears 
to make very little difference. British identity is positively associated with the ‘belonging to 
Britain’ model for both those born in and outside the UK, but no significant effects were found 
for the ‘belonging to the local area’ model. 
 
R squared
Reference = no British identity, not born in the UK
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Main: British ID 0.148 0.015 0.101 0.021
Main: Born in UK 0.055 0.028 -0.044 0.039
Int: Born in UK * Br ID -0.106 0.031 -0.098 0.042
Reference = no British identity, born in the UK
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Main: British ID 0.043 0.026 0.004 0.037
Main: Not born in UK -0.055 0.028 0.044 0.039
Int: Not born in UK * Br ID 0.106 0.031 0.098 0.042
Belonging to Britain Belonging to local 
area
0.088 0.100
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Table 49: Belonging interaction models for the Black group 
 
 
Table 50: Belonging interaction models for the Mixed group 
 
Table 50 shows the results of the interaction models for the Mixed group. For the ‘belonging to 
Britain’ model, the results are similar to those for the Black group, in that it makes no 
difference whether or not a respondent is born in the UK – positive associations with British 
identity were found regardless. For the ‘belonging to the local area’ model, the results are 
similar to those for the Mixed group in the previous regression models – positive associations 
appear to be coming from those born in the UK, as shown by the interaction effect between 
both being born in the UK and having a British identity. 
Last of all, Table 51 shows the results of the interaction models for the Chinese or Other group. 
There are again positive associations between British identity and ‘belonging to Britain’ for 
R squared
Reference = no British identity, not born in the UK
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Main: British ID 0.116 0.022 0.054 0.032
Main: Born in UK -0.039 0.034 -0.028 0.040
Int: Born in UK * Br ID -0.028 0.042 -0.055 0.049
Reference = no British identity, born in the UK
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Main: British ID 0.087 0.036 -0.001 0.042
Main: Not born in UK 0.039 0.034 0.028 0.040
Int: Not born in UK * Br ID 0.028 0.042 0.055 0.049
Belonging to Britain Belonging to local 
area
0.061 0.077
R squared
Reference = no British identity, not born in the UK
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Main: British ID 0.175 0.049 -0.122 0.063
Main: Born in UK 0.030 0.043 -0.041 0.053
Int: Born in UK * Br ID -0.100 0.060 0.171 0.077
Reference = no British identity, born in the UK
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Main: British ID 0.074 0.029 0.049 0.041
Main: Not born in UK -0.030 0.043 0.041 0.053
Int: Not born in UK * Br ID 0.100 0.060 -0.171 0.077
Belonging to Britain Belonging to local 
area
0.093 0.184
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both those born in and outside the UK, but there are no significant associations for the 
‘belonging to the local area’ model. 
 
Table 51: Belonging interaction models for the Other group 
  
R squared
Reference = no British identity, not born in the UK
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Main: British ID 0.262 0.028 0.051 0.040
Main: Born in UK 0.047 0.046 -0.080 0.068
Int: Born in UK * Br ID -0.013 0.058 -0.047 0.074
Reference = no British identity, born in the UK
Coef Std Err Coef Std Err
Main: British ID 0.249 0.053 0.004 0.062
Main: Not born in UK -0.047 0.046 0.080 0.068
Int: Not born in UK * Br ID 0.013 0.058 0.047 0.074
Belonging to Britain Belonging to local 
area
0.136 0.135
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Comparison of magnitude of effects 
 
Figures 14 and 15 compare the magnitude of the effect of having a British identity with the 
effects of having qualifications, and of living in one of the least deprived areas, for belonging to 
Britain and belonging to one’s local area respectively. 
Figure 14 shows that having a degree-level qualification as opposed to having no qualifications 
increases the likelihood a respondent will feel they belong to Britain, and living in one of the 
10% least deprived areas as compared to one of the 10% most also increases the likelihood a 
respondent will feel they belong to Britain. Both of these effects are significant at the 1% level. 
However, having a British identity is of substantial importance for belonging to Britain as 
compared with area deprivation or qualifications, perhaps unsurprisingly given the similarity of 
the concepts. 
Figure 15 shows that having a degree-level qualification as opposed to having no qualifications 
decreases the likelihood a respondent will feel they belong to their local area, although living 
in one of the 10% least deprived areas drastically increases the likelihood they will feel they 
belong. For this element, the pattern found for the other three models described above is 
repeated: area deprivation and level of qualifications have markedly stronger effects than 
British identity, with deprivation having an effect over four times the magnitude of British 
identity. 
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Figure 14: Size of effects - belonging to Britain 
 
Figure 15: Size of effects - belonging to local area 
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4.33: Models with a poor level of explanatory power 
 
Turning last of all to the group of models that have a poor level of explanatory power, one can 
ask: what is the impact of British identity on social cohesion?  
Five of the regression models are poor predictors of the social cohesion indicators, and have 
very low R squared values – the highest is that of the model for ability to influence decisions, 
which explains 3.9% of the variation. The elements of social cohesion this applies to are: 
1. Element 1: Equal treatment by service providers (NOT health services or the police) 
2. Element 2: Equal treatment by service providers (ESPECIALLY health services) 
3. Element 3: Trust in and treatment by the police 
4. Element 9: Ability to influence decisions of public institutions 
5. Element 10: Being treated with respect when in public / using public services 
Table 52 shows the impact of British identity on each of the measures of social cohesion. As 
was the case in four of the five other models discussed in sections 4.31 and 4.32, British 
identity has a positive and significant effect on several of the elements, but for two no 
significant effect was found. 
Table 52: Associations between British identity and social cohesion 
(positive values = increased social cohesion) 
 Equal 
treatment - 
general 
services 
Equal 
treatment – 
health 
services 
Trust in & 
treatment by 
the police 
Ability to 
influence 
decisions 
Treated with 
respect 
Effect of British 
identity 
0.063 0.019 0.019 0.061 0.013 
P value 0.001 0.017 0.152 0.000 0.173 
R squared 0.031 0.018 0.021 0.039 0.022 
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In terms of the control variables, the three models looking at services do not have quite such 
clear patterns as the other models with high or moderate explanatory power. For ability to 
influence decisions and, to a lesser extent, being treated with respect, however, education 
appears to be a fairly important predictor: with the model for ability to influence decisions, 
having no qualifications as compared with a higher education qualification decreases the score 
by a coefficient of 0.108, and for being treated with respect by a coefficient of 0.036, with both 
effects being significant at the 5% level. 
To a certain extent the patterns seen with these models are similar to the patterns for the 
other five models, discussed in the preceding sections. British identity, at least for three of the 
models, has a small but positive effect on social cohesion outcomes, and for two of the models 
educational qualifications have a fairly important effect. Given how low the R squared values 
are for these models, however, it is difficult to draw any particularly firm conclusions, since 
there may be other variables that are not controlled for that have large and confounding 
effects. 
So, is it possible to add additional control variables to the models in an attempt to raise the R 
squared values and attain more reliable results? For instance, it may be the case that attitudes 
towards services are affected more by whether or not a person has used them recently than 
by things such as British identity, education, or deprivation. There are quite a few variables 
available in the Citizenship Survey that could capture concepts that may be related to public 
services, influencing decisions, or being treated with respect. Although there are limited 
questions regarding public services generally, Table 53 shows potential control variables for 
the four following concepts: 
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Table 53: Additional control variables available in the Citizenship Survey 
Health: 
 GHealth: How good is respondent’s health in general 
 Dill: Respondent has a disability or long-standing illness 
 Rcare: Respondent’s family member has a disability or long-standing illness 
 Rorg: Respondent has had direct contact with health services recently 
Police: 
 Rorg9: respondent has had direct contact with police recently 
 Rorgcourts [derived]: respondent has had direct contact with courts, probation or 
prison services recently 
 Reldis9: police have discriminated against respondent because of religion 
Influencing decisions: 
 PinfI: how important is it to the respondent that can influence local decisions 
 Pcsat: would respondent like to be more involved with local decisions 
Being treated with respect: 
 Reldis13: Respondent has experienced discrimination because of religion 
 Rdispro: Respondent has been discriminated against when going for work promotion 
Source: UKDA (2007) 
Each of these variables was included in a regression model for all five of the elements for 
which the R squared values were low. All were included since there is a certain amount of 
overlap both in the interpretation of the elements, and in the control variables listed – 
although reldis9 (police religious discrimination) and reldis13 (general religious discrimination) 
were not used in the same model because they overlap. In addition, regressions were run both 
with and without ‘rdispro’, since there were a considerable number of missing values (due to 
the question being inapplicable to those who are not in work). 
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The results, broadly, were that the R squared values improved, but only modestly. It is of 
course possible to increase the R squared values simply by adding as many variables as 
possible, but there were in fact some interesting patterns that emerged by adding the extra 
control variables. Perceived discrimination had a significant, negative and relatively strong 
effect for each of the five models, indicating that perceived religious discrimination, or 
perceived discrimination in the workplace, is negatively associated with attitudes to public 
services, attitudes towards the ability to influence decisions of institutions, and feelings of 
being treated with respect. Interestingly, self-reported bad health, or the presence of a 
disability or long-standing illness, were not significantly associated with the health service 
composite variable, but were negatively associated with feelings of being treated with respect 
when in public or using public services (i.e. bad health is associated with worse social cohesion 
outcomes for this element). Having had contact with public service providers recently was not 
associated with the general equal treatment element. However, somewhat encouragingly, 
having had recent contact with the health services was associated with more positive scores 
on the health services element, and having had contact with the police had no effect on the 
scores on this element, although contact with the courts, probation or prison services did, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, have a negative association with scores for the police element.  
Table 54 shows associations between British identity and each of the five elements, together 
with the control variable (amongst those just added) with the strongest effect for that model. 
For each model, only the additional variables (as listed in Table 53) that were statistically 
significant were kept so as to avoid artificially increasing the R squared values.  
It is clear that a positive and significant effect of British identity remains for three of the 
elements, although it is also apparent that the effect is relatively small. The same pattern 
appears as for most of the models discussed in previous sections, whereby the magnitude of 
the effects of some of the control variables is much larger than the effect of British identity. 
Perceived discrimination, in particular, appears to be very important for attitudes towards 
public services, and for a feeling of being treated with respect. For ability to influence 
decisions, respondents’ attitudes towards whether influencing the decisions of public 
institutions is important to them has a large effect.  
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Table 54: Associations between British identity and social cohesion, and key control 
variables 
 Equal 
treatment - 
general 
services 
Equal 
treatment – 
health 
services 
Trust in & 
treatment by 
the police 
Ability to 
influence 
decisions 
Treated with 
respect 
Effect of British 
identity 
0.060 0.018 0.007 0.048 0.013 
P value 0.001 0.027 0.650 0.000 0.242 
Control with 
strongest effect 
General 
religious 
discrimination 
General 
religious 
discrimination 
Police 
religious 
discrimination 
Influencing 
decisions 
unimportant 
Workplace 
discrimination 
Co-efficient 
P value 
-0.325 
0.000 
-0.277 
0.000 
-0.648 
0.000 
-0.429 
0.000 
-0.137 
0.000 
R squared 0.043 0.038 0.040 0.094 0.057 
 
The R squared values are now a little higher, although are still quite low (aside from the model 
for ability to influence decisions, which has improved a fair amount), so it is worth being 
cautious about concluding too much from these models. Nevertheless, it is now possible to say 
a little more about these five models: there is a sense that perceived discrimination could be 
particularly important to respect and attitudes to public services; and that its importance 
greatly outweighs that of British identity. 
It is worth asking why it might be the case that, for these five elements of social cohesion, the 
independent variables used fail to produce a model with a high level of explanatory power. 
One answer could be that there are concepts not adequately ‘captured’ by the Citizenship 
Survey variables that could explain these elements – the fact that the Citizenship Survey 
income variable is problematic and not included in the regression models in this chapter is a 
possibility. Another answer could be that the composite variables measuring each of these 
elements are not particularly good measures of the concepts for which they are intended. A 
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third possible answer is provided by Fuller (2011), who highlights the difficulties that can be 
encountered when broad and national-level concepts are used to measure and explain social 
cohesion. In particular, Fuller focuses on how using such concepts can mask local complexities. 
This critique is certainly relevant to the methods followed in this chapter, since the objective 
has been to look for broad national-level (i.e. England and Wales) patterns in terms of 
indicators of social cohesion, and concepts that are associated with such indicators. 
With this critique in mind it is perhaps unsurprising that national-level patterns based on broad 
concepts such as socio-economic group, ethnic group and level of education cannot be 
consistently identified as predictors of several of the social cohesion indicators. One can 
speculate that the factors driving whether or not someone considers service providers to treat 
them equally, whether or not someone feels they can influence the decisions of public 
institutions, or whether someone trusts the police may be locally specific or more complex 
than broad categories allow for, although the possibility of exploring such issues was part of 
the reason for including a qualitative component in this study. However, it is difficult to say for 
sure which of these three possibilities accounts for the failure to bring the R squared values 
any higher. 
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4.4 Analysis 
 
One of the main findings of this chapter is that the social cohesion measures can be split into 
ten separate elements, and that these elements can be split into three groups in terms of the 
extent that the measure is explained by the regression models. The first group, consisting of 
satisfaction with one's place of residence, civic engagement and volunteering, and social 
interaction with people of different backgrounds, is relatively well-explained by the model, 
since the R squared values are relatively satisfactory. The second group, consisting of 
belonging to Britain and belonging to one's local area, is moderately well-explained by the 
model. The R squared values are a little low, but there are nonetheless some patterns and 
significant associations. The third group, consisting of treatment by service providers (a 
general measure, a measure focusing primarily on health services, and a measure focusing on 
policing), the ability to influence institutions, and being treated with respect in public, is by 
contrast poorly explained by the model. The R squared values for this group are very low, but 
including alternative control variables in the models can nevertheless modestly increase the R 
squared values. 
There are fairly consistent significant and moderately strong associations between British 
identity and many of the elements of social cohesion. This finding, to some extent, supports 
the contention that British identity is important for solidarity and cohesion (Goodhart 2007; T. 
Phillips 2010). However, several important caveats are necessary. 
First, the findings presented here are associations, and it is not clear which direction, if any, 
causality might go. There is a danger, for instance, of misinterpreting the finding that, for the 
Asian group, British identity is associated with belonging to Britain and one’s local area, and 
with civic engagement and volunteering, and socialising with people of different backgrounds. 
Given a recent tendency of negative sentiment towards Muslims (Amin 2003), there might be 
a temptation to interpret this finding as implying that Asians, or perhaps more specifically 
Muslims, should identify more with Britain in order to improve social cohesion. This, however, 
does not necessarily follow, since this association does not imply causality and it is perhaps 
more plausible that the relationship between British identity and social cohesion is complex 
and two-way. 
There is, in addition, evidence to suggest that members of minority groups may wish to 
identify with Britain but feel excluded from this identity. Modood et al. (1994) highlight the 
willingness of participants of Caribbean heritage to identify with Britain, but also their feelings 
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of exclusion from this identity because of their skin colour. It is perhaps prudent, therefore, 
not to advocate policies aimed at increasing British identity amongst members of Asian and 
Black groups due to a perceived link to an increase in some elements of social cohesion, but 
instead to recognise that, in some cases, British identity and social cohesion may go together, 
so one needs to establish ways to foster both. 
A second important finding of this chapter is that, for the Asian and Black groups, British 
identity is only positively associated with any of the elements of social cohesion for those not 
born in the UK. There are positive associations between British identity and many of the 
elements of social cohesion for the Asian and Black groups, but only for those not born in the 
UK. For the Mixed group, however, the pattern is slightly different, with British identity being 
associated with increased cohesion most often for those born in the UK. It is possible that this 
pattern reflects something to do with the immigration history of these groups, perhaps with 
British identity meaning something different to first-generation Black and Asian immigrants, as 
compared to second- or third-generations, and also as compared to the Mixed group, who may 
have more complex or hybrid identities. It is not clear simply from this finding why this might 
be the case, but it may be relevant to what Hall (2000) and Solomos (2003) term ‘new 
ethnicities’ in which, for third generation Black British people, for instance, new identity 
possibilities were established whereby “it was possible to be both Black and British” 
simultaneously (Solomos 2003, 211). 
What is certainly clear from this finding is the need to treat different generations – in the sense 
of immigrant generation – of ethnic minority groups separately when considering a 
relationship between British identity and social cohesion. It is crucial, given the emphasis in 
public and political discourse on British identity as a potential positive influence on national 
unity (O'Donnell 2007), and as a partial solution to the idea that “diversity threatens national 
stability” (Burnett 2007, 353), that it is recognised that the generation a member of an ethnic 
minority group belongs to may be of fundamental importance to whether or not British 
identity has any relevance to social cohesion at all. This issue is ignored by, for example, 
Goodhart (2007, 278) in his assertion that “we need to create, bottom up as much as top 
down, a post-ethnic sense of national solidarity that is open to citizens who do not belong to 
the ethnic majority but, equally, does not set itself against the feelings, symbols and 
solidarities of that majority”. David Blunkett’s assertion that “it was necessary to combine a 
strong sense of identity with knowledge of the English language and cultural norms if social 
cohesion [is] to be maintained” (Solomos 2003, 220) similarly ignores the issue of generation. 
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Third, the comparison between British and English identities is interesting. Despite the finding 
that there are positive associations between British identity and many of the elements of 
social cohesion, there is a negative association between English identity and socialising with 
people of other backgrounds, for the White groups – both those born in and outside the UK. It 
is impossible to say using the evidence in this chapter whether English identity is causing a 
reduction in relationships with people of other backgrounds, and it may also be the case that 
there are confounding factors not controlled for that are driving both. Nevertheless, the 
finding may be linked to the findings of other work, for instance Heath & Roberts (2008), in 
which the differences between ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ conceptions of national identity are found to 
be very important. English identity is, perhaps, an ‘ethnic’ identity, whereas British identity 
can, at least in principle, be a more inclusive ‘civic’ identity. It would also be interesting to 
investigate further the relevance of this distinction for the White non-UK born group. 
Last, but perhaps most importantly, it is crucial to compare the magnitudes of the effects of 
British identity with those of the other independent variables. Aside from the results showing 
– perhaps unsurprisingly given how similar the concepts are – that British identity has a 
relatively large effect on belonging to Britain, compared to the control variables British identity 
consistently has a relatively small effect on the social cohesion measures. It is necessary, 
therefore, not to overemphasise the relevance of British identity for social cohesion. For the 
models looking at attitudes to public services and respect, one (tentatively, given the R 
squared values) finds perceived discrimination to be very important, and certainly more so 
than British identity. For many of the other elements, area deprivation and qualifications are 
far more important than British identity. This, to a certain extent, supports the contention of 
Hickman et al. (2008) that “[we] need to consider how people relate to each other as well as 
addressing fundamental issues of deprivation, disadvantage and discrimination. Discussing 
how people get on together without dealing with inequalities will not work.” Similarly, it may 
support, to an extent, McGhee’s (2003, 392) criticism of the lack of emphasis in the social 
cohesion agenda on “factors such as poverty, exclusion from the workforce, exclusion from 
consumption”. It is worth reflecting, therefore, on the implications of this tentative finding for 
arguments over the relative importance of national identity and objective conditions for 
solidarity and cohesion. 
National identity and objective conditions 
Various academics have argued for the importance of national identity in creating or sustaining 
solidarity and cohesion. J. S. Mill (2001, 284), for instance, claimed that political stability 
required the adoption of a common identity to ensure people “co-operate with each other 
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more willingly than with other people”. More recently, Miller (2000, 31-2), argued “that 
nationality answers one of the most pressing needs of the modern world, namely how to 
maintain solidarity among the populations of states that are large and anonymous, such that 
their citizens cannot possibly enjoy the kind of community that relies on kinship or face-to-face 
interaction”. Such solidarity enables “people [to] feel themselves to be members of an 
overarching community, and to have social duties to act for the common good of that 
community, [and] to help out other members when they are in need” (ibid.). For Barry (2001, 
83), nationality is important because it provides “the foundation of common identity that is 
needed for the stability and justice of liberal democratic polities”. Barry, however, questions 
whether British identity in particular is in fact rich or ‘thick’ enough for such purposes, 
suggesting that “British nationality is a very thin glue to rely on if one is concerned about social 
cohesion” (Barry 2001, 84). These identities can allow for a sense of belonging to ‘imagined 
communities’ (Anderson 1991) in which members of such communities will never meet or 
know most of their fellow members. The fundamental argument underlying such claims is that 
some kind of meaningful common identity is needed to generate and sustain a sense of 
solidarity between people that are unlikely to generate such solidarity by other means, such as 
through face-to-face interaction. This solidarity in turn can help the stability of public 
institutions and the proper functioning of a democracy. Insofar as many such institutions and 
democratic politics happen to occur at the national level, a national identity is important in 
generating the required solidarity. 
On the other hand, many arguments have also been made for the importance of certain 
objective conditions in the creation and maintenance of cohesion and solidarity. Often these 
arguments come through concerns about social justice: an example is Fraser’s separation of 
redistribution and recognition as dimensions of justice, whereby an emphasis is placed on the 
importance of economic disparities as part of the redistributive dimension (Fraser et al. 2003). 
Economic inequalities are not only potentially problematic from a social justice perspective, 
but may also imply that people are in unequal positions to participate in society, thereby 
having implications for integration, cohesion and solidarity. There is also a certain amount of 
empirical work that focuses on how objective conditions might impact upon social cohesion 
and solidarity in Britain. Letki (2008) finds that an area’s level of socio-economic deprivation 
explains a large proportion of differences in a sense of community, trust and social interactions 
– concepts that are often regarded as important indicators of social cohesion and solidarity; 
whilst Hickman et al. (2008) find that poor housing, worklessness and poverty can all damage 
cohesion.   
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Social cohesion is clearly a problematic concept, and can be broken down into many diverse 
elements – to the point that it is not clear that including so many diverse elements in one 
concept is particularly helpful. However, to the extent that the operationalisation of social 
cohesion used here can be considered to be sufficiently similar to the related concept of 
‘solidarity’, these findings tentatively suggest that, for many of the elements, objective 
conditions matter more for cohesion and solidarity than British identity. For civic engagement 
and volunteering, having been through higher education has an association nearly three times 
stronger than that of having a British identity for people of a Black ethnicity, and more than 
five times stronger for the Asian group. For satisfaction with one’s place of residence, the 
association between British identity for the White UK-born group is over ten times smaller 
than that of area-level deprivation. For feelings of belonging to one’s local area, area-level 
deprivation is four times as important. Having said all this, a strong British identity does appear 
to have a small but fairly consistent association with positive outcomes, at least for some 
ethnic groups; although exceptions include a negative association between British identity and 
socialising with people of different backgrounds for the White non-UK born group. 
However, the relationships between national identity, objective conditions, and cohesion and 
solidarity may be more complicated than this. Miller, for instance, argues that one of the most 
important things about national identity is that it creates a sense of solidarity that can help 
sustain support for things such as redistribution. If this argument is correct, national identity 
may increase solidarity, which in turn creates support for redistribution which, when put into 
practice in the form of increased living standards for the less well off, in turn may increase 
solidarity (assuming that the increase in solidarity created by an improvement of living 
conditions for the less well-off is not cancelled out by a decrease in solidarity amongst those 
from whom money is redistributed). 
The findings presented in this chapter cannot disentangle the intricate relationships between 
national identity, objective conditions and solidarity. It is a tentative finding, however, that all 
three are associated with each other: positive social cohesion outcomes are strongly 
associated with positive objective conditions, particularly in the form of high levels of 
education and living in a less deprived area, and moderately associated with a strong British 
identity. Holding British identity constant, education and living in a less deprived area are 
strongly associated with positive social cohesion outcomes on several of the ‘elements’ of 
cohesion; and holding these objective conditions constant, a strong British identity is 
moderately associated with positive social cohesion outcomes on several of the ‘elements’ of 
social cohesion. 
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Another interesting question that is raised, rather than answered by, these findings is whether 
it is absolute or relative objective conditions that are associated with increased social cohesion 
outcomes. Many arguments have been made for the idea that substantive equality is positively 
related to cohesion and solidarity, and that in some circumstances equality may be more 
important than absolute objective conditions for a wide range of positive outcomes. Barry 
(2001, 79), for instance, argues that a “sense of solidarity is fostered by common institutions 
and a spread of incomes narrow enough to prevent people from believing – and with some 
reason – that they can escape from the common lot by buying their way out of the system of 
education, health care, policing and other public services that their less fortunate fellow 
citizens are forced to depend upon”. It is possible to point to some empirical findings in 
support of such an argument, some of which (e.g. Veenhoven 1991) suggest that, after a 
country’s GDP exceeds a certain point, further increases are not associated with increased 
well-being. However it is difficult to provide answers to this question from the findings 
presented in this chapter. The two variables that are particularly consistently associated with 
increased social cohesion represent a respondent’s level of education relative to others, and 
the deprivation of a respondent’s area of residence relative to that of others. It would certainly 
be interesting to know whether, for instance, raising the overall standard of education, but 
with the relative distribution of qualifications remaining the same, has the effect of increased 
scores on the relevant measures of social cohesion, or whether cohesion and solidarity are 
more a matter of inequality, as Barry (2001) suggests. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter gave a report of the methodology and results of the quantitative component of 
this study. It was intended in particular to answer the questions: what is the relationship 
between British identity and social cohesion; and does this relationship vary by ethnic group? 
Data from the Home Office’s Citizenship Survey were utilised first to produce composite 
variables, with each representing a separate element of social cohesion, and second to create 
regression models whereby British identity, along with the relevant control variables, were 
included in a model with the social cohesion measures as the dependent variables. 
Social cohesion, as represented by the variables available in the Citizenship Survey, was found 
to break down into ten elements: equal treatment by public service providers (general); equal 
treatment by health service providers; trust in and equal treatment by the police; satisfaction 
with one’s place of residence; belonging to neighbourhood and local area; belonging to Britain; 
social interaction with people of different backgrounds; civic engagement and volunteering; 
ability to influence decisions of public institutions; and being treated with respect in public. 
The ten elements were found to break down into three broad groups in terms of the extent to 
which the regression model provided a satisfactory explanation of social cohesion indicator. 
The first group was relatively well explained by the model; the second moderately well 
explained; and the third poorly explained. For the models that explaned social cohesion well or 
moderately well, British identity was found to be positively associated with social cohesion for 
the White, Asian and Black groups in particular. For the White group, however, there is a 
negative association between English identity and socialisng with people from other 
backgrounds. The magnitudes of the effects of British identity were also striking: the size of the 
effects are much smaller than those of area deprivation and qualifications, and (tentatively 
given the low R squared values) also perceived disrimination, for some of the elements. 
An additional finding of this chapter is that, for the Black and Asian groups, British identity is 
only positively associated with social cohesion on any of the measures for those not born in 
the UK, suggesting the possibility that immigrant generation may be of fundamental 
importance with regard to whether British identity has any relevance for social cohesion. 
There are several issues identified in this chapter that shed light on particular issues to be 
investigated in the qualitative component. First, it will be investigated whether generation may 
be important for the relationship between British identity and social cohesion. Second, it will 
be investigated whether interviewees consider British identity as an ‘ethnic’ or ‘civic’ 
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conception of national identity: this may be particularly relevant to the finding of a negative 
association between English identity and socialising with those of different backgrounds. Last, 
there will be an attempt to uncover reasons behind the associations found in this chapter. In 
particular it would be interesting to know interviewees’ views on whether British identity can 
cause social cohesion, whether social cohesion may cause increases in British identification, or 
whether a third factor may be driving increases in both British identity and social cohesion for 
some of the elements. 
  
170 
 
Chapter 5: QUALITATIVE COMPONENT 
 
The quantitative component addressed the question of the relationship between national 
identity and social cohesion by looking at broad, nationally-representative associations. The 
qualitative component, by contrast, addresses the question in a much narrower way, but one 
that should uncover much more nuance and detail than is possible using secondary analysis of 
a government dataset. 
The data for the qualitative component of this study consists of transcriptions from semi-
structured interviews with a sample of 22 respondents of Black African or Black Caribbean 
origin, living in an ethnically diverse area of south London. The objective of the interviews was 
to investigate: the ways in which interviewees talked about aspects of social cohesion (as 
defined by the ‘elements’ theorised in the quantitative component of this study, together with 
theoretical accounts by, for example, Forrest & Kearns (2001)); the ways in which they talked 
about aspects of their identities (in particular national and ethnic identities); and any links they 
may have seen between these concepts. It is hoped that the analysis of this data will give more 
detailed and nuanced insights into the presence, or not, of links between respondents’ 
national and ethnic identities and social cohesion than was possible with the analysis of data in 
the quantitative component. 
It is important to bear in mind that whilst the results from the qualitative component may be 
detailed, they do represent a much narrower answering of the research question than that 
provided in the quantitative component. The responses given in the interviews are all 
specifically from people belonging to two (admittedly broad) ethnic groups, so it is highly 
plausible that the responses given by members of other ethnic groups could be very different. 
Nevertheless, given the limitations of time on the number of interviews it was possible to 
conduct, it was felt that it was important to achieve a good representation of these two 
specific ethnic groups, rather than a sparse representation of many different ethnic groups. In 
addition, given the increased likelihood of respondents having complex and multiple national 
and ethnic identities compared to people of a White British ethnicity, it was felt that it would 
be more relevant to the research questions of this study to hear from people belonging to the 
Black African and Black Caribbean groups. 
Another aspect of the methodology which has the consequence of giving results that offer a 
narrower answer to the research question is that all respondents were currently living in a 
particular area of South London, and so responses may, to an extent, be locally specific, 
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although this is also a strength, especially given the possibility (as discussed in section 4.33) of 
some aspects of social cohesion being locally specific, and therefore being difficult to ‘capture’ 
with broad, nationally representative surveys. This is one of the reasons for including a 
qualitative component in the research design, although comparisons between areas will not be 
possible, since only one area was included in the study.  
These aspects of the methodology have implications in terms of the external validity of the 
findings. Fairly obviously, it will not be possible for the results to be taken as nationally 
representative, as they are taken from two ethnic groups in one local area of London. Even 
within those groups and that local area, they are not representative, as random sampling was 
not used. However, the intention was to find a wide range of possible views on each of the 
issues discussed in the interview, and for this reason, purposive sampling was used to 
maximise the diversity of the sample. 
So, how will this chapter contribute to the answering of the main research question? First, it 
will investigate the ways in which people understand their national and ethnic identities, and 
the interactions between the two. If, as some commentators claim (e.g. Goodhart 2007), 
overly strong ethnic identities have become problematic and divisive in Britain, then one might 
expect some respondents to privilege their ethnic identities and not identify with Britain at all. 
If some respondents do feel this, then what are their reasons? Do any respondents, as other 
commentators suggest (e.g. Solomos 2003), mix ethnic and national identities 
unproblematically, and feel both strongly at the same time? Why is it that the quantitative 
component found that generation was so important? Do respondents see marked differences 
in the identities of first, second and third generation immigrants, as some literature might 
suggest (e.g. Modood et al. 1994)? Section 5.2 investigates these questions by exploring the 
range of narratives by which respondents express their national identities. It finds that three 
key themes are repeatedly used when respondents express their national identifications: 
colonialism; generation; and the difference between British and English identities. 
Second, this chapter will investigate what respondents think about the impact of their national 
and ethnic identities on social cohesion outcomes. Do they feel, for instance, that if they felt 
more British it would allow them to belong to their neighbourhood more, or would engaging in 
civic activities or volunteering, perhaps, strengthen their British identity? Section 5.3 explores 
these questions, and finds three narratives in which British identity and social cohesion might 
be linked: by British identity being a ‘signifier’ of connectedness with society; by ‘Britishness’ 
being represented in social expectations of language, accent and etiquette, and by these 
expectations impacting upon social cohesion; and by British identity as knowledge of the 
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British political and social system impacting upon social cohesion outcomes. Section 5.3 also 
finds two narratives by which British identity does not matter for social cohesion outcomes, 
but other concepts do instead: these are individual preferences and personal responsibility; 
and other identities, such as Black identity, religious identity, a ‘global’ identity as a human, 
and a local London identity. 
Third, one might ask whether there is any way in which the narratives identified in Sections 5.2 
and 5.3 are linked. Are there groups of respondents that are more likely to use certain 
combinations of narratives than others? How do these respondents feel about their national 
identities? Section 5.4 identifies three broad groups of respondents: those discussing both 
colonialism and British identity as a ‘signifier’ of connectedness with society; those combining 
negativity about British identity with the narrative about language, accent and etiquette; and 
those combining a moderate, or perhaps ‘civic’ notion of British identity with the narrative 
about personal choice and responsibility. First of all, however, Section 5.1 turns to a discussion 
of the methodology used in the qualitative component. 
  
173 
 
5.1 Methodology 
 
Semi-structured interviews of around one hour were conducted with a group of interviewees 
chosen through purposive sampling from a small (around ward size) area in London. The 
objective of the interviews was to investigate: the ways in which interviewees talked about 
aspects of social cohesion (as defined by the ‘elements’ theorised in the quantitative 
component of this study, together with theoretical accounts by, for example, Forrest & Kearns 
[2001], although also allowing for other interpretations the respondents may express); the 
ways in which they talked about aspects of their identities (in particular national and ethnic 
identities); and any links they may have seen between these concepts. 
In constructing the sample the intention was to include twelve categories of participant, 
defined through an analytically constructed matrix. Attitudes to identity may vary by gender, 
and gender is likely to be more important for some ethnic identities than others (Dale 2002), 
so an attempt was made to interview equal numbers of men and women. For minority ethnic 
groups, the generation a person belongs to may be important for their understanding of their 
ethnic and national identities (Modood et al. 1994) so the sample was split into three age 
groups to increase the likelihood that different generations (i.e. first- or second-generation 
immigrants) were included. In addition, there is also evidence that social cohesion is influenced 
by employment (Hickman et al. 2008) so the sample was split between those in and out of 
employment. The twelve categories, therefore, consisted of six for men and six for women, six 
for people in employment and six for people out of employment, and four of each of the three 
age groups. Table 55 gives an illustration of the construction of the twelve categories. 
Table 55: Categories of participant included in the sample 
 
 AGE 
<35 35 – 50 >50 
FEMALE In employment Category  1 Category  2 Category  3 
 Out of employment Category  4 Category  5 Category  6 
MALE In employment Category  7 Category  8 Category  9 
 Out of employment Category  10 Category  11 Category  12 
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In total, 22 interviews were conducted, as explained in Chapter 3, section 3.2. There are two 
groups unfilled – a woman out of work in the middle age category, and a man out of work in 
the older age category, although the sample contained a reasonable spread of interviewees 
across the twelve categories (Table 6, Chapter 3, section 3.2 gives an exact breakdown). All of 
the interviewees self-identified as Black African or Black Caribbean ethnicity when filling in an 
initial screening questionnaire, when presented with ethnic categories from the Citizenship 
Survey. 
A range of methods were undertaken to recruit interviewees, with the hope that finding 
people from different sources would diversify the sample as much as is possible. These 
methods included addressing a church congregation, speaking to people asking for money at a 
local market and working on local market stalls, conducting interviews in local betting shops, 
speaking to people at a local supermarket, and using several contacts in the local area. 
Although there was not a formal process of interview piloting, the informal process involved 
some initial ‘practice’ interviews, which were conducted with participants the researcher knew 
well. These interviews were used to develop and refine the interview schedule (see the 
Appendix, Part B for the final version). The recordings of these were listened to and reflected 
upon, one of the interviews was transcribed in full, and the interviewees were consulted as to 
how they found the interview. This process had three main benefits: to give the researcher 
some initial experience in framing questions around the sensitive issues of a person’s 
identities; to give the researcher some practice in helping the interview flow; and to reflect 
upon whether the interview schedule could be improved. There was some concern over the 
repetitive nature of the latter part of the interview schedule, where ten topics were being 
discussed in turn; in response to this, the ten topics were condensed into eight in order to 
reduce repetition. In addition, there was concern over some of the phrasing in the interview 
schedule being overly academic or formal, and so more informal or colloquial descriptions of 
certain concepts were decided upon. For instance, ‘support for redistribution’ was changed to 
‘feeling willing to contribute towards the support of people in need (such as through taxes)’. 
Following this process a second, appropriately modified, version of the interview schedule was 
produced. 
After the informal piloting stage, the first two interviews conducted with participants forming 
part of the sample – one by the researcher and one by the second interviewer – were analysed 
to establish the effectiveness of the interview schedule. These two interviews were 
transcribed, reflected upon, and sent to the candidate’s supervisor. Several things were learnt 
from the first two interviews. In particular, there was a considerable amount of repetition in 
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the interview, particularly in the ‘linking identity and social cohesion’ section, whereby the 
same questions were repeated for each of the eight topics, making the process tiring and 
uninspiring for the participants by the time the questions had been asked for the fourth or fifth 
time. It was therefore decided to produce ‘show-cards’ for each of the eight topics,9 and to ask 
the interviewees which topic they would like to talk about most. The interview then became 
more fluid, whereby the participants could switch between the topics on the show-cards as 
they pleased, and it became less necessary to repeat the questions to such an extent. It was 
also felt that this allowed the participants greater control over discussing the issues that they 
wanted to raise, rather than being frequently prompted by rigid questioning. After this stage, 
the interview schedule was changed to incorporate these show-cards, and remained the same 
for the remainder of the interviews. 
The analysis of the interviews was designed to answer specific research questions, rather than 
allowing the research questions to emerge from the data, so an entirely open-ended or 
exploratory method of analysis would not be appropriate (this is also reflected in the semi-
structured nature of the interviews). Having said this, the analysis was intended to be more 
open-ended than that conducted in the quantitative component, since the idea was to look for 
narratives around the concepts under study, and the meanings each interviewee attributes to 
them. 
It was decided that an approach in the thematic analysis tradition was to be followed. A 
contrast can be made between inductive and theoretical thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke 
2006), or similarly an inductive approach as compared to a ‘template’ approach (Fereday & 
Muir-Cochrane 2006). An inductive approach (e.g. Boyatzis 1998) allows codes to be 
developed such that they are a way of organising the observations made from readings of the 
data, meaning that the coding is data-driven rather than based on previous research or a 
specific hypothesis. A theoretical approach (e.g. Crabtree & Miller 1992) draws on previous 
research and literature to develop an a priori set of codes that are then applied to the data, 
and so the development of a ‘codebook’ is based more on theory and previous research than 
the dataset itself. An inductive approach can be advantageous when one wishes to develop a 
research question from the data, whilst a theoretical approach can be advantageous when one 
wishes to answer a relatively narrow research question by analysing a particular aspect of the 
data (Braun & Clarke 2006). Because the analysis in this study was designed to answer a 
specific set of research questions, initially a theoretical approach was taken to coding, 
whereby an initial ‘codebook’ was developed a priori from the relevant literature. This 
                                                          
9
 See Show-Card 5 in the Interview Schedule, Appendix, Part B. 
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theoretical approach is also consistent with the design of the interview schedule, the structure 
of which was led partly by the ten ‘elements’ of social cohesion theorised in the quantitative 
component of this study. After the creation of the initial codebook, however, a more inductive 
approach was followed, such that the codes could be adapted and added to if those developed 
a priori did not ‘fit’ the data. An element of the inductive approach was therefore followed in 
the sense that any patterns or frequent observations across interviews that fell outside the 
initial codebook were included in a later version of the codebook. This combination of 
theoretical and inductive approaches is similar to that used by Fereday & Muir-Cochrane 
(2006). 
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5.11: Developing a codebook 
 
The codebook was developed in five stages: the first two a priori, and the last three on an 
inductive basis. The first stage was guided by the research question, and attempted to 
establish both the range of different meanings respondents attributed to their national and 
ethnic identities, and the range of different narratives by which respondents thought British 
identity might, or might not, impact upon social cohesion outcomes. Three codes were 
therefore developed for this stage: ‘nation’, which referred to any instance in which 
respondents discussed their identification (or lack of it) with Britain or any other nation; 
‘ethnic’, which referred to any instance in which respondents discussed their ethnic identity; 
and ‘impact’, which referred to any instance in which respondents explored ways in which 
their national or ethnic identities might impact upon social cohesion outcomes. Coding was 
conducted first by running a word search using the NVivo qualitative data analysis software, 
and then by reading through the interviews multiple times to check for consistency, and any 
relevant coding not identified by the word search. 
The second stage involved identifying key issues discussed in the relevant literature as 
potentially affecting national or ethnic identities, or social cohesion outcomes. The interview 
data were coded when respondents discussed any of these issues in any form, which involved 
a certain amount of judgement and interpretation, but the data were read on multiple 
occasions to check for consistency. The issues identified, with their respective codes in square 
brackets, were: 
 a distinction can be made between ethnic and civic types of national identity (Heath & 
Roberts 2008) [civic] 
 perceived discrimination may reduce the likelihood that a member of an ethnic 
minority group identifies with Britain (Maxwell 2006) [discrimination] 
 national identity may be affected by the acceptance of identity claims by others, such 
that members of minority groups may attempt to identify with Britain but never be 
fully accepted by the majority (Modood et al. 1994; Hall 2000) [acceptance] 
 ethnic identity may be important, in that there may be a difficultly in simultaneously 
identifying with one’s ethnic heritage and the national identity of the host country 
(Alba and Nee 2003) [dual] 
 quality of housing, level of poverty, and employment status may affect social cohesion 
(Hickman et al. 2008) [socio-econ] 
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 social cohesion may be affected by ethnic diversity and area-level deprivation (Putnam 
2007; Letki 2008) [diversity] [socio-econ] 
 ethnic diversity combined with scarce resources has also been identified as 
problematic for racial tensions (Dench et al. 2006) [scarce resources] 
 the generation an immigrant belongs to may also be important for national identity 
(Modood et al. 1994) [generation] 
 religious identity may affect the relationship between national identity and ‘social 
cohesion’ (Modood & Ahmad 2007) [religion] 
 there is evidence to suggest that education can influence both feelings of belonging to 
Britain (McCrone and Bechhofer 2010) and social cohesion (Hickman et al. 2008) 
[education] 
After the first two a priori stages of coding had been completed, therefore, the codebook 
consisted of the following codes: 
Table 56: Qualitative methods – a priori codebook 
 
CODE MEANING 
Nation Respondents describe their feelings about (their own or other people’s) 
British or any other national identity 
Ethnic Respondents describe their feelings about their own or other people’s 
ethnic identities 
Impact Respondents directly discuss the impact of British identity on any social 
cohesion outcome 
Civic Respondents discuss a civic / ethnic distinction, or describe a national 
identity as ethnic or civic 
Discrimination Respondents discuss perceived or actual discrimination or prejudice 
against themselves or anyone else 
Acceptance Respondents discuss identity claims being accepted, or not, by others 
Dual Respondents express two or more identities at the same time 
Socio-econ Respondents discuss any socio-economic issues, including employment, 
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poverty, housing, deprivation 
Scarce resources Respondents discuss any effects of a lack of resources combined with 
ethnic diversity 
Generation Respondents discuss differences in age or generation in national or 
ethnic identification 
Religion Respondents mention their own or anyone else’s religion 
Education Respondents discuss education 
 
The third stage of coding involved looking at the different ways in which respondents 
described their national identities, whereby the intention was to pick up inductively on themes 
or narratives that were expressed by several respondents. This was done by reading through 
any sections of text coded as ‘nation’, along with the surrounding text to maintain an 
appreciation of context. If at least two respondents explored a particular narrative surrounding 
the meanings they attributed to their national identity, this theme was coded, and themes 
were checked and re-checked for consistency. Respondents frequently mentioned issues 
focusing on generation and dual identities, which were both codes created in the a priori 
stage, but two new themes were identified by this process: colonialism, which was seen as 
central to some respondents’ understandings of their British identities; and the differences 
between English identity and British identity, which were quite frequently contrasted. These 
themes are explored in Section 5.2 of this chapter. 
The fourth stage of coding involved looking at the range of different narratives by which 
respondents thought British identity might or might not impact upon social cohesion 
outcomes. During this stage all sections of text coded ‘impact’, along with the surrounding 
text, were explored, and any narratives that were expressed repeatedly were coded. Two 
narratives that were in the a priori codebook were found here: religion was described as 
important for social cohesion by several respondents; as was an ethnic (or Black) identity. 
However several other codes were created inductively, based on other narratives that 
appeared: British identity as a signifier of connectedness to society (coded ‘connect’); British 
identity as language, accent and etiquette (coded ‘LAE’); knowledge of the British system as 
being important (coded ‘knowledge’); the importance of individual choice and personal 
responsibility for social cohesion (coded ‘individual’); and identities as either a human or a 
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local Londoner as being important (coded ‘global’ and ‘local’ respectively). These themes are 
explored in Section 5.3 of this chapter. 
The fifth stage of coding involved looking for patterns in terms of particular respondents using 
particular combinations of narratives. The approach to the methodology here was slightly 
different from the other coding stages. A spreadsheet was created in which each of the 22 
respondents were listed in rows, along with an indication of which of all the a priori and 
inductive codes had been expressed at any point during their interview. An indication of how 
they felt about their British and English identities was also given – these were coded as 
‘strong’, ‘moderate’ and ‘weak / rejection’ as appropriate. The idea was to find patterns in 
terms of those respondents expressing a particular set of narratives by showing which 
respondents exhibited which codes. Although not all respondents fell neatly into a group, 
there were broadly three different groups of respondents; these groups, and disconfirming 
instances, are discussed in Section 5.4 of this chapter. 
Before directly discussing the views of the respondents, it is informative to give each of the 22 
respondents a pseudonym, to ensure respondents’ anonymity but at the same time give a 
sense of who each respondent is. Table 57 below gives a list of pseudonyms and key 
characteristics for each of the respondents in the study. 
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Table 57: Pseudonyms and key characteristics for each respondent 
Name Gender Age Employment African or Caribbean 
Tania Female 18-24 In employment African 
Anna Female 25-34 In employment Caribbean 
Tracy Female 25-34 In employment Mixed 
Abigail Female 25-34 In employment African 
Julie Female 35-49 In employment Caribbean 
Mary Female 35-49 In employment Caribbean 
Sophie Female 35-49 In employment Caribbean 
Helen Female 50-64 In employment African 
Cheryl Female 50-64 In employment African 
Leila Female 18-24 Out of employment African 
Ellie Female 50-64 Out of employment Caribbean 
John Male 18-24 In employment Caribbean 
Alan Male 25-34 In employment Mixed 
Graham Male 25-34 In employment African 
Bruce Male 35-49 In employment Caribbean 
Brian Male 50-64 In employment Caribbean 
Terry Male 50-64 In employment Caribbean 
Adam Male 18-34 Out of employment African 
Lyndon Male 25-34 Out of employment African 
Nigel Male 35-49 Out of employment Caribbean 
James Male 35-49 Out of employment African 
David Male 35-49 Out of employment Caribbean 
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5.2 National identity 
 
This section will ask: how do respondents feel about their national identities? In particular, 
how do respondents feel about their British identities? 
The approach to answering these questions is as described as ‘stage 3’ in the methodology 
section, whereby all text coded as ‘nation’ was analysed. The aim is to uncover the range of 
narratives by which respondents described their national identities. There was considerable 
variety in the way in which respondents expressed their identification, or not, with Britain, but 
several key themes emerged, around which respondents based their discussions. These were: 
 Colonialism 
 Issues surrounding generation 
 The difference between British identity and English identity 
Section 5.21 will give a general discussion of respondents’ descriptions of their feelings of 
British identity, and the three following sections will discuss each of these three themes in 
turn. 
 
5.21: Respondents’ descriptions of their feelings of British identity 
 
Of the 22 respondents in the sample, 13 expressed some form of British identity when asked, 4 
said they did not have a British identity, 3 said they only felt English but not British, and 2 were 
rather indifferent when asked how they felt about their British identity. With one respondent – 
Cheryl – this indifference was expressed in terms of wanting to feel British, but not being fully 
accepted as British because of her skin colour: “Yes to an extent, but not completely … I feel I 
should be British but I live here, and um, but sometimes people make you think oh, you’re not 
from here” (50-64 year old, in employment). When asked whether she felt British, Leila – the 
second of the two respondents – expressed her preference for her Nigerian identity: “Um, in 
some way I guess, but the thing that, my parents have always spoken to me in their native 
language … I guess the only way how I really feel British is that we live here, my education is 
from here, yeah that” (18-24 year old, not in employment). 
Of those that said they did not have a British identity, Adam (18-34 year old, not employed) 
said "I'm not very patriotic, to be honest"; John (18-24, in employment) said he identifies with 
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London but with Britain "there's just been a betrayal somewhere”; Tania (18-34, in 
employment) remarked that she would just “say human”; and Sophie (35-49, in employment) 
thought that "as far as feeling British I can't say it's something I've ever given any thought to". 
Of those identifying with Britain, it was fairly common to mention their ethnicity at the same 
time: 
“as someone from, as Black Caribbean, I do feel I identify as being British, but it might 
be different to someone else” (Anna, 25-34, in employment). 
“I would say I’m British anyway … I put the Caribbean, but that’s where I’m from” 
(David, 35-49, out of employment). 
“I just like to keep the identity as an African as well, so obviously British, doesn’t 
bother me” (Helen, 50-64, in employment). 
In the social cohesion public discourse it is sometimes argued that British society has become 
increasingly divided along ethnic or religious lines, and that a stronger British identity would be 
a positive unifying influence. Other commentators dispute such claims, however: for instance 
(Hall 2000, 152) argues that young Black people can identify simultaneously with their 
Caribbean heritage, a ‘Black’ identity, and a British identity; and Amin’s (2003) reading of the 
2001 disturbances in northern England described young people as unproblematically adopting 
hybrid identities. It is worth describing, therefore, the ways in which respondents expressed 
their views about their ability, or otherwise, to identify both with their ethnic background and 
with their country of residence. 
All the respondents in the sample were able to express their feelings about their national and 
ethnic identities, and there was an overwhelming sense that, for those respondents that had 
either a British or an English identity, the dual or multiple identities were described 
unproblematically. Bruce – a 35-49 year old – described his identity as “Afro-Caribbean-British-
Black” and explained, “because my forefathers are from Africa, my parents are from the 
Caribbean, I was born in Britain, and I’m Black”. Ellie (50-64, out of employment) also 
described how her son was comfortable with his multiple identifications, saying that “I 
wouldn’t want him to grow up with a complex [due to multiple identities], that’s the thing but 
he doesn’t seem to have that”. Nigel, a 35-49 year old man who was out of employment, 
expressed his multiple identities, and the importance of passing on this understanding to his 
children: 
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“I was born here, but my family’s from South America. So it’s very important for me to 
maintain that, you know, history, because I’m… I’ve got a lot of children, and they 
need to know where their father’s come from. So it’s very important that they know 
that I’m a Black man, born in this country, my family’s from South America, and it’s 
very important for them to know their history, very important for them to know their 
history.” 
These views, therefore, are very much consistent with Amin’s (2003) argument that many 
people have hybrid identities unproblematically, and the fact that the majority of respondents 
were comfortable with both a British or English identity and their ethnic identities calls into 
question the idea that ethnic identities are in general divisive. 
 
5.22: Colonialism 
 
For some of the respondents, colonialism played a role in how they described their British 
identities. Five of the 22 respondents discussed colonialism, even though it was not mentioned 
as a question in the interview schedule. For several respondents, the fact their country of 
ethnic origin was previously a British colony featured in the way they made sense of their 
British identity and the duality of their nationality, and in some cases discussion of the identity 
of a parent went along similar lines. For instance, Terry (50-64, in employment) described his 
dual British and Dominican identity in the following way: 
“I’m proud of that, of being part of the United Kingdom, yes… I think they can live side 
by side, because as I said we have a colonial history, Dominica is a colony of Britain, 
and you have good things which, unlike the Portuguese, which Britain left us … there’s 
a connection between the United Kingdom and other countries”. 
Similarly, Mary (35-49, in employment) described her mother’s identity as “Grenadian and 
British … [because] my mother was born in Grenada at the time it was a British colony and so 
… most people of her age group would consider themselves to be Grenadian and British at the 
same time”. 
Julie – a 35-49 year old woman, also in employment – expressed more negative views of 
Britain’s colonial past: “Some people might not be happy about being British, I suppose 
because of the past, some people, um, for example colonialism, that kind of thing, it makes 
them feel alienated from being British”. However, for Julie, this did not stop her from feeling 
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British: “I mean the past is very important but I don’t think past problems or past shames will 
stop me from feeling British, but there are some people for whom it would, it would be very 
important”. She went on to say that “there’s a lot of people from for example India or Pakistan 
who because they’re like me they’ve been born here, and they know this culture, would 
identify themselves with being British, irrespective of how Britain behaved in India, sort of 
thing, they would still believe that their British identity was important”. 
A theme of the interaction between Britain’s colonial past and generation was unpacked in 
some detail by Mary, who described three different types of identity: 
“You’ve got Caribbean British identity of those individuals that were, that came here as 
being part of the colonialism, like my parents’ generation. And then there’s the 
Caribbean identity of those of us that were born and brought up here, of parents that 
were immigrants. Then there’s the Caribbean identity of those of us who are, who 
have migrated in the current world, like, and so they’ve come here recently and have 
sought British identity, and we see things very differently from one another … we 
might not relate to each other very well at all because our experiences are so vastly 
different, and so how we perceive our Britishness is going to be quite different. I might 
perceive myself as being more patriotic, more British than somebody else who’s not 
born and brought up here. They might say ok, I’m British, but they might not feel the 
strange sense of belonging that maybe I might feel from, you know, the experiences 
I’ve had from being part of the fabric of it all.” 
 
5.23: Generation 
 
For many of the respondents generation – in the sense of ‘generation of immigrant’ – played a 
key role in how British identities were expressed. Of the 8 people that directly discussed the 
differences in national identification between older and younger generations of Black people 
living in Britain, there was an overwhelming consensus that younger people identified more 
with Britain (or sometimes England) than older people. Examples of such views include (with 
the interviewer’s speech in italics): 
“And what about your children? What do they feel, do you think? Oh, they feel they’re 
British. They’re British and they spend more of their time in England … The younger 
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ones normally tend to identify directly with Britain, because that’s all they know” 
(Terry, 50-64, in employment). 
“I think the younger generation identify themselves very much with Britain … I find 
young people on the whole, people in their 30s and under, I think they have a very 
strong sense of belonging to Britain in most aspects of the culture … I think the young 
generation very much associate themselves with Britain and where they live, and 
which parts of Britain they’re from” (Julie, 35-49, in employment). 
“How does your son feel about feeling English or British? He says he’s ‘English but half 
Black’ [laughs]. Does he feel slightly ‘Jamaican’ in any way? Does he feel ‘Jamaican’? I 
don’t know, he’s so ‘English!’ [laughs]” (Ellie, 50-64, not in employment). 
“[Do] you think your children have a different identity to you, or do you? Absolutely, 
absolutely. Um, my daughter, my big daughter is probably more attached to this 
country … I think as a younger person growing up now, she probably feels more 
British” (Nigel, 35-49, out of employment). 
“Ooh, I think my son thinks of himself as British. I do, yeah” (Sophie, 35-49, in 
employment). 
In addition to older and younger generations, the other related themes that were often 
mentioned that determined how people felt about their national identities were place of birth, 
where someone grew up, and the length of time they had spent in a particular place. For 
instance, David, a 35-49 year old man born in the Caribbean, expressed such views: 
“well I can say I’m British, but I’m still from the Caribbean. It’s a bit like you, if you 
were growing up in Australia or something, but you’d still recognise yourself as from 
here. It depends how long you were in Australia for. If you were a little kid you could 
grasp that sort of culture easier, and quicker I suppose.” 
Views that younger people identified strongly with Britain or England contrasted with 
descriptions of older people’s feelings of national identity, which were in general seen as more 
weakly identifying with Britain, and also more split between Britain (or England) and their 
country of origin. Sophie said of her mother, “how she takes on board living in England I don’t 
know but I would say she feels St. Lucian”. Leila – a younger respondent, born in the UK – 
expressed the view about her parents that “obviously they’re less British … it’s just that some 
of what their norms and their values, are kind of different to the British values that we’re 
brought up with today”.  
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However the view that, in terms of their national identity, younger people identified mainly or 
only with Britain or England was also seen as problematic, particularly because these younger 
people may not be treated or accepted in the same way as white people of the same age. 
These views are related to arguments by Hall (2000) and Modood et al. (1994) regarding the 
importance of identity claims being accepted by others, and were coded as ‘non-acceptance’ 
during the coding stage: 
“There's a big generational thing. You know. As we move nearer obviously to the third 
generation, who don't see themselves as Caribbean or African, they just see themself 
as English, except that they can't be called English, I think that's where a lot of 
resentment is coming in because they don't feel that they're always seen the same 
way” (Bruce, 35-49, in employment). 
A very similar view was expressed by another respondent (Julie, aged 35-49): 
“Um... It think it’s… I think it is different with age, because um, younger people, 
younger people expect to be treated in the same way as um, as um Caucasian, and 
they find it harder because they associate themselves more with Britain, whereas um, 
people of my age and older, they remember what it was like to be treated as though 
they were different, and they more accept that, um, there are differences and that 
there are problems, and that there might be problems because of their ethnicity, 
whereas um, younger people they don’t expect that - they expect to be treated in 
exactly the same way as someone who is Caucasian and they find it an awful lot harder 
to cope with. So I think age is important, yeah.” 
The important narratives by which generation could affect national identity, then, were: the 
feeling that younger people identified more with Britain than older people; the idea that place 
of birth, place of growing up, and the length of time spent in a place were related 
determinants; and the idea that younger people, despite often identifying more strongly than 
Britain or England than older people, were not having their identity claims accepted because of 
their skin colour or ‘race’. 
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5.24: The difference between British identity and English identity 
 
The other important narrative around which respondents frequently based the discussion of 
the national identities was the difference between British and English identities. Differences 
between British and English identities have relevance to the debate about differences between 
‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’ national identities (e.g. Heath & Roberts 2008). Feeling English is sometimes 
portrayed as an ethnically based identity, where some kind of ancestry, along with ‘white’ 
physical characteristics are supposed to be prerequisites for adopting an English identity. 
Feeling British, by contrast, is sometimes portrayed as a (potentially) more inclusive civic 
identity, open to citizens regardless of ethnic background or physical characteristics. 
Respondents offered a variety of views with regard to the difference between English and 
British identities, although in 10 of the interviews the distinction was not discussed explicitly. 
Some respondents identified more with a British identity than an English one – “I’m not 
English. I would say I’m British but not English” – whereby the difference was seen as British 
being “a nationality” as opposed to English identity being “a real personal, a real who you are” 
(Graham, 25-34 year old man, in employment). Similarly, when asked whether he felt English 
or British, Nigel (35-49, out of employment) replied: “I’ve got an affinity towards where my 
family are, in South America, but I’m British. You know, I’m British. Clearly British.”. The view 
was also expressed that English identity was seen as an ethnically-based identity: “Well clearly 
I believe that I cannot be considered as English, unfortunately because I’m not Anglo-Saxon” 
(Bruce, 35-49, in employment). 
Other respondents expressed a greater English identity when asked whether they preferred 
British or English: 
“England really, because I was born and raised in England and I don’t really know 
Scotland and Wales and um, Northern Ireland very well, so I suppose I identify myself 
really with England.” (Julie, 35-49, in employment). 
On several occasions the view was expressed that feeling ‘British’ was often synonymous with 
feeling ‘Black British’, which was a signifier of difference rather than the signifier of similarity 
that came with an English identity: 
“Well, I like ‘Black British’ because it obviously recognises that I’m Black and I was 
second generation Blacks of this country but now I’m kind of almost the idea of 
‘English’, yeah… It’s more in terms of me internalising it, so I don’t feel like I’m always 
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the victim, if that makes sense? Because then when you categorise yourself, you’re 
‘Black British’, that kind of gives you like you’re separate from everything.” (Ellie, 50-
64, out of employment). 
It is noteworthy that the two young mixed-ethnicity respondents in the sample identified 
strongly with being English rather than British, with Alan (25-34) saying: “I’m English and that’s 
the way I see it. I don’t really understand the British tag”; and Tracy (25-34) saying “British is, 
just seems quite patriotic, and like, it’s like dominating, in my mind it’s like ‘I want to be all of 
it’… I couldn’t say I’m British, but rather English, because I know that bit a little bit more.” 
In sum, then, there was a wide range of views on respondents’ preferences for English or 
British identities, and their reasons for such a preference. English identity was equated with a 
‘white’ ethnic identity by some respondents; others challenged this view by trying to assert 
their similarity to other English people, such as by rejecting the ‘Black British’ label; and others 
expressed the view that they were English in a fairly uncontroversial way. 
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5.3 The relationship between British identity and social cohesion 
 
Section 5.2 explored the range of narratives expressed when respondents discussed their 
national identities. This section explores the range of narratives expressed when respondents 
discussed whether or not British identity has an impact on social cohesion outcomes. It draws 
on the coding described in stage 4 of the methodology section (5.1). 
When asked questions directly about the impact of British identity on any of the elements of 
social cohesion, or when discussing these relationships more generally, respondents had very 
different ideas about how British identity might, or might not, impact upon social cohesion 
outcomes. Some narratives described British identity as potentially important, whilst others 
did not. In the narratives in which British identity was important, respondents often expressed 
different understandings of British identity. 
Figure 16 represents the narratives in which respondents considered to be important for social 
cohesion - some focus on British identity as being important for social cohesion, whilst others 
do not. There are three narratives by which British identity could be important. The first was 
where British identity is a signifier of connectedness to society, whereby identity and 
connectedness go ‘hand in hand’. This narrative was very ambiguous in terms of any causation 
between British identity and connectedness, as the two were represented as going together 
instead of one implying the other. If one is connected with society, one often will also identify 
with Britain; and if one identifies with Britain one is more likely to be connected. Conversely, if 
one is not connected it is likely that one does not identify with Britain; and if one does not 
identify, it may be difficult to feel connected. 
The second narrative focused on an understanding of British identity in terms of social 
expectations of language, culture and etiquette. According to this narrative, Britishness is 
about a particular way of speaking, a particular accent, or a certain set of ‘manners’. For those 
that meet these social expectations, positive social cohesion outcomes often follow, for 
instance because one might ask the right question in the right way, or be understood better by 
others because of one’s accent and manner of speaking. 
The third narrative focused on an understanding of British identity as being about knowledge 
of the British system. Identifying with Britain means that one knows how to negotiate and 
engage with the social and political system, and this will lead to positive social cohesion 
outcomes such as feeling one is able to contact an MP, or knowing how to negotiate complex 
public services. 
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There were two narratives in which respondents expressed the view that British identity did 
not have anything to do with social cohesion outcomes, but that other things were important 
instead. The first narrative, expressed by a majority of respondents, was that positive 
outcomes were created by individual choice and personal responsibility rather than any 
aspects of identity. According to this narrative volunteering, engaging civically, being involved 
with a political group, or contacting a local MP were all things that were driven by an 
individual’s choices and motivations rather than anything else. 
The second narrative in which respondents expressed the view that British identity was not 
important for social cohesion was by emphasising the importance of other identities instead. 
According to this narrative, social cohesion is driven by religious identities, a ‘global’ identity as 
a human being, local identities, or ethnic or ‘Black’ identities, but not British identity. 
These narratives often appeared in overlapping and contradictory ways in which respondents 
expressed several in the same interview, considering British identity to be both important and 
not important for social cohesion at the same time. There were, however, patterns in terms of 
which respondents expressed which of the narratives: these patterns will be explored in 
Section 5.4, but the focus of this section is on introducing each of the narratives in turn. 
For brevity when quoting respondents’ views, parentheses will be used to indicate whether 
the respondent is employed or unemployed (E or U), and which of the three age categories 
they belong to (1 indicates 18-34 years; 2 indicates 34-49 years; and 3 indicates 50 years or 
over). Parentheses indicating E1, for instance, show that the respondent is an employed 
person aged 18-34 years. 
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Figure 16: Narratives of British identity and social cohesion 
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5.31: Narratives by which British identity affects social cohesion 
 
(i) British identity as a signifier of connectedness with society 
 
Several respondents expressed the view that British identity could be a signifier of 
connectedness with society. Often a contrast was made between those that had both British 
identity and a connection with society, and those that had neither. 
Mary, for instance, described how “if you don’t identify with Britain then you are probably 
feeling quite disconnected in terms of your sense of belonging. I think there’s got to be some 
sense of identity within that, within the fabric of British culture for you to even want to effect 
any change” (E2). Tania thought something similar, saying “I think if you feel like you’re not 
part of the country or if you’re not seen as part of the country people aren’t going to listen to 
you” (E1). John expressed similar views: 
“you have to [identify with Britain] on some level or why would you go to a public 
meeting if you hate Britain that much, you wouldn’t go to a public meeting … but 
that’s self-explanatory surely because  if you’re that anti-Britain, we’re in Britain, of 
course it’s going to be difficult for you to get by” (E1). 
Julie thought a similar problem may apply to motivations for being involved with a pressure 
group, whereby if someone “had less of an identity they might think ‘oh what’s the point, 
nobody is going to listen anyway’” (E2). 
The ambiguity in how this process might work, in the sense that both a lack of British identity 
and a lack of connectedness might each cause the other, was summed up by Anna, who 
described how people without a British identity “might not feel valued, or they might feel 
belittled by their environment, so they wouldn’t feel that they want to help it, so they’ll feel 
like they’re outsiders, so they wouldn’t feel they want to help” (E1). Not wanting to help might 
make one feel like an outsider, but feeling like an outsider might make one not want to help. 
An association between alienation from feeling British and local belonging was made by Julie, 
who thought that: 
“Some people might not be happy about being British, I suppose because of the past, 
some people, um, for example colonialism, that kind of thing, it makes them feel 
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alienated from being British, and then they don’t have as strong sense of belonging to 
wherever it is they live in London as someone who doesn’t think that” (E2). 
John likened British identity to ‘playing the game’, saying it is necessary to “buy into it” to get 
what one wants: 
“You need a British passport, on some level you need to buy into it and if you don’t, 
you’re stuffed … like I said, I feel betrayed and when it comes down to it, it’s like 
playing the game but at the same time it’s, ultimately I don’t believe in it but I know if I 
want to be able to do what I want to do and live the kind of life I want to live, I need to 
just accept it on some level and go along with it. It’s having a balanced opinion, 
knowing when to pick a fight and when to just …” (E1). 
 
(ii) British identity as language, accent and etiquette 
 
The second narrative in which British identity could be importance for social cohesion focused 
around Britishness in terms of language, accent and etiquette. It was often perceived that the 
ability to speak English well could lead to positive outcomes, and that an English accent was 
also beneficial. Knowledge of things perceived to be typically ‘British’ in terms of etiquette was 
also perceived to be linked to positive outcomes, for example because it could mean one 
might be more able to ‘negotiate’ complicated public services more effectively, or one might 
know how to ask the right question in the right way. 
The ability to speak English well was deemed important by many respondents. This narrative 
arose, for instance, when discussing access to public services, where a perception was 
expressed that people might be treated unfairly if their English language skills are not good. 
Sophie described her experiences as follows (E2): 
“In school there is a woman, I think she’s from Sri Lanka, and because of the language, 
I find in school she would go up to the women in the office because she might have 
some disagreement or something going on and they wouldn’t pay much attention to 
her or shoo her off. Yes, I can understand it’s hard to understand somebody who 
doesn’t speak English well, but I don’t like to see that because I think give her a 
chance, don’t try to shoo her off before you’ve even given her a chance to express 
what the matter is. And I think maybe for her at times she’s voiced to me that she 
sometimes a bit well what’s the point of me going and asking I don’t know, to a lawyer 
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or citizen’s advice, because she feels like they will, you know, not listen to her or give 
her a chance, but I’m somebody on the whole, I’m like you have just as much right as 
anybody…. Because in school only last week actually I had to go in with her, into the 
headmaster because she had some disputes that were going on with her son, where 
I’m like come for support and I will get them to sit down and listen, they will have to 
stop and yes it might be difficult, but if you give her time and are actually patient you 
will get what she’s trying to say to you rather than shooing her off, so I think that for 
some people depending on the language and where they’re from, yes at times it’s very 
difficult for them.” 
In addition, having an English accent was deemed an advantage by several respondents, 
although none of the respondents that did not have typically ‘English’ accents complained 
about mistreatment because of the way they spoke. Differences between accents in other 
English regions, or in the other countries of the UK, were not discussed. Tracy explained that “I 
think it’s an advantage that I have an English accent … I like the fact that I’ve got an English 
accent and I don’t look English, because I like the juxtaposition of that, it gives a kind of 
advantage somehow, so I think it’s quite a positive thing” (E1). Speaking about being treated 
with respect in public, and about access to public services, Leila said (U1): 
“I’m thinking like if you have an African accent, or a type of accent, and I dunno if 
you’re trying to communicate with someone they can just get frustrated more easily. 
Like any accent, I guess that would kind of, I dunno how to explain. I guess with an 
English accent I think everything is just easier done, you get things like easier, and 
people will tend to listen to you more.” 
In addition to seeing language and accent as central to both British identity and some aspects 
of social cohesion, some respondents perceived knowledge of typically ‘British’ or ‘English’ 
etiquette to be important for achieving positive outcomes. Tracy explained that if “you’re 
English yourself, you have a certain etiquette” (E1), and that this etiquette affects how one 
might communicate and so how one may be treated by others, for instance when using public 
services: 
“I think English people are respected more in England, in a lot of… and I think it’s a 
subconscious thing. I think it’s just easier for people in public services to deal with 
people that they think are English. I think there’s a sense that if they are English they 
just kind of know what’s going on” (E1). 
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Alan explained how this bias based on whether someone is perceived as English can lead to 
unfair treatment or discrimination: 
“if someone English who was white and grumbled about things that were going in 
Britain, or services, it would just be a political thing but somehow someone is from 
somewhere else... I mean someone who’s white and English and compares it to France 
or something it’s okay but if someone is from somewhere else with an accent or 
because of ethnicity we’re complaining that somehow it’s not okay” (E1). 
 
(iii) British identity as knowledge of the British system 
 
The third narrative in which British identity was important for social cohesion centred around 
the idea that British identity entailed knowing about Britain, and in particular the British 
political and social system. This in turn makes it easier for one to negotiate the system in order 
to get what one wants – for instance when using public services, contacting an MP, and so on. 
This view of British identity leads, in some cases, to an almost tautological answer to the 
question ‘what is the impact of British identity on social cohesion’, since if British identity is 
synonymous with being able to engage with the British political system successfully, yet one 
aspect of social cohesion is the ability to engage with the British political system, this implies 
anyone with a British identity will also have ‘greater’ social cohesion in this sense.  
Anna expressed how British identity could be an advantage in this sense: 
“That’s a very good question. Probably because I am comfortable as being a British 
person I wouldn’t have a problem with contacting my MP. I suppose someone who 
doesn’t know how the workings of this country work, wouldn’t go for that, but I 
wouldn’t have a problem, no. Ok, ok, so you think that because you do identify with 
Britain it makes these things easier? Yes. So you think if you didn’t identify with Britain 
you’d be less likely to do the volunteering work you’d done? Yes. Probably because I 
know what my local environment needs, so I’d find out what I could provide, and I’d 
want to do that because I know it affects everyone” (E1). 
However, Mary was more unsure about whether it was British identity itself that was driving 
these positive outcomes –instead it may be the complex nature of services, and the idea that 
they are not geared towards helping all people equally: 
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“Not necessarily.  I don’t necessarily think that services, public services, are geared 
towards supporting a variety of people, it’s geared towards supporting people who are 
equipped to be able to deal with those services because their services are very 
complicated.  And so if you struggle to negotiate how complicated those services are, 
and whether you identify with Britain or not, you may find that you’re on the outside 
of those services.  And it suits the government for that to happen, because then 
there’s a whole range of people who are just... who just kind of drop off the edge who 
they don’t have to look after or pay attention to, or care about really, because they’re 
not in the statistics” (E2). 
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5.32: Narratives in which British identity is not important for social cohesion 
 
In contrast to the three narratives outlined above, many respondents expressed views 
whereby British identity was not important for social cohesion, but that other factors would 
be. This section will explore these narratives. 
 
(i) Individual choice and personal responsibility 
 
Many respondents disagreed with the idea that broad traits such as British identity could have 
an impact on social cohesion outcomes, and instead preferred to talk about the importance of 
the individual, with personal choice and personal responsibility seen as of primary importance. 
This narrative, in various forms, was widely discussed, and was expressed by a majority of the 
respondents – 13 of the 22 in the sample. The narrative was also expressed by at least some of 
the respondents when discussing each of the elements of social cohesion, rather than it being 
a narrative focusing mainly on one or other of the elements. 
An emphasis on the choices and preferences of the individual was an important narrative with 
regard to the motivations to why respondents might feel they belong in their local area, 
whether they choose to volunteer or engage civically, and whether people might treat others 
with respect. When expressing this narrative respondents often viewed individual choices and 
preferences as much more important than feelings of identification with Britain.  
When discussing whether British identity might be important for whether or not people are 
treated with respect, David (U2) said that “it depends what type of people you’re talking to” 
and, on a personal level, the way he treated others with respect was “just my own thinking”. A 
similar opinion was expressed by Helen (E3), who thought that “people are different, some 
people treat others with respect, and others don’t. And they have their reasons, and their 
prejudices, and that.” Tania (E1) said that “I don’t think so, I think it might be just individual 
upbringing or generational upbringing, the way that this generation has been brought up.” 
The emphasis on personal preferences was again strongly present when discussing motivations 
for volunteering or engaging civically. James (U2) stated that “No, no that’s just me, I just want 
to help”, whilst Tracy (E1) dismissed British identity as being important for volunteering and 
civic engagement, saying “why would it matter because it’s about individual passions”. 
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Asked whether they felt identifying with Britain had an impact on a feeling of local belonging 
and satisfaction with where one lives, Leila thought that “I don’t think it makes much 
difference, I think it’s just really up to what the person wants and needs around them that 
makes the difference” (U1). Similarly, when asked whether he thought identifying with Britain 
had an impact on accessing public services, Graham answered “I’m just who I am, I just live my 
daily life, I just go with my aspirations and challenges, which you always face” (E1). 
Taking personal responsibility for what happens in one’s life was also repeatedly discussed. 
Although similar, this narrative contrasts to the idea that individual choices and preferences 
were important for determining social cohesion outcomes by emphasising how individuals feel 
they can change their own outcomes by their own willpower or behaviour (and also 
sometimes that others should do likewise). Anna expressed the view that if one is not satisfied 
with where one lives, it is important to do something about it and, if that proves impossible, 
move to an area when one can feel satisfied, saying “well, you have a choice of living where 
you want to live really, so you can live in an environment you are comfortable in, or if not you 
can move” (E1); whilst Brian expressed a very similar view, saying that “for people to be in a 
place where they’re uncomfortable well maybe they can do something, or maybe they can’t do 
nothing in that neighbourhood and they need to move themself to a place where they are able 
to integrate or be part of” (E3). 
Graham also expressed the view that if one is not satisfied with public service provision, it is 
important to do something about it – for instance by moving area to have access to a different 
school (E1): 
“you can find another way of improving the service that you want to get for yourself. 
So even if the state provide something that is not up to your taste, then maybe you 
can work more harder to provide a service that you want. So they, probably if the 
educational service is not too good, and you probably just, I just use a case where you 
want to send your son or your kid to a school, a better school, then that means you 
will have to work more harder, in order to send your kid to a better school … You don’t 
have to depend too much on the provision of the state, if that makes sense, it is what 
it is, but I wouldn’t live my life depending on the system of provision. If it’s not too 
good, I’ll have to make a provision for myself, to better my own life and probably the 
people around me. And hopefully at some people the state will get it and improve.” 
Other respondents discussed instances where they had personally created a solution to 
potential barriers to positive outcomes. For instance, when asked whether he thought that 
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British identity affected belonging to his local area, Bruce answered: “I think for me it doesn't 
make much difference because I think I've learnt how to relate to my neighbours” (E2). This 
idea was also expressed in a more negative sense, in terms of creating ‘coping strategies’ to 
deal with barriers to positive social cohesion outcomes, often created by perceived 
discrimination. Nigel expressed his views on how satisfied he was with where he lives in the 
following terms (U2): 
“I’m not satisfied here at all. At all. But I adapt to my conditions. I’m not satisfied here at 
all, but I adapt to my conditions. You know, what they say is what it is, and you know you 
have to really have to live with what you get, what you get is what you get. No, I’m not 
happy, I’m not happy with where I am at the moment, but it is what it is.” 
 
(ii) Other identities 
 
The second narrative that was often discussed when respondents disagreed that British 
identity is important for social cohesion focused on other identities. The main types of 
identities discussed were: identity as a human or identifying with the world; identifying with 
London; Black identity; and religion. 
Several respondents mentioned a ‘global’ identity of identifying with the world, or as a human, 
as being more important for social cohesion outcomes than British identity. Tracy put it in the 
following way: “I feel that I don’t belong [to Britain], and that the world is possibly my home, 
so that the fact that I feel like there’s a bigger picture if you like, there’s a whole planet out 
there, and I don’t need to feel like I’m necessarily stuck in one place” (E1). Discussing social 
interaction with others, Brian said: 
“it doesn’t really matter where you are, you do as another human to another human, 
you interact, you’ve got to otherwise you just may as well lock your door and don’t go 
out … I don’t see why the question’s asking the affinity to Britain. Why does it have to 
be affinity, it’s just human relationships” (E3). 
For Alan, being part of London was important: “in London, you’re part of this world city. 
Outside of London people don’t feel that connected to London and here there are people from 
all over the place. I don’t think it’s just about ethnicity” (E1). 
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Many respondents thought that their Black identity was important, for instance in terms of the 
type of political issues one might get involved with, or in terms of the type of volunteering one 
might do. Bruce thought that “if there were an issue affecting Blacks, yeah I would definitely 
march” (E2), whilst Sophie also made a distinction between Black and other issues, saying “I 
think for a lot of Black people maybe they don’t, they’re quite channelled in the sense of 
themselves and their family, not even necessarily helping other Black projects in the 
community, and for me it’s not necessarily like I do only Black projects, I do whatever is 
needed” (E2). Nigel thought being Black was a crucial disadvantage in terms of one’s ability to 
have a say in political decisions and being treated fairly: 
“I mean you don’t need to talk about because I mean, how many MPs are Black, how 
many … you know there’s not say for Black people in this country, or in America, the 
only person’s the President in America … of course it is important for them to feel 
British, but they don’t feel British, they feel that they’re Black, they feel that they’re 
living in someone else’s country” (U2). 
For some of the respondents, religion was also an important influence on some of the social 
cohesion elements, particularly with regard to whether one might do any volunteering, or 
which people one might want to help. For instance, Helen thought that “some people, because 
of their religion, they help old people, or children in need, anyway” (E3), whilst Alan expressed 
similar views, saying that religion may affect volunteering: 
“mainly along the lines of the groups that they then volunteer with. So obviously there 
are Jewish groups in the area, there are Muslim groups in the area, there are Christian 
ones so I think it’s more just in terms of which group they decide to volunteer with 
rather than whether they’ll do it, or not” (E1). 
For Julie, religion had far-reaching implications for many of the elements of social cohesion, 
affecting belonging, social networks, and alienation from British society: 
“I think religion plays a great part in feeling, and in developing a sense of belonging, 
and um, people who don’t have the church, that can sometimes help them feel 
alienated as well, not having a social network around them, can help them to feel that 
they are a little bit alienated from the British society” (E2). 
Julie went on to explain that her religion affected both her decisions to volunteer, and helped 
her retain a sense of self-worth: 
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“I think that’s down to being a Christian. Because I’ve been, you know, good to my 
faith, I’ve been accepted by God, so then I suppose I’ve got to be useful in society. And 
I think without my belief, then I’d be, um, then I’d feel, I’d have less self-worth without 
it, so then I don’t think I probably wouldn’t have had the courage to go out and do 
volunteering, or feel of use, whereas because of my faith that’s part of my faith to be 
of use to other people, because I don’t think Black people are always respected, I don't 
think they are always respected by the police, to be quite honest, they’re not always 
respected by the police or treated as though they’re of any value. Whereas that’s of 
less importance to me because of my faith, regardless of whether I’m valued, yes or 
no, it’s up to me to be of value, and to help others, so, and my faith is instrumental in 
that” (E2). 
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5.4 Links between narratives 
 
Section 5.2 explored the range of narratives by which respondents understood their British 
identities; and Section 5.3 explored the range of narratives by which respondents thought that 
British identity might, or might not, be important for social cohesion. This section attempts to 
identify links between some of the narratives: although many respondents used different 
narratives in overlapping and sometimes contradictory ways, there are patterns in the sense 
that certain narratives were more likely to be combined than others. At the risk of doing a 
great disservice to the complex and multifaceted views of the respondents in this study, in a 
very crude sense many, but not all, respondents fall into one of three groups – although 
disconfirming instances will be discussed later in this section. These three groups are intended 
to represent vastly over-simplified types, and will of course be very much reductive with 
regard to the respondents’ full views but, it is hoped, should nonetheless be interesting and 
informative with regard to how the narratives identified in this chapter are linked. 
The first group is made up of respondents who expressed views on British colonialism – either 
positive, negative, or a mixture of the two – and also expressed the view that British identity, 
at least sometimes, can go hand-in-hand with positive social cohesion outcomes, often as a 
signifier that a person is connected with British society. In this way, the colonialism discourse 
discussed in Section 5.2 is linked with the discourse on British identity as a signifier of 
connectedness discussed in Section 5.3. 
The second group is made up of respondents who viewed British identity as important for 
social cohesion in the sense that the former is very much associated with language, accent and 
etiquette: that is, they expressed the narrative described in Section 5.31(ii). These respondents 
also tended not to themselves identify strongly with Britain, and in many cases reject the 
identity. In this way, a rejection of British identity is linked with the view (found in section 
5.31) that British identity, as represented in norms of language, etiquette and culture, can 
impact upon social cohesion outcomes. 
The third group comprises those respondents not expressing any narrative by which British 
identity might matter for social cohesion, but instead expressing the view that individual 
choice and personal responsibility are important for social cohesion outcomes. The 
respondents in this group all had some kind of British identity, but were fairly unenthusiastic 
about it, with some saying British identification was not central to their life. For these 
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respondents, British identification was largely accepted, but not especially important either on 
a personal level or in influencing social cohesion outcomes. 
Figure 17 represents the ways in which many of the respondents in the sample form these 
three very broad groups with respect to the narratives they express, on the dimensions of 
having a strong or weak British identity, and whether or not respondents think British identity 
is related to social cohesion outcomes. Group 1 is rather mixed with respect to the strength of 
respondents’ British identities, with some expressing a strong identity but others being 
uncomfortable identifying themselves as British. The respondents in Group 1 also discuss 
issues relating to how colonialism is important for the formation of British identities, and 
generally also discuss how British identity can be a symbol of connectedness with or inclusion 
in society. Group 2 is made up of respondents who either reject or have a weak British identity, 
but who discuss how British identity can be linked to expectations and norms of social 
behaviour, which can in turn affect social cohesion outcomes. Respondents’ attitudes to these 
processes are often negative. Group 3 is made up of respondents that often have a moderate 
British identity, or who are rather indifferent, and who think that British identity does not have 
an impact on social cohesion outcomes, but instead express the view that individual choice 
and personal responsibility are far more important. In the following sections each group will be 
discussed in turn. 
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Figure 17: Links between narratives 
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5.41: Group one: colonialism and British identity as a signifier of connectedness 
 
Of the five respondents expressing the narrative that British identity might be a signifier of a 
person’s connectedness to society, four also expressed an awareness of how colonialism might 
be important for the meanings attached to a person’s British identity. Why might this be the 
case, particularly given the fact that questions on colonialism were absent from the interview 
schedule? Is there anything that can be drawn from the literature on colonial and postcolonial 
British identities that can give an insight into the narratives expressed by these respondents? 
This section will attempt to answer these questions, first by drawing on a selection of literature 
to consider the meanings of colonial and postcolonial British identity, and second by linking 
this literature to the views expressed by these respondents and considering instances whereby 
the views are both consistent and inconsistent with the literature. 
Rush (2011) explores British identification amongst Black residents in the 20th century 
Caribbean, noting how people either viewing themselves as middle class, or with the goal to 
become middle class, frequently adopted some sort of British identity, and in doing so 
“participated actively in the shaping and transmission of a Caribbean Britishness” (Rush 2011, 
10). Under colonial rule, those people having professional jobs or having more regular contact 
with schools, many of which were run by British Christian missionaries or the colonial 
administration, were under increased pressure to adopt British cultural norms; and more 
affluent people had better access to (often British-run) media, leading to increased exposure 
to British propaganda. Many Caribbean immigrants to Britain, both before and after the 
Second World War, therefore identified as British, at least as some part of their identity, 
before arriving in Britain.  
There are several aspects of this that are important for the present discussion. First, the idea 
that British identity can extend beyond the national boundaries of Britain is potentially 
important. For Miller (2000), one of the things that differentiates national identities from other 
sorts of identity is that national identity “connects a group of people to a particular 
geographical place” (Miller 2000, 29). This, however, is only partially true in the case of 
colonial Caribbean Britishness, which connected a group of people to two different places. It is 
true, as Miller asserts should be the case, that this national identity had a geographically 
bounded ‘homeland’. But, given the fact that some commentators (e.g. Habermas 2001) argue 
for a post-national world in which nationalism and national identities are no longer as relevant 
as they once were, it is curious that British identity, at least to some 19th or 20th century 
residents of British colonies, was already an identity that transcended national boundaries – 
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whereby the term ‘Britain’ referred to a “supranational” entity (Rush 2011, 7). If this is true, it 
makes Miller’s assertion that it “is this territorial element that makes nations uniquely suited 
to serve as the basis of states, since a state by definition must exercise its authority over a 
geographical area” somewhat contentious (Miller 2000, 30). As Yuval-Davis (2011, 88) argues, 
“citizenship in a state is virtually never the one exhaustive way of national belonging”. 
Second, colonial British identity was viewed by some as a symbol of middle-class status, since 
it was associated with a professional job, or an aspiration to get a professional job: many 
“members of the working classes were unlikely to adopt a British identity and British culture, 
while the growing numbers of white-collar West Indians increasingly participated actively in 
the shaping and transmission of a Caribbean Britishness” (Rush 2011, 9). In some sense, then, 
British identity could be viewed as a signifier of being connected with (colonial British) society, 
or of ‘getting ahead’ in society. 
With regard to the first point, it is certainly true that the respondents discussing colonialism 
recognised that many people born in former British colonies would identify themselves as 
British before they arrived in Britain, and that for them, there was no contradiction in having a 
dual identity. Terry explained that “my parents were born overseas, but I see that there is a 
direct link between Dominica and, as part of the empire. Because, Dominica used to be a 
colony of Britain, and I think there are good things been had of this country … I’m proud of 
that, of being part of the United Kingdom … You can still can be British and your country of 
origin, you can still identify with your country of origin”. Similarly, speaking of her mother, 
Mary said: “my mother was born in Grenada at the time it was a British colony, and so ... most 
people of her age group would consider themselves to be Grenadian and British at the ... same 
time”. This is an important point and perhaps one that deserves more recognition when 
arguments are made for the importance of generating or sustaining a sense of national 
identity in order to increase social cohesion (e.g. Goodhart 2007; Putnam 2007), or when 
national identity as a potential positive influence on social cohesion is discussed in public 
discourse (such as in some of David Blunkett’s speeches), with the implication that members of 
ethnic minority groups sometimes do not identify with Britain enough. 
Also worth noting are the experiences of some people of an ethnic minority origin, who found 
themselves “[blocked] out of any access to an English or British identity” due to a lack of 
acceptance of their identity claims (Hall 2000, 148). In the context of colonial British identities, 
Rush (2011, 5) describes how “black colonial subjects’ claims to Britishness have seldom been 
taken seriously”, and how many colonial immigrants to Britain were taken aback by the fact 
that, despite already identifying strongly with Britain, they were not seen as British upon 
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arrival in the British ‘homeland’. These ideas are echoed by many of the respondents in the 
sample. For instance, Cheryl expressed the view that “I’m Nigerian. I feel I should be British but 
I live here, and um, but sometimes people make you think oh, you’re not from here. They try 
to remind you with their actions and stuff like that.” Julie expressed a similar view, saying: “I’m 
not sure whether, the thing is I’m not sure whether um, it’s sort of always accepted that a 
Caribbean who was born here would identify themselves with Britain, it’s sometimes it’s 
sometimes in the media it’s almost as if it’s not really valued, but that’s I don’t think that 
worries me too much, I still would continue to feel English and British.” 
With regard to the second point, the five respondents in this group all express the narrative 
viewing British identity as a signifier of connectedness to society, but exhibit a variety of 
different views with regard to colonialism. Two of the respondents discuss colonialism without 
expressing any value judgements, two discuss colonialism in a negative sense, whilst the fifth 
respondent does not discuss colonialism at all. Mary – one of the two respondents not 
expressing a value judgement – discusses her understanding of her connection to Grenada, her 
mother’s place of birth, and also that “if you don’t identify with Britain then you are probably 
feeling quite disconnected”. 
Julie and John discuss colonialism in a negative sense. Julie says that “some people might not 
be happy about being British, I suppose because of the past, some people, um, for example 
colonialism, that kind of thing, it makes them feel alienated from being British, and then they 
don’t have as strong sense of belonging to wherever it is they live in London as someone who 
doesn’t think that”. Julie, however, is able to reconcile her British identity with such negative 
views regarding Britain’s colonial past, saying that “I mean the past is very important but I 
don’t think past problems or past shames will stop me from feeling British”. John has more 
difficulty reconciling Britain’s past with his feelings of Britishness. He describes his ambivalence 
about Britain by saying “Well, study your history, man, they’re all just a bunch of pirates going 
around the world nicking land”, but at the same time sees some good sides of the modern 
state: “there is a degree of satisfaction that you’re not going to get locked up for certain 
things, for example, like in other countries.  It’s a tolerant, open society so that obviously 
brings satisfaction for obvious reasons”. At the same time, he views identifying with Britain as 
a signifier of inclusion to some extent: “You have to on some level or why would you go to a 
public meeting if you hate Britain that much, you wouldn’t go to a public meeting.” John seems 
able to reconcile his identity as a British citizen with Britain’s past to a certain extent, and 
when asked how he felt that for some people it was important for them to identify with 
Britain, said: 
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“I think that’s fine, as long as that makes them feel good about themselves, great, but I 
think they have to ultimately realise, we all have to ultimately realise that all these 
things are just silly little games and count for nothing … I ain’t got nothing against 
someone being happy, if that’s what you want to do, cool.  But I just think it’s really 
important to have that underlying understanding that it is just a flag and beyond what 
I give it, it carries no meaning … But I think people haven’t learned that before they 
start waving the flag.  Every person should at some point realise the truth and that is 
that we’re all from the earth and we’ve all got a common history and a common 
culture beyond that.” 
For some respondents, then, an awareness of how colonialism can impact on the formation of 
a British identity appears to be linked with a view that British identity is a signifier of 
connectedness to and inclusion in society, and therefore a signifier of positive social cohesion 
outcomes. This link remains across respondents that are positive or negative about colonialism 
(with John, quoted above, being the most negative about colonialism). 
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5.42: Group two: Britishness and language, accent, culture and etiquette 
 
Five of the respondents in the sample expressed the narrative whereby British identity is 
associated with expectations and norms of language, accent, culture and etiquette, and 
whether or not these norms or expectations are met may affect social cohesion outcomes. It is 
notable that these five respondents also did not have a strong British identity, and often 
rejected British identity. There was a commonality between these respondents of negativity 
towards British identity, and also negativity towards the ways in which certain social 
expectations could shape outcomes. These five respondents often interpreted questions 
asking them about whether British identity could impact on social cohesion outcomes in a 
particular way – by viewing British identity as being about norms of language, accent, culture 
and etiquette, rather than something more internal (or as one respondent put it, “a real who 
you are”). 
Why might it be the case that some of the respondents with the most negative attitudes 
towards British identities are also those discussing ways in which British identities are 
associated with social expectations and norms, and these expectations and norms, in the form 
of language, accent, culture and etiquette, can impact on social cohesion outcomes? This 
section will explore this question by first giving a brief discussion of the literature on 
‘manners’, cultural etiquette, and the ‘civilising process’. Second, the five respondents 
expressing this narrative will be introduced, and an illustration will be given that they all 
exhibit the pattern of a rejection of or distancing from British identity, together with a 
generally negative view of the way in which social norms might affect social cohesion 
outcomes. Third, some parallels between some of the views of the respondents and the 
literature will be explored. 
There is a wide literature on the ways in which social norms and expectations can be 
produced. Elias (1994) documents the ways in which the nobility in Europe developed an ever 
more complex system of ‘manners’, propagated by expectations of behaviour in the 
courtroom, to maintain an authority over a newly moneyed bourgeoisie. In time, this code of 
conduct found its way into expectations of the behaviour of ‘lower’ classes in Europe, whereby 
the adoption of these systems of ‘manners’ was thereby associated with higher status and 
privilege. Codes of social manners were also a technique by which European imperial powers 
could export ‘civilised’ behaviour, in contrast to barbarism, around the world, such as the 
appearance of Spanish ‘etiquette books’ in Latin America (Moore et al. 2007). Furthermore, 
this ‘civilising’ process outside Europe, by which colonial subjects were taught norms of British 
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and Christian culture, could be used by native British missionaries to enhance their status in 
British society (Rush 2011). 
The five respondents discussing this narrative certainly show an awareness of how 
expectations of social ‘manners’ can affect other people’s perceptions, which in turn can affect 
outcomes. These respondents also often describe this process in a negative way, although this 
is not always the case, and very often this negativity is tied up with a rejection of or distancing 
from British identity. Leila – a young female respondent – describes how “the only way how I 
really feel British is that we live here, my education is from here”, and that “if you have an 
African accent … someone can just get frustrated more easily, I guess with an English accent … 
you get things like easier, and people will tend to listen to you more”. Tracy explained how she 
rejects British identity because “British is, just seems quite patriotic, and like, it’s like 
dominating, in my mind it’s like ‘I want to be all of it’ … I couldn’t say I’m British”; and yet also 
expressed the view that “English people are respected more in England … and I think it’s a 
subconscious thing”.  
Expectations over social norms can also extend to appearances, and norms of appearance can 
interact with other expectations. Alan describes a conversation at his workplace in the 
following terms: 
“[A colleague said that] ‘Oh I was really surprised there was this Black guy on the tube 
with a baseball cap and all this sort of stuff and reading Voltaire.’ I was like, ‘I know 
lots of people who wear baseball caps who went to university,’ but if they were white 
and doing that I don’t know, I don’t know what the assumption was. Is it the baseball 
cap or is it the ethnicity and why did he feel the necessity to mention that the guy was 
Black.” 
In terms of expectations about his own appearance, Alan also describes the following 
conversation: 
“It does sometimes feel like maybe if I haven’t shaved for a couple of days there’s an 
assumption about who I am maybe when I do certain things as opposed to my white 
friends who haven’t shaved for a couple of days and wear a beanie or whatever 
they’re just seen as student-types … and people have openly said it to me in my work 
in the past. They said, ‘It was only once you opened your mouth it was okay’ because 
I’ve got a middle-class voice, or accent, I don’t know.” 
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John described the obstacles he had to overcome to start a community organisation in a way 
that is very much in keeping with Elias’ ideas of the courtroom being used to sustain 
superiority through codes of conduct, by explicitly linking the challenge of reading legal 
documents to culture and the maintenance of a status hierarchy: 
“I can imagine how most people are scared away, scared off of doing it [starting an 
organisation or company] because I basically had to read through legal documents and 
liaise with a lawyer and dealing with the language of it.  It was linked to the culture, 
the linguistics of it and the system of it, almost like a hierarchy in the way it works with 
lawyers and whatnot and then you’ve got the law and you’ve got to register with this 
… But it’s going through that process of understanding the language because it’s the 
legal system, you’ve got these Latin words and the way the lawyers write and the rules 
and the rules of Articles and Association and whatnot, it’s dense stuff.  If you can break 
it down and digest it … it’s off-putting, it’s not necessarily an encouraging process but 
you’ve got to get through that to get to the good stuff. Back to the point of culture, 
maybe it is linked a bit to ethnicity and culture, seeing that as a daunting thing, 
difficult.” 
The respondents in this group, then, are characterised by having a weak British identity, or by 
rejecting British identity outright, and by expressing negative views on ways in which social 
norms and expectations can affect social cohesion outcomes. Similarities can be drawn 
between these narratives and the literature on the ‘civilising process’ and the way in which 
‘manners’ and etiquette are constructed. 
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5.43: Group three: moderate or indifferent British identity and personal choice and 
responsibility 
 
Group three is made up of respondents who are both fairly indifferent about their British 
identities, either downplaying their importance or having only a moderately strong identity, 
and who also express the narrative, outlined in Section 5.3, that it is individual choice and 
personal responsibility, rather than issues surrounding identity, that matter for social cohesion 
outcomes. 
From the interview data there are numerous examples of the combination of these two 
narratives. David downplayed the importance of his British identity by saying “I would say 
being British, I don’t know if that calls for anything that significant”, whilst at the same time, 
when asked whether feeling British had any impact on “whether you get involved with the 
council” replied: “No, no. It’s got nothing to do with that, it’s just my own choice.” Similarly, 
Leila was fairly unenthusiastic about her British identity, saying of her religious, ethnic and 
British identities that “I guess that British would be last”, and that the impact of British identity 
on local belonging was not particularly important: 
“I don’t think it makes much difference. I think that, I don’t think it makes much 
difference. I think it’s just really up to what the person wants and needs around them 
that makes the difference, not the fact that you feel more British or not.” 
In total, seven of the respondents in the sample expressed the view that individual choice and 
personal responsibility were important for social cohesion outcomes, and also did not express 
any narrative by which British identity could impact upon social cohesion. These seven 
respondents also either had a moderate British identity, whereby they identified with Britain 
but it was not central to their life, or were fairly indifferent about their British identity. 
It is possible to view the narratives expressed by this group in terms of two alternative 
interpretations. On the one hand, these respondents feel mildly British in the sense that they 
are happy enough with the country in which they live, but it is not something that is 
particularly important to them and it certainly has very little to do with their motivations for 
achieving positive ‘social cohesion’ outcomes such as volunteering, or political participation. 
These motivations instead stem from personal choices, and these respondents are expressing 
a rejection of the whole idea that people’s behaviour is somehow determined by certain 
factors, such as British identity. On the other hand, it is possible to see a connection between 
these views and concepts such as a civic notion of citizenship, or a civic nationality, whereby 
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citizens take their responsibilities to society seriously and have a duty to participate in many 
activities, such as participating politically or engaging civically.  
Most definitions of citizenship include not only the rights of the citizen, but also their duties 
and responsibilities (Yuval-Davis 2011). In order for democracies to function effectively and 
produce just outcomes, citizens must have a certain attitude towards their fellow citizens, and 
be prepared to participate in certain activities. Kymlicka (1995, 175) argues that “the health 
and stability of a modern democracy depends … [in part] on the qualities and attitudes of its 
citizens: e.g. … their ability to tolerate and work together with others who are different from 
themselves; their desire to participate in the political process in order to promote the public 
good and hold political authorities accountable; … and their sense of justice and commitment 
to a fair distribution of resources”. Barry (2001, 80) argues for what he describes as a ‘civic 
nationality’ which involves, amongst other things, “making sacrifices for the common good”, 
and being prepared to give up such things as money and leisure time for one’s fellow citizens, 
whilst Miller (2000, 131) suggests that a civic nationalism “does not imply a common history, 
language, culture, etc. but merely recognition of the authority of a constitutional or political 
framework”.10 Kymlicka also acknowledges the idea of ‘civic nationality’ as a version of 
citizenship based on ideology and shared commitment, but claims that a non-cultural notion of 
citizenship is mistaken since citizenship also implies the learning of certain cultural and 
historical features of a society, such as a common language.  
Leaving aside for a moment the debate over the feasibility in practice of a non-cultural notion 
of citizenship, it is possible that by downplaying the personal importance of their British 
identities, and in particular by both rejecting the significance of British identity for social 
cohesion outcomes and emphasising the significance of personal choice and responsibility, the 
respondents in this group are expressing a narrative that is similar to these concepts of civic 
nationality or civic citizenship. British identity is perhaps seen as something that is ‘thick’ with 
cultural and historical connotations, whereas by emphasising one’s personal responsibilities as 
important drivers of social cohesion outcomes, the narrative suggests that it is the fulfilment of 
the civic duties or sacrifices for other citizens that produce positive outcomes. 
Several of the respondents display this combination of narratives, whereby a moderate British 
identity is combined with a sense of personal responsibility to society, which in turn is seen as 
affecting social cohesion outcomes. Bruce, for instance, described his identity as Black British, 
                                                          
10
 It is worth noting that Miller doubts that many examples of civic nationalism actually exist, since most 
include cultural and historical aspects, but the concept is useful in the abstract as one end of a 
spectrum, with ethnic nationalism at the other.  
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but when asked how important this identity was to him, said it was “something that probably 
matters more to society rather than me”. When asked about whether his British identity 
affects his local belonging, Bruce says “for me it doesn’t make much difference”, and instead 
describes how the choices he has made to get involved with the local tenants’ association have 
led him to become accepted more in the local area: “I sit on the local tenants’ association, you 
know I'm quite active in what I do, you know, I feel because of that I'm accepted a lot more 
than probably had I sat, you know, been on benefits and, not doing anything.” When asked 
whether he thought his British identity affects his volunteering or civic engagement he gave a 
similar answer, saying “Well not for me … You know, and I wouldn’t have thought it would 
matter”; and instead emphasised the responsibility he felt to be involved with issues affecting 
many people in society, saying if there was an issue “which probably affects everyone, or if 
they want to march for something else, you know I mean the civil service march coming up you 
bet your bottom dollar I'll be walking on that unless they've made a decision today to sort out 
our pensions”.  
Helen also had a moderate British identity, but one that wasn’t central to her life, saying “I just 
like to keep the identity as an African as well, so obviously British… Doesn’t bother me”. She 
also emphasised how she thought that it was important to give something to society: 
“I enjoy you know, one on one, support and I believe that everybody should actually 
do something for the society they live in, and that’s why I did it, it wasn’t because I’m a 
Christian, I think I would have done that regardless.” 
When asked “how about your Britishness, do you think the fact you feel British has anything to 
do with it, or do you think…” she replied: “No, not really. I, I mean it’s individuals how they 
think and what they wanna do”. 
In sum, then, there could be two interpretations for the combination of narratives for many of 
the respondents in this group. On the one hand, the respondents could be seen as saying that 
no factors external to their own individual choice have got anything to do with social cohesion; 
or alternatively the combination of narratives could be viewed as a rejection of British identity 
as an influence on social cohesion, but an endorsement of the idea that a civic sense of 
citizenship, or a ‘civic nationality’ (Barry 2001) are important for social cohesion outcomes, by 
emphasising personal responsibility.  
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5.44: Disconfirming instances 
 
These three groups, however, do not fit neatly with the narratives expressed by all 
respondents in the sample. Although most respondents discussing colonialism also use the 
‘signifier’ narrative, there is one respondent that does not. 
Terry is a male over 50 years old, in employment. His ethnic heritage is from a former British 
colony, and both his ethnic heritage and his British identity are very important for him. There is 
a strong sense that he is comfortable with this duality of his identity: 
“I think they can live side by side, because as I said we have a colonial history, 
Dominica is a colony of Britain, and you have good things which, unlike the 
Portuguese, which Britain left us, for example schools, they left us hospitals … You can 
still can be British and your country of origin, you can still identify with your country of 
origin.” 
Terry is positive about Britain, and Britain’s colonial past, but consistently does not think that 
British identity has anything to do with social cohesion outcomes, frequently answering such 
questions by saying things like “It doesn’t make any difference”. 
For him, what is important for positive social cohesion outcomes has more to do with specific 
aspects of local and government policy. Two issues he repeatedly discusses are support for 
cultural organisations linking Britain with other cultures; and policies focusing on issues such as 
equality of opportunity. Of cultural or charity organisations, Terry said: 
“[I have] established an organisation, a charity organisation already, at the moment 
we’re looking to expand … to keep in touch with one another as well as trying to see 
how we can help our community back home, as well as people in England, not only 
Dominicans, but other people, from other different countries as well … In fact the 
organisation has been helping all over the world, people from all over the world. I find 
it is important that we keep our identity culturally because we need to, the kids who 
are growing up here they need to know more about Dominica, and where we are and 
where we’re going.” 
He also thought that equal opportunities policies were important for social cohesion 
outcomes, saying: 
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“Because there is something, equal opportunities policy, and a lot of people, they 
could quote the equal opportunities policy from the front book to the back book, to 
the end of the book. But my problem with this is you not only have to talk about equal 
opportunities, you have to be implementing equal opportunities. Not only 
implementing, take only one section, but you need to implement it in totality. In the 
workplace you find that some people, although they say they’re implementing equal 
opportunities policy, in truth or in fact, they tend to forget certain things, without 
implementing the whole thing. You should not just be talking about equal 
opportunities … you should also be talking about ethnicity, respect your ethnicity, your 
cultural background, your language and so on. If you cannot do this totally, it’s just a 
farce.” 
Terry therefore does not fit ‘neatly’ with the other respondents discussing colonialism, in 
group one. For him, an awareness of Britain’s colonial past does not lead him to think that 
British identity and connectedness with society go together; instead positive outcomes can be 
achieved by properly implementing specific policies designed to promote equality, or 
recognising cultural links between Britain and other countries. 
Similarly, although most respondents either express the ‘signifier’ narrative (and are in group 
one) or the ‘language, accent and etiquette’ narrative (and are in group two), there is one 
respondent expressing both. John is an employed male, under the age of 35, was born in 
Britain, but is rather negative about British identity. The signifier narrative is expressed in 
comments such as his response that British identity is important for some social cohesion 
outcomes: “I’d say yes but that’s self explanatory surely because if you’re that anti Britain, 
we’re in Britain, of course it’s going to be difficult for you to get by”; and yet he also views 
language as potentially important for positive outcomes, saying that “When I did my Level One 
training to teach, there were these two guys who both had really bad English … you have to fill 
out all these questionnaires in English and do all your course work in English and they were 
both struggling, having to get lots of help to get through it.” There in a sense in which these 
views combined are somewhat contradictory since, for him, British identity is both a signifier 
of connectedness with society, and so the two always go together; and also British identity 
only implies positive social cohesion outcomes when social expectations of language, accent 
and etiquette are met. John, then, also does not fit ‘neatly’ with the separation of the three 
groups outlined in this section. 
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5.45: Analysis 
 
What can the presence of these three groups of respondents tell one about any potential 
relationship between British identity and social cohesion? Regarding the first group, the 
similarity between colonial British and modern British societies is, perhaps, that in both cases 
British identity and connectedness with society in fact go together, whether one likes it or not. 
In colonial British society, middle-class status and professional jobs were seen as belonging to 
those that considered themselves to be, or aspired to be, British. In modern British society, 
British identity and connectedness also go together, and can be contrasted with a lack of 
identity and a lack of connectedness. Yet not all groups have equal access to such an identity 
or such connectedness. In colonial society the identity of ‘native’ Britons was contrasted with 
the (ostensibly lesser) identity of colonial subjects, and those with darker skin had more 
difficulty in being seen as British at all (Rush 2011). In modern society some groups are 
‘blocked out’ of access to British identity (Hall 2000) and, by implication, connectedness with 
society. British identity is, then, a signifier of connectedness whether one likes it or not, and 
both British identity and connectedness are not accessible to all groups on an equal basis. The 
emphasis here, then, is one where British identity and connectedness are seen as being 
attained by status or heritage. 
For the second group, etiquette and manners are important for social cohesion. In contrast to 
the first group, where British identity (and therefore connectedness with society) is something 
one either has or not, possibly because of one’s status or heritage, for the second group 
etiquette and manners can be learned. In this sense the narrative is more positive or inclusive 
than for the first group since members of minority groups could potentially ‘learn’ the 
manners necessary for social cohesion. In another sense, however, the message is quite a 
negative one, since all of the respondents in the group are negative about British identity and 
the processes involved in the relationship between ‘manners’ and social cohesion. In theory, at 
least, members of ethnic minority groups can ‘learn’ to have the right accent, language, or 
manners, to ensure positive social cohesion outcomes. Yet there is a sense of injustice about 
why it should be the case that it is necessary to conform to such social expectations to achieve 
positive outcomes. 
In contrast to the first two groups, where British identity is ‘thick’ with cultural connotations 
(heritage or status for the first group, and etiquette and manners for the second group) and 
this ‘thick’ British identity matters for social cohesion outcomes, for the third group what 
matters for social cohesion is a much ‘thinner’ sense of citizenship. A distinction between 
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‘thick’ and ‘thin’ cultures and moralities is explored by Walzer (1994), and has been adopted by 
various academics to differentiate between ‘thick’ culture-laden national identities, and a 
‘thinner’ citizenship. Walzer distinguishes between ‘thick’ or maximalist moralities and ‘thin’ or 
minimalist moralities. A moral argument always originates from within a ‘thick’ or maximalist 
morality – that is it is always ‘laden’ with culture and can never be made on an objective basis. 
Minimalist ‘thin’ moral arguments, however, can occur when something is abstracted from a 
thick moral argument such that someone from a different maximalist thick morality is able to 
agree with it. This other person will interpret the thin argument in terms of their own thick 
culture and morality, but what unites the two thick cultures is the “mutual recognition” of the 
thin claims: minimalism “consists in principles and rules that are reiterated in different times 
and places, and that are seen to be similar even though they are expressed in different idioms 
and reflect different histories and different versions of the world” (Walzer 1994, 17). 
One might distinguish between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ national identities, therefore, in a similar way. 
A thick national identity is, perhaps, one that is rooted in a particular culture, with its own 
detailed description of what is right and wrong, socially acceptable practices, and so on. A thin 
national identity might then be an abstract notion that members of several different maximal 
or thick cultures mutually recognise. It will have less cultural ‘content’ than the thick version 
and, following Walzer’s distinction, will be interpreted differently depending on the culture of 
the person doing the interpreting, but has the potential to be more inclusive than a culturally 
thick version.11 
If this argument is right, then, for the third group there is a recognition of their belonging to a 
maximalist culture in the sense that they all have some kind of British or English identity. 
However, this identity is not considered to be important for positive social cohesion outcomes: 
what is important instead is emphasising the ‘thinner’ ideas that most people in society can 
recognise as positive in the abstract: ‘helping other people’, ‘taking responsibility’, or ‘giving 
something back’ to society; rather than a ‘thick’ code of expectations of language or etiquette. 
So what does all this tell one about how British identity might, or might not, matter for social 
cohesion? When arguments are made in support of national identity, they are usually on the 
                                                          
11
 The view that British identity will be interpreted differently by people of different backgrounds was in 
fact expressed by a number of respondents. For instance, Mary said: “Do you know what, there’s... 
there’s two things, there’s... you’ve got Caribbean British identity of those individuals that were... that 
came here as being part of the colonialism, like my parents’ generation.  And then there’s the Caribbean 
identity of those of us that were born and brought up here, of parents that were immigrants.  Then 
there’s the Caribbean identity of those of us who are... who have migrated in the current world, like... 
and so they’ve come here recently and have sought British identity, and we see things very differently 
from one another.” 
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basis that it can provide some sense of solidarity between citizens, the vast majority of which 
are unlikely to ever meet each other to engage in face-to-face interaction, and that this 
solidarity is essential for such things as the functioning of democratic institutions, 
redistribution to support equality and social justice, and so on. This argument is made in 
particular in the face of increasing ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in modern 
democracies (although such diversity has always been present to some degree, the argument 
is that it makes such solidarity harder to achieve), economic globalisation (which has increased 
inequality, so solidarity is needed to support redistribution), and as a counterweight to the 
new, allegedly divisive identities emphasised by the ‘politics of recognition’. If British identity is 
to serve such a purpose, this chapter suggests three possibilities, each with different 
implications for overcoming any problems created by increasing diversity, economic 
globalisation, and the ‘politics of recognition’. 
The first possibility is that the importance of British identity for solidarity is emphasised whilst 
retaining its culturally ‘thick’ links to status and heritage. British identity and connectedness to 
society go together in that one either has them or does not, but having them is a matter of 
status and/or heritage. Emphasising British identity in this way, however, is unlikely to combat 
any potential problems of increasing ethnic, cultural or religious diversity, since one attains it 
by virtue of the fact that one is a member of the dominant ‘British’ culture in the first place. 
For similar reasons, an emphasis on the importance of status and heritage is unlikely to 
provide a balanced counterweight to other identity claims, since many of the identity claims 
are a result of the injustices created by status and heritage. It is also unlikely to provide the 
support for redistribution necessary to combat increasing inequality, since British identity (and 
therefore connectedness) are attained by status in the first place. According to this possibility, 
then, British identity is not an inclusive identity, and is unlikely to provide the basis for 
solidarity needed to achieve any of these three goals. 
The second possibility is that the importance of British identity for solidarity is emphasised in a 
culturally ‘thick’ way, but one that is open to anyone if they are prepared to conform to certain 
social expectations. In the context of the integration of diverse ethnic, cultural or religious 
groups into society, this can be achieved if they are prepared to assimilate. It is unlikely, 
however, to provide an appropriate counterweight to any ‘divisive’ claims of groups through 
the ‘politics of recognition’, since assimilation requires the adoption by everyone of a pre-
defined set of culturally ‘thick’ norms, and so there would be no room for other identity 
claims. The solidarity necessary for redistribution, in order to combat rising inequality, would 
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only be achieved to the extent that all (or at least most) members of society were prepared to 
assimilate in this way. 
The third possibility is that British identity in its culturally ‘thick’ sense is de-emphasised and 
that, instead, what matters for solidarity is the mutual recognition by all (or at least many) 
members of society of some more abstract, culturally ‘thin’ set of ideas that many people 
agree is important: ‘helping others; ‘giving something back’; or ‘taking responsibility’ being a 
few examples given by respondents in the sample. In Walzer’s sense, these are abstract 
commonalities that are generally agreed upon, but the details will be interpreted differently by 
members of particular ethnic, cultural or religious groups. A ‘thinner’ or ‘civic’ version of 
national identity has been endorsed by various academics (e.g. Barry 2001; Miller 2000). The 
respondents in the sample, however, preferred to describe these ideas not in terms of national 
identity, but more in terms of personal or individual responsibilities, or as common 
commitments to society (Sophie, for instance, said that “I live here I like Britain, I follow the 
laws, I, you know, I think I have a loyalty to Britain, but as far as feeling British I can’t say it’s 
something I’ve ever given any thought to ‘cause it doesn’t seem that important to me”). 
This third sense of national identity (or common commitment to society) is open to all, 
regardless of status, heritage, or membership of an ethnic, cultural or religious group. But 
would this third possibility create the solidarity necessary for overcoming any problems 
stemming from diversity, the ‘politics of recognition’, and rising economic inequality? 
Questions similar to this are often asked: Barry (2001, 83-4), for instance, asks whether the 
problem for British identity might be that “the criteria for membership in the British nation 
may be so undemanding as to render membership incapable of providing the foundation of 
common identity that is needed for the stability and justice of liberal democratic polities” and 
argues that there is a “sense that British nationality is a very thin glue to rely on if one is 
concerned about social cohesion”. Kymlicka (2008, 72), however, is more positive about the 
potential for ‘thin’ national identities to sustain solidarity: “In the last 40 years, we have seen a 
dramatic ‘thinning’ of national identities, as they have been stretched to accommodate 
demands for inclusion by a range of historically disadvantaged groups … At each step of this 
process, commentators have feared that the thinning of national identity to make it more 
inclusive would undermine its power to create meaningful solidarities. And yet it seems clear 
that thin national identities are still capable of sustaining the sort of solidarity that enables 
societies to adopt progressive social policies”. 
A related point, and one that is raised in particular given the fact that the respondents 
discussing narratives on the third possibility do not frame this ‘common commitment’ in terms 
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of a British identity at all, is why it should be the case that a national identity, or national civic 
commitment, is the appropriate level at which a sense of solidarity should be generated. It is in 
some sense a historical accident that many of the institutions for which a sense of solidarity or 
commitment is allegedly necessary are at the national level. One also has local institutions, 
local democratic politics, and so on, that would by the same argument require a sense of 
solidarity and commitment and yet still be too large for many of the members to meet face-to-
face. Perhaps a national identity would generate sufficient solidarity for local issues, too. But 
institutions and (to some extent) democratic politics also exist at the European level; as does 
an (admittedly relatively small) amount of redistribution. From this perspective an exclusive 
emphasis on the importance of national identities seems somewhat arbitrary. One wonders, 
when, for instance, Miller (2000, 32) argues for national identity because it is “de facto the 
main source of such solidarity”, whether this is currently true today, and certainly whether it 
will continue to be true in the future in the face of both globalisation on the one hand, and 
other competing sources of identity on the other. 
A point along similar lines is argued for by Barry in his criticism of ‘national romanticism’: 
rather than the nation-state being the fundamental unit of culture and morality (as for Miller 
and Walzer); or sub-state nations (as for Kymlicka); for Barry boundaries are “better the more 
conducive they are to the creation and maintenance of a liberal political order within them. 
Whether that requires units that are large or small, heterogeneous or homogeneous, is a 
pragmatic question. There is not going to be any generally applicable answer” (Barry 2001, 
137). 
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5.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter provided an analysis of the narratives expressed by 22 respondents of Black 
African and Black Caribbean ethnicity when asked questions about their ethnic and national 
identities, and any relationships they might see between them and social cohesion. Arguments 
for the importance of national identities and cohesion and solidarity often stem from the 
former’s potential role in generating solidarity amidst diversity, so to an extent it is important 
to hear the view of members of two minority ethnic groups. These views should not, obviously, 
be taken as representative of the general population, or even of these ethnic groups – instead 
the aim was to identify a wide range of narratives by which respondents understood their 
national identities, any relationships to social cohesion, and any links between the narratives. 
Section 5.2 provided a description of the narratives expressed when respondents’ discussed 
their national identities. A majority had a British identity, and three key themes emerged 
around which respondents based their discussions: colonialism; generation; and the 
differences between British and English identities. 
Section 5.3 provided a picture of ambiguity with regard to whether or not respondents 
thought British identity might be important for social cohesion. There were three narratives by 
which British identity was deemed to be important: British identity is important because it is a 
signifier of connectedness with society; British identity is important because it entails social 
expectations in terms of language, accent, and etiquette or ‘manners’, and these in turn can 
affect social cohesion outcomes; and British identity is important because it entails a 
knowledge of the British social system, which in turn can affect social cohesion outcomes. 
There were also two narratives by which British identity was deemed unimportant: because 
individual choices and personal responsibility were important instead; and because identities 
other than British identity were important. The other identities mentioned were a human or 
global identity, an identification with London, a religious identity, and a Black or ethnic 
identity. 
Section 5.4 linked certain narratives together in the sense that there were patterns in terms of 
the respondents expressing them. Respondents broadly could be put into three groups. For 
the first group, there was a link between the importance of colonialism for understanding 
British identity, and the narrative suggesting that British identity could be a signifier of 
connectedness with society. In colonial British society, British identity was related to middle-
class status, and was not available equally to all ethnic or socio-economic groups. In this way, 
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an understanding of British identity as inherently linked to status and heritage can be related 
to a view of British identity and connectedness with society going together: one either has 
both or neither. For the second group, there was a link between negativity about British 
identity and an appreciation of the ways in which Britishness could be represented in social 
expectations of culture, accent, etiquette and ‘manners’, and how these expectations can 
shape social cohesion outcomes. Although in theory this implies that such social expectations 
could be learned, respondents were quite negative about these processes, and there was a 
sense of injustice regarding how it was necessary to adopt pre-existing cultural practices in 
order to achieve positive outcomes. For the third group, there was a link between a moderate 
or indifferent British identity and the view that personal responsibilities and choices were 
particularly important for social cohesion. Although the respondents in this group did not 
reject British identity, its significance was de-emphasised, and commitments to such ideas as 
‘helping others’ and ‘giving something back to society’ were emphasised instead. 
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Chapter 6: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL IDENTITY 
AND SOCIAL COHESION 
 
This chapter has two main aims. Having presented the results from the quantitative and 
qualitative components in detail in the previous two chapters, it is important to return to some 
of the theoretical material detailed in the literature review. The first aim, therefore, is to 
expand upon the theoretical discussions of the nature of the concepts of national identity and 
social cohesion, and relationships postulated between the two, and the second aim is to 
synthesise the evidence from both the quantitative and the qualitative components of this 
study and give a discussion of it in the light of the expanded theoretical discussions. 
The first section of the chapter extends the discussion of arguments that national identity 
might be important for social cohesion found in the literature review. The suggestion made is 
that there are, broadly speaking, different types of argument corresponding to different 
political positions. Four main arguments about the importance of national identity for social 
cohesion are identified: first, a liberal concern with national identity being important because 
it generates the social cohesion that is necessary for the functioning of a nation’s liberal 
democratic institutions; second, a social democratic concern with national identity being 
important because it generates the social cohesion necessary for the implementation of 
progressive social policies; third, a communitarian concern with national identity being 
important for generating the social cohesion necessary for a civic culture that is able to provide 
citizens’ lives with context and meaning; and fourth, a conservative concern with national 
identity implying identification with the traditions, customs and history of national society, the 
cohesion of which is an important end in itself. 
The second section of the chapter examines the central concepts under investigation: national 
identity and social cohesion. The ways in which different meanings of each concept correspond 
to different political positions is made explicit. The evidence this study provides about the way 
in which the concepts have different meanings, and the way in which the relationship between 
them varies depending on the meaning in question, is then discussed and linked to the political 
positions previously outlined. 
The third section discusses the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in 
the context of the potential importance of different types of equality for social cohesion. 
Suggestions that equality is important for cohesion feature in academic literature (e.g. 
O’Donnell 2007) and in responses to the government’s community cohesion discourse of the 
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early 2000s (e.g. McGhee 2003); and this study provides evidence that also suggests certain 
types of equality may be particularly important for social cohesion.  
Last, the chapter reflects on whether the ‘level’ of the nation-state is the appropriate ‘level’ at 
which to focus on social cohesion. It discusses multicultural arguments for sub-state level 
cultures being important, and also arguments that, particularly in the context of processes of 
globalisation that create common concerns across national boundaries, cohesion at a broader 
level may also be important, such as the regional level (in particular the European Union) or 
the global level.  
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6.1 Arguments for national identity: left, right and centre 
 
This section explores liberal, social democratic and conservative arguments on the relationship 
between national identity and social cohesion. Since the concepts of ‘national identity’ and 
‘social cohesion’ are often used in such ambiguous ways, and with widely differing (but often 
unspecified) meanings depending on the nature of the discussion, it is informative to explore 
the motivations upon which a relationship between national identity and social cohesion might 
be postulated since this goes some way to uncover the meanings of each concept. It is argued 
that, although the traditions of liberalism, social democracy, and conservatism are very broad, 
there are generally speaking different senses of each of the concepts of national identity and 
social cohesion, and correspondingly of the relationship between the two, that can be linked 
to each of the traditions. 
I shall begin with a discussion of liberalism. The historical development of liberalism can be 
loosely split between classical and modern liberal periods, with the ideas of the former 
developing in the 18th and early 19th centuries, and the ideas of the latter from later in the 19th 
century (Kukathas & Pettit 1990). Both kinds of liberalism emphasised the individual’s right to 
individual liberty or autonomy, but what distinguishes modern from classical liberals is that the 
former added rights of protection from poverty, ill-health, and to the provision of education, 
to the more minimal classical idea of liberty understood in “just the negative sense of freedom 
from interference” (ibid., 74). Classical liberals have much in common with modern libertarians 
– a position that will be outlined later – but for now the focus will be on the ideas of modern 
liberalism. 
For liberals, the maintenance of a society’s liberal institutions, through which liberal principles 
can operate, is usually a very high priority. Usually the ‘society’ in question has been that of 
the state, and often there is an implicit assumption in liberal writing that the relationship being 
explored is that “between the individual and the state” without any particular justification of 
why this relationship is the most appropriate (Van Dyke 1995, 31). Liberals have held a variety 
of views on the relationship between nationality and the liberal state, but generally the 
concern is with a sense of social unity that is sufficient for the maintenance of liberal 
institutions: J.S. Mill, for instance, thought that “it is in general a necessary condition of free 
institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of 
nationalities” because a state with several nationalities is one in which members are 
“artificially tied together”, which may present an obstacle to the creation or maintenance of 
‘free’ institutions (Mill 2001, 288). In addition to stressing the importance of a sense of social 
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unity for the maintenance of liberal institutions, Mill expresses a concern for an absence of 
public order created by national differences within a state: “An army composed of various 
nationalities has no other patriotism than devotion to the flag. Such armies have been the 
executioners of liberty through the whole duration of modern history.” (ibid., 287). 
Other more recent liberals have expressed similar reasons for valuing nationality or national 
identity, again emphasising the way in which social unity and order are necessary conditions 
for the survival of liberal institutions. Barry (2001, 79) argues that “the creation and 
maintenance of the conditions under which liberal democratic institutions will survive must be 
a very high priority for an egalitarian liberal”, and that “we cannot expect the outcomes of 
democratic politics to be just in a society that contains large numbers of people who feel no 
sense of empathy with their fellow citizens and do not have any identification with their lot”.  
The liberal argument on the relationship between national identity and social cohesion, then, 
is characterised first and foremost by a concern for the maintenance of liberal (often 
democratic) institutions, without which liberal principles cannot be put into practice, and the 
autonomy or toleration of diversity that liberals value cannot be realised by all citizens. Since 
liberals “are presumably, first and foremost, people who want to see liberal institutions thrive” 
(Barry 1999, 57), the kind of social cohesion being discussed is often one stressing social unity 
or public order, which are seen as necessary conditions for the maintenance of liberal 
institutions. A shared national identity, in certain forms, may help generate this sense of social 
unity and empathy with other citizens. 
Perspectives different from the liberal one, however, might emphasise the importance of 
different values. A social democratic approach, for instance, might first-and-foremost 
emphasise the importance of equality rather than liberty or autonomy. For Miller (1998, 48), 
“the values underlying the political projects of the left … are of course disputed, but among 
them we must surely count democracy and social justice”, where social justice refers to 
measures taken to reduce “the huge resource inequalities generated by capitalist markets”. 
‘Social democracy’ has been used in many different ways and can mean different things but 
one way is as an extension of liberalism, but one in which material equality is given more 
prominence. This argument would stress that “individuals can exercise control over their own 
lives only when excessive concentrations of power, wealth, and advantage are replaced by the 
widest possible equality, but an equality which makes possible, rather than prevents, diversity 
and unpredictability” (Barker 2008, no page number). 
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There are some clear similarities between social democratic approaches and modern liberal 
approaches. Many liberals are not only concerned with the maintenance of liberal institutions, 
but also share with social democrats the importance of a sense of egalitarian social justice. 
Rawls’ (1999, 53) two principles of justice, for instance, are a good example of this: 
“First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal 
basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. 
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and 
offices open to all.” 
Rawls’ first principle is a classic statement of the liberal argument for the concept of liberty, 
but the second has more in common with the social democratic concern for egalitarian social 
justice. Where some social democrats would disagree with Rawls, however, is with regard to 
Rawls’ treatment of distributive justice as a political or contractual issue, rather than one that 
depends crucially upon affective social ties. Whilst all members of society agreeing to a 
political notion of fairness is a nice idea, so the argument might go, for members of a 
democratic society to be genuinely willing to make the sacrifices necessary for socio-economic 
inequalities to be reduced to an acceptable level, appropriate social relationships or ties must 
exist between members of that society: 
“Rawls advances a distributive principle - the difference principle - which gives people 
a claim on what others have produced by exercising their talents and skills, but says 
nothing about the communitarian relationships which, in practice, would be needed to 
underpin this principle … We can only expect them to consent to institutions that 
enforce the preferred distribution if they regard themselves as bound to the 
beneficiaries by strong ties of community: the stronger the ties, the more egalitarian 
the distribution can be”.  
Miller (1989a, 59) 
Another way of thinking about these differences between the liberal and social democratic 
concerns for autonomy and equality is Sen’s (1992) idea of debates over the ‘base’ of equality. 
For liberals, the most fundamentally important type of equality is that all members of society 
are equally able to enjoy autonomy – that is equality of autonomy represents the ‘base’. Any 
other types of inequalities that arise could then be justified on the grounds that at least there 
was equality at the ‘base’ – for instance financial inequalities between two otherwise similar 
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people could be justified on the grounds that each had equality of autonomy, and one simply 
chose to take a less lucrative career path. Social democrats, by contrast, might emphasise the 
importance of material equalities as their ‘base’, even if this means some restrictions on 
certain freedoms. From this perspective: 
“the argument should not be about inequality or equality in themselves, but about 
where (at what level) we demand that there should be equality and where we 
consider it to be peripheral or inequality to be tolerable. The difference of opinion 
between those who tolerate distributional inequality and those who do not becomes, 
therefore, one not about whether equality or inequality is a good thing but about 
where we insist that equality should be enacted and where we are happy to restrict 
it”.12 
(Platt 2011, 10) 
When translated into differences in arguments about the relationship between national 
identity and social cohesion, these differences between liberal and social democratic 
perspectives reveal an importance difference in what might be meant by national identity. One 
is a fairly ‘thin’ conception of national identity, whereby members of society have a simple 
commitment to that society’s institutions (potentially including institutions ensuring ‘fair’ 
redistribution). What Miller refers to, however, goes beyond this conception in that there is a 
cultural component to national identity: for him, things such as trust are “much more likely to 
exist among people who share a common national identity, speak a common language, and 
have overlapping cultural values” (1998, 48). The argument such theorists would make against 
the ‘thinner’ Rawlsian commitment, is that something more than an ideological commitment is 
needed for the proper functioning of a democracy, as suggested by Abizadeh’s claim that 
“[t]his is in fact his [Miller’s] substantive thesis: that democracy presupposes a shared 
nationality understood in cultural terms” (Abizadeh 2002, 498). 
                                                          
12
 This view is illustrated by Brian Barry’s description of differences between himself and Iris Marion 
Young. Barry considers the issue of the under-representation of women in ‘top corporate positions’, and 
argues that unequal outcomes such as these are potentially fair if they happen within the framework of 
just (by which he means liberal) institutions and there is an absence of discrimination. For Barry (2001, 
93): “Whatever outcomes occur as a result of free choices made within just institutions are the 
outcomes that should occur”. He describes Young’s position, by contrast, as emphasising that the 
unequal outcome is in itself unfair: 
“I would not for a moment wish to deny the great plausibility of a claim that the lack of women 
in ‘top corporate positions’ strongly suggests the existence of discrimination. But that is not 
Young’s claim: according to her, the fact that fewer than half of all ‘top corporate positions’ are 
filled by women actually constitutes discrimination” (Barry 2001, 93). 
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What appears, then, are two competing conceptions of what is meant by national identity and, 
I would like to suggest, two correspondingly different conceptions of social cohesion. 
According to the ‘thinnest’ conception, advocated by some liberals, social cohesion is required 
in order to ensure the effective functioning of liberal democratic institutions in society. To the 
extent that national identity is hoped to support social cohesion, this national identity will 
have a fairly ‘thin’ character – perhaps something like the concept of ‘constitutional 
patriotism’, to be discussed in Section 6.2 below. A ‘thicker’ conception of both national 
identity and social cohesion might be advocated by social democrats, by contrast, since the 
function of social cohesion is not simply to ensure the functioning of liberal institutions, but in 
addition to ensure that conditions of substantive equality can be realised. To the extent that 
national identity has a role in supporting this type of social cohesion, it may need to be of a 
‘thicker’ variety than that of constitutional patriotism, since members of a society need to be 
“bound to the beneficiaries by strong ties of community: the stronger the ties, the more 
egalitarian the distribution can be” (Miller 1989a, 59). 
There are, of course, many overlaps between liberals and social democrats with respect to 
these conceptions of national identity and social cohesion, since many liberals also stress the 
importance of a strong egalitarianism. Brian Barry is one such egalitarian liberal. Barry’s view 
of British identity is that it “seems to be largely a legal conception tied up with formal British 
citizenship rather than one with significant affective, cognitive or behavioural connotations”. 
This leads him to worry that, because of the lack of this ‘thicker’ aspect, “British nationality is a 
very thin glue to rely on if one is concerned about social cohesion” (2001, 83-4). As is often the 
case when social cohesion is discussed both academically and in public discourse, a precise 
definition is not offered. However one might infer from Barry’s egalitarian values the type of 
cohesion he is discussing: that is, something that both provides the social order required for 
the simple maintenance of liberal democratic institutions, and also allows for meaningful 
redistribution for the realisation of egalitarian social justice. As Barry explains, the problem 
with British identity is “that the criteria for membership in the British nation may be so 
undemanding as to render membership incapable of providing the foundation of common 
identity that is needed for the stability and justice of liberal democratic polities” (2001, 83, 
emphasis added).13 
David Goodhart makes a similar distinction. For Goodhart (2013, 287), a “national identity has 
both a very particular aspect rooted in the customs, language, texture and reference points of 
                                                          
13
 Of course, the social democratic concern with equality of outcome might be contrasted with the 
concerns of liberals such as Barry: “the former stressing greater material equality and equality of 
cultural access and the latter greater equality of opportunity” (O’Donnell 2007, 250). 
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everyday life, and a more universal ‘citizenship’ aspect derived from the political rules and 
procedures of liberal democracy. The two are normally mixed up together in most people’s 
ideas of national identity, though it is the first that carries most of the emotional charge.” The 
key issues here, according to Goodhart, are that “while ‘constitutional patriotism’ and the 
democratic rules of the road can help us live together despite growing diversity they are not 
enough to create a sense of mutual attachment” (ibid., 287); and crucially that this sense of 
mutual attachment is necessary for progressive politics. 
Thus far the discussion in this section has concentrated on differing conceptions of national 
identity, and the corresponding conceptions of social cohesion, that might be advocated by 
some liberals and social democrats. There is significant overlap in these respects between 
liberalism and social democracy, but where some liberals might advocate a ‘thin’ conception of 
national identity similar to that of constitutional patriotism, and a correspondingly ‘thin’ 
conception of social cohesion, social democrats or strongly egalitarian (particularly in the sense 
of equality of outcome) liberals might prefer a ‘thicker’ conception of national identity that is 
thought to support a conception of social cohesion that provides for the maintenance of liberal 
institutions but also is functional for redistribution and egalitarian justice. 
However, in addition to ideas that a certain level of cohesion may be necessary for the 
maintenance of liberal institutions, and for the adoption of progressive social policies, some 
communitarians put forward additional arguments regarding its importance. In particular, 
arguments have been put forward that the sharing of a common culture, and also of a 
common language, are fundamentally important in giving people’s lives context and meaning 
and can create the conditions for human flourishing. Miller, for instance, describes Charles 
Taylor’s position as suggesting that: 
“individualist liberals fail to understand the preconditions for autonomy. They see it as 
unproblematically given and needing only protection against external constraints, 
whereas in fact it requires a certain kind of cultural background. People can only make 
authentic choices about their own lives against the background of a civilization in 
which, for example, moral questions are debated in public, certain aesthetic 
experiences are available, and so forth. Community makes its appearance here in the 
guise of a common culture, participation in which is a necessary condition of liberal 
aspirations to autonomy”. 
Miller (1989a, 62-3) 
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With regard to types of social cohesion that may be important, arguments such as these imply 
that value needs to be placed on the cohesion of a common culture and language. Cohesion at 
the national level could be especially important, it might be argued, because “the promotion 
of individuality and the development of human personality is intimately tied up with 
membership in one’s national group, in part because of the role of language and culture in 
enabling choice” (Kymlicka 1995, 51). According to Abizadeh (2002, 496), partly for these type 
of reasons: “The specifically communitarian claim is that the social relations must constitute a 
community in a strong sense (e.g., not reducible to a contractarian scheme of social 
cooperation)”. Social cohesion in this sense, then, refers to cohesion of the community in 
terms of a thriving culture (and perhaps also common language), and not simply a contractual 
arrangement that may be sufficient to provide for the maintenance of liberal democratic 
institutions.  
It is necessary now, however, to look into conceptions of national identity and social cohesion 
from the political right, since the relationship postulated between the two concepts will again 
be different. The political right can be split between two schools of thought that are in many 
respects in fact rather different: libertarianism and conservatism. As mentioned earlier in this 
section, libertarianism can be understood as a modern version of classical liberalism (Kukathas 
& Pettit 1990). Libertarians tend to desire minimal government; often the only role of 
government is to monopolise the use of force and to ensure public order. Nozick (1974), for 
instance, preferred the idea of no state at all, but concludes that a minimal state is needed as 
it would be chosen by people to ensure enforcement of their liberties (see Kukathas & Pettit 
1990, 31). From the perspective of libertarianism, therefore, social cohesion is not a 
particularly important concern, aside from in the minimal sense of cohesion as public order. 
The issues egalitarian liberals or social democrats might be worried about – “social rights, 
rights to housing, education, health care and so forth – have no standing on libertarian 
principles” (Miller 2000, 51), and so the relationship between the citizen and the state is 
simply a contractual arrangement whereby the citizen acknowledges the hegemony of the 
state on the minimal set of roles ascribed to it. The national identity required for the 
maintenance of such an arrangement would be rather ‘thin’, perhaps something similar to, or 
even thinner than, the ‘constitutional patriotism’ of liberalism. 
The conservative position differs from the libertarian one in that the ideal of a minimal state is 
retained, but there is much more of a concern for social unity. Miller (2000, 42) suggests that, 
for conservatives: 
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“the individualism associated with the free market is not a sufficient basis on which to 
hold a society together ... What is needed … is a reassertion of moral values and social 
responsibility, and the citizen is portrayed as a person who sticks to the rules of the 
economic game while at the same time performing acts of public service such as 
charitable work in his or her local community”. 
The conservative emphasis on subscribing to common moral values is demonstrated by 
Conservative minister Matthew Hancock’s recent assertion that, despite the fact it is not a 
legal requirement, “Companies have a "social duty" to hire British workers before immigrants 
[since] while British firms were not legally obliged to prioritise local workers … they [have] a 
responsibility to support local employment” (BBC 2013). 
The conservative right would be critical of the liberal conception of national identity on the 
grounds that a purely ideological attachment to the state and its institutions is insufficient for 
social unity; what is instead required is an emotive sense of belonging, which would in turn 
dictate the nature of the state’s institutions, rather than the other way around: according to 
this view “[w]e have to feel that we belong together in a common society before we can 
address the question of the political institutions that will govern us” (Miller 2000, 104). This 
criticism is consistent with the conservative criticism of liberalism as imposing abstract a priori 
notions of justice upon a society, rather than allowing the customs and traditions of a society 
to dictate its institutions and sense of justice, for example as argued by Roger Scruton (2006, 
3): “The wise policy is to accept the arrangements, however imperfect, that have evolved 
through custom and inheritance, to improve them by small adjustments”. 
The key issues to take from this discussion are first that national identity and social cohesion 
can be used in various different ways; second that certain meanings of national identity tend 
to be used in conjunction with particular meanings of social cohesion; and third that each pair 
of meanings can loosely be associated with a political position. One can therefore identify 
something of a continuum, starting with libertarianism, then with liberalism, liberal 
egalitarianism, social democracy, and conservatism coming next in turn. Libertarianism and, to 
a lesser extent, liberalism, have both a very ‘thin’ idea of what social cohesion might mean – 
for the libertarian simply law and order in a minimal sense – and a correspondingly ‘thin’ 
notion of national identity (perhaps a ‘constitutional patriotism’) that, it is argued, can support 
the required cohesion. Social democracy implies a more demanding sense of social cohesion in 
which not only law and order, but egalitarian redistribution, are priorities, and so social 
democrats worry that a very ‘thin’ sense of national identity is insufficient to generate the type 
of solidarity required for progressive politics – what might be needed instead is an identity 
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based on ‘affective ties’. Conservatism becomes more demanding still, in emphasising descent, 
history and tradition, and adding cultural or descent-based criteria for membership of a 
society. Both the social cohesion required, and the national identity that is supposedly needed 
to underpin it, are ‘thick’ with cultural or ethnic content. The next section will explore in detail 
the different meanings of both national identity and social cohesion, the implications for the 
relationship between the two concepts, together with insights drawn from the quantitative 
and qualitative analysis in this thesis. 
Why does all this matter? This section has tried to outline the different meanings that can be 
attributed to national identity and social cohesion, and to suggest that understanding the 
motivations and political standpoint underlying arguments about the relationship between 
national identity and social cohesion can give insight into those meanings. It will become clear 
in Chapter 7, which gives a discussion of policy implications, how very often the vague nature 
of both the concept of national identity, and particularly the concept of social cohesion, can be 
exploited to generate arguments that can be somewhat misleading. Seemingly contradictory 
statements in public discourse, whereby one commentator might argue that social cohesion 
has been undermined by immigration and so a stronger national identity is required to 
compensate, but another might argue that society’s level of cohesion is doing just fine, are 
better interpreted in the light of the political views of those expressing the arguments. If the 
meanings of the terms are the same then both statements cannot be true at once; but if one 
interprets each commentator to have different understandings of what is meant by both 
‘national identity’ and ‘social cohesion’, then it becomes clearer what each commentator 
might be getting at. 
Whilst being in danger of oversimplification, I wish to highlight the following four arguments 
postulating a link between national identity and social cohesion that can be drawn from this 
discussion of the political and social theory literature: 
A1. National identity is important because it generates the social cohesion necessary 
for the effective functioning of a nation’s liberal democratic institutions. 
A2. National identity is important because it generates the social cohesion necessary 
for the implementation of progressive social policies, aimed at ensuring social 
justice. 
A3. National identity is important because it generates the social cohesion necessary 
for the maintenance of a civic culture – partly inherited and partly negotiated – 
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which is an important good in itself because it provides citizens’ lives with context 
and meaning. 
A4. National identity is important because it implies identification with the 
traditions, customs and history of national society, the maintenance and cohesion of 
which is an important end in itself. 
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6.2 Meanings of national identity and social cohesion 
 
6.21: Meanings of national identity 
 
As was discussed in Section 6.1, there are different theoretical arguments that can be made 
about the relationship between national identity and social cohesion, and these different 
arguments imply somewhat different meanings of national identity and social cohesion, and 
can be linked to different political positions. This section gives a discussion of the range of 
possible meanings of national identity that can be linked to these theoretical arguments. It 
argues that a three-way distinction between constitutional patriotism, civic national identity 
and ethnic national identity is helpful when discussing the relationship between national 
identity and social cohesion in order to provide clarity about what precisely is meant by 
‘national identity’. 
Constitutional patriotism is a concept that was originally developed by Dolf Sternberger, but is 
more commonly associated with the work of Jürgen Habermas (e.g. 1998; 2001). For 
Habermas it could provide “a functional equivalent to conventional notions of national 
belonging” (Fine 2007, 146), in a way that emphasises a non-emotive commitment to the state 
and its institutions, and de-emphasises traditional notions of belonging such as those based on 
history, culture or descent. Instead, a commitment to a state’s institutions, and the way in 
which they embody certain (democratic) principles, is emphasised. 
As Kymlicka points out, being committed to certain principles does not explain why people 
should be committed to any particular state (as opposed to all liberal democratic states): 
“In terms of their political values, the Danes, Germans, French, and British have 
probably never been as similar as they are now. But this has not had any appreciable 
impact on the desire of these majority nations to retain their national independence.” 
(Kymlicka 1995, 188) 
Habermas’ solution to this is to make a distinction between universalistic principles themselves 
and a specific political culture in which they are embodied: “The universalism of legal principles 
manifests itself in a procedural consensus, which must be embedded through a kind of 
constitutional patriotism in the context of a historically specific political culture” (Habermas 
1998, 226). Citizens can, therefore, agree with universalistic principles but be committed to the 
historically specific formulation of them in terms of the institutions of a particular state. 
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Constitutional patriotism, then, can be seen as an attempt to combine or reconcile the 
universal with the particular. Fine (2007, 42) describes this as follows: 
“On the one hand, constitutional patriotism refers to a shared attachment towards 
universalistic principles implicit in the idea of constitutional democracy. On the other 
hand, popular attachment to the idea of a constitution entails the sense of attachment 
citizens feel towards the particular ways in which abstract principles are interpreted 
and applied through national institutions.” 
Constitutional patriotism can be contrasted with a ‘civic’ sense of national identity. Whereas 
constitutional patriotism “seeks to bracket off questions about shared history and common 
culture and to claim that the basis on which citizens associate can be purely political”, ‘civic 
nationalism’ embraces a national culture, although it can also adapt “the inherited culture to 
make room for minority communities” (Miller 1995, 189). Constitutional patriotism refers to a 
political commitment to a state and its institutions, but is devoid of cultural content: for 
proponents of constitutional patriotism, the “level of the shared political culture must be 
uncoupled from the level of subcultures and their prepolitical identities” (Habermas 1998, 
118). Civic national identity, by contrast, is a form of national identity that is inclusive in the 
sense that any human being may (in theory at least) adopt it, but that has at least some 
cultural content, where culture is understood as referring to such things as a shared language 
or history, rather than a ‘political culture’ in Habermas’ (1998) sense. This can be contrasted 
with ethnic national identity, which includes both a commitment to the state’s institutions and 
legal system, and some cultural content, but the criteria for membership (or the recognition of 
membership) are based on descent or ethnicity. 
Sometimes the concept of a ‘civic’ national identity is used in such a way as to appear to mean 
something similar to the concept of constitutional patriotism, whereby it is devoid of cultural 
content and citizens have a mutual attachment only in that “each acknowledges the authority 
of a common set of laws and political institutions” (Miller 1995, 189). Kymlicka, however, 
argues that this usage has led to mistaken conclusions, such as in thinking that the ideological 
element to American national identity means that American ‘civic’ national identity is devoid 
of cultural content: 
“At the time of the Revolution, the overwhelming majority of Americans shared the 
same language, literature, and religion as the English … In order to develop a sense of 
distinctive nationhood, Americans emphasized certain political principles – liberty, 
equality, democracy – principles which had justified their rebellion. Some people 
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conclude from this that American nationalism is ideological rather than cultural … But 
that is a mistake. The Americans, as much as the English, conceived of national 
membership in terms of participation in a common culture … Ideology shaped, but did 
not replace, the cultural component of national identity.” 
Kymlicka (1995, 200) 
It may be more helpful, therefore, to distinguish between three concepts: constitutional 
patriotism; civic national identity; and ethnic national identity. “What distinguishes ‘civic’ 
nations from ‘ethnic’ nations is not the absence of any cultural component to national identity, 
but rather the fact that anyone can integrate into the common culture, regardless of race or 
colour” (Kymlicka 1995, 24). With regard to ethnic national identity, Abizadeh (2002, 497) 
notes that “ethnic nationalists appeal to the nation understood as a community of shared 
culture but also of common descent”. The three-way distinction is also illuminating with regard 
to arguments A1 to A4, as already hinted at in section 6.1. A ‘thinner’ national identity – in 
particular constitutional patriotism – might have more to do with arguments A1 and A2, where 
the emphasis is on the cohesion necessary to support the maintenance of liberal democratic 
institutions or institutions of redistribution; but a ‘thicker’ national identity such as a cultural 
civic identity or an ethnic identity might be more consistent with arguments A3 and A4, where 
the emphasis is on the maintenance of a civic culture, or on the inherited customs and 
traditions of national society. 
This three-way distinction was also, to an extent, supported by the narratives on national 
identity presented in the qualitative component, although respondents did not always express 
it in the same terms. For instance, a distinction was made between a national identity itself 
and a commitment to ‘following the laws’ or a ‘loyalty to Britain’, as indicated by the following 
respondent: 
“I live here I like Britain, I follow the laws, I, you know, I think I have a loyalty to Britain, 
but as far as feeling British I can’t say it’s something I’ve ever given any thought to 
‘cause it doesn’t seem that important to me”. 
This respondent’s views have some similarities with the notion of constitutional patriotism in 
the sense of following laws and of a distancing from conventional notions of national identity, 
but there is also a semantic ambiguity in that a ‘loyalty’ or a ‘like’ of Britain can also have an 
emotive component, so to some extent the respondent may be implying a sense of ‘love’ for 
Britain in addition to the ‘commitment’ of a constitutional patriotism. Nevertheless, there was 
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a clear distinction made between this respondent’s sense of ‘loyalty’ to Britain and a British 
identity. 
Respondents in the qualitative component generally saw British identity itself as implying at 
least some cultural content, in a way that is consistent with the understanding of a ‘civic’ 
national identity discussed above. One of the narratives around which British identity was seen 
as being connected with social cohesion focused on language, accent and etiquette, which are 
clearly cultural traits, rather than a non-cultural constitutional patriotism. English identity, by 
contrast, was clearly seen as an ethnic identity, with some respondents describing their 
exclusion from it due to not being (or being seen as) ‘Anglo-Saxon’. However, the possibilities 
for British identity to be exclusionary were also often discussed, suggesting that, at least for 
the respondents in this study, British identity has not yet become what Trevor Phillips (2009) 
describes as a purely civic, inclusive identity that is open to all. 
There is a debate, the implications of which will be expanded upon in the next section, about 
the extent to which ‘thinner’ versions of national identity are sufficient for the social unity and 
cohesion that states are alleged to require. Habermas argues that constitutional patriotism is 
sufficient for the functioning of a liberal state: “If some kind of national consciousness is 
required from the point of view of inculcating a willingness on the part of citizens to do what is 
required of them for the common good, such as the maintenance of public services through 
taxation or the acceptance of democratic decisions as legitimate, it is according to Habermas 
constitutional patriotism that can perform these integrative functions” (Fine 2007, 41-2). 
Others, however, argue that “Habermas’s ‘patriotism of the constitution’ is too thin … It is 
useless to imagine that particularistic loyalties can be attenuated unless there is some wider 
focus of loyalty that can be charged with some emotional force” (Barry 1999, 55). Miller 
similarly suggests that members of a society need to be “bound to the beneficiaries by strong 
ties of community” (1989a, 59). What is argued is that some kind of emotional attachments 
between citizens are needed; “a shared affective identity that inspires … members' loyalty” 
(Abizadeh 2002, 496) rather than simply a commitment to a contractual arrangement. What I 
will argue is that the extent to which this is a problem is at least partly explained by what is 
meant by social unity and cohesion and the reasons why cohesion is desired. Being clear about 
both the type of national identity and the type of social cohesion under discussion, therefore, 
can go some way to resolving seemingly contradictory claims.  
It is now, however, important to explore, in the context of the distinction between these three 
concepts of national identity, what the significance of all this is for the relationship between 
national identity and social cohesion. The first issue is related to policy implications, and refers 
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to the ambiguity in the usage of the term ‘civic’ identity. If it is used in the way Miller (2000, 
131) uses it, then civic identity refers to a non-cultural identity, or something akin to what I am 
calling ‘constitutional patriotism’. But as both Kymlicka (1995) and Miller (1995) suggest, most 
alleged examples of this non-cultural type of national identity are in fact mistaken, and such 
national identities do in fact have a cultural component to their meanings: “Immigrants to the 
United States must not only pledge allegiance to democratic principles, they must also learn 
the language and history of their new society” (Kymlicka 1995, 24). This is important because, 
when government reports (e.g. Denham 2001) suggest the need for a civic identity, if this 
means civic in the sense I am using it here, then this identity can be open to all groups 
regardless of descent (i.e. it is not an ethnic national identity), but adopting such an identity 
does involve some amount of cultural assimilation. My claim is simply that it is important to be 
clear about that fact, rather than using the ambiguity of the notion of ‘civic identity’ to suggest 
that no assimilation need take place. 
The second, and related, issue regards the cultural status of language. Given there has been a 
major emphasis on English language use in recent British policy on immigration and cohesion, 
it is important to understand whether enforcing English language use is a purely functional 
requirement or whether it should be understood as a part of the assimilation into British 
culture. It seems plausible that all languages, at least to some extent, have some cultural and 
historical connotations (e.g. Kymlicka 1995), and so requirements to learn English might be 
thought of at least in part as assimilation into the existing dominant culture. But one could, 
alternatively, adopt an argument such as that given by Brian Barry in order to downplay the 
significance of language as a cultural trait: 
“Where language is concerned, a state cannot adopt a neutral stance: it must provide 
its services in one or more languages, decide if a linguistic test for employment is to 
count as illegal discrimination, and so on. At the same time, however, it can be said of 
language as of no other cultural trait that it is a matter of convention. No doubt every 
language has its own peculiar excellences, but any language will do as the medium of 
communication in a society as long as everybody speaks it. This is one case involving 
cultural attributes in which ‘This is how we do things here’ – the appeal to local 
convention – is a self-sufficient response to pleas for the public recognition of 
diversity.” 
(Barry 2001, 107) 
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Whilst the idea that the English language has cultural and historical connotations is surely 
beyond dispute, it may be true that there can be functional reasons for learning English for 
many people, especially given its status as a major international language. The point here is 
only that this duality of reasons for emphasising English language use for social cohesion – 
both for culture and for getting on in British life – might be pointed out, and the priority 
between the two made explicit, when encouraging English language use.  
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6.22: Meanings of social cohesion 
 
This section provides a synthesis of the data from the quantitative and qualitative 
components, together with the theoretical considerations explored in this chapter up until 
now, to present an argument that the contested concept of social cohesion might be 
meaningfully split into two different concepts, which may be particularly advantageous when 
one is discussing the relationship between national identity and social cohesion. These two 
concepts are termed ‘institutional cohesion’ and ‘associational cohesion’. It is further argued 
that the relationship between national identity and social cohesion may depend on which of 
the two concepts one is discussing. Table 58 gives a comparison of the two concepts with 
regard to the evidence relating to each concept in both the quantitative and qualitative 
components of this study, and with regard to the theoretical considerations explored in this 
chapter up until now, including the four different arguments outlined in Section 6.1. 
Institutional cohesion refers to relationships between individuals and public institutions, 
particularly with regard to the ways in which individuals have a say in influencing these 
institutions, and the ways in which individuals can gain access to the services they provide. A 
‘cohesive society’ in this sense, then, refers to a society in which individuals feel public 
institutions are legitimate and can represent them, and where all individuals are able to access 
the services these institutions provide on an equal basis. This type of cohesion refers more to a 
contractual relationship between the individual and society’s institutions than any particular 
cultural traits. 
Associational cohesion, by contrast, refers to relationships between individuals in a society and 
to the ways in which individuals feel a sense of belonging as part of that society. A ‘cohesive 
society’ in this sense, then, refers to a society where individuals interact with each other, are 
engaged in civic activities with other members, feel strong senses of belonging to the society 
and their locality, and feel they have much in common with other members.  This type of 
cohesion refers to cultural traits and cultural similarities between individuals. 
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Table 58: A comparison of Institutional Cohesion and Associational Cohesion 
 Institutional Cohesion Associational Cohesion 
Description Refers to contractual 
relationships between individuals 
and public institutions. 
Refers to relations between 
individuals – in particular 
interactions with others and 
associational behaviour – and to 
spatial belonging, and 
emphasises cultural similarity. 
Quantitative 
evidence 
Operationalised as being able to 
influence and access public 
institutions. Not strongly 
associated with British or English 
identity; perceived discrimination 
associated strongly. 
Operationalised as engaging in 
civic and social activity and 
spatial belonging and 
satisfaction. Associated with 
British identity to some extent; 
education and deprivation are 
associated more strongly. 
Qualitative evidence Linked with national identity 
through knowledge of the British 
political system; feeling of 
responsibility to society leads to a 
commitment to constitutional 
framework. 
Linked with national identity 
through national identity being a 
signifier of positive outcomes; 
the non-acceptance of colonial 
British identities could lead to 
negative social outcomes. 
Theoretical issues Emphasises a commitment to 
liberal democratic institutions; 
‘sameness’ refers to equal access 
to institutions. 
Emphasises the sameness of 
values, culture and identities 
themselves, and has assimilatory 
implications. 
Consistent with 
political positions 
Liberalism, social democracy 
(arguments A1 and A2) 
Communitarianism, conservatism 
(arguments A3 and A4) 
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Quantitative evidence 
The quantitative component provides a body of evidence to support the distinction between 
institutional and associational cohesion. The quantitative component, let us recall, found that 
social cohesion breaks into ten different ‘elements’. Figure 18 below shows each of the 
elements, together with an indication of how they group into the two types of cohesion. From 
the evidence provided in the quantitative component, there are important differences 
between the two types in terms of the variables with which they have large and significant 
associations. The top half of Figure 18 represents ‘institutional cohesion’; whilst the bottom 
half represents ‘associational cohesion’. Institutional cohesion is represented by the ‘elements’ 
that measure the ability to influence public institutions, being treated with respect using public 
services, and perceptions of equal access to public services. Associational cohesion, by 
contrast, is represented by the ‘elements’ that measure social interactions with people of 
different backgrounds, civic engagement and volunteering, being satisfied with one’s place of 
residence including feeling that neighbours share values and can be trusted, and belonging to 
one’s local area and Britain. 
Figure 18: Two types of cohesion – links with quantitative analysis 
 
 
The reasoning behind the splitting of the ten elements of social cohesion into these two 
groups, with one group representing institutional cohesion and the other associational 
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cohesion, is as follows. The quantitative component found that the regression models for each 
of the ten elements of social cohesion broke up into three categories in terms of the 
proportion of variance explained by the model (i.e. the R squared values). The five models with 
a high or moderate level of explained variance were those that had variables representing 
associational cohesion as the dependent variable; and the five models with poor levels of 
explained variance were those that had variables representing institutional cohesion as the 
dependent variable. 
For the models representing associational cohesion, national identity was of some relevance: 
there were positive associations between British identity and each of the five elements for 
many of the ethnic groups, and these findings held up fairly robustly when subjected to 
sensitivity analysis, although educational qualifications and area deprivation were associated 
more strongly. For English identity the findings were more mixed: there were positive 
associations between English identity and civic and social activity for some non-white ethnic 
groups, but for the white group English identity was negatively associated with social activity 
with people of different backgrounds. The exclusive ethnic connotations of English identity, as 
discussed in the qualitative component, are a possible explanation for this finding. The fact 
that the R squared values for the models representing associational cohesion were reasonably 
satisfactory is important, because it suggests that the findings were less likely to be spurious 
associations driven by another factor that was not controlled for. These findings, in any case, 
suggest that for associational cohesion national identity may be of some relevance. However, 
whether or not the relationships between national identity and each of the measures of 
associational cohesion are causal and, if so, the direction of causality, are issues that it is 
clearly not possible to establish with these regression models. 
By contrast, the models with poor levels of explained variance were those that had dependent 
variables representing what I am calling institutional cohesion. Although for three of the five 
models there were again positive associations between British identity and the measure of 
social cohesion, it is difficult to conclude, on this evidence, that British identity has much 
relevance for the models representing institutional cohesion, for two reasons. First, the low R 
squared value increases the chance that a third factor that is not controlled for may be driving 
the positive association, which would mean that the associations that were found in these 
models are spurious. Second, the low R squared values mean that British identity cannot be 
doing much explanatory ‘work’ with these models. Since R squared values can be thought of as 
the reduction in the level of prediction errors as a proportion of the total variation, the R 
squared value of 0.018 found for the model for the ‘health services’ element shows that the 
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model does not predict the values of the social cohesion measure much better than simply 
using the mean. The fact that the magnitudes of the associations between British identity and 
each of the measures of institutional cohesion were small compared to some of the control 
variables in the model increases the sense even further that British identity had only a weak 
relationship with these measures of cohesion. 
Attempts were made, however, to increase the R squared values of the models measuring 
what I am calling institutional cohesion by adding additional control variables to the models 
that might theoretically be regarded as important for these types of cohesion. Measures of 
perceived discrimination, in particular, were added, and were found to have moderate success 
in increasing the R squared values in that they increased in some models, but not especially in 
others. However, a key finding was that indicators of perceived discrimination had effect 
magnitudes that were much greater than those of British identity (and only three of the 
models found significant effects for British identity). This suggests that British identity is not 
especially important for these measures of institutional cohesion, but that perceptions of 
discrimination are particularly important. 14 
Overall, then, the differences between associational and institutional cohesion in the 
quantitative component can be summarised as follows. British identity may have some 
relevance for associational cohesion in that there are fairly consistent, positive and significant 
associations between British identity and each of the associational cohesion measures for 
several ethnic groups, and the R squared values are generally large enough for it to be less 
                                                          
14
 For linear regression models with only one independent variable, the interpretation of R squared 
values in terms of the explanatory ‘work’ done by the independent variable is fairly clear. Since the R 
squared value measures the decrease in prediction errors when using the model as compared with the 
sample mean, the one independent variable is reducing the prediction error by precisely the amount 
indicated by the R squared value. For linear regression models with more than one independent 
variable, however, interpreting the explanatory ‘work’ done by any one particular independent variable 
is less clear-cut, since the overall reduction in prediction errors can be attributed to the combination of 
all explanatory variables. In general, however, assuming multicollinearity is not a great problem (see the 
Appendix, Part C for a discussion), it could be said that a greater amount of explanatory work is done by 
variables with relatively large coefficients. For models with large R squared values, therefore, it is likely 
that a greater amount of explanatory work can be attributed to a particular variable, as compared to the 
same variable with the same relative coefficient size in an identical model but with a lower R squared 
value. For these reasons, I am concluding that it is plausible to argue that, for the models representing 
institutional cohesion, the combination of very small relative coefficient magnitudes for British identity 
and low R squared values mean that British identity is not doing much explanatory ‘work’. For the 
models representing associational cohesion, by contrast, the combination of relatively small coefficient 
magnitudes for British identity and larger R squared values may mean that British identity is doing more 
explanatory ‘work’ in these models. In addition, many of the relative coefficient magnitudes for British 
identity are larger in the associational cohesion models than the institutional cohesion models. For 
instance, religious discrimination has an effect magnitude over 15 times greater than British identity for 
the model measuring equal treatment by health service providers (an indicator of institutional 
cohesion), but educational qualifications has an effect size of 10 times greater than British identity for 
civic engagement and volunteering (an indicator of associational cohesion). 
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likely that the associations are spurious. However, the associations are small compared with 
the effect magnitudes of some of the other variables – most notably area deprivation and 
educational level. For institutional cohesion, by contrast, British identity may have much less 
relevance. The R squared values of the models were initially very low and the positive and 
significant associations that do exist between British identity and cohesion for three of the five 
models are very small. When other control variables were added to the models in an attempt 
to increase the R squared values, measures of discrimination in particular were found to have 
effect sizes much larger in magnitude than those of British identity, and the R squared values 
remained fairly low in some cases. This combination of low R squared values and 
comparatively very small effect sizes for British identity suggests it is not doing much 
explanatory ‘work’ in these models, so may not have much relevance for institutional 
cohesion, at least in the way it is operationalised in this study. This finding, however, must be 
treated with caution because of the possibility that the relatively low R squared values are due 
to another factor that has not been included in the models (and that may change the co-
efficient sizes if included), or that these models do not ‘capture’ the concepts of what I am 
calling institutional cohesion particularly well. Nevertheless, the tentative findings regarding 
differences between institutional and associational cohesion are that perceptions of 
discrimination may have much more relevance than national identity for institutional 
cohesion; whereas for associational cohesion British identity may be moderately associated 
but education and deprivation may have much more important relationships to associational 
cohesion. 
Qualitative evidence 
The qualitative component presented evidence on narratives by which national identity and 
social cohesion might, or might not, be linked, and the narratives imply somewhat different 
understandings of what is meant by social cohesion. The differences in these narratives can 
also support the distinction between institutional and associational cohesion and, in addition, 
illustrate ways in which the processes underlying the relationships between national identity 
and each of the two types of cohesion might work. 
With regard to institutional cohesion, Chapter 5, section 5.31 explores a narrative whereby 
British identity and social cohesion are linked through knowledge of the British political and 
social system. The emphasis with this narrative is on an ability to access public institutions, 
such as ways of negotiating complex systems of public services, or ways in which it might be 
possible to contact a local MP. These ideas clearly have resonances with the understanding of 
institutional cohesion as being about the ability to access – as in the case of public services – or 
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influence – as in the case of contacting an MP to express one’s views – public institutions. In 
terms of the processes by which these examples of institutional cohesion might come about, 
one respondent discussed the complex nature of public services and the way in which services 
might not be “geared towards supporting a variety of people”. As with the quantitative 
evidence, in which perceptions of discrimination were linked to institutional cohesion 
outcomes, this respondent emphasises the importance of accessibility to public services for “a 
variety of people” in society, suggesting that ensuring equal access across different groups 
might be especially important. 
In addition, Chapter 5, section 5.43 discusses the respondents in ‘group three’. These 
respondents express a combination of two different narratives: they generally have moderate 
British identities, but downplay their importance, and they also emphasise the ways in which 
personal choice and individual responsibility might be important for social cohesion outcomes. 
The examples of types of social cohesion given by these respondents include being part of a 
local tenants’ association, and participating in a demonstration about pensions, which clearly 
have links to the idea of being able to influence public institutions. These respondents tended 
not to think their British identities had a role to play in social cohesion outcomes, and one 
possible explanation for the way in which these narratives are grouped is that respondents 
thought that their own sense of their responsibilities to society were important for 
determining social cohesion outcomes, rather than their British identities, where cohesion was 
understood as a commitment to a “constitutional or political framework” (Miller 2000, 131). If 
this interpretation is right, it supports the finding of the quantitative component that British 
identity does not have much relevance for institutional cohesion. 
With regard to associational cohesion, Chapter 5, section 5.31 explores a narrative whereby 
British identity can be a signifier of positive social cohesion outcomes; British identity and a 
sense of connectedness with society often went together, whilst an absence of British identity 
was often accompanied by a lack of connectedness. This narrative often used understandings 
of what I am referring to as ‘associational’ cohesion. British identity was linked with a sense of 
belonging, both to Britain and to a locality; and British identity was also linked with an idea of 
being ‘listened to’ in social situations. Both British identity, and its link to cohesion, were 
understood in cultural terms, particularly with regard to Britain’s history and descriptions of 
colonialism. One understanding was that negative connotations with regard to Britain’s 
colonial past could lead to a distancing from British identity, which could lead to an absence of 
belonging. Also, a colonial sense of Britishness was associated with middle-class status and the 
adoption of ‘British’ cultural traits. The issue of non-acceptance was also important, whereby 
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colonial British subjects would arrive in Britain already with a strong British identity, but would 
feel rejected from that identity by the white majority because of their skin colour. This in turn 
could lead to negative consequences in social situations where immigrants felt they were not 
considered as ‘from here’. 
The narrative about British identity and social cohesion being linked through language, accent 
and etiquette (see section 5.31), however, sits somewhat in the middle of the distinction 
between institutional and associational cohesion. In one sense, this understanding of the link 
between British identity and social cohesion is much more culturally ‘laden’ than the narrative 
focusing on knowledge of the British political system. The ability to speak English well, having a 
middle class English accent, and having an understanding of things perceived to be typically 
‘British’ in terms of etiquette were all linked to positive outcomes; whilst lacking these traits 
were linked to negative outcomes. There is clearly an idea that Britishness, understood in 
terms of subscribing to a dominant culture, was linked (sometimes unfairly) to positive 
outcomes. The cultural focus of these narratives fits more with what I am describing as 
‘associational cohesion’. On the other hand, many of these narratives used an understanding 
of cohesion described in terms of access to public services in particular, which fits more with 
what I am describing as ‘institutional cohesion’. This suggests – contrary to the quantitative 
evidence suggesting British identity has little to do with institutional cohesion – that cultural 
notions of British identity may indeed be important; but from another perspective could also 
emphasise the quantitative findings that non-discrimination is very important for accessing 
public services. Respondents in the qualitative component were often negative about the ways 
in which a lack of these cultural traits of language, accent and etiquette could be a problem, 
which may suggest that there is much work to do in ensuring equality of public service 
provision regardless of issues such as language proficiency. Indeed, Craig (1999, 197) highlights 
the way in which minority ethnic groups “are structurally disadvantaged in their treatment by 
the social security system”, not least because of failures to provide sufficient translation 
services. 
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Theoretical issues 
In addition, there are some important theoretical differences between the two types of 
cohesion. Institutional cohesion – referring to relationships between individuals and public 
institutions, including public services – has more in common with the concerns of some liberals 
and social democrats in terms of support for liberal democratic institutions and for the 
institutions of redistribution. Associational cohesion – referring to the ways in which people 
interact with each other and to belonging to place – has more to do with communitarian 
concerns with community, culture and language providing important conditions for human 
flourishing, or conservative concerns with the maintenance of national traditions and customs. 
Institutional cohesion might therefore have more relevance for arguments A1 and A2, as 
outlined in section 6.1 of this chapter, whereas associational cohesion might have more 
relevance for arguments A3 and A4. 
In this way, having a state that is institutionally cohesive might be thought of as an essentially 
liberal idea whereby citizens put aside their prepolitical attachments and show a commitment 
to a particular set of institutions and democratic processes, and a commitment to the ability 
for all to access them on an equal basis. The ‘cohesion’ refers to the same commitment and 
the same access to these institutions and processes of all citizens. After this point, there is a 
common framework of institutions and democratic processes through which difference – of 
culture, values or identity – can be contested. 
Associational cohesion, by contrast, may be seen to imply a quite different type of ‘sameness’ 
upon which cohesion is based. It does not simply imply a commitment to an essentially liberal 
framework, but actually of sameness of values, culture or identities themselves. Some of the 
questions in the Citizenship Survey that form part of what I am calling associational cohesion 
are of this type: for instance, respondents were asked to what extent they agree that their 
local area is a place where people share values. Thought about in this way, for an area to be 
institutionally cohesive it is not necessary that people share values (aside from universal 
democratic liberal ones); but for an area to have associational cohesion it may well be 
necessary. This issue of whether the sameness of values is constitutive of the meaning of social 
cohesion has resonances with the findings of Hickman et al. (2012, 12-3) that: 
“there is a strong suggestion in our interviews that many people have an 
understanding that pluralism necessarily entails conflict and that the goal sought is 
agreed means of resolving conflict rather than a mythical harmony based on common 
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values. Social cohesion, in other words, is not about avoiding conflict; it is about 
resolving conflict.” 
The issue about what is meant by ‘shared values’ is an important one, since policy is “driven by 
the attempt to commit and bind newcomers to the particular society that is receiving them, 
notionally making them familiar with the ‘British’ … values and ways of doing things” (Joppke 
2004, 253). Yet many of the specific values espoused by, for instance, the Cantle Report were 
simply universal liberal values: “Instead of being ‘British’, this was the universal, nationally 
anonymous creed of the liberal state” (ibid.). In other aspects of policy on community cohesion 
and immigration, however, the tone is rather different, and focuses on the perceived failure of 
minority communities “to ‘integrate’, and their desire to lead increasingly separate lives, both 
geographically and culturally, at odds with ‘traditional’ values of white Britishness” (Craig 
2008, 237), and implies ethnic minorities should assimilate into the majority culture. 
Rather than talking about shared values in the abstract, therefore, it is important to be clear 
about whether one is actually discussing universalistic liberal values or more specific values. 
When discussing the importance of shared values in our understanding of social cohesion, 
from the perspective of my distinction between institutional and associational cohesion, 
universalistic shared values might have more to do with institutional cohesion, but more 
specific shared values might have more to do with associational cohesion. The strong 
ambiguity over the type of values ‘Britishness’ is supposed to imply is illustrated by the list 
drawn up in a recent study (Ethnos 2005, 6): 
“These included upholding human rights and freedoms, respect for the rule of law, 
fairness, tolerance and respect for others, reserve and pride (generally valued by white 
English participants and criticised by white Scottish and white Welsh participants, as 
well as those from ethnic minority backgrounds), a strong work ethic, community 
spirit, mutual help, stoicism and compassion, and drunkenness, hooliganism and 
yobbishness.” 
Many of these values are clearly universal liberal values, but others are not. One would 
(presumably) not wish to argue that a cohesive society can be built around drunkenness, 
hooliganism and yobbishness, but perhaps one might argue that one could be built around 
‘reserve’ and ‘pride’. Yet if one wishes to emphasise ‘reserve’ and ‘pride’ rather than 
‘upholding human rights’ and ‘respect for the rule of law’, then this is going to imply 
assimilation to white English cultural values, which may evoke negativity from minority groups, 
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as shown in the Ethnos study. If one wishes to emphasise universal liberal values then it is, as 
has been discussed already, difficult to see what is specifically British about them. 
This neatly illustrates the duality of the discourse around social cohesion and shared values, 
whereby sometimes shared values are discussed in terms of universal liberal values which can 
emphasise such things as tolerance of diversity, but then the discussion can quickly shift to 
specifically white English cultural traits and can have strongly assimilationist connotations. It is 
extremely important to be clear as to exactly what an emphasis on cohesion and shared values 
is supposed to entail: is it important for all members of society to subscribe to the principles of 
living in a liberal democracy, but not necessarily important that people adopt the same cultural 
attachments beyond this; or is it important for all members of society to share at least some of 
the same cultural traits? Distinguishing between ‘institutional’ and ‘associational’ types of 
cohesion is one way to move away from such ambiguities and their very different implications, 
and could prevent the ambiguity from being used to shift without justification from a 
discussion of liberal values to one of English cultural assimilation. Distinguishing between the 
two types of cohesion could similarly help prevent contradictions such as the Home Office’s 
promotion of “assimilationist policies underpinning community cohesion (which ignores the 
continuing racism characterising British life)” (Craig 2008, 238) whilst at the same time 
suggesting that “to be British does not mean assimilation into a common culture so that 
original identities are lost” (Home Office 2005b, 15). 
These issues are, therefore, going to be crucially important for policy. In the context of the 
community cohesion agenda, more progress has been made specifying the type of national 
identity than being more specific about social cohesion, since a civic notion of Britishness has 
been promoted rather than the concept of English identity with its strong ethnic connotations. 
Whilst community cohesion has been defined in government reports (e.g. Cantle 2001; LGA 
2002), it is such a broad concept that simply defining it and its dimensions in a report, then 
going on to discuss it as a unified concept, can be problematic. If what I am suggesting in this 
chapter is sound, then there are going to be fundamental differences in the implications of 
policies promoting institutional cohesion as compared to associational cohesion, since the 
former may focus on issues of equal access to the state’s institutions and democratic 
processes, including understanding the reasons behind issues of accessibility for different 
groups, possible issues of discrimination and interactions between discrimination and group 
difference; whereas the latter may focus on encouraging a sense of sameness in values, 
identities and culture as a route to state-level national unity, and is going to have far more to 
do with assimilation into the majority culture.  
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6.3 Equality and social cohesion 
 
This section puts arguments over the relationship between national identity and social 
cohesion in Britain in context by asking what else might also be important for cohesion and 
solidarity. A major alternative to the debate surrounding identity in much academic literature 
is a discussion of the relationship between social cohesion and structural equality. Given that a 
major finding from Chapter 4 is also that inequality – in particular education and area 
deprivation – may be particularly relevant for social cohesion, it is pertinent to explore the 
potential relationship: that is the aim of this section. 
To begin with it is important to explore the theoretical arguments put forward for the 
relationship between equality and social cohesion. One can find two main arguments here. 
The first is discussed in section 6.1 as Argument A2: national identity is important because it 
can provide the social cohesion that is necessary for the enactment of progressive social 
policies, which in turn can help ensure equality. The direction of causation implied is from 
national identity to social cohesion, and then from social cohesion to the enactment of 
progressive social policies; in terms of the relationship between equality and social cohesion, 
therefore, the argument postulates social cohesion has the potential to cause increased 
equality. This is the kind of argument endorsed by Miller (e.g. 1995; 2000), in which he argues 
that strong ties of community can increase support for redistribution. A hypothesis which 
implies a similar direction of causality can be found in Kymlicka (2008, 62): “ethnic/racial 
diversity as such makes it more difficult to sustain redistributive policies, since it is difficult to 
generate a common sense of national identity and feelings of national solidarity across 
ethnic/racial lines”. This argument again implies that national solidarities enable the 
maintenance of redistributive policies. 
The second argument, however, reverses the postulated direction of causality. It suggests that 
a cohesive society is only possible (or is at least much more likely) under conditions of 
substantive equality. A number of notable theorists have argued along these lines. Rousseau 
(1973, 238), for instance, considered the distribution of rights and resources to both be 
important for the stability of states: “People the territory evenly, extend everywhere the same 
rights, bear to every place in it abundance and life: by these means will the State become at 
once as strong and as well governed as possible”. In addition, Durkheim considered material 
equality to be important: “While Durkheim accepted class hierarchy he was a radical 
meritocrat, arguing that organic solidarity could not function ‘normally’ without genuine 
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equality of opportunity … This led him to advocate a number of egalitarian positions, including 
opposition to inherited wealth” O’Donnell (2007, 252). 
A suggestion put forward for the mechanism that might drive this section argument is in the 
design of a state’s institutions, and in particular the welfare state. Titmuss (1971, 225), for 
instance, argued that “the ways in which society organizes and structures its social institutions 
– and particularly its health and welfare systems – can … foster integration or alienation”. If 
this second type of argument is correct, then states could create social cohesion not by 
bolstering national identity, but by carefully designing institutions such that, in particular, 
equality is increased. 
What the debate between the two arguments essentially comes down to is whether social 
cohesion is dependent on a prepolitical community of people that wish to live together and 
share the same political system and institutions, or whether social cohesion can be engineered 
by certain projects such as the design of these institutions themselves. Perhaps Kymlicka’s 
(2008, 61) suggestion that causation goes both ways is correct: “the welfare state has both 
presupposed and perpetuated an ideology of nationhood”. Yet, on the evidence from this 
study, to the extent that a national identity – either British or English – can be considered an 
indicator of a prepolitical sense of community, then inequality – in the sense of indicators of 
educational qualifications and area deprivation – appears to be much more important for 
social cohesion than a prepolitical sense of community. Of course, these are associations, and 
do not imply causality, but if national identity was to cause strongly increased social cohesion, 
then one should at least expect to find the two to be strongly and consistently associated. It 
may also be that British or English identity, as operationalised in the Citizenship Survey, do not 
‘capture’ the concept of prepolitical community, but in the way the concepts were measured 
here, indicators of equality were much more important.  
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6.4 Conceptual issues: multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism 
 
Many discussions of national identity and social cohesion, particularly ones closely related to 
public discourse in Britain, begin with a discussion of multiculturalism and ostensibly 
multiculturalism’s opposition to national identity and national social cohesion (McLaughlin 
2010; Percival 2007). I have decided not to pursue this approach in this chapter, and instead to 
focus on broader arguments for links postulated between national identity and social cohesion 
found in political and social theory, because I believe the approach is somewhat misleading, 
and for two reasons. First, it reduces the debate on issues that may potentially be important 
for generating or sustaining social cohesion to a very narrow subset of the possible options, 
namely by focusing on group identities; and second reduces the debate even further by 
choosing two particular types of group identity – some sub-state cultural identities and 
(presumably state-level) national identities – and presenting them as binary oppositions to one 
another, rather than (as I wish to suggest) simply two examples of a type of group identity. 
From my perspective, there are a range of different things that could be important for 
generating or sustaining social cohesion, of which group identities are one possibility. Even 
within the subcategory of group identities, state-level national identities and the sub-state 
cultural identities that some multicultural theorists frequently refer to are but two examples. It 
is more helpful to see emphases on multicultural and national identities as two types of a 
similar argument rather than the binary oppositions that they are sometimes made out to be. 
Mike O’Donnell (2007, 249) makes a similar point in arguing that the “underlying issue is social 
solidarity and how to foster it. Focusing on national identity as a counterbalance to 
multiculturalism is merely one approach and could be counterproductive if pursued 
insensitively”. 
Nevertheless, given the prominence in some of the social cohesion literature of a critique of 
multiculturalism, it is important to consider the arguments. This section will first consider 
arguments for the importance of supporting national identity and criticising multiculturalism 
on the grounds of sustaining social cohesion; and second put this debate in context by 
considering a critique of nationalism with reference to globalisation and theories of 
cosmopolitanism. A key theme throughout is of different ‘levels’ of group identity, whether it 
be at a sub-state level as advocated by some multiculturalists, a state level as advocated by 
some types of nationalists, a regional level as advocated by, for instance, some European 
Union enthusiasts, or a global level as advocated by universalists. An additional theme is a dual 
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challenge to the importance of national identities: a multicultural challenge from ‘below’; and 
a universalist challenge from ‘above’. 
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6.41: Multiculturalism 
 
Multiculturalism can refer either to a state of affairs – that is a description of multiple cultures 
existing within a single polity – or to a set of social policies generally aimed at attributing 
groups with particular rights on the basis of cultural differences. It is the latter meaning that is 
of interest here, given that the debate around the alleged divisiveness of multiculturalism 
tends to focus on multicultural policies rather than the existence of cultural diversity in itself. 
In its latter meaning, multiculturalism “can be seen as an attempt to remedy the longstanding 
patterns of injustice that have characterised state-minority relations in the era of nation-
building states” (Kymlicka 2008, 61). To the extent that liberalism has been influential for 
state-minority relations in this era, multiculturalism can also be seen as an attempt to remedy 
some of the perceived injustices of liberalism, such as supporting the dominant groups in 
society under the pretence of cultural neutrality. 
Justifications for multiculturalism can point in particular to the pretence of cultural neutrality 
upon which some liberal arguments depend, and suggest that such cultural neutrality is not 
practically possible. A state will necessarily need to make some cultural decisions, so the 
criticism goes, not least on the key issue of the language or languages to use in education, 
public sector employment, and the courts. The state is then not culturally neutral and, 
crucially, will often tend to favour the cultural preferences of the society’s dominant group or 
groups. The issue then becomes that a liberal claim of cultural neutrality is in fact a cover-up 
for the normalisation and imposition of the dominant group’s cultural values. As Young (1990, 
116) argues: 
“The standpoint of the privileged, their particular experience and standards, is 
constructed as normal and neutral. If some groups’ experience differs from this neutral 
experience, or they do not measure up to those standards, their difference is 
constructed as deviance and inferiority. Not only are the experience and values of the 
oppressed thereby ignored and silenced, but they become disadvantaged by their 
situated identities.”  
Multiculturalism, when used to refer to a set of public policies, can denote a very broad range 
of measures ostensibly taken to offset a bias towards the cultural values of a society’s 
dominant group, and to ensure that members of non-dominant groups have (at least roughly) 
the same opportunities for cultural fulfilment as members of the dominant group. Will 
Kymlicka, for instance, focuses in particular on sub-state level national groups and argues for 
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the adoption of policies designed to protect the language or culture of these groups on the 
grounds that without such deliberate protections, in “a democracy, public institutions are 
likely to be shaped by the culture of the dominant group” (2008, 53). This bias towards the 
culture of the dominant group may, in some situations, justify measures that emphasise the 
cultural traits of a non-dominant group. One example is in language policy: in Canada residents 
of Quebec are entitled to represent themselves in court in French, for instance, rather than 
being obligated to use English, as they would be required to do in the UK or United States. 
However, multiculturalism can be criticised on the grounds that institutionalising differences 
between groups can be divisive. Cultural differences between groups that otherwise might 
have been fluid and rapidly changing are instead ‘frozen’ due to the set of policies prescribing 
what those group differences are. In much of the Western world in the 2000s, this has led to a 
political counter-movement in opposition to multiculturalism, whereby the values of (state-
level) national identity and state unity are emphasised, and therefore setting the 
representation of multiculturalism as being something divisive as the direct opposite of 
national identity as a unifying force. This argument was made in political discourse by, for 
instance, Ted Cantle’s (2001) much-quoted report suggesting that communities in the English 
north were living ‘parallel lives’. David Goodhart uses a strand of this argument by criticising 
what he describes as “the multicultural invitation to newcomers – ‘You can remain unchanged 
and still fit in’ – [which] waves away the problem of integration but does not solve it” (2013, 
170). 
It is important to interpret these arguments for the importance of national identity and unity 
at the detriment of multiculturalism in the context of both the different political positions 
outlined in section 6.1 and the different meanings of national identity and social cohesion 
outlined in section 6.2. First of all, given that the debate focuses on the importance of culture, 
it is of more relevance for arguments A3 and A4 than A1 or A2. Clearly what the debate is 
about is an argument over the importance of emphasising group identity and the cohesion of 
the group at different levels – sub-state cultures (such as, for instance, Kymlicka’s emphasis on 
sub-state nationalities) and state-level national identities. Argument A3 focuses on the 
importance of access to a state-level national culture in providing context and meaning in 
people’s lives, but from a multicultural perspective a very similar argument could be made that 
instead focuses on sub-state level cultures. Nation-states, the argument goes, “are good for 
their members by providing them with the indispensable conditions of flourishing. The 
fundamental idea here … is that human beings require immersion in a language and culture in 
order to thrive” (Barry 1999, 20). Multicultural arguments can take a similar form: 
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multicultural policies may be needed to offset a bias towards the dominant culture in a society 
and allow subscribers to minority cultures the same opportunities for human flourishing as 
members of the dominant group.  
So, what insights into the debate between multiculturalism and national identity can be 
derived from the data presented in Chapters 4 and 5? From Chapter 5, there was an 
overwhelming sense in which the picture painted by critics of multiculturalism was not 
especially accurate. This picture suggests that at least some of the respondents spoken to 
might be living ‘parallel lives’, immersed in a culture separate to the British ‘mainstream’. This 
justifies, so the argument goes, the adopting of policies emphasising ‘what unites us’ – one 
common culture, a common national identity, a common language. Yet nearly all the 
respondents simply gave the impression that life is just more ‘messy’ than these 
representations, and were much more consistent with the idea of ‘new ethnicities’ whereby 
people have complex, hybrid identities, and adopt such identities unproblematically (Solomos 
2003), as well as with Amin’s (2003, 462) argument that many of the people involved in the 
2001 disturbances in northern England were “not confused about their identities and values as 
cultural ‘hybrids’”. The respondents neither drew mainly from ‘their’ sub-state culture (as 
argued by multiculturalists that they should be allowed to on social justice grounds, and 
portrayed as problematic by critics of multiculturalism); nor did they have any particular 
problem in describing their identification with Britain, how this interacted with their other 
identities, and the fact that having multiple identities was simply not a problem. From the data 
presented in Chapter 5, there is no particular evidence of anything like unified sub-state 
cultures of the kind described by multicultural theorists, and also no evidence to suggest there 
is something like a ‘mainstream’ British culture from which the respondents may supposedly 
be detached. 
One 35-49 year old man, for instance, described his identity as “Afro-Caribbean-British-Black” 
since “my forefathers are from Africa, my parents are from the Caribbean, I was born in 
Britain, and I’m Black”. A woman aged 50-64 made similar comments about her son’s multiple 
identifications, saying “I wouldn’t want him to grow up with a complex, that’s the thing but he 
doesn’t seem to have that”. Another man again expressed similar sentiments about how 
clearly his multiple identities were felt, and about the importance of his children sharing this 
understanding: “it’s very important for them [his children] to know that I’m a Black man, born 
in this country, my family’s from South America, and it’s very important for them to know their 
history”. 
261 
 
Admittedly the external validity of the findings from Chapter 5 is necessarily limited. The 
findings cannot possibly hope to represent even the area in which the study was conducted, or 
the ethnic groups in question, let alone all ethnic minority groups across Britain. The sample 
was composed of two (broad) ethnic groups in a very specific area of London. It is quite 
plausible that stories of ‘parallel lives’ might be told by members of different ethnic groups, 
from different areas of Britain. It is also plausible that the social positioning of the interviewers 
may have affected both the nature of the interviewees found, and their willingness to talk 
freely about these issues. Yet given the aim was to identify the range of narratives surrounding 
how people’s national identities might be related to social cohesion, it is striking that the story 
told by the critics of multiculturalism was not present. One might at least expect the meanings 
and connections postulated by these critics to be found meaningful by at least some of the 
respondents: but not one of them expressed such views, and a great many expressed 
scepticism with these arguments. 
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6.42: Cosmopolitanism 
 
If sub-state cultural identities and state-level national identities can be seen as simply two 
types of group identity, rather than the binary oppositions that the debate between 
multiculturalism and social cohesion takes them to be, then one might wonder why an 
emphasis could not be placed on the importance of groups identities at other ‘levels’. Many 
commentators have argued for the importance of identities and solidarities at levels ‘higher’ 
than that of the state: for instance the regional level, in particular referring to the European 
Union (e.g. Habermas 1992); or the global level (e.g. Fine 2007). Viewed from this perspective, 
multicultural theorists and the critics of multiculturalism do not seem to be on directly 
opposing sides. Both are arguing for the importance of group identities and group solidarities 
(for various different reasons); as are some proponents of regional or global solidarities. The 
disagreement is simply about the ‘level’ at which the group of most importance is claimed to 
exist. 
Cosmopolitanism can mean many things but at its most basic level simply means to be “a 
citizen of the world” (Barry 1999, 35). It is not a new idea, existing “long before that of 
nationalism”, dating back to ancient Greece, and being used more recently by Kant and Hegel 
(Fine 2007, ix). By contrast, the origins of nationalism are much newer – “in its modern and 
basically political sense the concept nation is historically very young … the old meaning of the 
word envisaged mainly the ethnic unit, but recent usage rather stressed ‘the notion of political 
unity and independence’” (Hobsbawm 1992, 18).15 This is true despite attempts by 
nationalists, particularly on the right (as discussed in Section 6.1), to emphasise history in their 
arguments, and despite suggestions that cosmopolitanism is a radically new idea that is out of 
touch with the reality of well-established and historically formed nation-states. Some 
contemporary cosmopolitans have embraced recent ideas of globalisation, arguing that there 
have been increases in international migration, global capital flows, economic and 
environmental interdependence between states, and technological changes that have 
revolutionised global communication, and suggesting that the salience of states is in many 
senses decreasing. Critics have argued that, far from nationalism and national identities 
becoming irrelevant in modern times, if anything national sentiments are increasing: “There is 
presently no sign that national identities are on the wane. Insofar as there is any movement, it 
appears to be in the direction of smaller, more intense forms of nationality rather than 
towards cosmopolitanism” (Miller 1989b, 238). This leads to criticisms of cosmopolitanism as 
                                                          
15
 Hobsbawm is quoting from the Oxford English Dictionary, vol. VIII (Oxford 1933), p.30. 
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being an ideal that is detached from reality. For Robert Fine, however, the difference of 
contemporary cosmopolitanism is that: “What makes modern cosmopolitanism modern, 
however, is not so much that it stands for a universal human community over and above local 
loyalties, but rather that it seeks to reconcile the idea of universal species-wide human 
solidarity with particular solidarities that are smaller and more specific than the human 
species” (2007, 15). If this is correct, then cosmopolitanism may be able to accommodate the 
“human need for solidarities smaller than the species” – including national ones – whilst at the 
same time embracing universalism (Hollinger 2001, 238).  
An important difference between, on the one hand, both multiculturalism and nationalism 
and, on the other, cosmopolitanism, is the relative emphasis on the importance of a single 
culture in people’s lives. Nationalists would tend to emphasise national culture; and 
multiculturalists sub-state cultures; but for cosmopolitans the emphasis is that a multiplicity of 
cultures might be important for any one person. Jeremy Waldron (1995), for instance, uses 
Salman Rushdie as his inspiration for a critique of communitarianism in which, he argues, 
Rushdie’s life can represent the complexity and multiplicity of sources of culture, meaning and 
identity that many people experience. Rushdie’s life as a migrant, with hybrid identities and 
cultural influences, is contrasted with “views that locate the coherence and meaning of human 
life in each person’s immersion in the culture and ethnicity of a particular community” 
(Waldron 1995, 94). It is certainly the case that many multiculturalists, and indeed many 
moderate nationalists, would agree with the idea that people have multiple sources of 
identity, providing their lives with multiple sources of context and meaning. Yet there can, in 
practice, be a tendency to overlook the importance of this fact, and to instead discuss the 
importance of a particular culture in people’s lives. Thus, Margalit and Raz argue that 
“[f]amiliarity with a culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable” (1995, 86, emphasis 
added). Yael Tamir similarly takes to speaking of the importance of a singular culture, by 
claiming that: “The right to culture is meant to allow individuals to live within the culture of 
their choice, to decide on their social affiliations, to re-create the culture of the community 
they belong to, and to redefine its borders” (1993, 8, emphasis added). 
From this perspective, rather than multiculturalism and nationalism being opposed, they both 
place excessive emphasis on one particular culture as being unique in providing meaning to 
people’s lives. Luban’s (1980, 393) idea of the “Romance of the Nation-State” is taken up by 
Brian Barry in his critique of both nationalism and multiculturalism: the nationalist “idea that 
people can flourish only within their ancestral culture” (Barry 2001, 263) is in fact very similar 
to the multicultural argument advanced by Kymlicka, who is “equally spellbound by sub-state 
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nationalities, and invests them in the same romantic spirit with a unique capacity to bring 
meaning to the lives of their members” (ibid., 137). 
I wish to suggest that the views expressed by the interview respondents in this study, as 
presented in Chapter 5, fit much more comfortably with a cosmopolitan outlook than with 
either a multicultural one or one that emphasises the importance of national unity. There are 
two aspects to this claim. The first is related to the discussion of multiculturalism in the 
preceding section, and to the opposition of, on the one hand, multiculturalism and nationalism 
as emphasising the importance of one culture in providing meaning to people’s lives and, on 
the other, cosmopolitanism as emphasising the multiplicity of sources of meaning and identity. 
I wish to suggest that the views of the respondents in this study are much closer to the latter 
view, as I hope is shown by the examples given in the preceding section from the interview 
data in Chapter 5. The second aspect of my claim is related to a criticism of cosmopolitanism: 
that the view of the world it presents is a very nice idea in theory, but it is simply out of touch 
with the reality of a world in which local and national loyalties are simply not going to go away. 
Whilst it is clearly important for cosmopolitans to respond effectively to such a challenge, since 
it is surely true that, although the importance of national loyalties in people’s lives may 
sometimes be exaggerated, they are not simply about to die out in the very near future, I also 
wish to illustrate some respondents’ views in which they clearly found meaning in the idea of 
global loyalties, identity as a human, and global citizenship. 
With regard to this latter claim, several respondents mentioned a ‘global’ identity of 
identifying with the world, or as a human, as being more important for social cohesion 
outcomes than British identity. One female said: “I feel that I don’t belong [to Britain], and that 
the world is possibly my home, so that the fact that I feel like there’s a bigger picture if you 
like, there’s a whole planet out there, and I don’t need to feel like I’m necessarily stuck in one 
place”. Similarly, a male respondent said: 
“it doesn’t really matter where you are, you do as another human to another human, 
you interact, you’ve got to otherwise you just may as well lock your door and don’t go 
out … I don’t see why the question’s asking the affinity to Britain. Why does it have to 
be affinity, it’s just human relationships.” 
For another male respondent, this global identity was connected to being a part of London: “in 
London, you’re part of this world city. Outside of London people don’t feel that connected to 
London and here there are people from all over the place. I don’t think it’s just about 
ethnicity”. 
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So what does this discussion mean for the relationship between national identity and social 
cohesion in general, and for the relationship between British identity and social cohesion in 
particular? The first point is that it may be all be very well that the cosmopolitan vision ‘fits’ 
better with the views of the respondents in this study than either the nationalist or the 
multiculturalist visions, but the importance of national identity for social cohesion, as we saw 
in Section 6.1, is supposed to be that it strengthens state-level cohesion and solidarity which 
can, in turn, be useful for various things, depending on one’s political viewpoint – the 
maintenance of liberal institutions, or egalitarian redistribution, perhaps. Although this study 
shows no evidence of the ‘parallel lives’ described by Cantle (2001), the fact of these complex, 
hybrid identities may be problematic in itself, since it may, the argument might go, be 
beneficial to social cohesion if the respondents in the sample had all unequivocally adopted a 
British national identity that superseded, or at least was now more salient than, all other 
identities.  
I wish to object to this line of argument, and for several reasons. The first is that there appears 
to be a major contradiction between this argument and a key claim commonly made by 
moderate defenders of national identity. This is that one must work with identities that 
actually exist, rather than proposing some kind of utopian system to which people do not, in 
reality, actually relate. Moderate nationalists might thereby criticise cosmopolitans on the 
grounds that national identities are in fact important to people, whereas ideas of global 
identities and solidarities are utopian fantasy. Miller, for instance, explains his starting-point 
as: 
“In moral and political philosophy, in particular, we build upon existing sentiments and 
judgements, correcting them only when they are inconsistent or plainly flawed in 
some other way. We don’t aspire to some universal and rational foundation such as 
Kant tried to provide with the categorical imperative … There can be no question of 
trying to give rationally compelling reasons for people to have national attachments 
and allegiances. What we can do is to start from the premise that people generally do 
exhibit such attachments and allegiances, and then try to build a political philosophy 
which incorporates them.” 
Miller (2000, 25) 
The point is simply that, if one wishes to follow through the ideas about the importance of 
existing sentiments consistently, then the fact of respondents’ complex and hybrid identities is 
a significant one. A global identity was meaningful to many of them; there are many potential 
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identifications that could be useful in building solidarities with others. These findings are 
hardly inconsistent with other studies, such as those using the concept of ‘new ethnicities’. 
Solomos (2003), for instance, highlights the importance of the possibility of being both Black 
and British at the same time; Hall (2000) describes how third generation Black people can 
identify with the Caribbean heritage, a ‘Black’ identity and a British identity simultaneously; 
and Amin (2003) describes the hybrid identities of young Britons. Such ideas make Miller’s 
insistence that the solidarities of importance must be at the national level rather difficult to 
sustain. 
And, of course, conservatives seeing intrinsic value in the preservation of a supposedly historic 
and unique national culture may not be especially sympathetic towards the realities of the 
hybrid identities of relatively recent immigrants and their descendants. Their response may be 
to tell such people: this is our country, either fully assimilate to this pre-existing national 
culture, or leave. Yet there is clearly a problem here. If one wishes to increase social cohesion 
in Britain, socialists, liberals and moderate conservatives would all agree that one must 
increase social cohesion amongst those people actually residing in Britain – some form of 
ethnic cleansing is ruled out – and Britain is a diverse place. But, as we have seen in Chapter 4, 
identification with exclusive national identities such as English identity are actually damaging 
to some forms of social cohesion. The data from Chapter 5 strongly support the idea that 
minority ethnic adoption of English identity is seriously problematic, since it is constructed on 
an exclusive ethnic basis. Only British identity – less exclusive than English identity – was found 
to be correlated with positive social cohesion outcomes.  
But there is a further problem here: generation is of crucial importance.16 British identity was 
only found to be correlated with social cohesion for those not born in the UK. For those of 
minority ethnicity but born in Britain, British identity was not correlated with any of the social 
cohesion measures. If the interview data in this study is anything to go by, and it is consistent 
in this respect with other studies (e.g. Heath and Roberts 2008), then most of minority 
ethnicity born in this country feel British in some form anyway, whether mildly or more 
strongly. And there is no evidence from this study that getting them to feel more strongly 
British, however that might be done, would have any positive impact on social cohesion at all. 
The discussion of the possibility of solidarities based upon a global identity leads neatly to an 
exploration of the rather peculiar nature of British identity itself, and in particular the 
relationship between colonialism and British identity that emerged from the interview data of 
Chapter 5. For those respondents that emigrated from a former British colony, the way in 
                                                          
16
 Or at least my proxy of it is, which is whether or not a respondent was born in the UK. 
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which many of them described how they already identified with Britain upon arrival was one of 
the clearest narratives to appear from the interview data. A 50-64 year old man expressed his 
colonial connections with Britain by saying “I’m proud of that, of being part of the United 
Kingdom, yes … because as I said we have a colonial history, Dominica is a colony of Britain … 
there’s a connection between the United Kingdom and other countries”. A 35-49 year old 
woman expanded in more detail on how colonialism affected British identification: 
“My mother was born in Grenada at the time it was a British colony and so … most 
people of her age group would consider themselves to be Grenadian and British at the 
same time ... You’ve got Caribbean British identity of those individuals that were, that 
came here as being part of the colonialism, like my parents’ generation. And then 
there’s the Caribbean identity of those of us that were born and brought up here, of 
parents that were immigrants. Then there’s the Caribbean identity of those of us who 
are, who have migrated in the current world, like, and so they’ve come here recently 
and have sought British identity, and we see things very differently from one another 
… we might not relate to each other very well at all because our experiences are so 
vastly different, and so how we perceive our Britishness is going to be quite different.” 
These issues also give a potential explanation as to why the interaction of British identity with 
those born in the UK had such an important effect on predicting social cohesion outcomes in 
Chapter 4: British identity was associated with positive social cohesion outcomes for those not 
born in the UK, but for those that were it made no difference. It is perhaps the case that this 
interaction – of those born outside the UK and with a British identity – ‘captured‘ something 
these respondents had in common and this may, possibly, have something to do with a shared 
experience of those emigrating from a former British colony. Regrettably, the Citizenship 
Survey does not provide sufficient data to investigate further those respondents originating 
from former British colonies, although this would make a fascinating topic for further research.  
That West Indian immigrants to Britain commonly viewed themselves as British before arrival 
is well-documented. Glazer (1995, 135) argues that “West Indian immigrants to Britain viewed 
themselves and, I believe, still view themselves as Black Britons, wanting nothing more than 
full acceptance, the same rights in all spheres that all other citizens hold”. In the context of the 
discussion of cosmopolitanism, and in particularly when set in opposition to the way in which 
identification with Britain is supposedly the solution to the fragmentation of society, the 
absence of which has been leading to declining cohesion and solidarity, the comparison of a 
colonial British identity felt by those emigrating to Britain with the recent insistence that 
immigrants identify more strongly is striking. Stuart Hall illustrates this dichotomy perfectly by 
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describing his experience in a recent interview: “I came as a colonial, I came bearing a British 
passport, a British subject, etc., it was only after that that I had to apply for one, or for 
permission to stay” (BBC 2011).  
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6.5 Conclusions 
 
Chapter 6 attempted to draw together the findings of Chapters 4 and 5, and to provide an 
extended theoretical discussion of the implications for the relationship between national 
identity and social cohesion. Section 6.1 explored the theoretical arguments for the potential 
importance of national identity for social cohesion found in social and political theory and 
identified four different arguments corresponding to four different political positions. Each of 
the four arguments also used somewhat different concepts of both national identity and social 
cohesion. 
Section 6.2 drew out these different meanings of first national identity, and then social 
cohesion, and discussed their relationships to the different theoretical arguments found in 
section 6.1 and the data presented in Chapters 4 and 5. With regard to national identity, it was 
suggested a distinction between constitutional patriotism and a ‘thin’ version of civic national 
identity might have more to do with theoretical arguments A1 and A2; and a ‘thicker’ version 
of civic identity and ethnic national identity might have more to do with theoretical arguments 
A3 and A4. 
Section 6.2 then discussed the relationships between the theoretical arguments, the way in 
which social cohesion was found to break up into ten ‘elements’ in Chapter 4, and differences 
in meanings of social cohesion found in Chapter 5. It was argued that social cohesion might be 
better broken up into two different concepts: ‘institutional cohesion’ and ‘associational 
cohesion’. Arguments A1 and A2 might have more to do with institutional cohesion; whilst 
arguments A3 and A4 might have more to do with associational cohesion. 
Section 6.3 discussed the findings in Chapter 4 in particular that indicators of equality may be 
much more strongly associated with social cohesion than national identity. It drew on the 
distinction between institutional and associational cohesion to show how perceptions of 
discrimination might be especially important for institutional cohesion, whilst education and 
deprivation might be especially important for associational cohesion. 
Section 6.4 explored the idea of different ‘levels’ at which cohesion and solidarity could exist. It 
argued that the debate in much recent public discourse, which focuses on the alleged 
opposites of multiculturalism and national unity, may be misleading. Instead it is suggested 
that multiculturalism and national unity are not the binary opposites they are suggested to be: 
instead they are two examples of arguments that identities (at a particular level) could be 
important to sustain solidarities (at the corresponding level). Alternative ‘levels’ at which 
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solidarities could be sustained are explored. Next, a discussion is given of the way in which 
both proponents of multiculturalism and national cohesion tend to focus on the importance of 
one particular level. Against this, a discussion of cosmopolitanism is given, which emphasises 
the importance of a multiplicity of different levels – with corresponding solidarities and 
cultures – at the same time. It is suggested that respondents’ views in Chapter 5 ‘fit’ better 
with a ‘cosmopolitan outlook’ (Fine 2007, 15) than an emphasis on one particular level and 
corresponding culture. This suggest that discussions on social cohesion in Britain should move 
away from an approach that emphasises national unity as a counterbalance to 
multiculturalism; instead, possibilities for multiple identities, solidarities, and cultures that 
might be important to people, could be explored. 
Yet if – as section 6.3 suggests – equality is important for social cohesion, then to an extent the 
level of the nation-state may also be indirectly important for social cohesion. The nation-state 
is currently of central importance for redistribution, which can help reduce inequalities, and in 
terms of a frame of reference for people’s perceptions of equalities (McKnight & Nolan 2012). 
Chapter 7 goes on to reflect, in the light of the discussion of section 6.4 on different levels of 
cohesion, on the role of the nation-state in sustaining social cohesion. 
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Chapter 7: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
 
This thesis has investigated the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in 
Britain. Arguments that national identity can potentially help sustain national solidarities have 
a long tradition in social and political theory, and have been revisited recently in British public 
and political discourse and social policy. In the early 2000s, the prior emphasis on 
multiculturalism began to be questioned and started to be seen as divisive and detrimental to 
national unity; in its place an agenda focusing on social cohesion was formed, with a particular 
emphasis on the importance of British identity. These debates and changes in social policy 
took place against the backdrop of political claims that diversity itself may undermine national 
solidarity and cohesion, and academic studies arguing that ethnic diversity may be associated 
with reduced trust (e.g. Putnam 2007) or reduced support for redistributive policies (e.g. 
Alesina & Glaeser 2004). This, along with the perception that multiculturalism could be 
divisive, gave the new emphasis on social cohesion a racial or ethnic dimension, in the sense 
that there was a new focus on immigrants (and possibly their descendants) integrating into a 
‘mainstream’ British culture. This thesis aims, I hope, to contribute both some kind of insight 
into whether or not British identity could indeed be beneficial to British social cohesion in the 
way suggested in public and policy discourse, and have something to say in relation to the 
more abstract theoretical debate on the importance or otherwise of a national identity for 
social cohesion and solidarity, albeit using evidence in the British context. 
This chapter asks: what is the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in 
Britain? I argue first that the type of national identity in question is of crucial importance; a 
distinction between constitutional patriotism, civic national identity, and ethnic national 
identity is helpful, and evidence suggests the latter form may in fact be detrimental to some 
aspects of social cohesion. Second, I argue that social cohesion might be better broken up into 
two separate concepts – one referring to support for certain of the state’s institutions, and the 
other to associational types of behaviour – since the correlates of each of the two concepts are 
rather different and their separation would resolve many of the confusions in academic and 
public discussions of social cohesion. Third, I find evidence to suggest that British identity may 
be of more relevance for the associational type of cohesion than the commitment type, but 
overall both British and English identity are of marginal relevance for social cohesion as 
compared to education, deprivation, and perceptions of discrimination. This suggests that 
attempts to use British identity as a tool to create unity and cohesion in the context of 
increasing diversity may not work or even be counterproductive; issues of inequality and 
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discrimination may be much more important to address. Last, I reflect on the extent to which 
issues of unity and cohesion at the level of the nation-state are still relevant in the context of 
identity politics on the one hand, and processes of globalisation on the other. I argue that 
nation-states, for the time being, remain important sites of redistribution and reference points 
for perceptions of equality; to the extent that these issues are important for social cohesion, 
nation-states are therefore important too. 
This chapter begins with a summary of the thesis thus far, providing an outline of the structure 
and a statement of each chapter’s key arguments and findings. It next goes on to synthesise 
the arguments from each of the chapters to answer the main research question directly: what 
is the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain? It next reflects 
theoretically on why it should be the nation-state that is the appropriate level at which 
cohesion is desired. Last, a discussion is given of the policy implications arising from this thesis 
in the British context, and some thoughts are given on important areas for future research. 
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7.1 Summary of thesis 
 
Chapter 1 introduced the thesis by discussing the ways in which issues of national identity and 
social cohesion have become prominent in public and political discourse in the last ten or 
fifteen years. It described how the debate around the importance of social cohesion arose in 
Britain in particular as a response to the disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 
2001, in that it attempted both to explain and provide a solution to the disturbances (Robinson 
2005). Ted Cantle’s (2001, 9) influential report on the disturbances, for instance, described 
communities living ‘parallel lives’: “Separate educational arrangements, community and 
voluntary bodies, employment, places of worship, language, social and cultural networks, 
means that many communities operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives 
often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful 
interchanges”. In the context of concerns over the alleged divisiveness of multicultural policies, 
increasing politicisation of debates over immigration, and further events such as the London 
bombings of 2005 which led to the questioning of Muslim allegiances to Britain, a new 
approach that focused on unity, British identity, and cohesion, was promoted by many 
commentators. David Goodhart (2013, xxiii), in a recent book, sums up this new approach: 
“To combine diversity with solidarity, to improve integration and racial justice, it is no 
good just preaching tolerance, you need a politics that promotes a common in-group 
identity … [it is important to] focus on integration and national identity and to question 
a form of multiculturalism that was too often indifferent to both”. 
Chapter 2 detailed the theoretical background to the question of the relationship between 
national identity and social cohesion in Britain. It explored the postulated relationships 
between national identity and social cohesion in the context of a discussion of the history of 
nationalism, links between nationalism and national identity, and the significance of race, 
ethnicity and religion. The few rigorous academic attempts to define the slippery concept of 
social cohesion were then explored, with a particular emphasis on the work of Forrest and 
Kearns (2001). As Kearns and Forrest (2000, 966) argue, social cohesion is typically “used in 
such a way that its meaning is nebulous but at the same time the impression is given that 
everyone knows what is being referred to. The usual premise is that social cohesion is a good 
thing, so it is conveniently assumed that further elaboration is unnecessary”. It is important to 
note, however, that although social cohesion is often thought of as an area-level concept, in 
the sense that cohesion is a property of an area, the way the concept is investigated in this 
thesis is at the individual-level, since individuals were interviewed in the qualitative 
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component, and the quantitative dataset was at the individual level. Although social cohesion 
is an area-level concept, indicators of cohesion can be found at the individual level. For 
instance, a borough of London being a place where common values are shared might be 
thought of as a type of social cohesion, but an individual believing that those in their borough 
of residence share values can be an individual-level indicator of cohesion.  
Having reviewed the postulated theoretical relationships and relevant theoretical background 
to the question of the relationship between national identity and social cohesion, Chapter 2 
then looked at existing empirical research into the nature of the relationship in Britain. Despite 
the prominence of arguments for the importance of national identity for social cohesion in 
political and social theory (e.g. Miller 1995; Barry 2001; Tamir 1993; Goodhart 2013), and the 
centrality of national identity in the UK government’s distancing from multiculturalism and 
emphasis on social cohesion since the early 2000s (e.g. Denham Report 2001), there is a lack of 
rigorous and detailed empirical research over the nature of this relationship (Kymlicka 2008), 
not least in Britain. 
Despite this lack of research, there are substantial bodies of evidence on related issues. 
Chapter 2 detailed some recent work on a possible link between ethnic diversity and social 
cohesion, including Putnam’s (2007) hypothesis that ethnic diversity is associated with reduced 
trust, and Alesina & Glaeser’s (2004) argument that ethnic diversity is associated with 
decreased support for redistributive policies. These arguments have not gone unchallenged, 
however, with evidence to the contrary provided by several commentators, who argue that 
ethnic diversity in itself does not necessarily undermine social cohesion (e.g. Banting 2005; 
Letki 2008). Next, literature on national identification in Britain, particularly amongst minority 
ethnic groups, was reviewed, and then the limited empirical work that does exist linking 
national identity with social cohesion in Britain was discussed. 
The next section of Chapter 2 drew on the reviewed literature to state the research question in 
more detail and context. A theoretical framework was produced that informs the design of the 
quantitative work discussed in Chapter 4, and that also guides to some extent the qualitative 
work discussed in Chapter 5, although the qualitative work is somewhat more open-ended. 
The theoretical framework in particular used areas of literature suggesting that the 
relationship between national identity and social cohesion might depend on various issues 
such as ethnic identity and religious identity, and ‘structural’ issues such as socio-economic 
level, education and deprivation. This framework guided the construction of regression 
models, and in particular the inclusion of control variables, in the quantitative component, and 
in the qualitative component it guided the construction of the interview schedule. 
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Chapter 3 gave an overview of the methodology used in the empirical components of the 
thesis. With regard to the quantitative component, it introduced the principles behind the 
choice of the Citizenship Survey, the way in the concept of social cohesion would be measured, 
and the ways in which the theoretical framework from Chapter 2 guides the construction of 
the regression models. With regard to the qualitative component, it introduced the area in 
which the interviewees all reside, and discussed the principles behind the choice of purposive 
sampling methods, and some limitations of the methodology. Although more detailed 
discussions on methods were presented in each of the empirical chapters themselves, Chapter 
3 gave an overview for the strategy for answering the research question empirically, and 
therefore linked the literature review with the two empirical chapters that come next. 
Chapter 4 gave a detailed report of the quantitative component of this study, with both the 
methodology and results discussed in depth. The first task of the chapter was to undertake the 
measurement of the slippery concept of social cohesion using data from the Citizenship 
Survey. The measurement was based theoretically around Forrest & Kearns’ (2001) definition 
of the concept: the strategy was to consider which variables available in the Citizenship Survey 
could potentially measure the parts of the concept identified by Forrest & Kearns; and then to 
conduct Principal Components Analysis in order to break all the variables considered as 
potential measures into a smaller number of components, with each component representing 
a particular ‘element’ of social cohesion. One of the key findings here was that social cohesion, 
as operationalised in this way using data from the Citizenship Survey, was a very fragmented 
concept. It was found to break down into ten different elements, representing rather different 
ideas: such as access to public service provision; feelings of belonging to locality and nation; 
political engagement and participation; or meaningful social interaction, civic participation and 
volunteering. Composite variables were created representing each ‘element’. 
Following the creation of variables representing the elements of social cohesion, Chapter 4 
provided data from regression models measuring associations between British identity and the 
social cohesion variables, with a host of control variables included. Ten regression models 
were created, with each one corresponding to a particular element of social cohesion, as 
identified by the Principal Components Analysis. The selection of control variables was guided 
by the theoretical framework in Chapter 2, which was based on the review of relevant 
literature. The broad findings were that for many of the ‘elements’ of social cohesion, British 
identity had a positive and significant effect on the social cohesion measure, but that the 
magnitude of the effect was very small in comparison with some of the control variables. 
Three control variables were found to be particularly important, and much more so than 
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British identity: a measure of the respondent’s educational qualifications; a measure of the 
relative deprivation of the area in which a respondent lives; and the respondent’s perception 
of being discriminated against, which was especially important in the models measuring access 
to public services. Although the many nuances in the data cannot be described in detail in this 
brief summary of the thesis, a tentative finding was that deprivation, education and 
discrimination may be much more important for social cohesion outcomes than British 
identity. However, the highly fragmented nature of the concept, as demonstrated by the 
Principal Components Analysis, makes broad statements about the relationship between 
British identity and social cohesion in general rather difficult without breaking the concept of 
social cohesion down further. 
There were two important additional findings of Chapter 4. The first was that when measures 
of British identity were replaced by measures of English identity, in most cases any positive 
associations were lost, and in some cases there were negative associations between English 
identity and social cohesion. The negative association between English identity and meaningful 
interaction with people of different backgrounds was particularly striking. This suggests that, 
rather than being potentially beneficial for social cohesion, English identity may in some cases 
be detrimental to social cohesion. The magnitudes of the effects, however, were again rather 
small, suggesting that any negative effect of English identity is small compared with education, 
deprivation or discrimination; and of course these are only associations and do not imply that 
English identity is causing reduced social cohesion. 
The second finding was that, for non-white ethnic groups, British identity was nearly always 
only associated with any of the measures of social cohesion for those not born in the UK, 
suggesting that generation may be of crucial importance to explaining the relationship 
between British identity and social cohesion. For non-white immigrant groups, British identity 
and social cohesion may be related to one another, but for the descendants of non-white 
immigrants, there is no evidence to suggest that British identity has any relevance for social 
cohesion at all. This finding has important implications for policy, particularly given the 
emphasis in government policy on promoting British identity amongst immigrants and their 
UK-born descendants alleged to be part of communities living ‘parallel lives’. 
Chapter 5 attempted to answer the question of the relationship between national identity and 
social cohesion in a rather different way to Chapter 4. The data were transcriptions of 
interviews with twenty-two respondents of Black African or Black Caribbean ethnicity, living in 
an ethnically diverse area of south London. Rather than attempting to get a representative 
overview of whether or not British identity is associated with various measures of social 
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cohesion, the qualitative component of the study, as presented in Chapter 5, took a narrower 
(in the sense that the sample was relatively restricted) but more open-ended approach. 
Interviewees were able to express their feelings of their own identities, and any connections 
they may or may not see between them and various aspects of social cohesion, in their own 
way, and the aim was to identify a range of possible narratives which, it was hoped, would be 
as diverse as possible. A focus on interviewees of Black African and Black Caribbean ethnicity 
allowed for an exploration of how people described both their ethnic and national identities, 
and the links between them, which was especially relevant to the research question because 
of the centrality of ethnicity and race to discussions of national identity, and because of the 
emphasis on the alleged lack of British identity amongst ethnic minority groups featuring 
prominently in the government’s ‘social cohesion agenda’ and related discourse. In presenting 
this data, Chapter 5 had three main tasks: first to present the range of narratives about 
respondents’ feelings of their national identities; second to present the range of narratives 
about ways in which British identity may, or may not, be connected with social cohesion; and 
third to identify links between the narratives. 
With regard to the first task, there were a variety of narratives on how strongly respondents 
felt British: some felt strongly British; some not at all; and some were rather indifferent. 
However, three main narratives emerged around which many respondents based their 
discussions of their national identities: colonialism, the importance of generation, and 
differences between British and English identity. Many respondents considered English 
identity to be an ethnically-defined identity, and felt excluded from it because of their skin 
colour, whereas British identity was in general seen as more inclusive to those that were not 
seen as ‘Anglo-Saxon’. In distinguishing between English and British identity there were 
certainly resonances of the commonly used distinction between ethnic and civic national 
identities (e.g. Miller 1995). Some respondents, however, fought against the perception that 
they were excluded from an English identity and firmly adopted it regardless, with one person 
explaining that she did not always want to appear the ‘victim’. Generation was also seen as key 
to the meaning given to national identity by many of the respondents, in that there were clear 
differences between the feelings towards Britain, or England, that first generation immigrants 
might have as compared to those that were brought up in Britain. The interaction between 
generation and colonialism was particularly interesting, and not something that was 
anticipated to arise from the interviews. The feeling that many first generation immigrants 
arriving from what was a British colony would feel strongly British before arrival, and were 
sometimes surprised by the non-acceptance of this identity by the existing population, was a 
clearly expressed theme by several respondents, and was very much consistent with Stuart 
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Hall’s account of his own experiences as a ‘post-colonial subject’ (e.g. Hall & Chen 1996; BBC 
2011). 
The second task of Chapter 5 was to present the range of narratives about ways in which 
British identity may, or may not, be connected with social cohesion, although respondents 
often displayed several narratives in the same interview. These narratives were inevitably 
oversimplifications of the respondents’ views, and perhaps ‘fit’ with some respondents’ views 
more than others, but it was necessary to simplify the interview data in this way in order to 
draw out similarities between the interviews. There were three narratives by which British 
identity was perceived to potentially have a connection with social cohesion. First, British 
identity was seen to be a signifier of connectedness with society, whereby British identity and 
connectedness went ‘hand in hand’. A contrast was made between the idea of people that 
have both a British identity and a connection with society, and people that have neither, 
although the causation implied was ambiguous – some respondents suggested both that 
having a British identity might lead to a greater connection with society, and that being 
connected with society could lead one to identify more as British. Second, British identity was 
understood as being about social expectations of language, accent and etiquette; identifying as 
British implied meeting these social expectations, which could then lead to more positive 
social outcomes. In particular, there was a perception that the ability to speak English well 
could lead to positive outcomes, particularly if one used a ‘typically English’ accent, but that an 
absence of ‘good’ English or an English accent could be problematic. Third, British identity was 
seen as entailing knowing about the British political and social system, which in turn could 
make it easier to get what one wants, particularly with regard to understanding how to access 
public services successfully or influencing political decisions. 
There were, however, two narratives by which British identity and social cohesion were not 
perceived to be connected at all; for these narratives, respondents expressed views that things 
other than national identity were important for social cohesion. The first narrative focused 
around the importance of individual choice and personal responsibility, rather than national 
identity, for positive social cohesion outcomes. This narrative was widely expressed by many of 
the respondents, and about many different aspects of social cohesion: individual choice and 
responsibility was seen to influence belonging, volunteering, civic engagement, influencing 
political decisions, accessing public services, and socialising with others. The importance of 
individuals using their own willpower to change outcomes for the better was often discussed. 
The second narrative focused on other identities: national identity was not considered 
important for social cohesion, but other identities were. The identities discussed in particular 
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were religion (often Christianity, but also a ‘spiritual’ identity not based around organised 
religion), an identification with London, an identification with humanity or the world, and a 
‘Black’ identity. For instance, when discussing the importance of identity for belonging, several 
respondents discussed how their identification as a human gave them a sense that the world 
was their home, and others discussed how London, rather than Britain, was more important to 
their identities. A view was also expressed that Black identity and religion were important, 
sometimes because a Black identity meant that particular ‘Black’ political issues were deemed 
important to campaign for, or because religious values meant that certain types of 
volunteering or help for others were very important.  
The third task of Chapter 5 was to identify links between narratives. The idea was to identify 
those narratives that commonly were expressed together by some of the respondents, in 
order to attempt to establish connections between narratives. Although many narratives were 
used in overlapping and sometimes contradictory ways, there were underlying patterns in the 
sense that some narratives were more likely to be combined. There were three groups of 
narratives. The first group linked the narrative on British colonialism – upon which there were 
positive and negative views – with a narrative that British identity was a signifier of positive 
social cohesion outcomes. Some of the respondents expressing this narrative felt strongly 
British and saw their British identity as a way of connecting to British society, and also felt the 
links between Britain and its former colonies were important. Others, however, expressed 
frustration at the ways in which their skin colour led to a non-acceptance of their national 
identity by others. 
The second group linked a narrative whereby British identity was felt only weakly, or was 
rejected outright, with the narrative that British identity was understood in terms of social 
expectations of language, accent, culture and etiquette. The significance of this was that there 
was a sense of frustration or injustice with the fact that the fulfilment of social expectations 
that were perceived to come with British identity were associated with positive social cohesion 
outcomes. The frustration or injustice stemmed from the sense that it was only by the 
fulfilment of predefined social norms (having a particular accent, adopting a particular 
etiquette) that positive outcomes could be attained. If one has a particular accent, or behaves 
with a certain etiquette, then positive outcomes would follow; but if one has the ‘wrong’ 
accent or etiquette, then negative outcomes would follow.  
The third group linked a narrative whereby indifference towards British identity was expressed 
with the narrative that individual choice and responsibility, rather than anything to do with 
identity, affected social cohesion outcomes. The sense here was of respondents accepting that 
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they felt (at least moderately) British, but suggesting that it had very little to do with social 
cohesion. 
Chapter 6 had three main aims. It started by expanding upon the discussion of theoretical links 
between national identity and social cohesion found in the literature review, by providing an 
analysis of the nature of the relationships postulated by political and social theorists, and 
established four broadly different types of argument that correspond to four different political 
positions. In particular these arguments focused on the ways in which national identity was 
deemed to be important for social cohesion, and imply somewhat different meanings of both 
national identity and social cohesion. The four arguments are: 
A1. National identity is important because it generates the social cohesion necessary 
for the effective functioning of a nation’s liberal democratic institutions 
A2. National identity is important because it generates the social cohesion necessary 
for the implementation of progressive social policies, aimed at ensuring social justice 
A3. National identity is important because it generates the social cohesion necessary 
for the maintenance of a civic culture – partly inherited and partly negotiated – 
which is an important good in itself because it provides citizens’ lives with context 
and meaning 
A4. National identity is important because it implies identification with the 
traditions, customs and history of national society, the maintenance and cohesion of 
which is an important end in itself 
The second aim was to expand upon the discussions of the concepts of national identity and 
social cohesion found in Chapter 2, in the light of the findings and insights from Chapters 4 and 
5. With regard to the concept of national identity, it built upon the discussion of civic and 
ethnic types of national identity found in Chapter 2 to make a three-way distinction between 
constitutional patriotism, civic national identity, and ethnic national identity. Constitutional 
patriotism is best known through the work of Jürgen Habermas (e.g. 1998), for whom it was “a 
functional equivalent to conventional notions of national belonging” (Fine 2007, 146). A civic 
national identity is one in which emphasis is placed upon acquired characteristics and so can 
be open to people of all ethnic groups; whereas an ethnic national identity is one in which 
emphasis is placed on “ancestry and ascribed characteristics that are more or less fixed at 
birth” (Heath and Roberts 2008, 24). This three-way distinction was, to a reasonable extent, 
supported by the distinctions drawn by interviewees in the qualitative component, whereby a 
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loyalty to, rather than an identification with, Britain could be seen as a kind of constitutional 
patriotism; British identity was largely but not exclusively a civic national identity; and English 
identity was largely but not exclusively an ethnic national identity. Some respondents did, 
however, describe ways in which they were not always accepted as British because of their 
‘race’, so British identity was not seen as an ‘ethnically neutral’ identity for all respondents; 
and other respondents described ways in which they adopted an English identity despite its 
ethnic connotations. 
Chapter 6 went on to combine this theoretical discussion with the findings from Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 to present a synthesis of theory and evidence with regard to the concept of social 
cohesion. The fragmented nature of the concept was explored, and it was argued that it may 
be beneficial to separate social cohesion into two different concepts: one referring to a 
commitment towards and equal access to the state’s institutions, including institutions of 
redistribution such as public services; and the other referring to associational types of 
behaviour, such as volunteering, meaningful interaction with people of different backgrounds, 
and civic engagement. These two types of social cohesion were termed the ‘institutional’ type 
and the ‘associational’ type, respectively. It was argued that, based on the data from Chapter 
4, the correlates of social cohesion depend on whether one is discussing the institutional or 
associational type, and data from Chapter 5 were used to illustrate the different meanings that 
can be attributed to the two concepts. The institutional type of social cohesion was found to 
be particularly associated with perceptions of discrimination, especially in terms of perceptions 
of equal access to public services; whereas the associational type of social cohesion was found 
to be particularly associated with area-level deprivation and educational level, although British 
identity may also be associated with the associational type of cohesion in some cases, albeit 
much more weakly than deprivation and education. It was suggested that British identity may 
have some kind of role to play for the associational type of cohesion; but for the institutional 
type of social cohesion there was very little evidence to suggest either English or British 
identity were of much relevance at all. 
Chapter 6 argued that links can be drawn between particular conceptions of constitutional 
patriotism and national identity, particular types of social cohesion, and different political 
positions. Broadly, it was argued that liberalism is more compatible with a ‘thinner’ type of 
national allegiance such as constitutional patriotism, and liberals are generally more 
concerned with the institutional type of social cohesion than the associational type. Social 
democrats might also be concerned with the institutional type of social cohesion, and in 
particular its implications for egalitarian redistribution; some may also worry that 
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constitutional patriotism is too ‘thin’ an allegiance to rely on for strongly egalitarian policies to 
be followed, so a ‘thicker’ civic national identity may be more compatible. Communitarians 
and conservatives might also be concerned with maintaining an associational type of social 
cohesion, since for communitarians a rich associational life can provide the conditions for 
human flourishing, and conservatives may be concerned about the maintenance of a national 
culture, which is seen as important in its own right. Communitarians might therefore support a 
culturally ‘thick’ kind of civic national identity, and conservatives might either support a 
culturally ‘thick’ civic national identity, or a national identity with ethnic connotations.  
The third aim of Chapter 6 was to reflect upon arguments for the importance of national 
identity for national social cohesion in the context of arguments for multicultural solidarities 
on the one hand and for global solidarities on the other. The ‘level’ at which solidarities are 
argued to be of importance was a key theme. In the context of debates in Britain portraying 
multiculturalism and national unity as opposites, it was argued that they instead represent two 
types of a similar argument about the importance of solidarity at a particular level. A 
distinction is drawn between different levels at which solidarities may exist: multiculturalism 
often refers to solidarities at the sub-state level; the discourse around the importance of social 
cohesion generally referred to the importance of solidarity at the national (usually British) 
level; arguments have also been made for solidarities at a regional level, and in particular with 
reference to the EU; and universalists would argue for the importance of global solidarities. 
Reasons given for why these solidarities are deemed important vary widely, but what such 
arguments have in common is the privileging of one particular level. Chapter 6 argued against 
this, and suggested that life is simply more complex than the account given by any one of 
these positions. People have multiple and complicated identifications at many different, 
potentially overlapping, levels, and any one of them can potentially form the basis for some 
kind of solidarity. Different solidarities are going to have varying importance for different 
people, and there can be no single answer to the question of the ‘right’ level for solidarities to 
be emphasised. It was argued that looking at the problem from a ‘new cosmopolitan outlook’ 
(Fine 2007) is more in tune with the complexities of people’s multiple identifications than a 
stubborn emphasis on solidarity and cohesion at, for instance, the level of the nation-state. 
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7.2 What is the relationship between national identity and social 
cohesion in Britain? 
 
Having summarised the thesis up until now, it is time to directly answer the main research 
question of this study: what is the relationship between national identity and social cohesion? I 
will make four main points: the first regarding the concept of national identity; the second 
regarding the concept of social cohesion; the third regarding the importance of equality; and 
the fourth reflecting on the role of the nation-state in ensuring equality. 
 
1. The relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain depends 
crucially on the nature of the concept of national identity in question. 
The type of national identity in question is of crucial importance in the sense that the 
relationship between national identity and social cohesion may be different depending on the 
type of national identity under discussion. I have suggested that it is helpful to draw upon a 
distinction between constitutional patriotism, civic national identity and ethnic national 
identity made by various academics (e.g. Kymlicka 1995), since the relationship of each to 
social cohesion may be rather different. Constitutional patriotism, in Habermas’ (1998) sense, 
refers to a functional equivalent to a national identity; that is a feeling of commitment to a 
polity that does not rely on notions of nationhood, with their historical, cultural and ethnic 
connotations. By contrast, civic national identity embraces a national culture, and ethnic 
national identity would also have an element based on common descent: “What distinguishes 
’civic’ nations from ‘ethnic’ nations is not the absence of any cultural component to national 
identity, but rather the fact that anyone can integrate into the common culture, regardless of 
race or colour” (Kymlicka 1995, 24). 
The distinction between these three types of national identity was broadly supported by 
respondents in the qualitative component of this study, although they did not always express 
the distinction in these terms. A concept similar to constitutional patriotism was sometimes 
described as a ‘loyalty to Britain’, in which British laws and procedures were respected, but 
was different to an identity, which was described as ‘a real who you are’. This ‘loyalty to 
Britain’ was therefore not seen as a national identity as such, but clearly is related to concepts 
of national identity since respondents discussed it as part of their discussions of feelings of 
national identity. There is, however, a semantic ambiguity in this description since, although a 
commitment to following the state’s laws was emphasised, a ‘loyalty’ to Britain could also 
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imply an emotive attachment as well as a commitment to a contractual arrangement. By 
contrast, English identity was clearly seen as an ethnic national identity, with many 
respondents expressing their feelings of exclusion from it on the grounds that they were not 
‘Anglo-Saxon’. British identity, by contrast, sat somewhere in between: respondents were in 
general more open to adopting a British identity, and some were less likely to express 
perceptions of exclusion from it on the grounds of ethnicity. British identity was repeatedly 
given historical and cultural connotations by many respondents and, for some, these 
connotations led to feelings of exclusion from it, based sometimes on ‘race’ or ethnicity, and 
sometimes on things such as English language usage, accent or cultural traits. 
For some respondents, British identity itself could mean very different things to different 
people and, potentially, this could lead to different relationships between British identity and 
social cohesion. In particular, this manifested itself through discussions of British colonialism 
and the differing British identities of ‘post-colonial’ immigrants to Britain as compared to those 
coming from countries that were not formerly British colonies. The story told by many 
respondents coming from former British colonies, or by their children of the parents’ feelings, 
was one whereby immigrants felt strongly British even before arrival in Britain; many had been 
through British colonial schooling, for instance. Upon arrival, these feelings of British 
identification were challenged by others on a racialised basis. These experiences have much in 
common with Stuart Hall’s descriptions of his own experiences of arriving in Britain (Hall & 
Chen 1996), and highlight the potential exclusionary aspects of British identity. According to 
the views of at least some respondents in this study, then, British identity has not (at least yet) 
been transformed into a ‘post-ethnic’ or purely civic and inclusive national identity, contrary to 
claims by, among others, Trevor Phillips (2009). To the extent that British and English identities 
are exclusionary of certain groups of people, they represent a problem for British social 
cohesion in that if such identities are emphasised to ostensibly bolster cohesion, they can 
(conceptually at least) only produce cohesion between those that feel themselves to have fully 
adopted that identity, and be fully accepted by others as having that identity. 
Although the boundaries of a distinction between constitutional patriotism, civic national 
identity and ethnic national identity are blurred, I wish to suggest it is helpful both to make 
such a distinction, and to describe English identity as a largely ethnic identity, British identity 
as a largely civic identity (albeit with some historical, cultural and ethnic connotations), and 
what respondents described as a ‘loyalty to Britain’ – in the sense of following British laws – as 
a kind of constitutional patriotism, albeit one with semantic ambiguities due to the emotive 
connotations of the word ‘loyalty’. The relationship between national identity and social 
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cohesion then depends on the type one is discussing. Although it was not possible to 
operationalise the concept of constitutional patriotism in the quantitative component of this 
study – and, in any case, it was not seen by respondents in the qualitative component to be a 
national identity as such – the quantitative component did produce striking evidence on 
differences in the relationship between British identity and social cohesion as compared to 
that between English identity and social cohesion. Whilst British identity was positively and 
significantly associated with many of the social cohesion measures, almost all of the positive 
associations were not found for English identity. In addition, English identity was found to be 
negatively associated with one type of social cohesion – that measuring meaningful 
interactions with people of different backgrounds. This is consistent with the discussion above 
of the dangers of the exclusionary nature of national identities with ethnic connotations, and 
suggests not only that English identity is inappropriate as a tool to bolster social cohesion, but 
also that the exclusionary elements of British identity may need to be addressed. 
In summary, then, the relationship between national identity and social cohesion in Britain 
depends crucially on the nature of the concept of national identity in question. A ‘loyalty to 
Britain’ might be said to be a kind of constitutional patriotism; British identity might be 
described as a largely (but not exclusively) civic national identity; and English identity might be 
described as an ethnic national identity. It may be important to address the exclusionary 
aspects of national identities – in particular those based on ethnicity or cultural markers – in 
order to make them more compatible with positive social cohesion outcomes. British identity 
may be associated with some positive social cohesion outcomes, but English identity may not 
and, potentially, may actually be damaging to some types of social cohesion.  
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2. Social cohesion might be better broken up into two different types of cohesion, since 
its relationship with national identity differs depending upon the type in question. 
In addition to the relationship between national identity and social cohesion depending on the 
type of national identity in question, it may also depend on the type of social cohesion under 
discussion. Social cohesion is a notoriously ambiguous concept, often to the point where “its 
meaning is nebulous but at the same time the impression is given that everyone knows what is 
being referred to” (Kearns & Forrest 2000, 966). According to the definition provided by 
Forrest & Kearns (2001), social cohesion can refer to: common values and a civic culture; social 
order and social control; social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities; social networks 
and social capital; and place attachment and identity. I wish to suggest that, at least for the 
purposes of discussing its relationship with national identity, it might be better broken up into 
two separate types: one referring to an ability to influence and access public institutions; and 
the other referring to associational types of behaviour and spatial belonging. 
From the quantitative component of this study (see Chapter 4), I found that social cohesion 
can break up into ten different ‘elements’, based on the way in which it was operationalised 
using the Citizenship Survey. These ten elements can be summarised conceptually in terms of 
four different groups, which are: 
 The ability to influence public institutions; 
 The ability to access public institutions, and in particular public services; 
 Civic and social activity; and 
 Spatial belonging and satisfaction. 
What I wish to suggest is that civic and social activity and spatial belonging and satisfaction 
differ somewhat from influencing and being able to access public institutions in their 
relationship with national identity, since the variables found to be associated with each of the 
two types (as shown in Chapter 4) are somewhat different. British identity was in general more 
consistently associated with the associational type of cohesion than with the institutional type 
of cohesion, as shown in Table 59 below. 
These two types of social cohesion are also conceptually rather different, with the first 
referring to relations between individuals and public institutions; and the second referring to 
feelings of spatial belonging and relations amongst individuals, in terms of interactions with 
others and associational behaviour. The concept of social cohesion might be made less 
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ambiguous and multifaceted by breaking it up into these two types. Based on the evidence 
provided in this study, British identity may have more to do with associational cohesion than 
institutional cohesion, and English identity may not be particularly related to either.   
Table 59: Two types of social cohesion 
Type of social cohesion Description Associated with 
Institutional cohesion Contractual relationships 
between individuals and public 
institutions, including ability to 
access and influence institutions 
British and English identity 
not strongly associated; 
perceived discrimination is 
associated more strongly 
Associational cohesion Relations between individuals and 
spatial belonging; emphasises 
cultural similarity 
British identity is associated 
to some extent; education 
and deprivation are 
associated more strongly 
 
From the qualitative component (see Chapter 5) there are also examples of how the processes 
underlying the relationships between national identity and each type of social cohesion might 
work. There were several narratives by which respondents expressed how they had problems 
in accessing public institutions – sometimes based on the complex way in which institutions 
were set up, and sometimes based on barriers of language or accent – and these problems 
were frequently seen as cases of discrimination. For the other type of social cohesion – the 
associational type – there are narratives of how feeling British might make one feel a greater 
sense of belonging, or how it might encourage one to volunteer, for instance; and how an 
absence of a British identity might be linked to a feeling of disconnectedness from society, 
which might lead to a lack of involvement in society (see, for instance, the narrative of ‘British 
identity as a signifier of connectedness with society’ in Chapter 5, section 5.31). 
The two types of social cohesion can also be linked to the different theoretical arguments for 
the ways in which national identity might be important for social cohesion, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, section 6.1. The institutional type of cohesion corresponds more to what liberals 
and some social democrats might be concerned with regarding social cohesion – the 
maintenance of a state’s liberal democratic institutions, and support for institutions that 
deliver egalitarian social justice, including public services. The argument here is that national 
identity can be important because it either generates the social cohesion necessary for the 
effective functioning of a nation’s liberal democratic institutions; or because it generates the 
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social cohesion necessary for the implementation of progressive social policies, aimed at 
ensuring social justice.17 The associational type of cohesion corresponds more to what 
conservatives and communitarians might be concerned with – a rich associational life and civic 
culture that provide the social conditions for human flourishing. The argument here is that 
national identity can be important because it either generates the social cohesion necessary 
for the maintenance of a civic culture that provides citizens’ lives with context and meaning; or 
because it implies identification with the traditions, customs and history of national society.18 
Based on the quantitative evidence in this study, British identity is not especially related to the 
first type of social cohesion, but may be to some extent related to the second type. The 
differences between these two types of cohesion surely highlight the importance when 
designing policy intended to influence social cohesion of being more specific about what one is 
discussing. There is the potential for simply ‘talking past’ one another if not.  
 
3. Equality may have a much more important relationship with social cohesion than 
does national identity. 
As has already been hinted at, the associations that were found between national identity and 
social cohesion in the quantitative component are relatively very small in magnitude as 
compared to some of the control variables in the models. Perceived discrimination appears to 
be particularly strongly associated with the institutional type of social cohesion, at least when 
one considers equal access to public services; and education and deprivation are particularly 
strongly associated with the associational and belonging type of cohesion. In short, it seems 
that indicators of equality might be much more strongly related to social cohesion than is 
national identity; that is either equality in the sense of non-discrimination, or structural 
indicators of equality such as education and deprivation. 
Given that these are associations, not causal relationships, what is the significance of these 
findings? One can find two competing explanations in the academic literature in terms of the 
possible causality at work here. The first has been discussed in terms of argument A2 (see 
Chapter 6, section 6.1), and suggests that a national identity can provide the conditions for 
social cohesion, which in turn makes progressive social policies, such as a strong welfare state, 
possible. The sense of causality implied is fairly linear: national identity causes social cohesion, 
                                                          
17
 See arguments A1 and A2, discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.1. 
18
 See arguments A3 and A4, discussed in Chapter 6 section 6.1. 
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which in turn allows for the maintenance of egalitarian institutions, which can implement 
redistribution. This is essentially the argument endorsed by, for instance, Miller (1995). 
The second explanation suggests the reverse direction of causality: a cohesive society is only 
possible within the context of structural equality and equality of access to public institutions. 
Barry, for instance, claims that a “sense of solidarity is fostered by common institutions and a 
spread of incomes narrow enough to prevent people from believing – and with some reason – 
that they can escape from the common lot” (2001, 79). O’Donnell (2007, 258) argues along 
similar lines: “It matters less what people believe than that they care about the society they 
live in. People are more likely to care if their rights are secure and they have a decent standard 
of living.” Furthermore, the “adoption of egalitarian policies could significantly contribute to 
the strengthening of social solidarity in Britain and, for that matter, globally” (ibid., 263). 
In terms of this second explanation, one suggestion of the mechanism by which cohesion is 
created is in the design of public institutions, and in particular the welfare state. Richard 
Titmuss, for instance, argued that “the ways in which society organizes and structures its social 
institutions – and particularly its health and welfare systems – can … foster integration or 
alienation” (1971, 225). What the debate essentially comes down to is whether one views 
cohesion as the result of some kind of pre-political community, which in turn makes the 
maintenance of democratic institutions and the adoption of progressive social policies 
possible, or whether cohesion can be generated by the design of institutions such that citizens 
feel they have something in common to share. This latter view, for example, is expressed by 
Brian Barry (1999, 59): 
“If I ask why I am obliged to contribute to the old-age pensions of somebody I have 
never met and have no particular interest in who lives in Rotherham, but not to the 
pension of somebody equally distant to me who lives in Rennes, the answer is that I 
belong to the same scheme of social insurance as the first but not the second.” 
Will Kymlicka (2008, 61), by contrast, considers the relationship to work both ways at once: 
“On the one hand, politicians appealed to ideas of common nationhood and national 
solidarity to legitimise the welfare state. Citizens were told that they should be willing 
to support the welfare state because its beneficiaries are co-nationals to whom we 
have special obligations: they are ‘one of us’. On the other hand, the welfare state also 
served to spread ideas of nationhood. Access to common national educational and 
healthcare systems, and to other social rights, gave concrete substance to ideas of 
common nationhood. Participating in the institutions of a national welfare state 
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provided a source of common experiences and loyalties that helped bind together the 
disparate populations of Western countries.”19 
Given that the findings from the quantitative component of this study are associations, it is not 
possible to give conclusive evidence either way on this debate. However, if a common sense of 
nationhood was a major factor in the creation of social cohesion, one would expect national 
identity to be strongly associated with social cohesion; yet such a strong association was not 
found. From this perspective, the second view – in which cohesion can be engineered or 
generated by rights such as equal access to the state’s institutions – appears more plausible. 
National identities were not strongly associated with the institutional type of cohesion at all; 
instead of perceptions of the absence of discrimination in terms of equal access to public 
services were much more important. For the associational type of cohesion, education and 
deprivation were much more strongly associated with cohesion than British identity. 
What is clear from these findings is the need for further research into all the possible drivers of 
increased cohesion – not just a focus on national identity – the directions of causation, and the 
potential underlying mechanisms. The possibility that carefully designed, inclusive institutions 
may be important for social cohesion is, perhaps, a particularly important future research 
agenda. As Mike O’Donnell (2007, 249) argues, the “underlying issue is social solidarity and 
how to foster it. Focusing on national identity as a counterbalance to multiculturalism is 
merely one approach and could be counterproductive if pursued insensitively”. 
 
 
  
                                                          
19
 Or, as Kymlicka (2008, 61) summarises: “In short, the welfare state both presupposed and 
perpetuated an ideology of nationhood”. 
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4. The ‘level’ of the nation-state is only one of a number of different ‘levels’ at which 
identities might be emphasised to support cohesion; but to the extent that the 
nation-state is important for equality, nation-states may be important for cohesion 
too. 
Chapter 6 argued that the UK policy shift in the early 2000s from multiculturalism to social 
cohesion, in which multiculturalism and social cohesion were seen as binary opposites and 
national cohesion was seen as a counterbalance to multiculturalism, might be better seen 
from the perspective of many different levels at which identities might be emphasised to 
support cohesion. Many different identities are important to people. Within Britain the most 
obvious alternatives to British identity are English, Welsh and Scottish identities. Even British 
identity itself is one that can transcend British borders, as was evidenced by discussions of 
colonialism by some of the respondents in this study. Government policy documents 
frequently use the concept of ‘community’ as if Britain could be neatly split into clearly defined 
and fixed parts; yet many other identities based on religion, class, sexuality, gender, ideology, 
individual preferences, and so on, may also be important to people and could also form the 
basis for solidarities. If one is concerned with creating the kind of cohesion that might be 
linked to access to culture and conditions for human flourishing, then there are many 
possibilities.  
In addition, processes of globalisation present additional challenges that require cooperation 
beyond the borders of states, such as an increasingly interdependent economic and financial 
system. If one is concerned about ecological issues, economic stability, or redistributive justice 
between states, then state-level solidarities are not the only ones of importance – regional or 
global solidarities may also be important too. Indeed, a world or human identity was indeed a 
clearly expressed narrative by some of the respondents in this study, and these possibilities for 
solidarities may be important in addition to state-level solidarities. Emphasising state-level 
national identities as a tool to create cohesion has the very real potential to de-emphasise the 
importance of cohesion at a wider level. 
This complexity and multiplicity of identity is well understood – e.g. Modood et al. (1994); Hall 
& Chen (1996); Hall (2000) – yet the complexity and multiplicity of possibilities for different 
solidarities and access to cultures is often overlooked. Margalit and Raz argue, for instance, 
that “[f]amiliarity with a culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable” (1995, 86, 
emphasis added); and Tamir claims that the “right to culture is meant to allow individuals to 
live within the culture of their choice, to decide on their social affiliations, to re-create the 
culture of the community they belong to, and to redefine its borders” (1993, 8, emphasis 
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added). Chapter 6 argued, therefore, that there may be a need in discourse both on 
multiculturalism and social cohesion to move away from an idea in which one particular 
identity and corresponding level of cohesion is emphasised, and towards one in which the 
complexity of people’s identities and cultural affiliations is recognised. These multiple and 
overlapping identities and affiliations may, perhaps, have the potential to be less divisive than 
an overemphasis on one particular identity and corresponding solidarity. It is suggested, 
therefore, that a ‘new cosmopolitan outlook’, in the sense used by Fine (2007, 15), would 
allow both desires for local belonging and identity to be taken seriously, but also to reconcile 
them with “the idea of universal species-wide human solidarity”. The nation-state, then, is just 
one of a number of possibilities for belonging, identity and solidarity. 
However, if equality is important for social cohesion, it is obviously significant for equality - 
and therefore indirectly for social cohesion - that much redistribution and other progressive 
politics occurs at the level of the state. As O’Donnell (2007, 263) notes: “The practical pursuit 
of equality has occurred mainly within the context of emerging nation states”. If one puts aside 
debates over the appropriate level at which equality should be ensured, it is undeniably true 
that states currently are fundamentally important in terms of redistribution within their 
borders. The European Union’s budget, for instance, is only 2% of the size of the government 
spending of its member states (Economist 2013). To the extent that equality is important for 
social cohesion, states are important for (state-level) social cohesion too. Miller’s (1995) claim 
that the state is de facto significant for social cohesion is, to some extent, therefore an 
important one. 
However, Miller’s further claim – that the nation-state is in a more principled sense the right 
level for progressive politics – is more disputable. This issue links to the arguments put forward 
in the previous section. If one views a nation-state as being fundamentally based on some kind 
of prepolitical community, then nation-states might indeed be argued to be the right ‘level’ for 
redistribution to take place. If, however, carefully designed institutions can produce the 
solidarity required for redistribution then cohesion can, at least to some extent, be 
engineered, and the currently existing state borders can be seen as largely arbitrary. 
Miller clearly subscribes to the first view. In saying that one “can only expect [people] to 
consent to institutions that enforce the preferred distribution if they regard themselves as 
bound to the beneficiaries by strong ties of community: the stronger the ties, the more 
egalitarian the distribution can be”, Miller (1989a, 59) appears to be arguing for a fairly linear 
idea of causation. Emotive loyalties and attachments, some constructed and some pre-
existing, create a sense of solidarity, which in turn allows for the enactment of progressive 
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social policies, which in turn enables the fulfilment of his socialist sense of social justice. 
Perhaps with something like Titmuss’ (1971) idea of the welfare state itself reinforcing 
commitments to redistribution in mind, Miller goes on to argue that it “is not an adequate 
answer to this line of thought to say that a distributive practice can, of itself, create the 
necessary ties. No doubt there is a process of reinforcement such that implementing a practice 
of distributive justice appropriate to a particular community will tend to buttress the sense of 
community that already exists” (ibid.). But, by implication, the pre-existing sense of community 
is a necessary condition for the implementation of the practice of distributive justice in the 
first place. 
Barry, however, gives the opposite view, arguing that “elevating … the “interests of the nation” 
normally goes along with the suggestion that it is at best irrelevant and at worst disloyal to 
divide the nation by making demands on behalf of one economic group over another … 
Redistribution has never come about in the way fantasized by Walzer and Miller, the general 
recognition that shared values require it. Rather, it has invariably required the creation of a 
political party that has deliberately sought to divide the electorate on socioeconomic lines” 
(Barry 1999, 50). An additional issue is that plainly many states do not coincide neatly with a 
single nation. Even if Miller’s argument that progressive politics requires prepolitical national 
ties holds for nations, then the absence of a fit between nations and states is problematic for 
the further claim that existing states are the right level for redistribution to take place. Britain 
– especially with the impending referendum on Scottish independence – is a case in point. 
Even if it is true that a special kind of solidarity is fostered amongst those sharing a national 
identity, this does not help redistribution in Britain very much. Most white Britons feel English 
rather than British – in fact, according to the 2008-9 Citizenship Survey, fewer than half of 
those of white ethnicity living in England and Wales stated British as their national identity 
(they could pick more than one) – so it is debateable whether Britishness actually constitutes 
the kind of national identity that is allegedly needed at all. 
McKnight & Nolan (2012, 35) studied “the determinants of preferences for redistribution in a 
pool of 33 European countries”, and found “that (at least in Europe) growing income inequality 
leads to more individual support for redistribution”. They also found “that the actual level of 
redistribution implemented in the country reduces support for more redistribution” (ibid.) 
suggesting that, at least to some extent, the design of public institutions – namely the extent 
to which they redistribute income – has an impact on people’s support for redistribution, as 
Barry (1999) and Titmuss (1971) claim. 
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It is surely the case that states are currently extremely important sites for redistribution and 
perceptions of equality. Given that discrimination and structural equality – in the form of 
education and area deprivation – were found to be particularly strongly associated with 
indicators of social cohesion, to the extent that states are influential sites of redistribution, and 
can be important for attempts to tackle discrimination, they may therefore be important for 
social cohesion too. In addition, states may be important for perceptions of equality. McKnight 
& Nolan (2012, 35-6) point out that an “important issue related to social cohesion within the 
EU is the extent to which people frame their assessments of their own well-being with 
reference to their fellow country-men and women or with a broader span including those in 
other EU countries”, and conclude that their “findings highlight the continuing importance of 
national reference groups in EU countries”. Whilst states remain important sites for 
perceptions of equality and possibilities for redistribution, therefore, they may also be 
important sites for sustaining social cohesion. 
However, given the multiplicity of different sources of identity and their possibilities for 
sustaining different solidarities, and given the possibilities for different sites to be important in 
terms of frames of reference for perceptions of equality, particularly in the context of 
processes of globalisation, then the possibilities for multiple and overlapping levels – from the 
local to the global – at which both institutional and associational cohesion might be important 
in the future should not be overlooked. If equality – both in a structural sense and in the sense 
of an absence of discrimination – is particularly important for cohesion, then the different 
‘levels’ at which these inequalities are framed will be important for the way in which future 
debates over cohesion and solidarity are contested. 
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7.3 The social policy context in Britain 
 
Since the disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001, UK race relations policy has 
seen a shift from previous policies focusing on multiculturalism, to a new policy focus on social 
cohesion or, more precisely, community cohesion (Worley 2005). In the wake of the 
disturbances several reports were published, of which the Cantle Report (2001) was arguably 
the most influential. The Cantle Report used the definition of social cohesion provided by 
Forrest & Kearns (2001) – the definition that also formed the starting point of this study – but 
simply replaced the word ‘social’ with ‘community’ to produce a definition of community 
cohesion. The Cantle Report built partly on Parekh’s (2000) idea of Britain being a ‘community 
of communities’, but claimed that different communities were living ‘parallel lives’; the task of 
community cohesion was then to bring together, in some sense, this diverse set of 
communities. 
The Denham Report (2001, 11), published around the same time as the Cantle Report, 
identified a civic national identity as a key component in the community cohesion strategy: 
“We have drawn on the detailed descriptions and analysis contained in the reports of 
Cantle, Clarke, Ouseley and Ritchie … in setting out the following brief overview of the 
key issues. There is a large measure of agreement on the following being the most 
important factors; 
- the lack of a strong civic identity or shared social values to unite diverse 
communities”. 
Indeed, the Denham report argued that the communities that had most successfully overcome 
the possible tensions resulting from diversity had done so because they had “succeeded in 
uniting diverse groups through a shared sense of belonging to, and pride in, a common civic 
identity” (Denham Report 2011, 11). The emphasis on using a civic version of British identity as 
a ‘social glue’ has been a highly prominent theme since 2001: “The issue of Britishness and 
what it represents, whether it is an identity that can continue to act as social glue, is resonant 
in all discussions about cohesion in the UK” (Hickman et al. 2012, 49). The promotion of British 
identity as a potential positive influence on cohesion has taken place despite Parekh’s (2000, 
38) much-criticised claim that “Britishness as much as Englishness, has systematic, largely 
unspoken racial connotations”, to the point where Trevor Phillips, the former chair of the 
Equality and Human Rights Commission, has suggested that Britishness “offers us an 
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overarching common identity, available to anyone who chooses to live here” (T. Phillips 2009, 
248). 
Following on from the definition of community cohesion provided in the Cantle Report, the 
Local Government Association’s Guidance on Community Cohesion proposed the following 
‘working definition’ of a cohesive community: 
 “there is a common vision and a sense of belonging for all communities; 
 the diversity of people’s different backgrounds and circumstances are appreciated and 
positively valued; 
 those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities; and 
 strong and positive relationships are being developed between people from different 
backgrounds in the workplace, in schools and within neighbourhoods.” 
LGA (2002, 6) 
This new focus on community cohesion was criticised extensively, and in particular on the 
grounds that it over-emphasised social or cultural explanations for failures of cohesion and did 
not address the extent to which structural inequalities, poverty or exclusion might be 
important for cohesion as well (McGhee 2003; Amin 2003; Hickman et al. 2008). In particular, 
there was a criticism that the lack of emphasis on structural factors in this discourse implied 
that minority communities had chosen to self-segregate themselves, which underplayed “the 
impact of socioeconomic disadvantage, racial discrimination, and segregation resulting from 
external constraints on settlement rather than choice decisions” (C. Phillips 2009, 196). 
Platt’s (2002, 143) comparison of Lord Scarman’s report on the Brixton disturbances in 1981 
with the Cantle Report highlights this issue: 
“Scarman’s object of attention was disadvantage, specifically racial disadvantage: deal 
with disadvantage, he suggested, and ‘race relations’ will look after themselves. By 
contrast, Cantle focuses on the communities and on getting pre-supposed 
‘communities’ to speak to each other. Scarman could be criticised on the grounds of 
promoting an integrationist view of society, which was not sufficiently sensitive to 
cultural difference. On the other hand, Cantle’s acceptance of difference as self-
evident and having apparently fixed and permanent boundaries could be seen to 
detract from the very important issues of structural disadvantage facing both white 
and minority group ‘communities’.” 
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To an extent, the failure to emphasise structural explanations of the 2001 disturbances, and in 
the community cohesion policy discourse, was later addressed in the Improving Opportunity, 
Strengthening Society report (Home Office 2005a). This report offered “a greater balance 
between the expressed need for a common British identity and sense of belonging and the 
eradication of social and economic inequality between ethnic groups” (C. Phillips 2009, 197). 
The London bombings of July 2005 were also significant for the community cohesion discourse. 
The discourse had already been influenced by the ‘war on terror’ following the attacks on the 
US in September 2001, since these events had already unfolded when the 2001 reports by 
Cantle, Denham and others were published. The fact that British-born Muslim men carried out 
the attacks intensified the “culture of unashamed questioning of the cultural practices and 
national allegiances of British Muslims” that already existed (Amin 2003, 460). This, combined 
with the focus on problematised communities, allowed the discourse to focus on the 
assimilation of self-segregated communities into the ‘mainstream’ rather than on problems 
inherent in the whole of society. By problematising certain communities such as those in 
Bradford, Burnley and Oldham, and certain groups such as Muslims, attention could be 
detracted away from society as a whole. There are resonances here with concepts such as an 
‘underclass’, or the ‘social exclusion’ of particular groups or individuals, which are based upon 
a distinction between the normal and the problematic ‘other’.  
The Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC) was set up in July 2006 as a response to the 
London bombings. The CIC’s report in 2007 departed somewhat from the Cantle Report in that 
“cohesion policy was relevant to every locality and not just those that had been the recipient 
of immigration and exhibited the characteristics of fractured communities” (Hickman et al. 
2012, 39). However, in other respects the CIC continued in the tradition of the Cantle Report, 
such as by questioning the value of multiculturalism. 
Further riots in England, in August 2011, led to the ‘Riots Communities and Victims Panel’ 
being set up to “explore the causes of the riots and how communities can be made more 
socially and economically resilient, in order to prevent future disorder” (DCLG 2013, 4). The 
Panel’s final report (RCVP 2012, 12) emphasised failures in relationships within communities, 
such as problems of poor parenting, feelings of being unable to “intervene in each other’s 
lives”, and not feeling “neighbours treated each other with respect”, as undermining social 
cohesion. However, the report also discussed the feelings of many residents that public service 
providers were not listening to them or involving them in decision making. This issue was seen 
as an additional problem for cohesion. 
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Both individual and structural issues were identified as causes of the riots. Youth 
unemployment, sometimes resulting from failures in the education system, were prominent 
issues, but proposals for tackling issues of wealth inequality to combat a perception of “a 
growing gap between rich and poor” in certain areas, and as a route to preventing future riots, 
were confined to suggestions that “society must continue to support sustainable growth and 
promote business expansion” and that “businesses have a clear role [in] giving[ing] something 
back to society and making progressive steps to sharing wealth and providing opportunities for 
individuals to achieve a stake in business” (RCVP 2012, 9). Indeed, the central proposal to 
combat wealth inequality was to promote the “Government’s responsible capitalism work to 
make shareholder participation a priority and support businesses that take this approach to 
business planning” (ibid. 10). Individuals, on the other hand, were criticised for their lack of 
‘personal resilience’ and ‘character’: “Young people who develop character will be best placed 
to make the most of their lives … Evidence also tells us that employers want to see character in 
potential recruits” (ibid., 7). 
The issue of policing – and perceptions of unfair treatment including racial discrimination – 
that rioters themselves described as a highly significant factor in the riots (Lewis et al. 2011) 
was also mentioned in the Panel’s final report but, whilst noting that “Black and minority 
ethnic happiness following contact with the police is significantly worse than it is for white 
people”, meekly recommended only “that police forces proactively engage with communities 
about issues that impact on the perceptions of their integrity” (RCVP 2012, 11); a stark 
contrast with both the rioters’ own perceptions of the issues at hand, and with the 
Macpherson Report’s (1999) description of the police as ‘institutionally racist’ over a decade 
earlier. The government’s response to the report (DCLG 2013) emphasised that the 
government is “committed to building stronger relationships between the police and public” 
(ibid., 28), and acknowledged that “the benefits of stop and search need to be carefully 
weighed against the potential negative impact on community confidence in the police, and the 
confidence and trust of those from Black Minority Ethnic backgrounds in particular” (ibid., 29). 
However, in the policing section of the government’s response to the report, not a single 
reference was made to differential treatment of ethnic groups, or racial discrimination by the 
police. 
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7.4 Implications for social policy and future research 
 
In this UK government policy context, what, then, are the implications of this study for policy 
and future research? The government’s usage of the term ‘community cohesion’, as it appears 
in various reports, is extremely broad and ambiguous, and can be used to refer to many 
different concepts simultaneously. In Guidance on Community Cohesion (LGA 2002, 6), 
community cohesion is described as a concept that “incorporates and goes beyond the 
concept of race equality and social inclusion”. Given that the concepts of social inclusion and 
exclusion themselves are broad, contested and ambiguous (e.g. Barry 1998), ‘going beyond’ 
such concepts is an ambitious task. I wish to suggest that it is questionable whether social 
cohesion, or the related concept of community cohesion used in government reports, is 
particularly helpful in its unified form. Evidence from this study suggests that the correlates of 
different aspects of cohesion are rather different and it may be helpful to divide social 
cohesion up into at least two different concepts which, as working titles, I have termed 
‘institutional cohesion’ and ‘associational cohesion’. Institutional cohesion, as operationalised 
in the quantitative component of this study, refers to the ability to influence and gain equal 
access to public institutions. Associational cohesion, by contrast, refers to associational types 
of behaviour – that is ways in which people interact or relate to other another – and to 
belongings to place. With reference to the ‘working definition’ of community cohesion given 
by the LGA (2002, 6), associational cohesion might have something in common with “a 
common vision and sense of belonging”, the appreciation of “the diversity of people’s different 
backgrounds and circumstances”, and the “strong and positive relationships … developed 
between people from different backgrounds”; whilst institutional cohesion might have 
something in common with the “similar life opportunities” of people from different 
backgrounds, particularly when this refers to their equal access to public institutions such as 
public services. 
British identity, upon which there has been much focus in policy discourse on community 
cohesion, was found to have little to do with institutional cohesion but may be somewhat 
more important for associational cohesion. Given that “social cohesion is the currently 
favoured shorthand to address the complex and often disjunctive set of policy challenges” 
relating to “similar phrases such as community cohesion, social inclusion and integration, and 
antonyms such as social exclusion” (Zetter et al. 2006, 4), being more specific about the type of 
cohesion under discussion might go some way to resolve disputes whereby some claim that 
there is a crisis of social cohesion, whilst others claim instead that discourse around 
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community cohesion is one way of drawing upon earlier discourses of assimilation but in an 
apparently deracialised manner (Worley 2005). Additionally, arguments about national identity 
being important for institutional as compared with associational cohesion may be associated 
with different political positions: a liberal or social democratic position, or a communitarian or 
conservative position, respectively (see Chapter 6 for a discussion). It is crucial in any 
discussion of policy to be clear as to which type one is referring to, since this would not only go 
some way in reducing the ambiguities currently inherent in the concept of social cohesion, but 
would also allow any assumptions being made on the basis of political persuasion to be made 
more explicit. 
Rather than having a general emphasis on the importance of a civic notion of British identity in 
all policy discussions of cohesion (Hickman et al. 2012), policy discussion could then focus on 
the issues of most importance corresponding to the type of cohesion in question. If one is 
interested in designing policy to promote institutional cohesion, the evidence from this study 
suggests that British identity may be of little relevance. Instead, the most important issue may 
be perceived fairness, on the one hand, or discrimination, on the other, in terms of access to 
public institutions such as public services. In terms of institutional cohesion, there is little 
evidence here to suggest that a policy of trying to make minority groups feel more British is 
going to be effective in increasing cohesion. That institutional cohesion – which in particular 
focuses on equal access to public services – appears to be strongly related to perceptions of 
discrimination should not be surprising. Craig (2008, 242) identifies a large body of evidence 
suggesting that “access to welfare provision is highly unequal, on a basis that is highly 
racialised”. If one is concerned with designing policy such as to foster institutional cohesion, 
therefore, it may be particularly important to address these issues of unequal access. 
Given that perceptions of discrimination appear to be important for institutional cohesion, 
there is a serious concern that the community cohesion agenda, with its emphasis on national 
unity and the questioning of the allegiances of immigrant groups and their descendants (Amin 
2003), and its links to immigration policy with its “political rhetoric about security and the so-
called ‘war on terror’” (Craig 2007, 616), may in fact be undermining cohesion rather than 
bolstering it. The Race Relations Amendment Act in 2000 “increased the onus on public sector 
organisations to demonstrate that they were operating in a non-discriminatory fashion” (Platt 
2002, 13). Yet some policy implemented under the ‘war on terror’ has gone in precisely the 
opposite direction: the stop and search legislation has, “the Home Office admits … 
disproportionately disadvantage[d] people ‘of Muslim appearance’”, to the point where a 
senior Asian police officer claimed that “a new offence, of ‘travelling whilst Asian’, had been 
301 
 
covertly introduced by police” (Craig 2008, 240). This is despite the fact that, in more than 
100,000 searches under terrorism legislation, no arrests relating to terrorism were made 
(Guardian 2010). From this perspective, the modification of Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 
following a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights is a welcome development; as is the 
(partial) acknowledgement of the problems with stop and search in the government’s 
response to the 2011 riots (DCLG 2013), although the discriminatory nature of stop and search 
is not fully recognised. A recent report found that “Enforcement of drug laws is unfairly 
focused on Black and Asian communities, despite their rates of drug use being lower than the 
white majority”, with Black people being 6.3 times more likely to be searched than white 
people (Eastwood et al. 2013, 11). Minority ethnic groups may “also have greatest difficulty in 
accessing appropriate health provision, often because of the failure of health services to 
respond to specific cultural needs such as for interpretation” (Craig 2008, 242). Descriptions of 
discrimination by the police, and barriers in access to public service provision due to language, 
accent or complex institutional design were clearly expressed by many of the respondents in 
the qualitative component of this study. If one is interested in designing policy to benefit what 
I am calling ‘institutional cohesion’, therefore, it might be much better to address these issues 
of discrimination and unequal access rather than the ‘one size fits all’ solution of focusing on 
boosting British identity. 
If, however, one is interested in designing policy to influence what I am terming ‘associational 
cohesion’ then British identity may have somewhat more relevance. Associational cohesion 
refers to relationships between individuals – ways that people interact and engage with each 
other – and also to belonging to place, whether that is the local area or Britain. Many 
government reports, at least until the increased emphasis on structural factors in the Home 
Office’s (2005a) Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society, focus strongly on this type of 
cohesion; the Cantle Report, for instance, problematised people living in communities where 
their lives “do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful 
interchanges” (2001, 9). Some associations were found in the quantitative component of this 
study between British identity and indicators of this type of cohesion; and narratives were 
found in the qualitative component that could describe mechanisms of the ways in which a 
relationship might work. The focus of government reports and policy has been on a civic 
notion of British, rather than English, Scottish or Welsh identity, and the evidence presented 
here suggests the choice is the right one: British identity is more inclusive and has a greater 
potential to be a civic identity. However, several crucial caveats must be made about the 
relationship between British identity and associational cohesion.  
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The first concerns the notion of British identity itself. Many of the government reports refer to 
the importance of a notion of civic identity, such as the Denham Report’s (2001, 12) reference 
to a “civic identity which serves to unite people and which expresses common goals and 
aspirations”. Yet the evidence from the qualitative component of this study suggests that 
British identity may, at least not yet, be considered to be a truly civic identity that is open to 
all. Some respondents described ways in which they felt blocked out of access to a British 
identity, or ways in which it was associated with particular expectations in terms of language, 
accent and etiquette. British identity may, as Parekh noted, still have “systematic, largely 
unspoken racial connotations” (2000, 38). The experiences of ‘post-colonial’ respondents, 
many of whom arrived in Britain with a strong sense of British identity only to find their 
identity was not accepted because of their skin colour, is particularly striking. As Hickman et al. 
(2012, 50) suggest: “One of the problems for those determined on the functionality of 
Britishness as a social glue is Englishness, the latter is highly significant in prescribing the 
possibilities and impossibilities of Britishness”. Another key issue with regard to promoting 
Britishness as a tool to increase social cohesion is the fact that there is evidence to suggest 
that the adoption of a British identity amongst white English people is less commonplace than 
one might expect from the community cohesion discourse, and may be less commonplace 
than for many non-white groups, such as Hickman et al.’s assessment that: 
“It is also important to bear in mind that the group of people for whom Britishness 
may have least resonance now, because of the unraveling of the two nation building 
projects, is the White British majority ethnic group in England, many of whom would 
far rather the category ‘English’ featured on the Census ethnic origin question as 
opposed to British (their wish was granted in 2011).” 
(Hickman et al. 2012, 51-52) 
Similarly, a study by Ethnos (2005, 7) found that “the participants who identified most strongly 
with Britishness were those from ethnic minority backgrounds resident in England”, rather 
than white people. With regard to government reports and policy, particularly at issue here is 
the emphasis in early reports on community cohesion on certain problematised communities, 
with minority ethnic communities’ failure to integrate and adopt a British identity being the 
implied root of the issue. From this perspective, the change of emphasis in the CIC report (CIC 
2007) on cohesion being something all communities should strive for is a welcome 
modification. If one is to use a civic notion of British identity as a tool to increase social 
cohesion, therefore, it may be at least as important to promote it amongst white ‘English’ 
people than amongst members of ethnic minority groups. 
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Of course, that British identity is not currently a purely civic identity does not mean that it does 
not have the potential to be a purely civic, inclusive identity. A critic of this study might point 
out that the failure to find meaningfully large associations between British identity and the 
institutional type of cohesion may be because British identity does not yet have the character 
required of it. Some suggestions have indeed been focused on a need to reconstruct British 
identity. If it was possible to characterise people’s understandings of British identity over time 
(its exclusionary or inclusionary nature, how close to a civic identity it might be, and so on), 
and combine this with a longitudinal study of how British identity and social cohesion were 
associated, then one might get some idea of the relationship if British identity were to become 
truly civic. This, perhaps, would be an important topic of future research. 
The second caveat regarding the relationship between British identity and associational 
cohesion concerns the British identities of members of minority ethnic groups, since there may 
be crucial differences between those born in Britain and those that were not. From the 
quantitative component of this study, there is very little evidence to suggest that, for those 
identifying with an ethnic minority group and born in Britain, British identity has any impact on 
social cohesion of either type – nearly all of the associations that were found were amongst 
those not born in Britain. This distinction was not clear made in, for instance, the Cantle Report 
(2001); the references were instead to supposedly clearly-defined communities that 
(presumably) grouped together first, second and third generation immigrants. If one combines 
this evidence with the evidence from the qualitative component, and elsewhere (e.g. Modood 
et al. 1994), that suggests British-born people of ethnic minority origin may encounter barriers 
of access to English and British identities, it may invoke feelings of exclusion or frustration if 
the policy to increase cohesion emphasises their need to identify more strongly as British. 
Amongst those not born in Britain, a distinction may also need to be made between those 
emigrating from former British colonies and those that emigrated from elsewhere, since many 
‘post-colonial’ first-generation immigrants to Britain already felt British upon arrival, and may 
have, and have had, different experiences and understandings of British identity. Further 
research into whether the associations found between British identity and associational 
cohesion for those not born in the UK are because of differences in ‘post-colonial’ experiences 
would be beneficial to understand fully the importance, or otherwise, of this distinction. 
The third caveat refers to the finding in the quantitative component that issues of structural 
equality – most notably education and deprivation – may be much more important than 
national identity for associational cohesion. This raises the possibility that reducing structural 
inequalities – and also in paying attention to the distribution of structural inequalities across 
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different ethnic groups – may be a much more beneficial policy focus for associational 
cohesion than a focus on British identity. For this reason, the slight shift in the Home Office’s 
(2005a) Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society report towards emphasising inequalities 
between ethnic groups, in addition to British identity, is to be welcomed but perhaps does not 
go far enough. From the evidence presented here, the primary focus may need to be on 
inequalities, and British identity should come second. What is certainly clear is that more 
research into the relationships between inequalities and cohesion, their interactions with 
ethnic difference, and the mechanisms underlying such relationships, is needed. There is, for 
instance, evidence to suggest that the effects of educational qualifications on social mobility 
vary markedly by ethnic group. Platt (2007b, 487) argues that “minority group members are 
well aware of the importance of education as a necessary (if not sufficient) route to success” 
but that some ethnic groups were able to use education to achieve more positive social 
mobility outcomes than others. It is certainly plausible that similar differences could exist with 
regard to social cohesion. The understanding of ethnic differences in the effects of education 
on a variety of social outcomes, and the mechanisms underlying them, is therefore an 
important topic for future research. 
There are specific policy implications in particular arising from the fact that area-level 
deprivation was found to be strongly associated with associational cohesion in the quantitative 
component. Obviously the findings were associations, so it is unclear whether there are causal 
relationships between deprivation and cohesion – or, for that matter, between education and 
cohesion. Nevertheless these relationships, and whether or not social cohesion policy should 
be targeted at addressing inequalities in deprivation and education, are important topics for 
future research and the potential policy implications are important to discuss.  
Policies that target particular areas have a long history in the UK, and were enthusiastically 
adopted by the Labour government since 1997 (Platt 2002). The initial focus of the community 
cohesion reports on the ‘problem communities’ in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham could be 
seen as one example, albeit one that overemphasised ‘how people get on together’ rather 
than structural deprivation. However, the areas measured by the deprivation variable in the 
quantitative component are Lower Layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs), which contain an 
average of around 1,500 people, so it is not clear whether they correspond to the type of 
communities that the Cantle Report refers to.20 The Labour government, nevertheless, also 
implemented the New Deal for Communities, and the National Strategy for Neighbourhood 
Renewal which, given the apparent importance of area-level deprivation for associational 
                                                          
20
 See Chapter 4, section 4.31 for a discussion. 
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cohesion may seem like an appropriate strategy for increasing cohesion. Given that ethnic 
minorities are over-represented in deprived areas this strategy might appear, on the face of it, 
to also have the effect of improving equality between ethnic groups. 
There are some problems with a policy approach that targets specific deprived areas, however. 
With reference to the evidence from the quantitative component of this study, there is a 
possibility that the variable measuring deprivation is actually ‘picking up’ on other issues of 
structural inequality. This is particularly the case given that a measure of income was not 
included as a control variable in the final regression models – for reasons discussed in Chapter 
4 – although an individual’s socio-economic group, including being out of work, was included. 
It may, therefore, be the case that structural inequalities other than area-level deprivation, 
including ones that focus on the individual, are also important for social cohesion. In addition, 
Platt (2002) highlights a number of difficulties for the strategy of targeting deprived areas. 
First, resources targeted at specific areas may not go to the most deprived people in those 
areas and, in particular, “there is evidence that minority ethnic groups have gained less from 
targeted neighbourhood funds than their presence warrants” (Platt 2002, 157). It is possible, 
therefore, that the adoption or continuation of policies aimed at deprived areas may not have 
the effect of increasing cohesion because the resources are going to the ‘wrong’ people. 
Second, “the perception of targeted resources and their (‘undeserving’) recipients in a context 
of scarce resources can create tension and heighten incipient resentments and divisions” 
(ibid.), which may be problematic for cohesion. It may be advisable, therefore, to focus policy 
not only on deprived areas, but also to implement some less targeted and more universal 
policies to reduce structural inequalities. What is certainly the case is that more research is 
needed into the relationships between both individual poverty and area-level deprivation, and 
social cohesion, and this may be particularly important at a time when cuts to public services 
may widen some inequalities in the coming years, and their impacts on different ethnic groups 
may vary markedly. 
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Appendix: PART A – CHOICE OF DATASET 
 
Choice of Dataset for Quantitative Component 
Two key criteria in choosing an appropriate dataset for the quantitative component of this 
research were: the presence of appropriate questions on identity; and the presence of a 
sample suitable for investigating ethnic differences. With respect to the first criterion, of 
particular importance was the presence of questions on ethnic and religious identity, since 
such questions are uncommon in most UK surveys, along with extensive questions on national 
identity. With respect to the second criterion, the key elements that were sought after were 
either a relatively large sample size, or the presence of an ethnic minority boost sample and 
appropriate weightings. A larger sample, or an ethnic minority boost, would increase the 
number of respondents falling into each ethnic category, thus increasing the chances of finding 
statistically significant differences between ethnic groups. It what follows, some of the main 
datasets containing desirable elements for the purposes of this research are described, in 
order to explain and justify the choice of the Citizenship Survey as the most appropriate. 
Weaknesses of the Citizenship Survey are also noted. 
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a longitudinal survey, which would potentially be 
advantageous for investigating the temporal ordering of relationships between identity and 
cohesion. Unfortunately, however, the survey contains limited questions on identity (BHPS 
2008). Additionally, the sample is too small to be appropriate for investigating ethnic 
differences, since the initial sample in wave one consisted of only 8167 households, and there 
is no ethnic minority boost sample (Taylor, Brice et al. 2009). 
The Labour Force Survey (LFS), by contrast, has a larger sample of approximately 60000 
households (ONS 2007), which would make it more appropriate than surveys with smaller 
sample sizes for investigating ethnic differences. The advantages of this larger sample for the 
purposes of investigating ethnic differences are demonstrated in a recent report using the LFS, 
researching ethnic differences in women’s demographics and economic activity (Lindley, Dale 
et al. 2004). However, it shares a weakness with the BHPS in that it contains only limited 
questions on identity (LFS 2007), and for these reasons is unsuited to this research on the 
relationships between identity and cohesion. 
The British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey contains a relatively good set of questions on identity, 
including questions on national identity, religious identity, attitudes towards immigration and 
threats to national identity, and also regarding which aspects of a respondent’s identity are 
318 
 
most important to them (UKDA 2008). However, the BSA survey unfortunately has a relatively 
small sample of 4468 cases and has no ethnic minority boost sample (BSA 2008), making it, like 
the BHPS, unsuitable for investigating ethnic differences. 
The Citizenship Survey, by contrast, includes an ethnic minority boost of approximately 5000 in 
addition to its core sample of approximately 9600 (UKDA 2010). This potentially makes it 
possible to reveal statistically significant differences between ethnic groups in the 
relationships between identity and social cohesion that would not be revealed without the 
boost sample. The Citizenship Survey is also relatively rich in questions on identity, and 
provides both attitudinal and behavioural measures of ‘social cohesion’ on several dimensions. 
It was felt that, on balance, the Citizenship Survey was the most appropriate survey to use for 
this research. This is in particular due to the fact that no other datasets contain the 
combination of an appropriate sample for investigating ethnic differences, together with 
relevant questions on identity.  
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Appendix: PART B – INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
Introduction 
Thank you for being willing to take part in this interview. The interview should take around an 
hour, and if you feel uncomfortable with the questions at any time please feel free to say so 
and we can either stop, or move onto a different question. If you would like to stop at any time 
and for any reason please be assured you can do so without any problems. 
The interview is part of my research for a PhD at the London School of Economics. I am looking 
into the relationships between national identity (such as whether people feel they belong to a 
particular country), and social cohesion (which includes the ways in which people trust each 
other, form friendships, what they think about their rights and responsibilities, the respect 
they have for each other and for the law, and whether they share values with the people 
around them). I think that, in this country, we don’t know enough about these things, and I 
hope that, in some small way, this research will help provide information and ideas to people 
in power so that they can make better decisions. 
Can I also assure you that this interview is strictly confidential and you will remain completely 
anonymous. Your name will not be on any record of this interview and will not appear in 
anything that I write. Finally, can I please ask for your permission to record this interview, and 
for you to confirm whether you are happy to start? I'm the only person who will listen to this 
and, once I've typed it up, I shall delete the recording. 
 
INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS 
Perhaps we could start by you telling me a little bit about yourself? 
  [If needed, probe with the following questions, or if not, fill in the blanks.] 
How old are you? 
[Show showcard 1 with bands] 
Are you currently in employment? 
[Show showcard 2. Probe: Who else, if anyone, in your household is in employment?] 
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Do you have any educational qualifications? 
[Also: code gender] 
Do you think you can identify your household’s estimated income from this list of income 
bands? (But don't feel you have to if you don't know or don't wish to say.) 
  [show showcard 3] 
How many people are there in your household? 
  [probe: is there anyone under 18; are there any dependants?] 
 
IDENTITY: Ethnic Identity 
I would now like to ask you a few questions about your identity. By identity, I mean ‘who do 
you think you are?’ 
To what extent, if at all, would you say you identify with any of the following ethnic groups? 
  [show showcard 4] 
If you feel that none of these apply how, if at all, would you define your ethnicity? 
Which country or countries were your parents from? 
Is your identification with your ethnic group especially important to you? Is this central to your 
life or something that matters to you "in the background"? 
 
IDENTITY: Religious Identity 
Would you say you are religious, or not? 
[Probe: What is your religion? Do you count yourself as an observant … (Christian, Muslim, 
etc.)…?] 
Is this especially important to you? Is it central to your life or something that matters to you 
"in the background"? 
[Probe: Do you feel it is more or less important than your ethnic identity, or are they of similar 
importance to you? Are the two things, so far as you're concerned, in a sense connected?] 
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IDENTITY: National Identity 
I would now like to ask you questions such as whether, or not, you think of yourself as 
belonging a particular country or nation. 
If you feel you identify with a particular country or nation, what do you feel your national 
identity to be? 
 [Probe:   Do you feel this identity is split between [country of origin] and 
[Britain/England]? 
 Do you mainly feel English or British? 
[if identifies with [country of origin]: 
In what ways would you say you are still connected to [country of origin]?] 
Is your national identity especially important to you? Is it central to your life or something that 
matters to you "in the background"? 
 [Probe: How does this compare with other aspects of your identity? 
Are you able to describe why you feel you have that national identity? 
[Probe: What do you feel it is that you have in common with other people that also have that 
national identity?] 
Do you mind me confirming - what is your formal/legal nationality (e.g. what does it say on 
your passport(s))? 
Do you think it is important that people feel able to both maintain their ethnic identity and 
identify with a national group or country, or do you feel this is something that is not 
important? 
 
*************** 
Have you ever felt discriminated against because of any aspects of your identity, or is this not 
something that you've ever experienced? 
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Can I ask whether you are able to rank each aspect of your various identities in terms of how 
important you feel each is to you? Which is the most important and which is the least 
important and in which order would you place the ones in between? 
[show piece of paper on which I have written each aspect of identity a person has mentioned] 
Is this how you've always felt or do you think you might have answered that question 
differently earlier in the course of your life? 
Do you think your parents/Children would answer that question the same as you or differently? 
Do you think your friends that are the same age as you would have answered that question the 
same or differently? 
 
LINKING IDENTITY & SOCIAL COHESION 
The following card shows some of the themes that are sometimes talked about when people 
discuss social cohesion. I would like to talk about each theme in turn. 
SHOW-CARD 5 
Feeling able to use public services (such as health services or education services, for example) 
Feeling of belonging to your local area or neighbourhood 
Feeling satisfied with the place that you live (such as getting on well with other people, 
trusting other people, sharing values with other people, feeling safe) 
Having opportunities for volunteering and civic engagement (by which I mean things such as 
attending local meetings, contacting a local councillor, contacting an MP, and so on) 
Socialising with other people and forming friendships 
Being treated with respect when in public 
Feeling that you are able to influence the decisions of public institutions (such as your local 
council, parliament, or the police) 
Feeling willing to contribute towards the support of people in need (such as through taxes) 
[show card, then take each theme in turn, starting with the relevant introductory question 
and then moving on to the main questions] 
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LINKING IDENTITY & COHESION: INTRODUCTORY QUESTIONS 
Public services 
Do you feel that you are able to use public services as you would like, or not? 
[probe:  - this could mean education services, health services, or public transport, for example - 
and services that your family/children use as well as services you use (or have used) yourself  
do you think you are treated equally compared to other people? 
which people in particular are you thinking of? ] 
< GO TO MAIN QUESTIONS > 
 
Belonging 
To what extent, if at all, do you feel you belong to your neighbourhood and local area? 
[probe: - how strongly do you feel you belong? 
is there a difference between how you feel about your neighbourhood and how you feel about 
your local area? ] 
< GO TO MAIN QUESTIONS > 
 
Satisfaction with the place you live 
To what extent, if at all, would you say you are satisfied with the place in which you live? 
[probe:  - would you say the place you live is somewhere where people share values, or 
not? 
how well would you say people get on together? 
do you feel safe where you live, or not? 
Do you trust other people, or not? ] 
< GO TO MAIN QUESTIONS > 
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Volunteering & civic engagement 
To what extent, if at all, have you been involved recently (over the past year) in any 
volunteering? 
To what extent, if at all, have you been involved recently (over the past year) in any civic 
engagement activities (such as contacting your local councillor or MP, attending a local 
meeting, or something similar)? 
< GO TO MAIN QUESTIONS > 
 
Social interaction & friendships 
Would you say you have people you would call your friends, or not? 
[probe:  - how often, if at all, do you have contact with them? ] 
To what extent, if at all, would you say you socialise with people of other backgrounds to you? 
[probe:  - these different backgrounds could be people of a different ethnicity, religion, 
income level, or social class for example ] 
< GO TO MAIN QUESTIONS > 
 
Being treated with respect 
To what extent, if at all, would you say you are treated with respect when in public? 
[probe:  - in what situations would you say you are or are not treated with respect?] 
< GO TO MAIN QUESTIONS > 
 
Influencing decisions  
To what extent, if at all, would you say you are able to influence the decisions of public 
institutions? 
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[probe:  - this could mean influencing your local council, MP, or parliament, for 
example ] 
< GO TO MAIN QUESTIONS > 
 
Willingness to contribute 
To what extent, if at all, would you say you are willing to contribute towards the support of 
people in need (e.g. through taxes)? 
< GO TO MAIN QUESTIONS > 
 
LINKING IDENTITY & COHESION: MAIN QUESTIONS 
 
Do you feel that the way in which you do or do not identify with Britain affects [this theme], or 
do you think it makes little or no difference? 
[probe:  - (IF APPLICABLE) is there any way in which your other national identities affect 
this, or do you think they make little or no difference? 
is there any way in which you ethnic identity affects this, or do you think it makes little or no 
difference? 
Is there any way your religious identity affects this, or do you think it makes little or no 
difference? ] 
Thinking now about people other than yourself, do you think the way in which they do or do 
not identify with Britain affects [this theme], or do you think it makes little or no difference? 
 
[probe:  - if, for instance, you think about someone of an older or younger generation, 
would you answer this question differently, or not? 
if you think about someone of a different ethnic group, would you answer this question 
differently, or not? 
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if you think about someone of a different religion, would you answer this question differently, 
or not? ] 
I’ve heard it said that [this theme] might be affected by many different things, such as 
inequality, poverty, people’s education, ethnic diversity, job opportunities, discrimination, and 
so on. Do you think that anything else might affect [this theme], or do you think other things 
make little or no difference? 
[probe:  - do you think [factor being mentioned] is of more, less, or the same 
importance for [this theme] than a person’s British identity? 
and how about for you personally? ] 
 
Is there anything else that occurs to you that you'd like to tell me? 
 
Thank you very much indeed for taking the time and trouble to talk to me …..  
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Show-card 1: AGE 
 
 
18 - 24 
 
25 – 34 
 
35 – 49 
 
50 – 64 
 
65 – 74 
 
75 +
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Show-card 2: EMPLOYMENT21 
 
1 Self employed 
2 In paid employment (full or part-time) 
3 Unemployed 
4 Retired from paid work altogether 
5 On maternity leave 
6 Looking after family or home 
7 Full-time student / at school 
8 Long term sick or disabled 
9 On a government training scheme 
10 Something else (please give details) 
 
                                                          
21
 These categories are taken from the Citizenship Survey questionnaire (UKDA 2007). 
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Show-card 3: INCOME 
 
No income 
Under £2,500 
£2,500 - £4,999 
£5,000 - £9,999 
£10,000 - £14,999 
£15,000 - £19,999 
£20,000 - £24,999 
£25,000 - £29,999 
£30,000 - £34,999 
£35,000 - £39,999 
£40,000 - £44,999 
£45,000 - £49,000 
£50,000 - £74,999 
£75,000 - £99,999 
£100,000 or higher 
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Show-card 4: ETHNIC GROUP22 
 
White 
1 British 
2 Any other white background (please give details) 
 
Mixed 
3 White and Black Caribbean 
4 White and Black African 
5 White and Asian 
6 Any other mixed background (please give details) 
 
Asian or Asian British 
7 Indian 
8 Pakistani 
9 Bangladeshi 
10 Any other Asian background (please give details) 
 
Black or Black British 
11 Caribbean 
12 African 
13 Any other Black background (please give details) 
 
Chinese or other ethnic group 
14 Chinese 
15 Any other ethnic group (please give details) 
 
  
                                                          
22
 These categories are taken from the Citizenship Survey questionnaire (UKDA 2007). 
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Appendix: PART C – MULTICOLLINEARITY 
 
The table below shows correlations between each of the explanatory variables used in the 
regression models, in order to check for multicollinearity. That the explanatory variables are 
correlated is normal; indeed, if this were not the case then there would be no need to include 
them as control variables. However, when correlations between them are too high, this can 
create problems since including two highly correlated explanatory variables in the model can 
result in both being shown as statistically insignificant when including only one may show 
statistical significance. Generally, good practice is to ensure there are no correlations over 
around 0.7. As can be seen from the table below, there largest correlation is 0.515 – between 
a respondent’s ethnic group and whether are not born in the UK. It makes intuitive sense that 
these variables would be correlated, and the fact that there are no higher correlations 
suggests that multicollinearity should not be a substantial problem.  
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Appendix: PART D – SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
Alternative jackknife calculations for variance estimation for Tables 14, 15 and 16. 
Table D1: The impact of British identity on social cohesion (jackknife variance estimation in 
parentheses) 
 Satisfaction with 
place of residence 
Civic engagement and 
volunteering 
Socialising with 
people of 
different 
backgrounds 
Effect of British identity 
P value 
0.043 
0.000 (0.000) 
0.038 
0.001 (0.001) 
0.014 
0.115 (0.116) 
R squared 0.193 0.158 0.189 
Table D2: The effect of area deprivation, deciles (jackknife variance estimation in 
parentheses) 
(reference = least deprived; 10 = most deprived) 
 Satisfaction with one's place 
of residence 
Civic engagement and 
volunteering 
Socialising with people of 
different backgrounds 
 Coefficient P value Coefficient P value Coefficient P value 
2 -0.060 0.005 (0.006) 0.044 0.076 (0.78) -0.012 0.582 
(0.585) 
3 -0.065  0.002 (0.003) 0.019 0.425 (0.428) -0.036 0.090 
(0.092) 
4 -0.111  0.000 (0.000) 0.005 0.841 (0.842) -0.028 0.193 
(0.196) 
5 -0.156  0.000 (0.000) 0.017 0.497 (0.500) -0.018 0.415 
(0.418) 
6 -0.178  0.000 (0.000) 0.004 0.861 (0.862) -0.045 0.039 
(0.040) 
7 -0.278  0.000 (0.000) -0.009 0.716 (0.718) -0.048 0.024 
(0.025) 
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8 -0.376  0.000 (0.000) -0.020 0.421 (0.424) -0.095 0.000 
(0.000) 
9 -0.455  0.000 (0.000) -0.035 0.164 (0.166) -0.099 0.000 
(0.000) 
10 -0.558  0.000 (0.000) -0.063 0.012 (0.013) -0.155 0.000 
(0.000) 
 
Table D3: The effect of level of qualifications on social cohesion (jackknife variance 
estimation in parentheses) 
(reference = higher education) 
 Satisfaction with one's 
place of residence 
Civic engagement and 
volunteering 
Socialising with people 
of different 
backgrounds 
 Coeff. P value Coeff. P value Coeff. P value 
A level or 
equivalent 
-0.061 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.068 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.025 
 
0.085 
(0.086) 
GCSE or 
equivalent 
-0.089 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.208 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.036 
 
0.004 
(0.004) 
Foreign or 
other 
qualifications 
-0.177 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.233 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.054 
 
0.051 
(0.053) 
No 
qualifications 
-0.142 0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.403 
 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.105 
 
0.000 
(0.00) 
 
335 
 
Satisfaction with place of residence (jackknife variance estimation): 
Note: strata with single sampling unit treated as certainty units.
                                                                              
       _cons     1.733848    .043709    39.67   0.000     1.648115    1.819582
    year0809     .0067444   .0118738     0.57   0.570    -.0165457    .0300345
              
         10     -.2466178    .033113    -7.45   0.000     -.311568   -.1816677
          9     -.2095326   .0284676    -7.36   0.000    -.2653708   -.1536944
          8     -.1827446   .0300324    -6.08   0.000    -.2416523    -.123837
          7     -.1187964   .0277029    -4.29   0.000    -.1731347    -.064458
          6     -.1523723   .0257306    -5.92   0.000     -.202842   -.1019027
          5     -.0858216   .0241054    -3.56   0.000    -.1331036   -.0385397
          4     -.0722186    .025333    -2.85   0.004    -.1219084   -.0225288
          3     -.0351356    .025548    -1.38   0.169     -.085247    .0149759
          2     -.0158808   .0248234    -0.64   0.522     -.064571    .0328095
     pethdec  
              
     relprac     .0177576   .0127023     1.40   0.162    -.0071575    .0426727
              
          5       .228934   .0278668     8.22   0.000     .1742742    .2835938
          4      .2007963   .0251335     7.99   0.000     .1514977    .2500949
          3      .1879844   .0263934     7.12   0.000     .1362147    .2397541
          2      .1290303    .025554     5.05   0.000     .0789071    .1791535
     slive5c  
              
     1.rcobc     .0093676   .0213946     0.44   0.662    -.0325973    .0513325
              
         10      -.557699   .0267607   -20.84   0.000    -.6101892   -.5052087
          9     -.4550116    .025741   -17.68   0.000    -.5055017   -.4045215
          8     -.3763926   .0262034   -14.36   0.000    -.4277897   -.3249955
          7      -.278473   .0251359   -11.08   0.000    -.3277762   -.2291698
          6      -.177715   .0244396    -7.27   0.000    -.2256526   -.1297775
          5     -.1564399   .0230796    -6.78   0.000    -.2017097     -.11117
          4     -.1111356   .0221321    -5.02   0.000     -.154547   -.0677242
          3     -.0651747   .0216385    -3.01   0.003     -.107618   -.0227315
          2     -.0599583   .0215972    -2.78   0.006    -.1023205   -.0175961
      dimdc2  
              
          5     -.1418024   .0183055    -7.75   0.000    -.1777081   -.1058968
          4     -.1771497    .040381    -4.39   0.000    -.2563556   -.0979438
          3     -.0887201   .0152619    -5.81   0.000    -.1186557   -.0587844
          2     -.0610705   .0173162    -3.53   0.000    -.0950356   -.0271053
    zquals6c  
              
      2.rsex    -.1273231    .010866   -11.72   0.000    -.1486363   -.1060098
       dvage     .0016963   .0004603     3.68   0.000     .0007934    .0025992
              
          7      .0387819   .0599397     0.65   0.518    -.0787877    .1563516
          6      .0070441   .0324252     0.22   0.828    -.0565567     .070645
          5     -.0611777   .0318171    -1.92   0.055    -.1235859    .0012305
          4     -.0796393   .0213198    -3.74   0.000    -.1214573   -.0378212
          3     -.0558358   .0167306    -3.34   0.001    -.0886523   -.0230192
          2     -.0278283   .0160995    -1.73   0.084    -.0594069    .0037504
    rnssec7c  
              
          5     -.1172182   .0319364    -3.67   0.000    -.1798603   -.0545761
          4     -.1803266   .0306826    -5.88   0.000    -.2405095   -.1201436
          3     -.0633263    .027786    -2.28   0.023    -.1178275    -.008825
          2       .026636   .0273475     0.97   0.330    -.0270052    .0802773
     ethnic5  
              
    impbridc     .0427955   .0104513     4.09   0.000     .0222956    .0632954
                                                                              
      compm4        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Jackknife
                                                                              
                                                R-squared          =    0.1929
                                                Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(  42,   1539)    =     77.45
                                                Design df          =      1580
                                                Replications       =      2203
Number of PSUs     =      2203                  Population size    = 20631.563
Number of strata   =       623                  Number of obs      =     20400
Survey: Linear regression
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Civic engagement and volunteering (jackknife variance estimation): 
 
Note: strata with single sampling unit treated as certainty units.
                                                                              
       _cons     .8385469   .0407369    20.58   0.000     .7586429     .918451
    year0809    -.0198516   .0116765    -1.70   0.089    -.0427546    .0030513
              
         10     -.0975211   .0296237    -3.29   0.001     -.155627   -.0394152
          9     -.0381908   .0289946    -1.32   0.188    -.0950627    .0186811
          8     -.0341701   .0288319    -1.19   0.236    -.0907229    .0223826
          7     -.0106692   .0280625    -0.38   0.704    -.0657128    .0443743
          6     -.0245723   .0270904    -0.91   0.365    -.0777092    .0285646
          5      .0006593   .0273441     0.02   0.981    -.0529752    .0542938
          4     -.0044332   .0279826    -0.16   0.874    -.0593201    .0504537
          3     -.0129651   .0284549    -0.46   0.649    -.0687784    .0428481
          2      .0161396   .0268925     0.60   0.548     -.036609    .0688883
     pethdec  
              
     relprac     .1582179   .0122513    12.91   0.000     .1341875    .1822484
              
          5      .1276476   .0256796     4.97   0.000     .0772779    .1780173
          4      .1339616   .0224882     5.96   0.000     .0898517    .1780714
          3      .1490304   .0237884     6.26   0.000     .1023702    .1956906
          2      .0690362   .0229148     3.01   0.003     .0240896    .1139828
     slive5c  
              
     1.rcobc     .1520771   .0189534     8.02   0.000     .1149005    .1892536
              
         10     -.0630552   .0253289    -2.49   0.013     -.112737   -.0133734
          9     -.0352035   .0254301    -1.38   0.166    -.0850839    .0146768
          8     -.0204296   .0255503    -0.80   0.424    -.0705456    .0296865
          7     -.0093571    .025878    -0.36   0.718    -.0601159    .0414017
          6       .004334   .0248598     0.17   0.862    -.0444277    .0530957
          5       .017488   .0258968     0.68   0.500    -.0333078    .0682837
          4      .0049913   .0250921     0.20   0.842     -.044226    .0542087
          3      .0191351   .0241489     0.79   0.428    -.0282321    .0665023
          2      .0439811   .0249186     1.76   0.078    -.0048958    .0928581
      dimdc2  
              
          5       -.40331   .0180632   -22.33   0.000    -.4387404   -.3678796
          4     -.2327743   .0328837    -7.08   0.000    -.2972747    -.168274
          3     -.2078252   .0150729   -13.79   0.000    -.2373901   -.1782602
          2       -.06756   .0174495    -3.87   0.000    -.1017867   -.0333333
    zquals6c  
              
      2.rsex     .0564832   .0111196     5.08   0.000     .0346726    .0782939
       dvage     .0011273   .0004353     2.59   0.010     .0002734    .0019812
              
          7     -.0609011   .0603468    -1.01   0.313    -.1792693    .0574672
          6     -.0319344   .0327927    -0.97   0.330    -.0962562    .0323874
          5     -.1961537   .0307115    -6.39   0.000    -.2563932   -.1359142
          4     -.1766382   .0205456    -8.60   0.000    -.2169377   -.1363388
          3     -.1198879   .0154631    -7.75   0.000    -.1502183   -.0895575
          2     -.0616269   .0157476    -3.91   0.000    -.0925154   -.0307385
    rnssec7c  
              
          5     -.1182188   .0283882    -4.16   0.000    -.1739013   -.0625362
          4       .052197   .0258835     2.02   0.044     .0014273    .1029667
          3     -.0500625   .0219816    -2.28   0.023    -.0931787   -.0069463
          2     -.1565865   .0222101    -7.05   0.000    -.2001509    -.113022
     ethnic5  
              
    impbridc     .0377186   .0110668     3.41   0.001     .0160115    .0594258
                                                                              
      compm8        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Jackknife
                                                                              
                                                R-squared          =    0.1577
                                                Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(  42,   1539)    =     64.00
                                                Design df          =      1580
                                                Replications       =      2203
Number of PSUs     =      2203                  Population size    = 20631.563
Number of strata   =       623                  Number of obs      =     20400
Survey: Linear regression
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Socialising with people of other backgrounds (jackknife variance estimation): 
 
 
Note: strata with single sampling unit treated as certainty units.
                                                                              
       _cons     1.248611   .0373194    33.46   0.000      1.17541    1.321812
    year0809     .0030489   .0108323     0.28   0.778    -.0181983     .024296
              
         10      .4829605   .0258772    18.66   0.000     .4322032    .5337178
          9      .4602081   .0263278    17.48   0.000     .4085669    .5118492
          8      .3977484   .0258908    15.36   0.000     .3469644    .4485324
          7      .3546424   .0270071    13.13   0.000     .3016689    .4076159
          6      .2572286   .0263657     9.76   0.000     .2055131    .3089441
          5      .2445425   .0270642     9.04   0.000     .1914569    .2976281
          4      .1668024   .0267627     6.23   0.000     .1143082    .2192966
          3      .1428814   .0272355     5.25   0.000       .08946    .1963029
          2      .1182571   .0278795     4.24   0.000     .0635725    .1729417
     pethdec  
              
     relprac     .0237942   .0109154     2.18   0.029      .002384    .0452045
              
          5      .0247711   .0204721     1.21   0.226    -.0153843    .0649265
          4      .0312569   .0172333     1.81   0.070    -.0025456    .0650593
          3     -.0015559   .0178793    -0.09   0.931    -.0366254    .0335137
          2      .0032005   .0173666     0.18   0.854    -.0308635    .0372646
     slive5c  
              
     1.rcobc    -.1131286    .015412    -7.34   0.000    -.1433588   -.0828985
              
         10     -.1546108   .0233744    -6.61   0.000    -.2004589   -.1087627
          9     -.0986412   .0220087    -4.48   0.000    -.1418106   -.0554718
          8     -.0946208   .0220161    -4.30   0.000    -.1378047    -.051437
          7     -.0482032   .0215113    -2.24   0.025    -.0903968   -.0060095
          6     -.0447226   .0217953    -2.05   0.040    -.0874733   -.0019719
          5     -.0177927   .0219807    -0.81   0.418    -.0609072    .0253218
          4     -.0284255   .0219786    -1.29   0.196    -.0715358    .0146848
          3     -.0355597   .0211122    -1.68   0.092    -.0769705    .0058512
          2     -.0120853   .0220979    -0.55   0.585    -.0554295    .0312589
      dimdc2  
              
          5     -.1046399   .0154156    -6.79   0.000     -.134877   -.0744028
          4        -.0539   .0278329    -1.94   0.053    -.1084932    .0006933
          3     -.0363799   .0126882    -2.87   0.004    -.0612674   -.0114925
          2     -.0246778   .0143696    -1.72   0.086    -.0528632    .0035077
    zquals6c  
              
      2.rsex    -.0335296   .0090953    -3.69   0.000    -.0513698   -.0156894
       dvage     -.005949   .0003943   -15.09   0.000    -.0067223   -.0051756
              
          7     -.0123385   .0512478    -0.24   0.810    -.1128594    .0881825
          6      .0087754   .0256517     0.34   0.732    -.0415396    .0590904
          5      -.080492   .0243725    -3.30   0.001    -.1282979   -.0326861
          4     -.0174101   .0181147    -0.96   0.337    -.0529415    .0181213
          3     -.0275531   .0128816    -2.14   0.033    -.0528199   -.0022863
          2     -.0297133   .0127953    -2.32   0.020    -.0548108   -.0046158
    rnssec7c  
              
          5      .1756708   .0221222     7.94   0.000     .1322788    .2190628
          4      .2570257   .0238323    10.78   0.000     .2102795    .3037719
          3       .162912   .0171205     9.52   0.000     .1293308    .1964933
          2      .1112538   .0172211     6.46   0.000     .0774752    .1450325
     ethnic5  
              
    impbridc     .0140738   .0089464     1.57   0.116    -.0034743    .0316218
                                                                              
      compm7        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                            Jackknife
                                                                              
                                                R-squared          =    0.1885
                                                Prob > F           =    0.0000
                                                F(  42,   1539)    =     94.57
                                                Design df          =      1580
                                                Replications       =      2203
Number of PSUs     =      2203                  Population size    = 20631.563
Number of strata   =       623                  Number of obs      =     20400
Survey: Linear regression
